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GENERAL TYPES OF SUPERIOR MEN

A PHILOSOPHICO-PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF GENIUS, TALENT AND PHILISTINISM IN THEIR BEARINGS UPON HUMAN SOCIETY AND ITS STRUGGLE FOR A BETTER SOCIAL ORDER

BY

OSIAS L. SCHWARZ

With a Preface by

JACK LONDON

and an Introductory Letter by

MAX NORDAU

Savoir, c'est prévoir; prévoir, c'est pouvoir; pouvoir c'est devoir.—A. COMTE, M. GUYAU

Zur Wahrheit durch Entsagung.—O. L. S.

Οὐδὲν ὡρίζω.—ZENO

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TO MY WIFE:

I

Ich bin ein armer Denker,
Hab' weder Ruhm noch Geld;
Doch hole mich der Henker,
Ob so was mir vergällt
Das Leben hier auf Erden,
Wo manche Nullität
Sich stolz oft kann geberden
Als gross' Autorität.

II

Das Einz'ge was ich bieten
Dir, meine Liebste, kann,
Sind reine Liebesblühten
Von einem treuen Mann.
Ich kann auch auf den Schwingen
Der kühnen Phantasie
Dich in die Sphäre bringen
Erhab'ner Philosophie,
Von wo aus wenn Du schauen
Wirst nach der kleinen Erd',
So wirst Du nicht mehr bauen
Auf eitler Dinge Wert.
Wie kleinlich und vergänglich
Erscheint auf dieser Höh',
Wie leer und unzulänglich
Alltäglich Freud' und Weh!
Nur Wahrheit und die Liebe
Sind ew'ge, heil'ge Güter:
Die fürchten keine Diebe
Und brauchen keine Hüter.

III

Drum liebe Deinen Denker
So ohne Ruhm und Geld.
Es hole mich der Henker,
Ob ich Dir's nicht vergelt'!

O. L. S.

Berlin, October 20, 1901.

I

Abseits von den Menchenwogen,
Welche strömen hin und her,
Unbewusst sich hingezogen
Fühlend nach erhab'ner Sphär',
Wandr'ich einsam, unbeachtet,
Auf bewusstem, eig'nem Pfad,
Wo mein Herz fortwährend schmachtet
Nach mehr Licht und guter Tat.

II

Und so wandernd ganz alleine
Auf dem schweren Lebenspfad,
Schöpf' ich, teure Liebste meine,
Frischen Mut und neuen Rat
Aus der heil'gen, reinen Liebe,
Welche unser Herz belebt
Und die harten Schichsalshiebe
Zu vermindern ist bestrebt.

O. L. S.

Berlin, October 27, 1901.

I

Si l'on veut écrire sur des matières où la connaissance ne peut provenir que de l'observation et la solidité que de la méditation, s'exerçant à ses heures sur des données complexes et de plus en plus nombreuses, il faut avant tout n'être pas pressé d'être lu. En effet, travailler en ces matières, c'est attendre. Attendre, c'est se laisser instruire par les choses, par les gens, par les livres, et plutôt encore en profitant de ce qu'on les recontre qu'en se donnant grand' peine pour les aller chercher; car les livres, choses, gens, sont tous un peu comme les complaisants: questionnez-les, ils se font de votre avis; n'ayez pas l'air de vous soucier de leur opinion, leur pensée se trahit et la vérité leur échappe.

R. Töpffer.
(Réflexions d'un peintre génevois, t. II, p. 46.)

II

Was eine lange weite Strecke
Im Leben von einander stand,
Das kommt nun unter einer Decke
Dem guten Leser in die Hand.

Goethe.

PREFACE

"General Types of Superior Men" is one of those immortal, epoch-making works which appear only at very long intervals, and which leave an indelible, constructive impression on the mind of the world and mark a century mile-stone on the arduous and painful path of the world's intellectual development. This is so because such a work as this springs from the bottommost deep of a prophetic soul which is moved by an insatiable and impervertible impulse for truth as well as by the purest love for the entire human family.

This present work gives us vastly more than can be inferred from the title. The psychology of the various and many types of superior men is merely the nucleus of his subject from which Mr. Schwarz ventures into all regions of human knowledge in order to build up his original philosophy of human life. His philosophy, as embodied in this work and in two as yet unpublished works on ethics, is not the nebulous, lifeless, grandiloquent but meaningless theorizing of our universities, but is the reasoning of an intensely original thinker—one who deals with the realism of life, who is not afraid to touch upon the fierce class struggle that seems to him to threaten to strangle human progress, and one who uses simple, easily intelligible language because he really has something freshly new and intelligible to say under the sun.

One of Mr. Schwarz's greatest merits is the fact that he voices a vigorous protest against the tendency of our capitalistic civilization towards over-specialization,

which is egotistic unconcern about remote ends, totality of happiness, and wholeness of life. His work is truly a revival of Socrates' fight against the shams and sophists who ever bend themselves to the dethronement of ethics and the instatement of the worship of mammon.

What Sigmund Freud tries to accomplish with his psycho-analysis in the field of mental pathology, Mr. Schwarz (himself not so faithful and precise a disciple of Max Nordau as he strives to make himself believe) tries to accomplish in the field of social pathology by breathing into the various fields of human activity the revivifying air of sincerity, self-scrutiny, straight thinking, and plain speaking. What many of our radical writers have striven to accomplish indirectly, implicitly, concretely in novels of social criticism, Mr. Schwarz handles boldly, directly, and explicitly, not alone in this work, but in the two works on ethics previously mentioned which it is to be hoped will soon see the light of day.

Jack London.

Glen Ellen, Sonoma Co., Calif.
August 19, 1915.

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8 rue Henner, Paris, June 4th, 1912.

My dear Mr. Schwarz,

At last I have achieved the perusal of your Mss. with the additional notes; much later than I had anticipated; but I could not do it sooner, as I hate mere skipping and want to read carefully.

I have never been more embarrassed to judge a work than in your case. If I were to discuss all your ideas—and the temptation to this course is very strong—I should have to write several volumes. This being out of the question, I must needs limit myself to mere generalities which are just as unsatisfactory to myself as to you. However, I have no choice.

Your book is teeming with ideas, but still more seething with feelings. It is a vehement preaching in the old testamentary prophetic style, abrupt, fitful, violent, abundant, just as the momentary wrath or sorrow inspires the preacher; it is Isaiah holding forth on the structure of modern society and on the barrenness and wickedness of the souls of contemporary civilized men.

Your study on genius, pseudo-superior man and philistine is in reality a pretext for invective against the average man who is in fact an average beast. Your indictment against that type is wonderful in its quaintness, raciness and overwhelming power. It compares favorably with the very best, most scathing satires on the miserable creature man that I know of in the world literature. But it is dogmatic, not scientific, it is subjective and cannot claim that calm objective argumentativeness that carries with it convic-

tion even to obtuse or oppositionally oriented minds. You charm by your wit, your imagery, your originality; you dazzle by your temperament, your vigor, your torrential and breezy dash and pluck; you stun with your thunder-bolts; but you scarcely ever stoop to prove, to discuss, to argue, to count with the possibility of a disagreeing opinion and to refute it.

In detail, there are some statements and presumptions which I deem dubious; your analysis of hereditary influences in the formation of genius is hazy. But this is of no importance. Only a pettyish carping critic would stop at it. We must span the whole, and this is, not dry, lifeless, pale abstractions, but impassioned, hot-blooded, flushing life.

Your picture of real society, especially, I suppose, in America, is ghastly and appalling. Many of its features apply to civilized society everywhere and hold good in every country. Your idealism which makes you fervently believe that socialistic society would show none of the vices you so marvelously brand in the capitalistic society, is beautiful and lofty. I doubt, however, that you are right. Socialistic society would be constituted by, and composed of, men, and as, on your own showing, the philistine is vastly predominating in our species, this stupid and evil fellow would carry his own shortcomings into socialistic society as well. The state of mankind is conditioned by the quality of men, not by institutions.

Your mastery of English is astounding. Altogether you are a powerful writer and sure to achieve success in the long run.

Yours very faithfully,

Dr. Max Nordau.

GENERAL TYPES OF SUPERIOR MEN

GENERAL TYPES OF SUPERIOR MEN

CHAPTER I

DEFINITION, GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF GENIUS AND TALENT

GENIUS AND TALENT

General Characteristics of Their Fields of Activity— The man of talent subsumes special cases, isolated phenomena, under a known general rule, under a known general law; the man of genius is rather concerned with ascending from a few special cases, from a few isolated phenomena, to a new general rule, to a new general law.

But new generalizations are not the only field for the activity of a genius. Sagacity is displayed not only in discovering something quite new. It is not less required in reducing something unknown to something known, something apparently known to something really unknown; in identifying things commonly considered unlike, as well as in separating or in discriminating things vulgarly regarded as identical; in finding relations between things and events which to the talented man seem entirely unrelated; in finding expression or means of realization for what in others are mere vague, groping, timid feelings and wishes.

From a maximum of observations the talented man draws a minimum of conclusions, whereas the genius draws a maximum of conclusions from a minimum of observations. Talent is mostly concerned with applying, interpreting, modifying, verifying, . . . the creations of the genius.

The startlingly novel creations of the genius are

largely due to the fact that he draws the material for his reasoning processes in particular and for his mental activities in general from all available sources, unhampered in his selection by either prejudices or fear of consequences. He draws not only upon the limited scientific stock in trade and upon those conscious personal experiences which enjoy scientific popularity and social approval, as the mere man of talent does, but he also draws upon the tabooed, unpopular, obscure facts and claims and upon the vast store of subconscious perceptions and long-forgotten memories. Only in distinction from the philistine who reacts to his mental torpor and dull daily routine by resorting at intervals to stimulants, intoxicants, excitements in order to break for a short while the barriers between the subconscious reservoir and the dried-up conscious streams of thought, and in distinction from the genuine psychic mediums, hypnotic subjects, crystal-gazers, clairvoyants, mind-readers, etc., who, when not resorting to the easier method of fraud, resort to artificially induced states of mental dissociation, inner absorption, hypersensitiveness, in order to dig up from their subconscious some forgotten trivial, personal memories and some directly or telepathically obtained perceptions—the man of genius draws naturally, steadily, slowly, effortlessly, during his normal state upon the worth-while contents of his subconscious reservoir, by keeping the gates of his consciousness always wide open and by keeping his attention always concentrated upon some vital question or problem. And just as he draws fearlessly, impartially and patiently upon the vast but chaotic store of the subconscious, just so is it his practise not to dismiss from his consciousness any thought, feeling, or impulse that claims his attention before having found for it the proper place or function in his mental economy, no matter how distasteful, unflatter-

ing, tabooed, unpresentable that thought, feeling or impulse may appear. And if, for some reason, he is compelled to deviate from this wholesome habit of constant self-scrutiny, psycho-analysis, intellectual impartiality, and to relegate certain thoughts to the subconscious, he never allows them to remain there long in an isolated, erratic, dissociated, non-incorporated state; for they may work havoc by developing into mental weeds (fixed ideas, phobias, obsessions, delusions, etc.) which tend to overrun, displace, replace, or break up the normal, primary personality.

The hypermnesia of fever, dreams, trance, etc., proves that our subconscious or automatic mental activity (subconscious perception, memory, . . .) is richer in contents, in receptivity and in invention, but poorer in orderliness, general harmony, organization, selection, adaptation, utilization, is less our own, than our conscious perception, conscious memory, conscious judgment. Conscious mental activity means to select those of our numerous present, past, and possible impressions which we can organize into a working mechanism in conformity with our few dominant, driving, guiding ideas and ideals. There is no or little room in an average sane consciousness for ideas which do not fit into a teleological scheme: such ideas are consciously soon forgotten, although they may leave nominal or verbal representatives in consciousness for a certain time.

Conscious activity is never an exact repetition or copy of an older or usual activity; moreover, it is always selective, critical, teleological: it suspects, expects, or tends towards harmony, an aim. Semi-conscious, inspirational, spontaneous activity is a still greater deviation from the usual, but is not teleological for the actor or agent himself. Automatic behavior is an exact copy of an older one; it may tend towards

an aim, a priori unknown to the agent. The fact that a close observation can always detect a difference between a really and a seemingly conscious activity, proves that consciousness is not a mere epiphenomenon, a mere mental image; it is a regulator, a factor helping in new situations, but disturbing in usual circumstances. "Conscious" means influenced by, influencing, harmonizing with, the mind at large. The achievements of the talented men are conscious, anticipated, slightly original, voluntary; the creations of the genius are semi-conscious, inspirational, spontaneous, highly original; the average man is best fit for muscular or automatic activity. The convictions of the genius are mainly first-hand, i. e., drawn directly from the hard school of bitter personal experience, from the cosmical and social environment, and deeply rooted in his innermost soul. Others' opinions are wholly adopted by talented, and especially by average men. They do not separate fact from interpretation and appreciation (emotional interpretation); whereas the genius extracts the objective components of the facts, adding his own interpretation and valuation if necessary.

The intellectual seeds of thoughts planted into an average or talented mind, either perish or develop into thoughts more or less similar to their mother-thoughts; whereas the genius grafts his own thoughts and feelings upon those which are transplanted into his mind, and thus gives birth to improved, new intellectual plants. He invents means and ways of increasing the amount of truth, beauty, love, social happiness; of enriching and ennobling human life.

Difference of Degree—Does the man of genius differ in degree or in kind, quantitatively or qualitatively, from the average man? How does he differ from the man of talent?

It depends upon the point of view from which we

look at them simultaneously. What appears to be a quantitative difference from the objective point of view, appears as a qualitative difference from the subjective point of view.

The abilities of the original man are not different from those of the routine man: they are merely more developed, richer in results. Looked at from above, from the philosophical point of view, the genius may not seem much more than an average man. But from the social or human standpoint, the quantitative difference seems so large that it can be taken for a difference in quality. If we look at their abilities, geniuses differ merely in degree from others; but if we look at their achievements, fields of activity, they differ in kind.

All the mental processes (perceiving, remembering, imagining, judging, reflecting and their various combinations) presuppose and arise from a dualism, a discrepancy between the self and the not-self, the present and the past, the present and the future, the actual and the possible, the known and the unknown. All these processes have in common such a dualism, and involve the same, irreducible elementary operations of discriminating, identifying, linking. They differ, however, in the degree of complexity, of remoteness between the related facts. What is true of the various mental processes in one and the same individual, holds also of the mental processes of the genius when compared with those of the average man: The genius has no abilities different from those of the average man, he only has them in a larger quantity. Where the mental energy of the common mortal is soon exhausted when applied to simple, concrete facts having reference to his daily needs, the genius can apply his mental energy as easily in attacking abstract notions, whole complexes of facts having no immediate bearing upon the narrow

sphere of actual human interests.

Aim and Ability.—Ability and aim, force and direction, are inseparable. But this does not mean that the same ability, the same force, must always persist in the same direction, and cannot be turned towards a different aim; nor does it mean that the same aim cannot be attained, or at least striven after by different abilities. There is no limit to the number of aims, directions of activity; but the number and the magnitude of the abilities, forces, impulses are limited. Hence arises the need of neglecting, reducing, subordinating some aims in favor of others. The mere fact of getting interested in a certain line of activity, of beginning to pursue a certain aim, reduces, often against our will and without our knowing it, our ability of pursuing other aims. Aims and means lie on the same line; only the means must be first passed through before the aim can be attained. This being often the only difference between means and aims, we understand why a means may become an aim and why an aim may become a means to a further end. Some geniuses differ from each other more in aim than in ability (various classes of scientists: physicists, chemists, geologists . . . ; various classes of artists: poets, novelists, dramatists; painters, sculptors, musicians, actors, etc.). Others differ from each other more in ability than in aim. Thus observers, scientists, philosophers, all pursue truth. Only the first stop at facts and simple relations, at perceptions; the second rise to more complex relations, to concrete concepts; the third rise to the most general concepts, to world-conceptions, to first principles. Philistines differ from geniuses in both aims and abilities. The talented man differs from the genius belonging to the same class more in ability than in aims. What for a more able man, for a genius, is a mere means or secondary aim, is for a talented or less

able man who works in the same direction a primary aim. What is a primary aim for a man working in one direction, for one class of genius and talent, is a mere secondary aim or a means for one working in a different direction, for another class of genius and talent, and vice versa.

Natural Interests.—In addition to the difference in abilities, other fundamental differences between genius, talent and average mind must be looked for in the quality and quantity of their respective inborn, natural interests; for it is these interests that determine the content and direction of our consciousness, perception, memory, imagination, revery, thinking; it is these interests that set in action or stimulate our mental abilities. We usually notice, remember, . . . spontaneously, involuntarily, easily, what we are directly interested in; we notice, remember, . . . deliberately, intentionally, vountarily, slowly, what we are indirectly interested in; we disregard, we relegate from our consciousness whatever is against our natural interests and inclinations. To the philistine, food, shelter, clothing, sexual love affairs, his bodily appearance, gossip, external approbation, material possessions, superficial intellectual pleasures, are just as serious affairs or aims of life as the pursuit of general, abstract, impersonal knowledge, of beauty, of social reform and social happiness, of self-perfection and self-approbation, of spiritual possessions, of refined and ethereal intellectual joys, are to the genius. The philistine is just as insatiable, just as philoneistic and persistent, and often just as original in his trivial pursuits and petty ambitions as the genius is in his lofty aspirations. Only the philistine insatiableness is detrimental to society as a whole, the philistine's philoneism consists merely in love of new sensations, of fads, of fashion, of distinction, of new appearances. A philistine would feel

just as unhappy if he had to eat every day the same kind of food, and wear a whole year the same clothes, as a philosopher would feel if he were compelled to think continually the same few thoughts, and to read his whole life only one and the same book, say the Bible. The man of talent stands midway between the genius and the average man. The pseudo-superior man or the ordinary man of action, in addition to the philistine pursuits and the sham intellectual pursuits, and the semi-superior man, in addition to some real intellectual pursuits, strive also for power, influence, popularity, political or economic leadership.

The natural interests or inclinations of an individual being given, the characteristic objects of his thoughts, the permanent content of his consciousness, and his characteristic ways of action follow as necessary corollaries; for *qui veut la fin, veut les moyens.*

A great, exclusive interest in, or an intense desire for, a certain object, joined to a little ability, can accomplish much more in that direction than a great ability guided by a feeble interest. Looking at the results alone, such an individual with an intense, one-sided desire, great perseverance, but little ability, is often mistaken for a genius. This is the case especially of financial kings, political and military heroes, explorers. . . . True genius, however, is more or less universal; it attains many-sided results in a comparatively short time, with comparatively little labor, with comparatively simple tools or apparatus, without premeditation, without perseverance conscious of its particular aim.

Self-Instruction.—In study, in self-instruction, the genius seeks rather confirmation of, than impulse for, his creations; whilst the talented man seeks rather impulse, stimulation for mental activity.

Some learn in order to know; others read in order to

have something to talk about; a third class utilize their learning either for theoretical or for practical purposes, either for theoretical or financial speculations. Both extremes, the disinterested genius and the selfish materialist, belong to the third class; dilettante readers, professors, etc., belong to the second group; scholars, serious readers, etc., belong to the first.

To the superior man, to the man with genuine hunger for knowledge, books are a means of supplementing, completing, broadening, strengthening and unifying his knowledge gained from personal experience; in books he seeks stimulation to further thinking and personal observation or investigation; books serve to widen his intellectual horizon, i. e., to make his mind still more receptive for an ever-increasing field of impressions; they help him overcome, in imagination at least, the limitations imposed upon him by the daily routine and prosaic struggle for bread as well as by the shortness of human life; in books he looks for the acquaintance with such men, things and epochs as are not accessible to his direct observation. To him book knowledge is not—as it is to the pseudo-superior man—a substitute for the communion with men and Nature, for the personal search after knowledge, an excuse for laziness and parasitism, an object of luxury or a dead weight to be stored away, carried around and preserved intact in his memory in order to be displayed, boasted, exhibited on certain occasions; to him it is an indispensable brain food to be digested, assimilated and transformed into available energy, into dynamic, energizing, guiding ideas; unlike our dignified scholars, he does not allow his attention to be entirely absorbed by the opinions and speculations of others about men, things and life's struggles, but prefers to consult the latter directly and to keep in touch therewith.

Genius and Erudition.—In science the conservative

element is represented by scholars, savants; in practical life it is represented by women. The more we know about the opinions of others, the less opinions of our own can we form. Vast erudition—narrow views. The memory of the pure scholars is puffed up with verbal wisdom and with studied words of praise, or admiration for acknowledged, past progress; but their own mental eyes are blind to the real progressive movements and intellectual fermentations going on under their very noses.

Erudition is to, or, rather, beyond a certain extent, an obstacle to originality. Erudition is only a means to the original man, but no end in itself. In the works of others, the genius does not look so much for information as for stimulation of his own creative activity.

Memory.—The memory of the genius is assimilative; that of the savant is mainly reproductive. The memory of the genius is essentially assimilative, comparative, harmonious, i. e., it retains those experiences which can be brought into connection with its own original content; whereas the memory of the savant and of the average man is chronological, topographical, unharmonious, accumulative except in the sphere of his specialty or of his personal interests. The genius remembers what he understands; the others may come to understand in the long run what they remember, although too much memorizing, i. e., absorption of too much intellectual food—especially if not called for by a higher or an organic need—usually hinders digestion, assimilation, understanding.

Imitation, Teachableness.—Just as the human baby seems to be at a disadvantage, because of its clumsiness, helplessness, unadaptedness, when compared with many animals that come into the world almost completely equipped with instincts of self-preservation;

just so does the genius seem to be clumsy, backward, unteachable, unsociable, unadapted, slow-witted, when compared with the philistine and particularly with the pseudo-superior man, who learn quickly to imitate the language, manners, behavior of others and the outward form of everything. But just as the initial advantage of animals over men, i. e., their well-defined inherited abilities, proves a stumbling-block to learning from individual experience, to further progress and self-expansion; just so the apparent greater teachableness at school, the passive adaptability or inborn imitativeness, the grasping of forms, conventions, surface of things of the philistine proves to be a stumbling-block to teachableness at the school of life, to creativeness or active adaptability, to mental self-development, to getting at the bottom, substance or essence of things, to finding the path to be followed under new, unusual circumstances. The genius may show awkwardness and lack of skill in the field of tradition worship, routine and convention; but the philistine is absolutely helpless in the field of self-education, innovation, pioneering, coping with new and broad problems.

Imitation of other people's doings and sayings is the most natural, hence the easiest method of mental growth, in philistines, in one-sided and semi-superior individuals. Imitation, learning, begins, of course, with the mere form, outer appearance, word, or the letter of the true, beautiful, and the moral; and it ends with more or less complete assimilation of the hidden, invisible content.

The growth of the genius proceeding from within, from content towards form, from thought and feeling towards expression, we can understand why he is unable to imitate others, we understand why he is so awkward and hence so easily detected when he tries to speak and act without having the corresponding

convictions and feelings, we understand why an actor is very seldom a good playwright, and vice versa; we understand why the genius—even the many-sided—makes the impression of being less adaptable to new circumstances, less teachable, than the semi- and the pseudo-superior men. In the philistine and the pseudo-superior man, form and content are usually dissociated, or rather form is the all-important pursuit, form is an end-in-itself; whereas in the genuine superior man, form and content are inseparably connected: He cannot accept the one without the other, he cannot speak for the mere beauty of the sound, he cannot act like others for the mere sake of acting or of pleasing, he cannot act without feeling and pursuing ends in conformity with his actions, he cannot adopt publicly, externally or temporarily, the form of higher thoughts and sentiments and pursue secretly, innerly or later baser ends like the pseudo-superior man. So that where the philistine has merely to adopt a form, the genius has to adopt simultaneously the content hidden therein; and this retards his success in learning from others. Where the philistine and the pseudo-superior man rest satisfied with a superficial, partial assimilation of others' thoughts and feelings, the genius cannot refrain from going to the bottom, origin and end of things; he cannot refrain from following up the thoughts to their remotest antecedents and down to their remotest consequences. And this is another cause of his slowness in assimilating others' ideas. The apparent quick-mindedness, quick-wittedness, teachableness, adaptability, many-sided education of pseudo-superior men lies in their lack of conscientiousness and in their purely formal, verbal, partial, disconnected, superficial, imitative learning from others. The pseudo-superior man is richer in words than in ideas, richer in expression than in feeling, richer in appearances than

in realities. The reverse is true of the genius. The genius, like an infant, disposes of more states of consciousness than of adequate words to express them. The philistine is poor in both ideas and corresponding words.

Thought-pride, Verbosity, Grandiloquence.—Just as to the financial millionaire money has a very small subjective value, so the intellectual millionaire or the man of genius does not make so much of an original thought as the intellectually poor do. There is a thought-pride as well as a purse-pride.

Verbosity and grandiloquence are an indirect betrayal of thought-pride or intellectual snobbism; it is a substitute for self-praise and intellectual sterility. Verbosity is also a sign of thought-confusion; of inability to extricate and separate the clear, solid, valuable thoughts from the ore of impure, muddy, useless, cumbersome, erroneous judgments. Hence genuine genius and verbosity are never found together. The very original man becomes *blasé* to intellectual pleasures: Original ideas come naturally and easily to him, without any conscious or voluntary struggle on his part; not knowing the hardships of the struggle for truth, he cannot feel the joys of intellectual triumph.

SUPERIOR AND AVERAGE MIND

Social Significance.—Action precedes reaction; spontaneous activity precedes voluntary activity; play precedes serious activity; revery, imagination, hypothesis, precede perception of new realities or new facts. Serious activity consists of play activities which are modified and oriented by the pressure of ungratified needs. Truths or facts are often nothing but verified and modified hypotheses, just as reaction is nothing but action modified by an external cause. The reaction is

not equal to the external action: it is merely proportional to it. The external action by itself could not provoke any reaction, if the body acted upon were not more or less self-active. Thus facts do not obtrude themselves upon the mentally inert individual, i. e., upon the unimaginative; education, argumentation, reasoning, do not appeal to the philistine masses; insults are not quickly responded to by individuals who are free from vanity, unless these insults are calculated to wound the instinct of self-preservation.

Children, women and the rich, whose needs are ministered to by others, and who are kept aloof from the struggles against harsh realities, may indulge in play, revery, illusions, incomplete perceptions, unverified hypotheses. But adults, men, and the poor, who are thrown upon their own resources and, hence, have to face realities, must control and direct their activity, must verify their presuppositions and conform them to reality. The philistine masses, who indulge in all kinds of superstitions, mystical beliefs, illusions, prejudices with regard to remote men and things that do not affect them directly, immediately and palpably, would be crushed out of existence if they did not form more or less correct opinions about men and things that constitute their immediate environment. The philistine does not see in men and things much more than he anticipated, nor does he anticipate very much. He does not see new facts unless they are forced upon his attention by geniuses and by the pressure of immediate circumstances, at the same time. If the genius is more impressed by the same things which act on everybody, it is because he is himself more distinterestedly active, it is because he anticipates more, it is because he is always ready to meet half-way everything and everybody, since he does not waste too much energy, as the philistine does, on petty, trivial, selfish matters. If man is

much more capable of serious activity than animals, it is because—owing to his prolonged infancy—he has a much greater or richer store of play activities to draw upon in case of emergency. If human intelligence meets needs and external obstacles much more effectively than animals, it is because man exerts his intelligence even in the absence of needs or of obstacles, even before they arise and after their cessation. If the man of genius solves better than the philistine life problems of general, future, higher interest, it is because the personal, momentary, selfish, bodily interests of the genius are reduced to a reasonable minimum, and hence do not absorb his entire attention and energy. Just as it is not so much the greater total relative weight of the brain as the greater weight and complexity of the frontal and parietal lobes which distinguishes the genius from the philistine; just so—to express the same thing in terms of energy—what characterizes the genius is not so much his greater total vital or merely mental energy as the greater surplus of mental energy which is at the disposal of higher, synthetic, conceptual, general, disinterested, prospective and retrospective thinking, and which results from the fact that the genius spends a minimum of energy on lower, particular, personal, present interests.

It is easier to impart motion to a moving body than to a body at rest; for in the real world there is no such a condition as a zero velocity: A body at rest adheres ever more to its surroundings, hence acquires an increasing negative velocity, which must be overcome before the body can be set in motion. Just so knowledge or intellectual motion can be easily imparted to the thinking individual, but not to the adult philistine who did not stop at his childhood's thoughtlessness or intellectual inertia, but adheres ever more to the fixed dogmas, superstitions, customs of his immediate social

environment, and contracts an ever-increasing aversion to free, independent thinking. The genius is, in the animate world, the moving, progressive or dynamic element; he cannot take root anywhere; he moves freely —mentally, at least, if not bodily—from one social class, nation, race, to another; from the present to the past or to the future; from one object of thought to another. He is hated by the philistines, who form the static, conservative, nay, regressive element; for he recalls them from the easy, downward, catabolic path, and spurs them on along the arduous, onward, anabolic path of human life.

A genius stands for a social organ, whose function is to elaborate a certain ideal, new aspiration, to be completed, counterbalanced by other aspirations elaborated by other geniuses. In spite of the multi-lateral symmetry of the social organism, geniuses of the same class cannot so easily take the place of each other, for each has something *sui generis*, even when compared with those belonging to the same class. The average man stands for a mere social unit, social cell, easily replaceable, substitutable, frequently replaced and substituted, and not infrequently misplaced on account of social imperfections, thus hindering the functioning of social organs, of geniuses.

The moral geniuses form the brain, the cerebral organs, of the social organism. The agitators, organizers, leaders, form its nervous system: they carry to the moral geniuses detailed information as to the anomalies existing within human society; they give the signal of alarm in case anything goes wrong with human institutions; they also carry to the philistine masses, which represent the muscular system of the social organism, the general remedial measures devised and recommended for execution by the moral geniuses. The other geniuses, the purely technical, artistical, scientifical, philo-

sophical, merely play the rôle of organs concerned with particular functions but not with the welfare of the entire organism. The moral geniuses alone see to it—or, rather, will see to it—that the functions performed by these geniuses should run their normal course and should not be turned or shunted off into the channels of parasitic outgrowths, of intra- and extra-social parasites.

Just as in the individual organism it is not the nerves that feel the pain or realize the cause of and remedy for the pain-producing disturbances, but the brain hidden in its shelter does all this work noiselessly and unostentatiously; and just as in the individual organism there are special nerves, the sensory, afferent or centripetal nerves, for transmitting to the brain the disturbances occurring in various parts of the organism, and other nerves, the motor, efferent or centrifugal, for reacting, according to the dictates of the brain, upon the causes of these disturbances: just so in the social organism it is not the pure agitators and pure truth-tellers that feel the grieves of mankind or elaborate suitable remedies, but the obscure, solitary, noiseless, moral geniuses do all this work. The pure truth-teller merely reports on abnormal conditions, iniquities, oppression, intolerance, without fully grasping their extent, deeper causes and far-reaching consequences. And the pure agitator stirs up the masses to action, without being fully aware of the imperiousness, scope, authorship of the message delivered by him to the people. Since, however, the evolution of the social organism shows signs that it will not much longer follow the line of extreme specialization or differentiation, like the hierarchical evolution of the individual organism, but will rather tend towards a democratic state of society in which all differentiation will be externalized, confined to tools, machinery, institutions, but not to

men, i. e., every member of society will be conscious of as many social happenings as possible, and capable of fitting into almost any social institution, function or position; it follows that we must not feel surprised to meet here and there with intellectual and artistic geniuses who are also moral geniuses, with intellectual producers who are also intellectual distributors, with moral geniuses who can also agitate or carry their own messages to the people—not to the too rough, stultified, unthinking class—, with some agitators who really feel and partly elaborate themselves what they say, with dramatists who are also able to enact their own productions, etc. On the contrary, the opposite ought to surprise and pain us, viz., to find actors who misrepresent the author because they themselves are incapable of feeling like him, with agitators who merely make a profession out of carrying the messages of hope and regeneration sent out by moral geniuses because they themselves are vain, selfish and incapable of self-sacrifice; in short, with interpreters who misinterpret the teachings and admonitions of geniuses. It ought to pain us that the masses have been so degraded to mere brainless tools by the spoliation or predatory system as to be deprived of understanding for the calmer expression of feelings and for the logic of the moral genius and to need the gesticulation, declamation, noise of the pure agitator in order to be aroused from their mental torpor.

Impressibility, Consciousness, Personality.—The superior man, i. e., the man of great talent, has not only a more heterogeneous impressibility but also a more developed consciousness than the average man: His consciousness is more selective, teleological, differentiated, discriminating, orderly, harmonious, economical, adaptive, spontaneous or self-active, and qualitatively richer, i. e., richer in aims or interests.

The average man leads a subconscious, suggestible, imitative life; only in new, unhabitual circumstances does he become self-conscious. When the tempest and the commotion of the unexpected is over, the average mind falls back into the sweet habitual sleep of its semi-conscious, hypnoidic life. The reverse is true of the normal superior man; his self-conscious personality is more stable, more steadily awake.

The average man is hetero- and auto-suggestible, i. e., his systems of ideas can be harmonized only under the influence of an external authoritative will. Otherwise his mind is in a state of anarchy, disharmony, subject to the tyranny of fixed ideas, false beliefs. The superior man is cosmico- and socio-suggestible, i. e., his systems of ideas are mutually harmonizing themselves and under the control of real, objective relations. Blind imitation of local, self-styled authorities accounts for 99 per cent of an ordinary man's thinking, feeling and doing. This is the reason why the statistical method is of such little use in psychology and social sciences.

The personality of the original man is concentrated and determined rather by internal than by external factors. Changing the external factors (material possessions, domestic, national, racial, professional influences), the internal kernel is not intimately affected. The personality of the inferior man is dis-centrated, diffuse, determined and held together mostly under the pressure of external circumstances. On removing the latter the kernel soon volatilizes.

If the educated philistines, and especially the pseudo-superior men, are so eager to live among or to be seen with a so-called better social class, it is not only because they want to deceive others as to their value, but also because they themselves—owing to their suggestibility, imitativeness, mental mimicry—feel and tend to

become different in a different social environment. Only the genuine superior man, the man with a strong, original personality, can afford to mingle with all kinds of social elements without losing anything from his value; nay, he gains in many-sidedness and in consistency by doing so: by asserting and defending—either overtly or before his inner forum—his convictions, sentiments, peculiarities, against those of others, he comes to find out which are of real, permanent, indestructible social value and which are not worth being fought for and transmitted to posterity.

The average man possesses on the whole less discriminative or selective ability and less motility and spontaneity than the genius; laymen less than specialists; females less than males; animals less than men; plants less than animals; inanimate and dead matter less than living matter or protoplasm. The philistine accepts almost indiscriminately the opinions and sentiments thrust upon him by the men in authority; he hardly chooses his wife, friends, vocation, sources of enjoyment and information, etc.; he associates and makes friends with those with whom he happens to be thrown together; his horizon does not go much beyond the narrow circle of men and things into whose midst he happens to have been thrown by circumstances; he passively submits to the existing order of things, unable as he is to conceive the possibility of a better one. His personality is so little his own, so little a product of his spontaneity and internal forces, and so much produced and maintained by immediate external, particularly social, influences that it goes to pieces, i. e., he goes insane during a one or two years' solitary confinement, but it remains unaffected by a lifelong monotonous occupation. The amount of solitude a man can bear, as well as the reciprocal of the amount of monotonous work, blind obedience, compulsory sociability

with uncongenial men at which he begins to feel annoyed, revolted, unhappy, could therefore serve as a measure of his individuality, originality, spontaneity, self-activity, independent personality.

The average civilized man dreads nothing more than solitude, ostracism, the relaxation of the external influences, suggestions or pressures, in the absence of which his unstable, volatile, hysterically predisposed mind threatens to break up, to disintegrate, to run wild or to fall into extreme, incurable hysteria. His apparent venality, his willingness to obey a master or to serve as a mere tool, his seemingly stupid or ungrateful opposition to socialism, anarchism or any other movement directed towards his emancipation, and his hero-worship, are reducible to his dread of mental dissociation if left to himself, or to his acquired inability to act spontaneously except within very narrow limits and only in one or two directions allowed by local public opinion and by his exploiters. External or social pressures brought to bear from all sides by various kinds of oppressors or exploiters prevent the average man's mind from evolving, and split it up into innerly incoherent bundles of impulses; and these very same external pressures, which have destroyed the evolutive power and inner unity of the philistine's soul, become now indispensable for the keeping up of its external, apparent, artificial integrity.

The less one has *in* one's self, the more does one try to have *on, with,* and *around* one's self; the less ability, the more noise about one's own doings and merits; the less reason to be proud of one's own merits, the more does one boast of those of others, of one's descent, family, friends, club, party, sect, race, vocation, material possessions, social rank; the less esteem one deserves, the more does one ask of one's fellow-men, and the more vulnerable is one's self-love; those are most

proud of their school education, profession, college, who have intellectually least profited from them.

The philistine is in the social world what an inert body is in the physical realm. Like an inert body, the intellectual and the moral philistine do not enter into intellectual or moral activity from their own initiative or spontaneously: they need an impulse from without, from a foreign will. Nor do they cease persisting in beliefs, customs, moral practises, etc., imposed upon them by intellectual or moral geniuses—even if the latter have become absurd, harmful—until an impulse towards a contrary or a different direction is given them.

The spontaneity of the genius is like the spontaneity of an explosive which does not need an external cause proportional to its effects in order to explode; it is the apparent spontaneity of accumulated little causes which begin to act visibly merely upon the addition of another little cause, which seems to be the only one on account of its being the last and the noticed one.

What distinguishes the philistine from the genius is the fact that in the former external influences remain separated, unconscious, dormant, and hence without appreciable effect; whereas in the latter these small impersonal cosmico-social influences are accumulated, summed up, concentrated until they give rise to new thoughts, sentiments or acts of will, personal and strong enough to externalize themselves and to act upon the inert minds of the philistines.

Difference in Thinking.—What distinguishes the thinking of a superior man from that of the average man is the fact that a thinking process, once begun, in the mind of a superior man, tends to persist in the same direction, after the cessation of the external or internal stimulus; it tends to spread, not only over actual and present experiences, but also over past and possible ex-

periences and circumstances; whereas with the average man the thinking processes are of short duration and of little extension, and are aroused by immediate external stimuli. To the genius, thinking is an organic, permanent need, an end-in-itself. To the philistine, thinking is either an adventitious, aimless, play activity, or a mere means used only under the pressure and for the gratification of urgent bodily needs.

Under ordinary circumstances, the philistine does not care much, nor is he able, to meditate on general problems (origin, meaning, aim of human life and of the universe . . .), on questions having no direct and immediate bearing on his own material welfare. Only under the stimulus of intense psychical pain or deep discontentedness, and sometimes under the stimulus of a general surplus of vital energy, do such questions arise in his mind; but his thinking usually stops soon without having advanced much beyond the raising of the questions. Owing to cumulative hereditary tendencies, to spontaneous variations, or mutations, the organ of thinking—which in his philistine and semi-intellectual ancestors arose only adventitiously under the pressure of intense psychical pain, or of a great general surplus of vital energy—becomes in the genius permanent, endowed with specific energy which causes it to function under the stimulus of the slightest psychical pain, nay, even in the absence of such a stimulus, and even in the absence of a total, general surplus of vital energy.

The genius discriminates in a thing and in a phenomenon, the typical, general, essential, permanent . . . from the individual, particular, accessory, changeable. . . . The philistine is inclined either to regard every object or phenomenon as particular, as *sui generis*, or to regard everything as typical. The man of talent, the scientist, are less penetrating and hence

more cautious than the man of genius: They observe a large number of similar things or phenomena before they dare to separate the typical from the individual. The philistine, like the child and the primitive man, mistakes fable for fact, second-hand for first-hand knowledge, the accidental for the essential, the form for the spirit, the ephemeral for the eternal, the means for the end, the copy for the original, tautologies for explanations, the particular for the general, the artificial and the conventional for the natural, the changeable for the permanent, the trivial for the important, the local for the universal, the appearance for the reality, words for things, thoughts, feelings or will. This distinction between the philistine and the intellectual man in matters of general human interest is also found between the ignorant and the educated, the inexperienced and the experienced, between specialists and laymen, pupil and teacher, in matters of theoretical, indirect, practical interest. The philistine cannot discriminate in the present the vestiges of the past and the germs of the future; he is unable to see how the present can serve to reconstruct the past and to foretell the future. He does not discriminate between accidental, changeable, occasional, imagined, desired, subjective, apparent relations and material, essential, permanent, immutable, causal, real relations between things; between spiritual and material possessions.

Compared with the slow, uncertain, groping inferences of the philistine and of the talented man, those of the genius make the impression of intuitions. Where the man of talent reasons, the man of genius perceives. Where the man of talent searches without finding, the man of genius finds without searching. Where the man of talent sees darkness, inextricable confusion, the genius sees light, clearness, obvious relations.

Thinking, reason, does not transcend experience. We

do not get by reasoning more than what is given in experience, i. e., in perception and feeling. Reason can only analyze and synthesize the data of experience, but it cannot increase their number. If from the present we draw conclusions as to the future, it is because experience has shown us that the future is to the present what the present is to the past; that what is prominent in the present was a mere tendency in the past, hence what is a mere tentative to-day may become a reality to-morrow. If from a few particular known instances we draw conclusions as to the whole class, i. e., as to the unknown instances belonging to the same class, it is because experience has shown us that things, events, men having one attribute in common usually have or tend to have in common other attributes also. Our experience teaches us not only what is, not only the real, but also what ought to be, the ideal; for the "ought" is one of the actual tendencies, the ideal is an exceptional or embryonal real, the future is embryonal in the present.

If genius seems to transcend experience, it is because the experience of the genius is richer, more conscious of the whence and the whither than the experience of the talented man and of philistines. It is because the mental eye of the genius is tuned to perceive tendencies, nascent movements, while others are wholly absorbed in noisy actualities; his eye is tuned to look for the deeper similarity and unity of things, while others' attention is entirely engrossed with superficial variety. Hence, what is reality, a general truth, a perception, a conscious or inner command, a clear state of mind, "Zweckbewusstes Streben," an actual experience to the genius, is still a dream, a particular truth, a bold inference, a law or duty or outer command, a dim state of mind, a vague desire timidly groping in the dark for expression or realization, a possible ex-

perience to the philistine.

Formal, external, superficial, geographical, historical, striking differences between men, things or phenomena, captivate the whole attention of the philistine and blind him as to the essential, inner, hidden, permanent, time- and space-independent, less striking similarities. And vice versa: Formal similarities take possession of the philistine's entire attention or interest, and do not allow him to see essential differences. To the thinker, however, both geographical or spatial and historical or temporal differences, the differences between nations and the differences between epochs, are not so much differences of kind or essence as of degree or form: Evolution is not so much creative as selective; human progress is not so much in the line of intensity as of comprehensiveness, i. e., higher intellect, refined sentiments, and higher morality are not a product of modern times, or the exclusive possession of a certain race; and do not increase with time or place, but merely meet with ever more opportunity and adherents. Just as the railroad and the telegraph have practically reduced the bodily or physical distances between men; just so this insight into the permanent and universal similarities hidden beneath the changeable and local forms reduces considerably the soul- or psychical distances between men. And where the philistine mind sees nothing but bewildering chaos and unceasing disharmonies, deeper insight reveals to the thinker underlying order or unity and an ever-growing harmony.

All our mental processes, even the simplest, most short-lived, and seemingly instantaneous, pass through stages of growth and of decay. Thus, the simplest process of sensation, if attended to, begins with a vague consciousness of some undifferentiated, unlocalized, unidentifiable experience; after a moment the process becomes ever more differentiated into an experience of a

definite quality, intensity, duration, local sign . . .; in exceptionally favorable circumstances, this simple sensation may evolve or rather get incorporated into an increasing complex process of perception, apperception (= perception + memory), conception, general view. An incipient perception, an incipient recollection, is a vague experience of something indefinable, unnameable; after a while, if no other experience has captivated our attention, the perception or the recollection becomes clearer, more differentiated, we discriminate it from other past and present experiences, we localize it, we classify it as novel, as familiar, as belonging to a certain setting, etc. Likewise, the conception of a class of things or of phenomena, the conception of a general or common property, begins with a vague suspicion which only after days, months, years—if ever—takes on a definite, more or less sharply marked-off, shape. The stage of dissolution of a mental process is the reverse of the evolutional stage. Thus, if, after coming to a clear decision as to what to do and as to how, when, where, why do it, our attention happens to be captivated by some sudden flash of memory or of perception, our decision rolls back into the depths of subconsciousness, of indecision, from which it has painfully and elaborately been carried up to the heights of conscious, harmonious life: we first remember only what we decided to do, but we cannot recall the how, where, why . . .; then, we do not even know what we had decided to do, we merely know that something has been decided upon.

Now, to revert to our subject of superior and of average minds to which I wanted to apply the above-given psychological considerations. In the philistine mind, mental processes, especially the conceptual processes, never pass the embryonal stage of vagueness, indefiniteness, lack of individual characterization. The

unbalanced, nebulous, immature or decaying, mystical thinkers succeed occasionally in carrying their conceptions very near the height of clearness, of intellectual safe standing ground; but either their intellectual courage or their intellectual strength fails: they become dizzy, and allow their conceptions to slip back into the dark abysses of unconsciousness, of intellectual confusion and uncertainty. Only the balanced intellectual genius succeeds in maintaining some concepts upon the luminous heights of clear thinking. Only the ideal man of action, the volitional genius, is fully conscious of his wishes, aspirations, and means of reaching them. The volitional philistine only knows that he wishes to live differently; but what this difference consists in he does not even suspect. And volitional talent knows what it craves for, but it does not know how to give it reality. The emotionally talented man feels the pressure of a strong feeling in his heart; but how to deliver his heart, how to bring this emotional child to daylight, how to bring it up to full maturity and to social usefulness: this task is left over for the emotional genius.

The normal average man is intellectualy anthropocentric, and emotionally ego-centric, which is not identical with egoism; the intellectually superior man is intellectually cosmo-centric, and emotionally ego- or anthropo-centric; the morally superior man is intellectually and emotionally anthropo-centric.

The common mortal turns his mind to disinterested thinking when he is free from material preoccupations; the superior man does so in spite of the cares and troubles of the daily life. The thinking function of the common mortal, and especially of women, is not yet differentiated; it has no specific energy at its disposal; it works only in the case of a surplus of energy, or under the pressure of immediate necessity; it is in-

termittent, adventitious, unstable. Common sense reasons sanely, but very seldom clearly; whereas philosophical speculation reasons clearly rather than sanely.

The moral philistine, after having secured some spot of solid ground in the midst of the stormy ocean of human life, may begin to feel interested in the lot of his less fortunate brothers who are driven around by the merciless, savagely raving storms; he may come to consider those who worry about others' troubles as not mere eccentrics. Whereas the moral genius is deeply pained by the sight of his drowning fellow-men, and he devises schemes of bringing them to the solid ground which he sees extending near at hand and in great abundance, while he himself is floating around upon unsteady waves foaming with rage and is in danger of being swallowed up himself at any moment by the bottomless abyss. The art-philistine becomes aware of the beauties of Nature only after—and not before—he has become free from material cares, from the uncertain struggles for economic security. Nature with her elementary, untamed forces, the ocean with its raging, stormy waves, are beautiful to look at, but not to struggle against. Just as one cannot afford to rejoice in the contemplation of the muscular strength and dexterity of wild beasts before these beasts have gone out of sight, or have been rendered inoffensive by being imprisoned behind the iron railings of menagerie cages; just so with the rest of nature: until the men of genius have taught their fellow-men how to domesticate natural forces, animals, and plants, to make provision for the future, Nature was—as she still is for the pariahs of modern civilization—a vast reservoir of inimical forces, a vast hiding-place of unexpected, ubiquitous, steadily lurking dangers for man to avoid or to contend with. Nature's apparent and hidden beauties remained unnoticed by the majority of primitive men who were

ignorant of her laws and ways, whose entire time and energy were consumed by the struggle against the unchained, capricious forces. Her horrors disappear for the civilized man in proportion as he comes to know her better, to comply with her laws, to domesticate ever more of her forces, to secure ever more solid standing-ground from which to contemplate safely the rest of the untamed domain of nature, to secure ever more provisions for the future in order to be able to indulge in revery and in retrospections. The man of genius for whom ideals are not mere dreams, but anticipated future realities; the man of genius for whose mental eye the potentialities of cosmic and of human nature are quasi-actualities, may enjoy, anticipatingly, the beauties of Nature, while she is still treating him stepmotherly. The moral genius may rejoice, anticipatingly, over the beauties, amenities, bright opportunities of a future human society—while being ill-treated and roughly handled by actual human society—because he sees it potentially existing in the present, because he rests satisfied with a minimum of material gratifications in order to save the rest of his time and energy for the contemplation and pursuit of higher aspirations.

Mental Harmony.—In the mind of the average man there is an apparent harmony between the most antagonistic and contradictory states of consciousness, just as there seems to be harmony between savage peoples who never come in contact. This state of affairs is neither harmony nor disharmony: it is anharmony. True harmony must be preceded by more or less conflict. The harmony in the mind of the superior man is like the harmony between civilized nations who have learned to appreciate the advantages of peace and co-operation in the light of the disadvantages resulting from a previous state of war. The great mass of average men live in continual contradiction between words

and deeds, between opinion and behavior. Their life is full of contradictions, inconsistencies, for the simple reason that they lack the capacity for self-scrutiny and their opinions are impressed from without, and are not the product of an inner evolution. Hence, their contradictions are more extramental than mental; they exist for others rather than for the actor himself. In other words, the average man is not illogical, he is alogical; his mind is not dis-harmonious, it is an-harmonious, or broken up into disconnected compartments. Mental disharmony seems to be the prerogative of the thinking man, either in the initial or in the declining stage of his evolution. In the average mind, cruelty and kindness, superstitions and sound judgments, predatory and cooperative impulses, live side by side without coming into contact for lack of a unifying, self-scrutinizing, higher brain organ.

As affections, or emotions, have a centrifugal, diffusive, directly communicative character; and as ideas, convictions, are centripetal, concentrative, but indirectly communicative; we understand why opposite, contrary, contradictory emotions never coexist in mind at the same moment, for they either neutralize each other, or predominate alternately; we understand why even philistines may attain emotional harmony, although there is disharmony, contradiction, between their convictions. Harmony between ideas, thoughts, convictions, is indirectly established through their accompanying affective components. Only convictions, theories, general views springing from within, from the depth of our soul, are accompanied by strong affections. Whenever a new theory on a certain matter is thrust upon the attention of an original man having theories of his own on the same matter, he feels immediately whether the new theory agrees with his own or not, even before he is able to bring forward logical argu-

ments for or against it. Before he is able to confront the theories themselves, he feels the agreement, or the opposition between their irradiating emotional waves. Whereas the convictions, theories, of the philistine, of the semi- and the pseudo-superior man, being imposed from without, are rather superficial, deprived of emotional roots and ramifications of their own, more or less skilfully grafted upon vain and selfish ideas and desires; we understand therefore why there is no harmony, at best no lasting harmony, between their ideas; we can understand why they can simultaneously give their assent to contradictory theories, to religion and science, to knowledge and superstition, to capitalism and socialism. Their only means of testing a new theory is to see whether it subserves personal interests, whether it does not run counter to the approval of influential, prominent men, whether its verbal adoption is conducive to an increase in popularity.

Difference in Affection and Volition.—In the evolution of mental activity from the average man to the thinker, the following law seems to dominate the affective and volitional aspects. The thinker gains in duration and clearness what he loses in rapidity and intensity. Irritability, impulsiveness, intolerance become, or make room for, sensibility, deliberation, tolerance. In psychology, like in mechanics, the products "duration $\times$ rapidity" or "clearness $\times$ intensity" remain constant, as we advance from the unthinking to the thinking stage.

The affections of the philistine, especially of women, have the following characteristics: *(a)* They are intense, promptly aroused, but inconstant, short-lived, and vague (unconscious of origin and aim). *(b)* There is no differentiation, no purity, no independence of sentiments: The object of love is at the same time an object of admiration, sexual attraction, respect, pride,

hope, joy, envy . . .; the object of hatred is also an object of contempt, anger, disrespect, fear, shame, sorrow . . .; self-love is inextricably mixed or alloyed with self-conceit. Thus to the moral philistine, poverty (including the poor man) is at the same time an object of pity, contempt, ridicule, antipathy, dread . . .; and wealth (including the wealthy) an object of desire, worship, admiration, love, confidence. . . . *(c)* There is an undue extension or transference of sentiments from one quality of the object inspiring them to all the other qualities which by themselves would not be able to inspire the same sentiments, nay, which would often inspire quite the opposite sentiment. Thus the philistine cannot admire the intelligence of a man and despise his character at the same time; he cannot love merits and find defects also. *(d)* Undue extension or transference of sentiments to other objects having purely superficial or accidental connections with the primary object of love or of hatred. If the philistine loves or hates a person, nation, race, he also loves or hates their possessions, wearing apparel, pet animals, manners, language, etc. *(e)* The philistine's affections are evoked by, and often entirely concentrated upon, the mere form, symbol, name, outward or accidental and *per se* insignificant qualities of the object. This can be seen in sexual fetichism, idolatry, superstitions, beliefs, individual and collective antipathies. . . . *(f)* Between two opposite emotions there are no, or merely embryonal, intermediary emotions. Thus women especially may swing back and forth between love and hatred without stopping at any transitional sentiment (sympathy, warm politeness, indifference, cold or formal politeness, antipathy). They may swing almost instantaneously from extreme enthusiasm, exaltation, happiness, blind confidence, conviction . . . to extreme unhappiness, depression, discouragement, ab-

solute distrust . . . without stopping at any intermediary step (zeal, interest, indifference, disinclination; contentedness, indifference, discontentedness, etc.). *(g)* The philistine mistakes an interested, associative or heteronomous affection for a disinterested, directly produced, objective, autonomous affection. *(h)* The philistine is philoneistic in the realm of sensations and emotions, but misoneistic in the realm of ideas, thoughts. The reverse holds of the scientific and philosophic genius. The artist and the poet discover new emotional sources in the old objects of affection; the philistine looks for new emotions by changing the object of his affection. This accounts partly for the rapid spreading of alcohol, tobacco, narcotics, new beverages, new foods, new fashions, new objects of affection. This accounts partly for the fact that modern and civilized men differ from previous generations and from uncivilized men much more in objects of affection, in language, food, shelter, clothing, than in the affections themselves and in beliefs, convictions, ideas. *(i)* Parallel to the philistine's hopeless confusion and inextricable mixture of thoughts (mistaking of identical objects for different ones, and vice versa; mistaking of appearances for realities; inability to analyze a manifold; inability to discriminate between necessary and contingent . . .) there runs a confusion and mixture in his affections. Parallel to his narrow-mindedness, ignorance, erroneous judgments there is narrow-heartedness, indifference or lack of sympathy, misplaced and uncalled-for affections, undeserved antipathies, emotional outbreaks at the wrong moment and in undue proportion. Not only most of his opinions about, but also most of his affections towards, things and persons, and himself, come from without, through hetero-suggestion.

ADAPTATION, HEREDITY AND VARIABILITY

Adaptation.—The genius anticipates the future. The common mortal is adapted to actual circumstances; the genius is adapted to ideal future circumstances which are potentially contained in actuality. Like a converging lens, the genius concentrates the weak, unconscious, scattered tendencies of the mass of philistines into a luminous, conscious, life-producing focus. The direct influence of the cosmico-social environment does not rise to the level of consciousness in the average mind. Only through the suggestive intermediation of the genius does it gain entrance into it, after having undergone many mutilations.

The common mortal, left to himself, adapts himself negatively: by fleeing, forgetting, renouncing; by drowning thought in ferverish, aimless, single-aimed activity; by indulging in illusions, hopes, appearances, stupefying practises and beverages; by seeking refuge in torpor, sleep, ecstasy, mysticism, nirvana. The genius causes positive adaptations: change of environment, of self, or of both. The sane genius is highly adaptable; his mental equilibrium is stable, i. e., environmental influences displace, or lift his psychical center of gravity or the center of his vital interests, and this displacement is gradual and proportional to the external cause.

The insane man has an unstable mental equilibrium; an insignificant external cause may suddenly and irrecoverably overthrow the center of his vital interests. The average man is adaptable only under the combined influence of the environment and of the geniuses; he has an indifferent mental equilibrium; if new environmental influences supervene, he cannot displace accordingly his psychical center of gravity without the assistance of the geniuses.

The male is variable, adaptable, teachable (which, of course, has nothing to do with verbal or school teaching), acquisitive, original. The female is stable, conservative, imitative, individually or ontogenetically unprogressive. Thus many a man born in the so-called higher stations of life has adapted himself, when he had to, to the rough, harsh, uncertain, struggling life of the poor; whereas even women born in poverty can never adapt themselves to the difficulties, uncertainties and lack of luxuries of such a life. That so-called lowly born women fit in easily in higher ranks, if good luck brings them there, is no proof of adaptation. A smooth course of life does not demand any effort, and the aristocratic atmosphere with its empty conventionalities is nothing new to any woman, for whom simulation, the desire to please or to make impression by any means, is a natural, inborn aim of life.

Intelligence means, primarily, the ability to adapt one's self to changeable, uncertain surroundings, with a minimum of action or expenditure of energy, and with a minimum of loss. Animal and philistine adaptation consists either in running away from unfavorable surroundings, or in persistent efforts, untiring, blind attempts to overcome them. Human and original adaptation neither gives up the struggle altogether to seek refuge in vegetation, torpor, forgetfulness, self-deception, self-stupefaction, nor does it persist in continual, blind, exhausting, harmful action, but looks for the most economical way of changing either the environment or the subject himself. The genius, in distinction from the philistine, and man, in distinction from animals, is neither over-active nor indolent, i. e., averse to action in general; he is rather lazy, i. e., averse to muscular effort, especially to useless and harmful effort. The moral genius is seemingly less adaptable to actual social circumstances than the a-moral and the

immoral genius who have no self-respect, no moral character to fight for or to guard against mutilation. The genuine intellectual genius for whom thinking, or the pursuit of knowledge, has become an aim-in-itself, is apparently less adaptable to our modern social environment than the pseudo-superior man in whom thinking has remained a means of furthering his personal well-being, of regulating and economizing his expenditure of energy. But the genuine intellectual genius has another way of saving his energy, viz., by renouncing the gratification of vanity and of the desire for material luxuries. The moral genius does not fight against human laziness or aversion to muscular effort, for he knows that man's strength and progress does not lie in the direction of muscular growth but in the direction of brain development. He merely fights against laziness at the expense of one's fellow-men, while he praises laziness which results from and leads to reflective subjugation of natural forces. He knows that laziness is not such a hateful thing as selfish and parasitical employers would have their employees believe; if it were so, they would not reserve laziness as a privilege for themselves. The moral genius hates drudgery, bestial display of muscular action, just as much as he does extreme general laziness, torpor, vegetation, simultaneous inertia of mind and body.

A lower kind of bodily adaptation, a passive or submissive adaptation, is seen in plants and in cold-blooded or poikilo-thermous animals, whose life-intensity fluctuates with the fluctuations in the atmospherical, aquatic and food-supplying conditions; these animals can or rather must even suspend their life activities, if they are unable to keep pace with external fluctuations in temperature, moisture, etc. Very primitive is the adaptation of these animals and of most plants—especially of the so-called hibernating and æstivating—

and of primitive men, to fluctuations in the food-supplying conditions. They can gorge themselves with a seemingly unlimited amount of food, if there is plenty of it; they can also stand starvation, if there is no food supply: a kind of inter-cellular and inter-organic cannibalism is going on which enables the more essential organs and cells to eat up the less esential; the life functions are reduced to a minimum, or even to zero, so as to reduce the expenditure of energy. A higher degree of bodily adaptation, an active or progressive adaptation, is to make the body independent, within certain limits, of external fluctuations. Thus the warm-blooded animals, by means of internal heat-producing mechanisms, sudoriferous (sweat) glands, etc., succeed in maintaining their temperature, moisture, life rhythm more or less uniform or constant, in spite of external fluctuations. Likewise, the habit of storing away food, and agriculture, give independence of the fluctuations in the food-supply conditions.

What has been said about bodily adaptation holds also of psychical and social adaptation. There is a lower, passive or philistine type of adaptation to one's social environment which consists in allowing one's convictions and sentiments to fluctuate in accordance with, to take on the color of, one's changing social environment. The adult philistine becomes more imitative, suggestible, hypnotizable, i.e., he suspends his own judgment and critical ability, and becomes a believer among believers, skeptical among skeptics, cynical among cynics, tyrannical and selfish among exploiters, etc.; or he gives up his mental activity altogether and becomes a stupid, docile, harmless, intellectually inert and indifferent individual.

The higher kind of adapation to one's social environment is that of the genius who either creates for himself a social environment in conformity with his own

convictions and sentiments; or keeps at a distance from others so as to preserve his individuality against the crushing burden of imposed beliefs. Unlike the emotional individual whose psychical equilibrium is exposed to being disturbed by the fluctuating, capricious changes of fate and of human affections; the intellectual individual is well equipped with psychical self-protective mechanisms which enable him to preserve his mental temperature and equilibrium by discriminating between realities and appearances, between realizable



and unrealizable wishes; by eliminating vanity, illusory aspirations, wishes whose fulfilment depends on others; by transforming dreams into realities; by avoiding too close contact with capricious men; by learning how to calm down capricious emotional upheavals, etc.

The more accelerated the growth of a living being is in a certain direction or along a certain evolutional path, and the farther it travels thereon the less is its chance and ability of changing direction and of following a better, higher-leading, new path. The more moldable by environment animals are, the less capable are they of molding and transforming it, or of creating a better artificial environment. The more adapted an

animal is to a given environment, the less adaptable does it prove in case of an environmental change. The philistine and the man belonging to an inferior race are bodily more developed, i. e., nearer to the mature simian type than the intellectual man and the man belonging to a superior race, who bodily stand nearer to the infantile type.

What one gains in adaptiveness to one's given environment, one loses in adaptableness to a new or different environment. In other words, the more we confine ourselves to the pursuit of a few objects near at hand, the less able we become to pursue the numerous and as yet remote or non-existent ends. In order to live one must be somehow adapted to one's surroundings. The degenerate is unadaptable but not unadapted. Or, more correctly, he is actively, but not passively, unadaptable. He lives because he has found some simpler, smoother, more frictionless conditions and surroundings; but he could not survive if these conditions, too, would change or be taken away from him. An extreme degree of degeneration is to be both actively and passively inadaptable: such an individual, if there be such a one, could not survive any change in his habitual course of life. The actively adaptable is unadapted to, dissatisfied with, existing or stable conditions; he is capable and fond of initiating changes; he has the power to resist, to change, select, subdue, external influences, and to assert, maintain, freely modify his natural or inborn tendencies. The adapted is passively adaptable to slowly changing conditions, but inadaptable to rapid, and still less to sudden, changes; he is imitative, submissive, yielding, self-surrendering, renunciating, suggestible.

In prehistoric times, the bodily stronger but psychically less adaptable dark races drove the bodily weaker but psychically more adaptable white race away from

the warm zone, which does not demand much exertion and initiative on the part of the living beings which inhabit it.

Heredity.—Heredity means persistence and transmittal of old environmental influences, i. e., of the organism's reactions thereto, as long as the provocative environmental causes remain the same or vary but slightly, i. e., in details only. The genius inherits the parental tendencies to react in a modified way to the environmental changes. The philistine inherits the rougher, more organized, more primitive ways of reaction. The genius inherits the potential, undeveloped, unfinished, unrecorded, insecure, socially unprotected, variable mental possessions of his parents; whereas the philistine inherits their actual, developed, localized, secure, constant, socially approved mental possessions. What in the parents or ancestors was but a timid, nascent, acquired, secondary way of reaction, becomes in the genius a regular, natural, instinctive, primary way of reaction; and the primary reactions of the ancestors (struggle for food, shelter, clothing, social rank, reproduction . . .) become either all or most of them secondary in the genius; they become subordinate to his intellectual, social, or other ideals, i. e., he is ready to sacrifice them or to reduce them to an indispensable minimum in case of conflict with the latter.

The experiences passed through during an individual's lifetime can neither destroy natural impulses nor create new ones. All they can accomplish is to slightly increase or decrease the natural, inherited proclivities. Thus a naturally truth-loving individual cannot very well become an accomplished, undetected liar or impostor, in spite of his bitter experiences due to sincerity. An individual's experiences do, however, get accumulated, summed up, in the form of instincts, emotions, in his descendants, provided the external physico-

social circumstances remain the same, i. e., cause the descendants to have experiences similar to those of their ancestors. The more intellectually gifted an individual is, the more easily can he free himself from inherited impulses which are counteracted by his natural environment, or the more easily can he change his environment so as to support his natural proclivities. It was natural for prehistoric man to inherit and to preserve various emotions, or instincts of fear (fear of darkness, animals . . .), for his environment was full of dangers threatening his life at every step. But if a modern man is haunted by the same phobias which are no longer justified by his environment and individual experiences, it is a case of degeneration, of atavism, at best of philistine inertia. Instinctive suspicion, withholding of truth from, and cruelty towards, strangers, which is natural in primitive peoples surrounded by inimical tribes, is often to be considered as pathological, or at best as philistine conservatism in a civilized man who ought rather to cultivate emotions of altruism, effusiveness, communicativeness.

Variability and Progress.—Progress, evolution, development, means adaptive change, i. e., a change to the benefit of the organism undergoing it. Progress does not mean continual, uninterrupted, rapid change or variation. Progress means change at the moment and in the direction needed. What, for instance, would become of human intercourse if language varied rapidly, if the number of dialects increased instead of being reduced? Linguistic evolution means increasing clearness, comprehensibility, and economy of the correspondence between words and ideas; but all these requirements necessitate fixity, uniformity rather than variability, slow rather than rapid change. Nor does progress necessarily imply absolute novelty, increasing complexity. Progress may often require a return to

older and simpler ways. Progress, like anything else, is rather characterized by its aims and results than by its means, rather by its content than by its form. Progress is not necessarily simultaneous in all the parts or functions of an individual or social organism; it often necessitates temporary stagnation or even regress in some of them. Not only the genius, but the philistine also is variable. Only in the philistine the tendencies towards variability are weak, repressible, and do not meet with an intelligence that can seize upon, retain, reinforce the adaptive ones, and neglect, eliminate the non-adaptive. The philistine's tendencies to vary remain latent until they get an additional stimulus coming from geniuses with irrepressible tendencies to vary. The philistine is variable, but not progressive; imitative but not creative; original in form, trivial and simple matters, but not in content, important and complicated matters.

What is progress, adaptation, advantageous variation, to a certain individual or social class, may mean regress, maladjustment, disadvantage, for mankind as a whole. What is progress for mankind may be irrelevant, meaningless to the universe. What is a disadvantage, a voluntary or non-voluntary maladjustment, for the genius, results in advantages, better adjustment for human society as a whole. Hence, from the social standpoint, from the standpoint of social progress, the genius is more adaptable than the philistine; whereas from the standpoint of the individual's interests, the philistine may be and often is better adapted, better fitted for survival, which does not mean that he is more adaptable than the genius. Thus, for instance, the moral genius knows very well the tricky ways and means of our so-called successful men; but his higher ideals, his self-respect, make him despise such a course of life. The philistines make often the impression of being more

adaptable than geniuses, because they easily imitate, and get accustomed to, the external appearances and manifestations of new situations, if they are compelled to. But, at bottom, they assimilate and understand just as little of the spirit of progress as their uncivilized, primitive brothers and sisters. And women often seem more adaptable than men because women are never brought into really novel circumstances: at various times, in various places, in various social classes, women in reality have to play one and the same rôle, viz., the rôle of inspiring, spreading, refusing love, with or without domestic drudgery in addition; the actress and the play remain the same, only the language and the costume vary.

Progress means to come ever nearer to one's aims or goals. Human progress or civilization means a qualitative and quantitative increase in the realization of economic, intellectual, emotional, æsthetic and moral ends. It means increasing security of livelihood, increasing number of means for the gratification of bodily needs, increasing certainty and generality (comprehensiveness) of knowledge, increasing number in the sources of healthful enjoyment, increasing happiness, solidarity, love, liberty or respect for individuality among men. In short: It means to enrich and to intensify human life, to lengthen it spiritually if not materially, to increase it qualitatively if not quantitatively. Spencer's formula of evolution as applied to human societies emphasizes the formal, irrelevant, outer aspect; but fails to touch the kernel, the soul, of the matter. As an attempt to embrace in a single glance such a vast field of seemingly disparate phenomena from the vertiginous height of philosophical generalization, Spencer's formula certainly deserves all our praise and admiration. But the respect for the boldness and lofty aim of the attempt must not blind us as to the meagerness of the

results.

The method by which progress is effectuated is active adaptation, i. e., change of cosmical and social environment; creation of better, securer, more constant, artificial surroundings; domestication of physical and of psychical forces; weeding out of harmful variations in self and in not-self; seizing upon and cultivating useful variations.

Difference in Racial Influence.—Bodily differences between different races are more pronounced, more natural, than psychical differences; and geniuses belonging to different races differ still less in the latter respect than the average men of different races. This fact can easily be explained if we keep in mind that the body is adapted to relatively stable physical circumstances limited in time and space, whereas the mind is a product and a factor of superior adaptation to unstable, changeable, past, present and possible physical and social circumstances. Geographically, the various races live in different circumstances, but intellectually they live or tend to live in the same world. Actual circumstances may differ from race to race, but possible circumstances are the same for all races. Hence, the uniformity of the philosophical temperament all over the world.

Bodily and externally, man is dependent on, shaped by, and has to conform with, the physical and the social environment. Mentally, however, the superior man masters and shapes the environment in conformity with his needs and wishes, and makes himself within certain limits independent of it. The stronger one's inner mental life, i. e., the greater one's genius, the more independent does he become of his physical and social environment; the less is he influenced by so-called racial and national mental traits which are not permanent, stable and natural, as ethnical psychologists would

have us believe, but accidental, superficial, changeable, artificial, due to philistine, or compulsory, imitation of tone-setting pseudo-superior men.

Genius and Nationality.—The more isolated a group of men, a community, tribe or nation, the less isolation, solitude, freedom or independence, do its individual members enjoy, and the less is the number of thought-stimulating influences acting on them. With increasing relations or intercourse between nations, the originality and normal peculiarities of individuals increase, while the national or abnormal, unnatural peculiarities disappear: national and individual originality are inversely proportional. The peculiarity of a province or nation consists in the uniformity or lack of peculiarity in its individual members, i. e., in their enforced unilateral development. What distinguishes provinces or nations from each other is not fundamental differences but the accentuation or greater frequency of certain common human qualities in some nations and of other qualities in other nations. That these provincial and national mental characteristics are mostly superficial, enforced, artificial, simulated, is proved by the fact that the children of immigrants do not differ psychically from the children of natives: The sons of supposedly effusive, impulsive, emotional Italians become self-controlled, reticent, taciturn, foxy, intellectual-looking Yankees; the child of a supposedly monotheistically predisposed, peace-loving Jew can be brought up to become a fanatic polytheist or a pugnacious Gentile.

The more original an individual is, the less national characteristics does he possess. Geniuses belonging to different nationalities resemble each other both physically and psychically much more than they resemble their own countrymen; not only geniuses, but also average men belonging to different nationalities but

having the same profession, sympathize with and resemble each other much more than their own countrymen who follow different professions. So artificial and purely accidental or compulsory a matter is the division of mankind into nations; patriotism usually unmasks itself as being a cloak for class interests; rulers and capitalists of one nation intermarry with those of other nations, and feel degraded if one of their class intermarries with a member of a socially or financially lower class, although belonging to the same nation.

Attitude Towards the Established Order of Things. —The common mortal accepts the world and its actual organization as a complex of indisputable, inalterable facts; the superior man of an extreme moral idealism refuses it any reason of existence; the balanced idealist accepts the world and human society as a complex of facts on the way of being transformed, capable of being remodeled.

Desire, belief, knowledge, do not form three independent, differentiated processes in the mind of the average man (and still less in women): he does not believe nor does he try to know what he does not desire to be true; he is convinced of and believes in his superiority, immortality, etc., because he desires it; whereas the thinking man strives to know the world in order to change his desires and beliefs accordingly, where the contrary is not feasible. The average man, when he becomes sentimental, swings between hope and fear, between the extremes of rose-tinted optimism and pessimistic wailings; the balanced superior man persists in meliorism. Modern pragmatism is a relapse into this primitive, undifferentiated, philistine way of thinking. William James, one of the most brilliant among modern sophists, frankly dethrones logic; in his "Will to Believe" he reduces truth or reality to a mere

product of our beliefs, and later in his "Pragmatism" and "Meaning of Truth" he makes the last regressive step, i.e., he subsumes both knowledge or truth and belief under value, utility, or human desires.

To the average man, the ideal is realized somewhere or nowhere; to the superior man, the ideal is projected into the future. The ideals of perfection, justice, goodness, etc., are conceived by the inferior man in the form of actual realities (God, paradise, etc.) existing externally, in a remote space. The superior man conceives them as possibilities, existing internally and potentially, as possibilities that the human soul is gradually approaching—like the parabola its asymptotes—which, in other words, tend to become realities in an infinite time.

The men of genius form the periphery of the human phalanx; they are more in touch with the surrounding environment, with the cosmical and social *milieu;* they receive the first impact, the first blows, which they transmit in a mitigated form to the great mass of men, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, they transmit the accumulated unconscious reactions of the mass in the form of conscious, apparently spontaneous reaction against the environment.

The philistine has a blind, disinterested respect for the established institutions, for established opinions; he judges their soundness by the number of adherents, regardless of the psychical and other differences between the adherents; he looks up to them as indisputable, immutable, divine institutions which are beyond comprehension, beyond criticism. The pseudo-superior man is an interested, insincere worshiper of success. He never attacks a harmful social institution, a misleading and erroneous system of beliefs, as long as they are in power and in favor with the majority, as long as it pays better to be on good terms with them.

He never defends a nascent theory, a nascent institution, as long as it is dangerous, risky, unremunerative to do so. Only the genuine genius does not allow himself to be carried away by the torrent of blind and of interested worshipers, or by the imposing externals and by the momentum of a long past, or by the aureola of traditions. The only *raison d'être* of theories, beliefs, opinions, he finds in their amount of truth. The only title to existence of social organs or institutions he finds in their social usefulness, i.e., in their performing more efficiently, more economically, the functions which single members or private groups of members of the community perform but imperfectly, inefficiently; just as in the individual organism cutaneous respiration and cutaneous elimination of waste products do not render superfluous the more efficient pulmonary breathing or the more efficient elimination through the kidneys, nor would the brain enjoy the privilege of being constantly supplied with food even in times of starvation if it were not of unique, paramount, indispensable importance to the whole organism.

The philistine's conservatism or reverence for and idealization of the existing order is nothing but the obverse of his misoneism or aversion and opposition to real, fundamental, far-reaching changes. Thus the proletarian philistine may overcome his natural misoneism to the extent of seeing the advantage of trades unions, whose object it is to force exploiters to pay higher wages, to improve the working conditions, but he is unable to go a few steps further with the socialists and industrial unionists and strive to do away with exploitation altogether. The minority of aristocratic or predatory philistines, in their turn, may go the length of conceding a few superficial, formal, partial, apparent reforms; but—even when they herald themselves as liberals, progressives, reformers, etc.—they

remain bent upon preserving the old social organization based upon slavery, upon a more or less disguised oppression, exploitation of their weak, poor, defenseless, friendless, foreign fellowmen, whom they drive either into a shiftless, erratic, insecure livelihood or into lifelong vegetation and monotonous drudgery.

True and False Superiority.—The true or vocational superior man strives to become better and wiser than he is; the senational, noise-making, self-advertising, professional, pseudo-superior man strives to appear superior to others and greater than he is. These two tendencies, viz. the tendency to be superior, to become perfect, and the tendency to be recognized, acknowledged as such, exclude each other. Hence, the late, often posthumous, but enduring glorification of genuine idealists, and the promptly acquired, noisy, but perishable glory of the heroes of the day, perishable and ephemeral like the mass of their admirers itself.

The pedant, the financial aristocrat, the intellectually pseudo-superior man, is much more anxious than the true scholar, the born intellectual aristocrat, the intellectually genuine superior man, to impress others with his superiority by means of select language, manners, outward appearances, company, surroundings. The liar, the hypocrite, the morally pseudo-superior man, feels more than the sincere the necessity of emphasizing and trumpeting out his sincerity, of beautifying his motives, of having all appearances or circumstantial evidence speak in his favor, just because he himself is not very much convinced thereof. The pseudo-superior man believes in his own intellectual or moral excellence in proportion as he succeeds in making others believe therein.

The knowledge of the pseudo-superior man is superficial, verbal, lazily and incidentally picked up from lectures, conversations, journalistic accounts, and

criticisms of books, etc. The ideas of the genuine superior man are laboriously worked out from personal experiences and observations, or patiently gleaned from the perusal of the original works of other honest thinkers. The pseudo-superior man learns just enough to be able to hide his ignorance and to make believe that he knows much more than he actually does.

The pseudo-superior man is superficially many-sided; there is no inner connection between his ideas, no harmony between opinions and acts; he does not approach the study of the world from inner or evolutional impulses: he is guided by fashion, by the importance given to it by actual society; his guide is not within himself, for he pursues ostentation, notoriety, fame, success rather than truth. He apparently serves two masters: the criminal financial and the disinterested thought speculators.

Pseudo-superior men differ from average men not so much in their thinking, feeling, and striving as in their way of expressing it, in their language or rather refined slang and in their manners or rather mannerisms; they differ not so much privately, internally, really as they do publicly, externally, apparently; not so much in intelligence, real knowledge, stock of ideas as in verbal knowledge, education, stock of words, useless neologisms and formalities, in astuteness, in their feminine ability to simulate superiority and to conceal their prosaic pursuits beneath an external crust of poetry; they do not differ so much from the mass as they endeavor to make themselves and others believe by resorting to intellectual snobbism, i.e., by using and hunting for rare, pedantic, high-sounding, oracular words, inflated manners, gestures, by keeping at a distance from the great mass, by enshrouding themselves in an atmosphere of mysteriousness and assumed importance. The genuine superior man does not waste

time in delighting in, in showing off, and in exploiting his superiority: he tries to be, not to appear, greater than he is. The pseudo-superior man gratifies his personal vanity, his selfish pursuits, advertises himself indirectly while apparently glorifying the profession, caste, sect, nation, race to which he happens to belong; he conceals his egotism and conceit under the more respectable and more presentable cloak of professional, fraternity, sectarian, national, racial megalomania. The pseudo-superior man accepts such truths only as are valuable to him; he considers truth and personal value as identical or, more correctly, value is his practical criterion of truth. Not so the ideal man: he accepts and defends truth, even if it be detrimental to his personal interests; only in ethical matters which depend partly on human will does he test truth in the crucible of social value. Ethical, religious, artistical, philosophical theories and ideas are for the former a full dress to be put on for great occasions and festivals; to be shown, exhibited on the platform or stage, in the classroom or in books, but not to be worn, to be made use of in every-day life.

The pseudo-superior man does not love knowledge, truth, art, religion . . . for their own sake or for the sake of their general usefulness, but for the sake of the material benefit he can derive therefrom. He considers them as his private property to be kept a secret, to be protected against theft, to be used as a source of power over the propertyless, i.e., over laymen and over the ignorant. He carries the individualistic, egoistic habit from the economic world over into the intellectual, spiritual world as much as the spirit of the time or the *Zeitgeist* allows it. The modern western pseudo-superior men do not openly form such hermetically sealed castes as the ancient priests did and the Brahmins still do, but the open-eyed connois-

seur can still detect much of this caste spirit, caste secrecy, caste grandomania, caste or interested solidarity euphemistically called *esprit de corps* among our academicians, politicians, liberal professions, and, what is worse still, he discovers among them the predatory or gang spirit. But, in spite of their endeavors to monopolize knowledge, art, religion . . . and the material advantages going therewith, the intellectual world is ever more penetrated by the international, socialistic, communistic, hospitable spirit, thus paving the way for socialism, community of material goods in the economic world.

The genuine superior man is too rich in original thoughts and too high above the applauses of the ephemeral masses to resort to the pseudo-superior man's various forms of intellectual dishonesty: obscure, mystical, picturesque, dazzling language; puzzling, mystifying theories; adulteration, distortion of commonplace truth; plagiarism, feeding one's readers or audience on empty words, on Hegelian nonsense and vagaries. . . .

The genuine superior man adopts the intellectual or moral sphere as his permanent place of abode, just as in the economic world the independence-seeking type of pioneer ventures into new lands with the intention of creating for himself and others a new and more tender adoptive fatherland. The intellectual world is not the natural element in which the semi-superior, and still less the pseudo-superior man, can permanently live. He only occasionally, if at all, ventures to those as yet little inhabited regions in order to have some amazing, sensational wonders to report to the sedentary, conservative masses of philistines, which, although averse to actual changes of place, opinions, habits, unless compelled by external circumstances, enjoy hearing about such wonderful possibilities. The semi-superior man is in

the intellectual world the analog of the predatory pioneer, adventurous traveler, explorer of unknown lands, who travels thither, not in order to live there, but in order to satisfy either his own curiosity, aimless Wanderlust or the curiosity of the non-nomadic masses, and thus to earn fame, money, and what not. The pseudo-superior men, the academical philosophers, the professional moralists, are in the intellectual or theoretical world what the politicians, demagogues, office-seekers are in the economic world or world of action. The intellectually pseudo-superior men pose as originators of new thought directions, of intellectual progress, while doing their best to discourage, to suppress, to silence the contemporary genuine theoretical geniuses of whose rivalry they are afraid. The volitionally pseudo-superior men pose as social reformers, as benefactors of the people, as benevolent rulers, while persecuting, imprisoning, destroying the genuine contemporary and social reformers in whom they scent dangerous rivals destined to supersede them some day when the people will be more enlightened, more critical and open-eyed.

The genuine superior man strives modestly and noiselessly towards self-perfection, towards excelling himself. He does it out of an inner evolutive impulse, and not, like the semi- and pseudo-superior men, out of envy, ambition, or compelled by the need of competing with others and to surpass them by any means, either in reality or in appearance. This unscrupulous competitive need is a mitigated form of the fighting instinct, and is still considered in our actual society as the chief characteristic of manliness; whereas the harmlessness, sincerity, straightforwardness of the genuine superior men points to the existence in embryo of a cooperative instinct which, in a more perfect society, will supersede aggressiveness and interested docility; from a mere demand of reason that it is now-

adays, collaboration will become an instinctive or emotional demand.

In all their doings the pseudo-superior men assume an air of self-importance which gives them the appearance of taking their work seriously, of considering their work as a primary end, as the only or most important aim of their life. Only the connoisseur unmasks an actor in the pseudo-superior man, only the connoisseur sees that the real aim is self-aggrandizement. Like the actor, the pseudo-superior man may sometimes deceive himself as to the real materialistic aim of his acting, and identify himself for a moment with the disinterested intellectual hero whom he impersonates.

The pseudo-superior men in the intellectual world treat knowledge and classes of knowledge or sciences in a similar way as women and financial aristocrats in the economic world treat men and classes of men. They are very anxious to keep up artificial demarcation lines between various sciences; they are more anxious about methods and terminology than about the knowledge pursued; style, form, manner and order of exposition, are more essential to them than the ideas expounded; they care more for the author, origin of an idea, its bearing on their own interests, than for the idea itself, for its truth, for its bearing on general human interests; they lay more emphasis upon formal, abstract, dry, verbal than upon material, concrete, living, real logic. Their works, if they produce any, are a display of elegant, brilliant, refined, fashionable methods; of over-systematization, of musical, hypnotizing, multicolored language or expression; of mathematical garments; of everything that is mystifying, awe-inspiring, but not of real, substantial, socially useful knowledge or truth.

The pseudo-superior man, like children and women,

strives for authority, power, social distinction, linguistic wealth, which are but symbols of superiority. He imagines that with the symbol the thing represented by it will infalliby come also. Or he mistakes, and hopes that others will also mistake, the appearance, the symbol for the reality, the thing-in-itself. The craving for power, for sham superiority or social distinction, is a remnant, a mitigated form of the primitive, bestial predatory or parasitical habits of the nomadic aggressive tribes who preyed upon the peaceful, sedentary, agricultural races; and the spontaneous, quasi-instinctive, distinterested respect or fear shown by the masses to such sham superior individuals, even if they have no real power, is a relic of the primitive justified fear shown by the conquered, exploited, ill-treated masses in the presence of a despotic, capriciously cruel member of the ruling class or of the victorious invaders.

The aim of the pseudo-superior man being power, social distinction and superiority over others, but not truth, not real intellectual superiority; we understand why he looks for truth—or rather pretends to do so—everywhere except where it is to be found; at best, he preferably looks for it in the distance, among primitive peoples, in uninhabited lands, in the remote, inaccessible past. He prefers intricate, mathematical, dialectical, incomprehensible, abstract methods which are inaccessible to and uncontrollable by the majority. He seemingly looks in the clouds and in the heavens for things that are on earth, under everybody's eyes. He prefers roundabout, untrodden, deserted, mysterious paths where nobody can follow him and see whether he really travels thereon or merely sits down in idleness while people consider him a pioneer and expect him to return with a message that he has discovered new perspectives.

The proletarian philistine is frankly materialistic and prosaic, frankly narrow-minded and narrow-hearted; nay, he often hides a tender soul under his rough exterior and higher aspirations under his assumed or externally imposed brutal manners. Whereas the aristocratic philistine, and particularly the pseudo-superior man, is a philistine with the appearance or in the garb of a superior man. He conceals his hard-heartedness under a smiling, soft-mannered behavior; he conceals his prosaic, materialistic nature under memorized poetical expressions; he conceals his egoism under the cloak of altruistic pursuits; he has a hideous soul in a beautiful, attractive body. In short, he is a phrase-monger, an appearance-monger; he imitates or mimicks and deals in the outward forms of all that is noble and ideal. The parasitical or pseudo-superior man, who takes on the outward appearance of the genuine superior man, and even improves upon it, in order to reap the credit and remuneration due to the latter for his social services, reminds me of those African savages who, after the confinement of their wives, lie in bed and simulate all the sufferings of childbirth in order to receive the consolations and congratulations to which by right their wives are entitled. The pseudo-superior man leaves the earnest, hard, ungrateful, dangerous pioneering work to the genius; and, when the new land is already prepared and rendered sufficiently safe for mass colonization, or, to drop the figure, when the new doctrines are sufficiently cleared up, rendered immune from attack and opposition, he jumps in, stirs up the public, constitutes himself a leader or an executive authority, in order to reap the admiration and the benefits which are really due to publicly unknown, long forgotten or merely posthumously honored geniuses. If our present-day rulers had been born a hundred years earlier, they would not have styled themselves

defenders of international peace, of international morality, friends of the negroes, etc., just as they hate to-day to take up the cause of unemployment, of socialism, of child labor, etc., because these movements are not yet sufficiently advanced or free from danger and, hence, demand too much self-abnegation, too much real work and self-sacrifice of their defenders. The pseudo-superior man wages war while seemingly making peaceful transactions; he competes under the mask of cooperation; he furthers solely his own interests under the mask of serving others; he commits crimes under the appearance of seeking justice or of enforcing the law; he is an innocent-looking criminal; when he finds the antiquated or military form of war inefficient, he claims to be a defender of peace while he goes on using the more dangerous—and to him harmless—weapon called capital to crush his competitors and to enslave his fellow-men, carrying the spirit of war over into new fields of human activity (industry, commerce, politics, education, church, etc.); he is an intelligent-looking fool, a friendly-looking egoist, an active-looking idler, a serious or dignified-looking, frivolous creature, a brave-looking coward, an honest-looking rascal, a beast of prey in a sheep's skin. He hides his obtuseness, superficiality, ignorance, nonentity behind mystifying conventionalities, formalities, ceremonies, sonorous words, etc.

Sociability.—The philistine is more sociable, although less social or altruistic, than the superior man, because he has less refined intellectual and emotional needs than the latter. The philistine has no strong convictions to defend against unbelievers or skeptical people; he has no clearly defined and imperious aspirations beyond food, shelter, reproduction, bodily amusements and clothing, on account of which he should differ from his fellow-men. He has no penetrating in-

sight into others' hearts and minds to distinguish impure, mixed, interested, simulated feelings towards him from pure, unmixed, distinterested, genuine ones; to distinguish words of the tongue from words of the heart. Nor has he any longing for such subtle, invisible, ethereal possessions as friendship, love, fame; he has no understanding and hence no yearning for the chastity of the soul: the chastity of the body is sufficient to him; friendliness, politeness taste to him just as good as—nay, much better than—friendship and sympathy. He has no trains of thoughts to follow out, no problems to think out, so that transitory solitude is no necessity to his mind; nay, more, solitude is a horror to him, for his soul or inner world is such a desert that he is afraid of being left alone with his own thoughtlessness. Thinking is, or rather has become, so unnatural to him that an occasional reflective state of mind is regarded by himself and others as a symptom of mental derangement, whereas in the superior man the opposite symptom, thoughtlessness, becomes alarming; just as revolutionary thoughts, which are natural in a social philosopher, are a symptom of moral insanity in the ignorant and narrow-minded.

The philistine is more communicative, for he makes no selection among his few banal, trivial, suggested, ever-recurring thoughts to see which deserve being communicated to others; he is too naïve to know that what is important to him may not seem so to others. Whereas the superior man tries to select those which appeal to the interest and understanding of others, and this selective process going on inwardly is another obstacle to ordinary sociability. With the philistine, language is not so much a means of conveying his thoughts and feelings as a means of sociability, of approaching his fellow-men, a channel of discharge for his surplus of

motor energy; talking is no serious activity to him, no means to a higher end, it is rather play activity; it is not a means to externalize his own, or to penetrate into others', inner, psychical, sensory activity; it is rather an end-in-itself, a source of immediate pleasure. All men, both superior and philistine, have the same bodily needs (in financial aristocrats these become more refined and more differentiated); whereas not all superior men have the same intellectual needs and abilities, for specialization is carried to its extreme: some delight in observation, experimentation; others in speculation, interpretation, invention; within each field the material worked upon and the method pursued differ from superior man to superior man to such an extent that no two superior men of like intellectual needs are likely to meet one another *in persona;* they only meet through the intermediary of their published works. Solitude is the price paid for mental superiority, be it even solitude in the midst of admirers. The sociability of the philistine springs from disinterested love of men and human company; whereas the sociability of the pseudo-superior man is like the helpless attachment of the parasitical animal to its host.

The incentives of the pseudo-superior man to sociability are his self-seeking nature or desire to further through others his personal interests, and his vanity or love of being admired by the masses; the causes of his dexterity and success in society are his ability to simulate and to dissimulate, his little degree of superiority over philistines, his ability of indirect self-advertising, his lack of strong convictions and feelings, and of intellectual honesty which should prevent him from playing any rôle. Whereas the superior man, compared with the pseudo and semi-superior man, seems unsociable because he is not bold enough, not prominent enough, not naïve enough, or he is too polite, too

poor or dependent, too *rücksichtsvoll* to assert his own personality in society and to impose it upon others; he is too unskilled an actor, too self-respecting, too honest intellectually to make believe that he thinks and feels like others, and to act accordingly; he is too original, natural, and engrossed with permanently important matters and thoughts to have time or patience for imitating artificial, trivial, transitory social manners, empty conventionalities and formalities, stereotyped phrases.

Thinking is a private matter. Only the results of thinking, only thoughts and conclusions, can be shared, communicated, used for social purposes. But the processes and ways of thinking, the searching after conclusions, are unsharable, uncommunicable, because not fully known to the thinking individual himself: To know in what way new conclusions are to be reached means to have almost reached them. Hence, to be sociable all the time or at any time means to give up one's thinking, to relapse into animal superficiality and thoughtless enjoyment of life. Likewise with love: Conjugal, parental, fraternal love are private matters. One cannot fondle one's wife, children, brothers and sisters, intimate friends in public, without arousing the envy, indignation, laughter of the unheeded selfish onlookers. Continual or frequent social intercourse makes, therefore, for the destruction, not only of originality or truth-seeking, but also of love. Sociability breeds conventionality, superficiality, posing, acting, shallowness of heart and mind.

When thinking people will become more numerous and economically less dependent, they will reform social life: They will impose upon it respect for individuality, naturalness; they will make it more agreeable by combining it with more free play, with intermissions of isolation, with the freedom of retiring with-

out formalities from and of joining at pleasure again in the social circle. An ideal human life cannot subsist without a healthful alternation and combination of activity and rest, of work and play, of effort and relaxation, of sociability and isolation, of social intercourse and privacy. . . .

Difference in Intellectual Needs.—The objects of needs, in contradistinction to the objects of luxury, must be enjoyed continually or at least periodically; they cannot be dispensed with without causing pain, unhappiness, harm; one never tires of them; one longs for them instinctively and not merely out of imitation; hence, one cannot with impunity be dissuaded from pursuing them. The objects of needs are not always different in kind or quality from those of luxuries. One and the same object is usually an object of need or an object of luxury according to the quantity that one may dispose of and enjoy. The boundary line between needs and luxuries is shifting, not only for various individuals, but also for one and the same individual. The limits, however, within which the boundary line may slide to and fro without destroying the happiness, health or even the life of the individual, are fixed for one and the same mature individual.

Intellectual pursuits which are organic needs for the genius are mere luxuries for the philistine; and most of the bodily comforts and gratifications of vanity which seem to be a need to the philistine are dispensable luxuries for the genius.

The philistine has no real or only rudimentary intellectual needs. He has curiosity, but no thirst for knowledge, no ideal aspirations. In the man of talent, the intellectual needs are somewhat developed, but not so pronounced, whole-heartedly adhered to, and not so impulsive as to assert themselves in spite of adverse circumstances. External circumstances, the social

milieu, accentuate some intellectual tendencies and point out the direction of their development, but suppress many others. Hence the intellectual manifestations of the man of talent are voluntary, methodical, systematical, *planmässig*, full of erudition, but ridiculously poor in new conclusions. The pseudo-superior man has some talent and often even a spark of genius; but he subordinates his little, superficial intellectual ability to the attainment of material and vain pursuits. In the man of genius, the intensity and the direction of intellectual impulses are determined from within. Hence their manifestations are spontaneous, unmethodical, poor in erudition, but rich and bold in conclusions drawn.

The pursuit of uncertain, risky, not wholly attainable ends, requires most—if not the whole—of our energy. We cannot therefore afford to pursue two opposite kinds of such ends. He who chooses, or rather feels impelled by his nature to pursue, truth, knowledge, social happiness, must be either sufficiently provided with resources and means of satisfying his material bodily needs, or he must reduce these to a minimum whose gratification is well-nigh secure; for no one can take his flight into the higher, intellectual spheres without starting from a bit of secure, safe, solid, economic standing ground. Likewise the great mass of toiling people, and the insatiable materialists, need their whole energy in the pursuit of food, clothing, shelter, social recognition—no matter whether deserved or not—vain luxuries, petty ambitions, etc. They need therefore a bit of apparently momentarily safe intellectual standing ground in order to take refuge therein whenever they get tired and feel the vanity of their petty pursuits; in order to appease their occasionally awakening drowsy conscience when it reproaches them for their materialism. And this minimum of solid intel-

lectual standing ground they find in dogmatic religion, in dogmatic science, which save them the trouble of personal pilgrimage to the lofty regions of philosophical meditation on such intricate, subtle, vital matters as immortality, origin and aim of human life, justification and valuation of various ways of human activity, etc. The philistine, the materialist—if not too much stupefied by drudgery or greed and unbridled enjoyment—although lacking themselves the leisure and ability to pursue spiritual values, feel just as much the need of an indispensable minimum of solid intellectual ground in the form of dogmas, religious practises, ready-made convictions as the most world-despising, impassible philosopher is in need of a secure indispensable minimum of economic standing ground in the form of food, shelter, clothing.

The aristocratic or parasitical philistine pretends to strive after knowledge, education, when in reality he is after a mere semblance of knowledge or the mastery of a grandiloquent caste language, which should constitute his title to a privileged position, that is, to the exertion of authority over the masses of proletarian philistines. This fact is well known, although not openly admitted by all pseudo-superior men, successful lecturers, preachers, heads of educational institutions, who spurn to divulge their precious knowledge in the market place, in the street corners, and prefer to attract their audiences through personal ties, exclusive fees, imposing buildings, dazzling pomp and ceremonies, adorned flattery, etc.; for they know that the mere prospect of acquiring knowledge would not attract the aristocratic philistines, and still less would it induce them to open their purses and to part with some of their money, their only object of sincere adoration.

Difference in Originality.—Strictly speaking, it is not correct to say that originality is what distinguishes

the genius from the masses of philistines, unless we understand by originality any mental difference from the multitude; in the latter case, however, our whole statement reduces itself to a tautology. If we give to the word originality its true meaning of initiative, inventiveness, mental variability, mental capacity of going beyond imitation, of doing more, better or differently than we have been taught, of impressing the stamp of individuality on what has been suggested to us, then we cannot deny a certain amount of originality and of philoneism to any philistine, for there are no two perfectly identical things, let alone identical men, in this world. It is a common observation that philistines, particularly the minority of aristocratic philistines, also enjoy being different from their neighbors; nay, they mistake their formal, petty differences for superiority and try to compel others to acknowledge it. It is also a common observation that many a would-be aristocratic philistine, who has been born into a low, humble, poor, servile condition, takes very easily, when favored by circumstances, to automobile riding, to indulgence in luxury and in ostentatiousness, to a domineering, tyrannizing, haughty attitude and behavior, etc., thus disproving Lombroso's contention that the philistine is misoneistic or averse to change and novelty. The truth is that the philistine is merely averse to the mental effort necessitated by higher, disinterested pursuits; he is averse to changing himself (and very naturally so) and to such new circumstances as compel a change of self or a greater mental effort than he is capable of; he is averse to new institutions that demand, not outward conformation, but compliance with their spirit. But he is not in the least averse to an improvement in his material condition, to amusing novelties, to new comforts, to new sensations, to commercial innovations and technical progress that

bring him in greater returns. He is averse or opposed to radical, substantial, great changes, but not to superficial, formal, trivial, slight changes. He is disinclined to adopt new ends, but does not object to new and better means for the attainment of his every-day ends. Thus the alleged conservatism of the savage philistines did not prevent them from appreciating the superiority of firearms over their bow and arrows. Likewise the conservatism of the church did not shrink in ancient times from using steam power and mechanical inventions for the purpose of fraudulently maintaining the popular belief in miracles; nor does it shrink in our times from adopting the use of electricity and of other modern inventions; all it cares to conserve is the stupidity of the flock and its privileges based thereupon. What is euphemistically called the antagonism between misoneism, conservatism, individualism, . . . and philoneism, progressivism, socialism, . . . is in reality nothing else than the antagonism between selfish, parasitic, low, stupid pursuits and unselfish, productive, higher pursuits; for the progressive individual never dreams of throwing overboard all the past acquisitions of mankind; nay, he is more anxious than anybody else to conserve whatever has proved to be generally useful. The only difference between philistine and superior originality, individuality, mental variability is this: that the former is purely quantitative, applied either to trivial, useless, aimless, playful pursuits or to selfish, materialistic, bodily, narrow, simple, immediate needs, or to outstripping one's fellow-men by slightly deviating from the common road and temporarily following an unencumbered roundabout way; whereas the originality of the genius is qualitative, that is to say, his mental abilities are quantitatively much greater than those of the philistine and his interests or aims differ qualitatively, i. e., in

kind, number, seriousness, comprehensiveness, from those of the philistine; his originality applies itself to remote, ultimate, broad, intellectual, generally useful ends, to setting new ideals or new aims of life.

The originality of the minority of snobbish or aristocratic and commercial or would-be aristocratic philistines invents new amusements, new games, but not new machines; new words for old ideas; more palatable, but not more wholesome or more substantial food; more adorned, but not more hygienic dresses; new appearances, but not new realities; luxuries, but not new means of gratifying real needs; charity, but not altruism; jurisprudence, legal tricks or subtleties, but not a reorganization of society upon an equitable basis. The originality of aristocratic philistines also manifests itself in idealizing, disguising their own base pursuits, and not in adopting nobler aims of life; in inventing methods of deceiving, enslaving, spying and imposing upon their fellow-men, and methods of rising on the backs of the latter; in inventing methods of self-advertising, self-glorification, flattering self-deception, and not of self-perfectioning. From aristocratic philistines we can learn how to uselessly spend our surplus energy in games, hunting, dancing, athletics and on other wasteful, stultifying forms of muscular activity, or in idle, verbal speculation, reverie, psychical research, spiritism, occultism, etc., but not how to transform this surplus energy into sensory energy, idea-forces, sane and useful thoughts, or how to make it render generally useful services while relieving ourselves thereof; or, in other words, how to combine productive work with play (so as to avoid the accumulation of a dangerous surplus), mental uplift with amusement, public service with personal benefit. From aristocratic originality we can learn how to pass off for promoters, leaders, benefactors, useful members of society,

when in reality we are incompetent, non-producers, indolent parasites; we can learn how to invent conventions, formalities, ceremonies, excuses, lies to fit every occasion and to serve as shields for concealing our ignorance, misdeeds, callousness, egotism, embarrassment, etc.

The originality of proletarian philistines applies itself to finding out ways of pleasing the exploiters and their allies; it also manifests itself in taking personal advantage of the existing artificial social order, but not in improving it; it finds ways of enduring, mitigating, avoiding existing evils, but not in facing and destroying them once for all; it finds some amount of happiness in the midst of privations of all sorts, some amount of hope and consolation in illusory beliefs, self-stultification, etc.

The formal, low-grade, deceptive, anti-social originality of the aristocratic philistines reaches its climax in their leaders, champions and spokesmen, the pseudo-superior men, who, while being really in the employ of the exploiters or aristocratic philistines, pose as leaders of the entire congregation, community, nation, in order to gain the confidence of the exploited. In addition to formal, verbal, deceptive originality, the pseudo-superior man also possesses a spark of real originality. He prostitutes and degrades, however, the art or science in which he happens to be gifted; he perverts it from its true, socially useful mission and presses it—under a disguise, of course—into the service of his employers. Thus, if he happens to be a psychologist like Hugo Münsterberg, he degrades psychology to the art of the detective ("On the witness stand") or to the art of the slave-driver ("Psychology and industrial efficiency"); at best, he wastes his ingenuity on trifling, useless, playful, sensation-arousing investigations.

If a surplus of energy is left to the rich philistine in consequence of his freedom from material cares (food, shelter, clothing), he either spends this surplus in pleasure-seeking which ruins his mind and body, or, in exceptional cases, he turns his mind to original activity. But this originality, in distinction from the genuine originality of the genius, does not manifest itself so much in setting new and socially useful aims of life, in enriching the contents of human aspirations, as in enriching and uselessly beautifying the mere forms of old pursuits. The rich philistine is intellectually too timid to venture upon new, untrodden ground, to venture beyond the externals of old or proposed institutions. He rather prefers to go around vital problems, not too far away from the masses, than to try to bring light into the dark interior of the problems themselves, where he may find himself all alone. The rich philistine spends his surplus of energy on inventing, or delighting in, socially detrimental play activities and luxuries (food-delicacies, new fashions in dress or shelter, etiquette, conventionalities, love-play or flirtation, dilettantism, decoration, eccentricities, fads, useless neologisms, . . .) rather than in serious activities, in socially useful aims (pursuit of real knowledge, of vitalizing love, of substantial beauty). What distinguishes the genius from the philistine is, not so much the latter's inability to strike upon new interpretations, thoughts, feelings or manners of acting, as his fear of the unknown, his fear of getting too far away from the multitude, his lack of intellectual courage to invite his fellow-men to follow him into the new intellectual regions of which he happens to get a glimpse. The mercenary or pseudo-superior man, on the other hand, is not afraid of the unknown. But he is too little thirsty for knowledge, and he is too much concerned with his own material comfort to venture too

far into the unknown; nor is he very eager to bring light into the darkness of the unknown, from fear of betraying his little advancement therein, and also from the desire to exploit the fear and curiosity of the masses which do not dare to follow him, but are nevertheless waiting to get enlightenment or consolation from him on his return from the transcendental world. The rich philistine, to whom a superficial or verbal education lends the appearance of intellectual superiority, and the pseudo-superior man, lack the modesty, the disinterested, impersonal, self-forgetful love of knowledge of the genuine superior man to go too far away from the public: They venture far enough to attract the public attention upon themselves, but they do not go too far to get lost sight of, nor do they absent themselves for too long a time in the realms of thought and meditation to be forgotten by the admiring contemporaries. They also lack the genuine superior man's intellectual honesty to see how little real knowledge is left to impart to others after it is disentangled from its academic verbiage and from the purely ornamental, useless, fictitious, pseudo knowledge. Not that the field of human inquiry has been exhausted or is limited and exhaustible, but under present conditions the teacher lacks either the ability or the means of guiding his pupils along the path of independent inquiry. It was not only fear of intellectual prostitution that made Spinoza shrink back from notoriety and refuse a university professorship, but also his modesty, his fair-mindedness, his feeling that he did not know enough yet to teach others, let alone to spread it out in a two years' college course. Likewise with Schopenhauer: it was not grando-mania that made him lecture to his students on his own "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," but it was the conviction that this was for the time being the best and most secure knowledge he could

impart to others. Whereas the pseudo-superior men (99 per cent. of college professors, academic philosophers, priests, ethical culture leaders, journalists, statesmen, . . .), driven by vanity or by greed, undertake to teach and preach things that they do not know themselves, to enlighten others in matters about which they are themselves in the dark, to lead their fellow-men towards goals unknown to themselves, or towards goals that they do not care to reach. The dilettantism of rich philistines is analogous to the flirtation of brainless and heartless women. The dilettanti do not take art and science seriously. Unlike the genuinely superior men, they do not concentrate their love and constant attention on one single pursuit while preserving their friendship or interest for all the other nobler pursuits. All they want is to draw selfish amusement, to gratify their vanity; and to kill their time or *ennui;* just as flirts degrade love —which is a serious matter for the preservation and improvement of the species—to a mere plaything, pastime or weapon of exploitation. The semi-superior men take their intellectual pursuits seriously. Only, like the great mass of normal women, whose love seems to be reserved merely for successful men, the semi-superior men reserve their interest merely for fashionable scientific and artistic pursuits. Just as the merchant deals with a commodity not because he is interested in it or because he desires it for his own use, but merely because there is a demand for it, i. e., because it is saleable; and just as a mediator between marriageable men and women treats both the genuine and the spurious need of love as a commodity; just so does the pseudo-superior man treat knowledge, art, morality as a commodity to be sold, to be transferred from the producer to the consumer, in a more or less adulterated form.

What has been said about male aristocratic philis-

tines applies also to the female philistines. During their first youth and during their child-bearing period, they indulge mainly in flirtations, love affairs, sex parasitism, with hardly any understanding for the real world they are living in. Those who are not entirely degenerate also take upon themselves part of their maternal duties. During the *second youth*, however, when they have no more maternal duties to attend to, those who are incurable sex parasites foolishly try to live their girlhood over again, giving food to scandalmongers and destroying the happiness of many a home. Whereas those who have not been entirely crippled by their parasitic function try to develop to a certain extent the neglected organs of their souls, viz., the need for sociability, female friends, knowledge, social welfare work, defending the women's rights movements, spreading light on sexual hygiene, etc.; they are incapable, however, to embrace serious pursuits that require more courage, more energy, more self-denial, such as scientific investigations, socialistic propaganda, radical reforms, nursing of the poor, taking care of orphans or of children whose parents go out working, starting a crusade against the tyranny and the morally ruinous effect of fashions, luxuries, display of wealth.

CHAPTER II

ORIGIN AND CONDITIONS

ORIGIN, CAUSES

Heredity, Spontaneous Variations.—Heredity and variation are two simultaneous, complementary qualities of reproduction. Neither is more primitive and more in need of explanation than, or a special case of, the other. The elementary functions of life (nutrition and reproduction) being given, heredity and variation follow as necessary corollaries. For life means some sort of changes or variations. If the parents vary, i. e., if the parents are different at every moment from what they were at preceding moments, owing to variations in the external and internal environment, how can we expect the child who is born and lives in a different environment to reproduce all the parental traits exactly as they were in the parents at the same periods of their lives? On the other hand, the internal and external environment of every fœtus and child overlaps more with the parental environment than with anybody else's environment. What wonder, then, that his variations are nearer to the mean variation of his parents than to anybody else's mean variation? Any character or trait consists of three parts: One is inherited; one is apparently due to variation, but is really mostly due to the actualization, liberation, or emergence in the child of an inherited latent parental trait, or vice versa; it may be due to the latentification or repression of a parental actual trait; the third part is

really due to variation, i. e., to acquisition made under new circumstances.

From the subjective point of view, genius appears to be a spontaneous phenomenon, a creation *ex nihilo;* objectively, however, it can be regarded as a result of accumulation or of summation of inherited unconscious tendencies, of inherited cosmical-suggestive impulses.

If heredity meant persistence, conservation, copying; if heredity were only uniparental or alternate, then, of course, genius and heredity would be incompatible. But if we keep in mind that we inherit tendencies, that tendencies which have been counteracted, repressed, neutralized in our ancestors may become freed, released, actual in us, their descendants; that there is such a thing as bi-parental or blended inheritance, i. e., summation of similar parental characteristics in the descendants, then there is no contradiction between inheritance and genius.

The child is not simply a copy of his parents. He is a continuation of the parental tendencies; he continues their curve of development, in its ascending or descending stage. The child of a genius who has reached the culminating point of his development-curve, who—in other words—has no more potential tendency toward a higher stage, is likely to be an inferior being, inferior to his father, at least.

Hereditary, inner, physiological influences could be interpreted in the last analysis as cumulative environmental, outer, social influences: for what we inherit from our ancestors must have been acquired at some remote past under the influence of the social-physical environment. Only those acquired characters are transmitted hereditarily which affect strongly the parent's organism, i. e., which affect not only the soma, but also the germ plasm.

To produce a genius, the qualitatively similar characters of the parents must be added algebraically; a geometrical addition gives birth to common mortals and to talented men. The resultant, however, of such an algebraic addition is unstable. Hence, the non-hereditary characteristic of higher genial abilities. The geometrical addition of potential or actual abilities can give an indefinite number of different resultants, starting from zero, and reaching as a maximum the arithmetic sum. If we have an angle of maximum attraction between two characters, c_1 and c_2, that is an angle of 0^0, we have a resultant $c_3 = c_1 + c_2$.



This is a case of creative inheritance. That "love-children," i. e., children conceived in mutual sexual attraction and in noble self-forgetfulness, untainted by sordid financial and other selfish considerations, are both mentally and bodily exceptionally vigorous, is a well-known fact. If the angle of attraction is such that the resultant c_3 equals either c_1 or c_2 we have a case of alternate inheritance.

A maximum angle of repulsion, i. e., 180°, gives $c_3 = c_1 - c_2$ or degenerative inheritance.



Environment.—Every man is both a product and a factor, at the same time, of the environment in which he lives. Only the genius is a more important factor than the others. Both the working class and the class of geniuses, i. e., the physical and the mental workers, the protecting, supporting, and the really guiding classes, arise from the ecto-derma of the social embryo, from the outer, more exposed to, but not wholly worn-out by, physico-social environmental influences and frictions, from the less protected, less supported, and the less guided strata of human society.

The influence of the actual, immediate environment is not so evident or manifest in the individual life of the genius as in that of the average man; it is not so evident in the life of individuals as it is in that of the race and of the species; not so great upon the body as it is upon the mind. The reverse is true of heredity: Its influence upon the genius, the race, the mind, is not so great, manifest and univocal as it is upon the philistine, the individual, the body. The influences of the environment seem to be cumulative, hence the appearance of spontaneity given to original creations. In the genius, the latent, remote, mediate environmental influences seem to be more concentrated to a burning, active focus than in the talented or the average man. In the individual life, the point of application of tendencies (the matter upon which the tendency is exerted) is apparently more subject to environmental influences than their magnitude (capacity of achievement) and than their direction (general nature), which are rather hereditary, inborn.

Theoretically, the environment of a thing, of a being, is all the rest of the world except itself. Practically, however, the environment of a being consists only of those things and beings which can act upon it. The environment of animals, especially the social environ-

ment of man, is largely selected. This fact makes it difficult to disentangle the share of external influences and opportunities from that of individual peculiarities and abilities, the share of compulsion, suggestion from that of will, adaptation, originality. Strong individual peculiarities, pronounced originality, cause their owner to avoid as far as possible the company of those in the midst of whom he cannot manifest or at least preserve his nature. The superior women of all times, such as the hetairæ of ancient Athens, have always tried to surround themselves in their *salons* with a select social milieu or to find it in convents, literary circles, etc. The less original an individual, the more easily does he discover his like to associate with. The philistine is welcome everywhere, because he has the most elementary human needs which are common to and approved by all men.

If the environment of a being consists only of those things, events and beings which act upon it; it follows that the genius lives in a different environment from that of the philistine; or, more correctly, the environment of the genius is more extended than that of the philistine. Whereas the philistine is acted upon by his narrow, local, physical, artificial, personal, phenomenal, immediate, visible, present, actual, . . . environment, the genius is also acted upon by the cosmical, psychical, natural, hidden, impersonal, remote, invisible, past, possible, latent, . . . environment. The philistine, in order to change his behavior, needs examples given by living authoritative persons. To the genius a mere hint, a mere suggestion coming from any source—from the animated or inanimated world, from obscure or prominent men, from persons or books, . . . —is sufficient.

Individuality and environment, ability and opportunity, are correlative terms; one presupposes the

other; they have to be explained in terms of each other. Neither is a mere cause, or mere effect of the other. Individual differences, variations, originality, are partly due to environmental changes. And vice versa: changes in man's physico-social environment are caused by individual peculiarities, by originality or genius. If an environmental change, in order to stimulate original human action and thinking, has to work cumulatively by means of heredity, the same holds of the influence of the genius upon his surroundings; attempts at innovation have to be repeated by a succession of similar geniuses and talents, their efforts must be cumulated before a real and lasting innovation can take place.

The psychically independent or isolated individuals, i. e., the individuals who for some reason or other are more or less free from the shackles of tradition, custom, externals, conventions and from restless material pursuits; the individuals who without breaking entirely—like the extra-social criminals, the insane, the eccentric, *Natur-Menschen*—with the slowly and blindly advancing compact group of human beings, keep at a certain distance from it: such individuals, I say, have a better, more comprehensive view of both nature or physical environment and human society or social environment. They see the opportunities of the physical environment, they are open to its suggestions and teachings; they also receive the impact of the blind strivings, aspirations, tendencies of the social group which, on account of counteracting tendencies and on account of the great mass acted upon, cannot see their way out of the state of mere latency or vague desire, cannot go over into an actual change of direction, but which in the independent individuals go freely over into an actual movement in a different direction. The semi-independent individuals who are often nearer to the independent individuals than to the bulk of philistines, soon follow

dragging along a greater or lesser part of the dependent, imitative, mentally inert individuals. The bulk of human beings may preserve its old course and perish little by little; whereas the new little social group may break gradually all its connections with the old group and form a group apart, following a different and more advantageous or progressive course. This new group, in its turn, may also get split up, after a certain time, into a smaller, more progressive and into a large, conservative group; and so on.

Necessity.—Individual necessity does not engender genius. Nor does social necessity. The only thing it does, is to select, to encourage useful originality. The social needs prepare channels for the activity of the genius, prescribe its direction, but do not create it. Otherwise, we could not understand why different races, different nations having the same social needs, do not produce the same quality and quantity of genius. Or, if these needs do contribute towards creating genius, they are certainly among the secondary factors. Abilities, originality, genius, are not by any means the products of aims, needs, wants, necessity, poverty. The latter merely select, guide, seize upon, make subservient the former; nay, more, they degrade, pervert, deflect, the former from their natural course. Higher abilities (intellectual, artistic, moral, . . .) arise spontaneously whenever the lower abilities that minister to the gratification of bodily needs leave a surplus of mental energy. Geniuses arise in families that either do not need or do not care to spend much energy on the acquisition of food, shelter, social rank. Geniuses, inventors, are very seldom greedy or sensitive to their material wants, nor do they reap many material benefits from their intellectual labor. In our modern society where the majority of men are compelled to spend their whole time and to exhaust their entire

energy in the gratification of lower needs, higher abilities and genius must remain the apanage of a privileged but often degenerate minority. But in a socialistic society where, thanks to genuine solidarity and cooperation, all men will enjoy the privilege of economic security, of leisure and of liberty, higher pursuits and genius—from exceptional, abnormal, dearly paid-for natural endowments—will become general, normal, common attributes of mankind.

Our necessities or needs induce us to seize upon everything that can best gratify them; they make us invent new means of satisfying them. But it is only a surplus of energy, leisure, freedom from material cares and from restraint or oppression, that enriches our lives by enabling us to look for new aims or new needs, or to develop our neglected, embryonal, spontaneously arising needs. A need never leads to the adoption of new needs. On the contrary: every need tends to subjugate, minimize, displace the others, and to press all our abilities and our entire energy into its service. Necessity is not the mother of real and great inventions; it is rather the exploiter of such inventions as promise to be useful and docile. The greed and vanity of capitalists encourage technical inventions which lend themselves to an increase in the capitalistic power; but all other technical inventions and all the new moral or social ideas, in order to assert themselves, have to struggle very hard against capitalistic persecution. It is not economic pressure, it is not poverty that induces the genius to invent: it is by freeing himself from this pressure, it is by reducing his bodily needs and by giving up petty ambitions that he gains a surplus of energy which he devotes to creative work.

Historical Progress of Genius.—It is an admitted fact that the average duration of life increases, not in consequence of an increased vital energy, but in conse-

quence of a decrease in its being wasted, due to greater cleanliness, to better hygienical and social circumstances. The same holds of the modern genius when compared with the genius of antiquity: he is not richer in mental abilities, but he can make a better and more economical use of them, thanks to the greater wealth of knowledge at his disposal, thanks to the laws and formulas discovered by the geniuses of the past which enable him to survey with little effort vast horizons of particular phenomena and thus to save his mental energy for further new acquisitions.

The modern genius owes his superiority over the ancient genius, and the educated genius owes his superiority over the uneducated genius, to the accumulated human knowledge which is transmitted to the former in a condensed, handy form through the channels of school, class or caste, and home education. And just so man owes his conceptual thinking, his superiority over other intelligent and teachable animals, not only to an inborn greater mental ability, but also to social heredity, to language which allows him to learn from the experience of his ancestors and contemporaries; whereas the animal has no other channel of transmitting its experiences than the narrow channel of instincts, of physiological heredity. But if it is doubtful whether human genius is increasing in intension, ability, absolute magnitude, there is not the least doubt that its sphere of interests, its field and the number of men endowed therewith, are steadily increasing until under a more equitable social régime the human species will consist only of geniuses of all sorts who will enrich, beautify and beatify each other's lives.

Is Genius a Partial Increase of Abilities?—The rudimentary organs, the muscular inferiority of the civilized man compared with his uncivilized ancestors, and of the genius compared with the philistine, the

organic deficiency of man in comparison with his cousins on the zoological scale: all these facts prove that intellectual progress is necessarily compensatory, i. e., at the expense of the body; they prove that inferior instruments of adaptation disappear, become atrophied by disuse before superior ones. Particularly the unequal development of non-substitutional abilities speaks unambiguously in favor of the origin of genius by compensation. The division of labor in social life makes it unnecessary and impossible for the individual to develop all his abilities equally. Without the division of labor we could have talented men, but never men of genius. Hence, the scarcity of genius in the country, and its frequency in cities, where, alas, it is outweighed by poverty in morality, in solidarity. Up to a certain limit there is no antagonism between the receptive and the reactive abilities of the mind, there is no antagonism between the intensity of special abilities and the total number of abilities, there is no antagonism between the objective and the subjective aspects of our mental processes. In other words, a continuous, normal, many-sided progress in mental abilities may occur at the expense of the body alone (thinking at the expense of acting, or of the reproductive power; intelligence or soul-beauty at the expense of the bodily beauty); whereas an abnormal, discontinuous, one-sided progress of abilities is made at the expense of the mind itself (intellect, conception, cogitation, introspection, at the expense of the senses, perception, observation, extro-spection, sentiments, moral character, and vice versa); an addition, a synergy of certain abilities, goes hand in hand with a subtraction, divergence, disharmony of others.

Physiologically speaking, we are perhaps right in saying that both genius and insanity are due to an overflow, to a debordation of mental energy (due to a

shock, obstacle, stopping up of a channel, or to a leakage). In the genius, the overflowing energy finds channels of discharge in the higher centers of the brain; whereas in the insane, the overflowing energy, not finding such channels, causes devastations, both sensory and motor. Unlike the hierarchical social organisms, which, if not soon democratized, are invariably doomed to see their leading or ruling class lose its usefulness—if it ever had any—and become a dangerous parasite perishing itself of fatty degeneration while plunging the ruled majority into the abyss of atrophic degeneration—the individual organism is the only hierarchic society, in which the ruling class, that is, the brain, is always concerned with the general welfare and never thrives at the expense of the organism; even in the man of genius, the growth of the higher functions of the brain—although taking place to a certain extent at the expense of the body—does not lead to degeneration or decay, except under highly unfavorable conditions, nor does it proceed from degeneration, as Lombroso would have us believe, but it merely eliminates or relegates to a subordinate rank the physiological-anatomical methods of adaptation and the destructive, predatory abilities by replacing them with superior weapons, with constructive and cooperative abilities, with means of preventing waste of energy, with means of making up in quality, intensity, for any loss in quantity, extensity.

Social and Economic Causes of Philistinism.—Owing to the primitive compact tribal or horde life during the nomadic, hunting period with its external uniformity or uniformity of occupation for all members, which tends to bring about an internal or mental uniformity also: owing to the tyranny exerted at a later period by nomadic invaders, by parasitic conquerors and subsequent rulers, upon their military forces and

upon the subjugated peaceable, agricultural tribes, which tyranny does not tolerate any critical, independent judgment in the conquered, in the ruled; owing to the pressure of economic dependence, during the modern industrial period, which crushes all individuality out of existence, by reducing the masses of men to mere machines, to mere instruments for increasing the wealth and the comforts of a few idlers; owing to these and other external, social pressures which can be reduced ultimately to the pressure of fear, of direct or indirect intimidation exerted by the crowd, leaders, exploiters, which paralyzes all mental spontaneity—at least, all its overt manifestations—leaving untouched only one spring to action, viz., that of instinctive or of voluntary imitativeness; owing to the social pressures, I say, the human species consists of a considerable mass of philistines, i. e., of thoughtless, automatic, empty-minded, empty-hearted, intellectually blind, purely imitative individuals; and of a non-negligible minority of semi- and of pseudo-superior men who dare to assert their originality or spontaneity only in directions which are useful to—or which at least do not harm—the interests of their immediate social superiors, of the handful of rulers and exploiters (monarchs, financial kings, employers, capitalists, government, church, organized parasitic professions). Owing to natural or physiological causes alone, we ought to have only a vanishing minority of philistines among men. Fortunately, the increasing division of labor; the lack of rational solidarity, nay, the occasional antagonisms and mutual indictments or exposures between the exploiters themselves; the increasing individual liberty due to increasing traveling facilities, and to increasing agglomerations of men into cities; the privilege of anonymity due to the press and to city life; the possibility for the modern or industrial slave to pay with his independence for

that of his children and for that of the intellectual proletarians who make it their business to enlighten the masses in open or disguised ways; the lack of foresight in the exploiters who, while caring for their immediate and personal interests, undermine the interests of their class and of their remote posterity, etc., etc.: all these and many other subtle, imperceptible causes work towards freeing the majority of men from the grip of paralyzing and stultifying fear, from the grip of human parasitism which is the main cause of philistinism and of social misery.

Social pressure weighs more heavily upon the grown-ups, and among these mostly upon the normal or sane-minded; whereas children and eccentrics are allowed a little more free play or spontaneity. This fact might be a partial explanation of why hereditary philistinism manifests itself after the period of adolescence, i. e., there are less philistines among children than among the mature; it might also explain partly why genius manifests itself more frequently in families with a nervous, eccentric diathesis than in families with a sedate temperament. The philistinism, empty-mindedness and mental degeneration of the rich is not so much acquired, i. e., due to the power, privileges, idleness, excessive indulgence in pleasures afforded by wealth, as it is inherited from degenerate self-seeking and materialistic ancestors, in whom all human aims were atrophied or destroyed by an unquenchable greed or rapacity. These parvenus or upstarts had at least one aim in life, viz., accumulation of money, which stimulated their activity and made them indirectly interested in those phases of human progress which lend themselves to exploitation; whereas their children, whose fortunes grow quasi automatically, find themselves brought into this world without any aim of life, without any natural interests on which to spend use-

fully their energy.

It is not always the fit, the strong, the courageous, the progressive animals that survive. Often the unfit, the timid, weak, unprogressive animals survive, because they do not venture out of their dark hiding-places, and thus escape dangers, pitfalls, the attacks of enemies. Just so the darkness of ignorance, stupidity, humor-worship or, more correctly, frivolousness, saves many a man from being crushed out of existence by exploiters, who only hate and destroy competitors, critics, the serious-minded, the moral geniuses who try to spoil their lucrative spoliation business. Only those proletarian geniuses escape corruption or persecution who remain in the lower, ignorant, oppressed social strata, and confine themselves, like the fluorescent deep-sea animals, to carrying around their feeble, self-created light merely within the boundary lines of their own milieu which stands under such a high, crushing pressure from above.

Economic Cause of Philistinism.—All manifestation of misoneism, of aversion to change, of aversion to new ideas, institutions, reforms, which seems to be such an insurmountable obstacle to progress, would dwindle into an insignificant, impotent, negligible resistance, if it were not secretly backed up or reenforced by economic interests, by a fear of financial loss or loss in prestige. The psychological cause of misoneism, i. e., the aversion to a change in our habits, the dislike of mental effort, does not count for much with normal men living under normal circumstances, who are rather thirsting for—though not always capable of finding through themselves—some change, some new aims of life, some new source of activity, knowledge and enjoyment. The same pseudo-rulers, the same captains of industry, and the same parasitical nobility who so vehemently oppose all reforms demanded by socialists, moral geniuses,

altruists, as soon as the demand for certain reforms becomes too widespread to be resisted, and as soon as they find some cheap way of apparently or superficially complying with such demands without any loss of prestige or money for themselves, begin to call themselves promoters of such reforms and become very proud of the credit which is undeservedly given them. The same vain academicians and pseudo-scholars who vehemently refuse to accept the new theories and philosophical conceptions of non-professional, non-academical, self-taught, genuine thinkers, because the acceptance of such new truths would mean a loss of prestige for their self-important personalities and for the capital-supported institutions of learning, are only too glad to have something new to promulgate provided it is their own or provided they have succeeded in undetectedly stealing it from some poor devil of a socially obscure genius. The same captain of industry whose sleep and conscience are not in the least disturbed by the vision of thousands and thousands of human lives wrecked and lost in his mills, or by the thought that his millions are paid for with streams of human blood and tears, is proud, however, of the financial support which he lends to the International Peace Movement, because such a movement does not harm, nay, it furthers his commercial interests.

As soon as our caste and clique system and all economic dependence—which are ultimately based on class parasitism—will be done away with, it will be surprising to see how rapidly men can progress and how little philistinism or misoneism is natural to the human species.

Similarly, men's aversion to being criticized is largely due, it is true, to their hypocrisy, deceitfulness and self-conceit; but it is also due a good deal to the fear of financial loss that is usually entailed by criticism.

If human self-conceit and hypocrisy seem ineradicable, it is all due to their economic basis. If Religion seems to be fundamentally conservative and antagonistic to science, it is because we mistake the Church for the seat of Religion: We mistake for the seat of Religion what is in reality a parasitical institution thriving on the people's ignorance, superstitions, ungrounded fears.

Karl Marx and Achile Loria have so masterfully proved that economic or financial interests are at the bottom of all intolerance shown by temporal and spiritual pseudo-leaders to the pioneers of science, new creeds, free thought, democracy; just as economic or financial interests, and not mere stupidity or vanity, are often at the bottom of the hunting for titles, class distinctions, empty honors, and at the bottom of court scandals, intrigues, ludicrous ceremonies or formalities, pomp, royal marriage affairs, etc. The intolerance manifested by philistines is of a disinterested, purely psychological nature: it is due to suggestion, mental inertia or aversion to a change in the habits of thinking, feeling, acting. Their intolerance and prejudices would never go over into active aggression and persecution of superior men and of other races, if they were not fanned into a flame of passion by the deliberate lies, press machinations, etc., of the pseudo-leaders whose economic interests are in danger of being harmed by the real but unpaid leaders of mankind. As a proof that the real cause of the rulers' intolerance of honest, critical, independence-loving, ideal, original men is not due to misoneism or mental conservatism, we have the fact that they tolerate men of a different type provided the latter are inferior, more stupid, uglier than themselves, so as to throw into relief the superiority of the former; they also tolerate more intelligent men, provided the latter are mercenary, homage-paying, sub-

missive; nor do they interfere with the various species of intra-social brainy parasites whom they are afraid of. But they are intolerant of, and impatient, harsh, or cruel with, defenseless superior individuals who put them into the shadow and whose light discloses to view their defects kept hidden in the dark. They are intolerant of independence-loving individuals who refuse to subserve their make-believe game of directive or guiding ability, and who refuse to pay them homage, thus betraying their uselessness and purely ornamental, self-assumed social function.

CONDITIONS, INCENTIVES

Pain.—Pain is a stronger stimulus to thinking and creating than pleasure. Socially considered, it may be one of the causes of genius; individually considered, it is a stimulus only: A social cause may degenerate into an individual stimulant, and an individual incentive may become a cause, in the long run.

The awakening from the inertia of thoughtlessness, under the pressure of necessity or need, is painful. Thinking, in its initial stage of running away from unfavorable circumstances, is painful; but in its second stage, of seeking better circumstances, it becomes pleasure-giving. The post-thinking stage, of finding favorable or satisfactory solutions, terminates in indifference, just as the pre-thinking stage, the stage of mental inertia, started with indifference.

Poverty.—Poverty, it is maintained, stimulates thinking, creation. It is true, but every truth holds within certain limits only. So does temperature, up to a certain degree, stimulate our psycho-physical activity. But below and above certain limits it paralyzes. Poverty may intensify original activity, if it does not reach the limit of insecurity, uncertainty as to the

gratification of the most elementary bodily needs. There is as little progress in equatorial regions as near the poles; there is as small a percentage of men of genius among the paupers as among the high financial aristocrats.

Only the poor, socially obscure individuals have a chance to know the real predatory basis of human society and the hideous souls of the so-called upper class, for nobody considers them worth while to put on a poetic mask in their presence.

The real world obtrudes itself upon the attention of those who have to struggle against its asperities and thorny paths. Even our own real self is revealed only when its wishes and impulses are resisted, when its assertions are disputed and contradicted. The poor, the unprotected individual, he who is thrown upon his own resources, he whom nobody has relieved of the burden of responsibility, he whose every step requires forethought and foresight, he whose every attempt at self-assertion is being opposed, cannot very well afford to lose himself in revery, dreams, delusions, musical and mystical intoxications, sweet thoughtlessness and self-conceit, as the rich do. The life-path of the rich—owing to the quasi-automatical self-multiplying power of capital—is so smooth and their wants are so regularly ministered to by hirelings that they need not make any voluntary effort, any muscular or mental exertion which would prevent them from falling asleep, from falling an easy prey to hypnotizing, fantastic, morbid and shallow literature, to the flattering delusions of spiritualism, psychic research, idle speculation, day dreaming, Christian Science, theosophy, and other mystic humbug. Only the state-, church- or capital-supported idealistic philosopher can afford to shut himself up within the narrow circle of his shadowy ideas, and to forget, ignore, or even deny the existence of a

harsh, stern, stormy reality beyond. Only he can afford to forget the inseparability and distinction between subjective and objective, dream and reality.

In the struggle against Nature, man comes to a clearer insight not only into the hidden reality of the material world, but also into his own soul. If to live means to struggle, to be active, to overcome obstacles, to gain mastery over nature and over one's own soul by means of increased knowledge, to increase one's power and develop one's psycho-physical organs by a constant and reasonable use; it follows that the financial aristocrats, in spite of their luxurious, noisy, seemingly brilliant and happy parading, in reality vegetate and constitute a dangerous crushing burden upon the toiling classes which are worn out by unnecessary overexertion, by a hopeless and compulsory drudgery whose only aim is to make the path of a negligible minority of idlers, not only smooth, but dangerously slippery and vertiginous, while the life-path of the great mass threatens to become ever more obstructed by insurmountable obstacles. Both the extremely poor who have neither the opportunity nor the strength to struggle and to assert themselves, and the extremely rich who have nothing to struggle against, nothing to strive for, are doomed to degenerate in mind and body, and to constitute a burdensome obstacle in the way of human progress. Geniuses, leaders of mankind, defenders of great causes, arise mainly from the social middle classes which enjoy an optimum of economic independence, and which are not entirely free from, nor entirely crushed by, the struggles for existence. To take seriously the higher or intellectual pursuits, to advance in the purely intellectual direction, one must be sufficiently advanced bodily and economically, i. e., one must save energy by having his lower, bodily needs regularly, automatically, rhythmically attended to, one must be

protected against and free from economic fluctuations and uncertainties demanding over-exertion and prolonged, restless, unrhythmical attention. Thus in intensively industrial and commercial countries, like the United States, the public struggles too hard against economic uncertainties to be able to look for moral and intellectual uplift in the theaters, at lectures or elsewhere: All they look for is amusement, relaxation, forgetfulness, thoughtless pleasure, emotional intoxication.

Poverty and Intellectual Fertility.—Necessity, not poverty, is the mother of invention. The struggle against poverty excludes the pursuit of truth. If poor geniuses are seen to be productive, in spite of their poverty, this does not prove anything against the paralyzing influence of poverty. It merely means that geniuses do not struggle against it, in order to be able to pursue truth. Only when poverty becomes intolerable does the genius awake from his habitual indifference or impassivity towards it; he struggles for a moment to surrender again. Instead of defending himself, he addresses the threatening poverty, as Archimedes addressed the Roman soldier, with the words betraying his only preoccupation: "Noli turbare circulos meos."

Isolation and Social Life.—The impulse to mental activity comes mostly from without—from the cosmical or social environment—; but the activity itself is purely individual, and, in order to run its course, requires prolonged isolation of the creating individual, admitting only an intermittent contact with nature and society, if the first impulse has not been strong enough to push the activity to satisfactory results. Too close, continued, direct, immediate contact with our fellowmen prevents us from gaining a general and broad view, true conceptions about human nature and human or social relations; it also renders us unable to resist com-

pulsory, automatic, unreflective suggestion. Too much separation or isolation, on the other hand, renders our general views blurred, vague, lifeless; we become estranged from, and in course of time we lose sight of, everything that is human. A wise combination or compromise between, and alternation of, isolation and association, leads to an harmonious development of individuality. Entirely isolated or entirely absorbed by social life, man loses his personality and his equilibrium. Both the absolutely solitary and the absolutely gregarious animals remain unprogressive.

Only in an economically advanced society, in cities, where the division of labor is carried very far, is such isolation of the thinking individual possible, is he freed from the pressure exerted by the mass. Whereas in the country, in undifferentiated, primitive, tribal life, the pressure of the mass with its fixed customs, inviolable traditions, represses every manifestation of originality except in the despotic chief, and in the unmanageable children and insane.

Division of labor depends, among other conditions, on the density of population. And the denser the population of a city, the greater is the chance of being psychically isolated for every individual, i. e., the chance of living less known, less noticed, less influenced by people differing in nature; the greater also is the chance of meeting and of associating with, or at least of hearing from, congenial minds; hence the greater is the courage in every individual of remaining true to himself, of allowing free course to his natural propensities, of manifesting his peculiarities, his originality.

Isolated, man and animal are thrown upon their own resources; the yoke of the responsibility for their actions weighs heavily upon their minds and impels them to control, inhibition, deliberation, poly-ideistic

thinking, foreseeing of consequences and learning from past experience, selection of the fittest among the spontaneously arising ideas and impulses. As a member of a crowd, man and animal relapse into a condition of intellectual inertia, confused thinking, credulity, of emotional, instinctive, automatically imitative, unstable, exaggerated, uncontrolled, destructive, non-inhibited, impulsive, non-harmonized, mono-ideistic, motor activity, either bodily or mental, lacking in introspection, circumspection and prospection. Between the extremely objective, critical, original thinking of the psychically isolated, contemplative genius and the extreme suggestibility, automatism of the crowd, there is the rationally imitative, conservative life of societies, clubs, parties, corps, etc., and the impersonal, indirect, self-imposed suggestions of the public, of book and magazine readers. The genius is constructive, progressive; the public is cooperative; societies are conservative; crowds are destructive.

The life of solitary (isolated) animals is relatively simple; there is not much change in their surroundings, nor do many unexpected events occur during their life time. Hence, no great amount of brain work is required of such animals. The minds of animals living in crowds or herds have no free play *(Spielraum)* or psychical isolation, hence no individuality of their own. Forethought and responsibility resting with the leaders only, it follows that the brain work of such gregarious animals is reduced to a minimum, to mere imitation and docility.

Social life offers a reasonable amount of free play or psychical isolation, but it also imposes a tolerable share of responsibility upon every member. The contact between the members of society is not so close, not so personal, not so material, not so compulsory and immutable as that between the members of a crowd

or horde. Whoever has a strong, expansive, original individuality which requires more free play or isolation and contemplation, has also to take upon himself a greater burden of responsibility and of discomfort resulting therefrom; for leaders do not tolerate and do not protect their like, and still less their critics or superiors who might eclipse them. It is true, the responsibility of a gregarious, social animal is less than that of an isolated, solitary animal; but social life is so complicated and progressive that more brain work is required of a relatively protected social animal than of an isolated animal thrown upon its own resources, be it mere imitation of tone-setting individuals. A maximum amount of brain work is required of independent individuals who keep at a distance from the herd and also of leaders—I mean real, and not sham or nominal leaders who protect and preserve themselves under the mask of protecting and serving the community; I also mean leaders in the broadest sense of the word: any superior man influencing or guiding others directly or indirectly, mediately or immediately, consciously or unconsciously.

The above trend of thought leads me to the assumption that all the solitary animals belonging to the same species are almost equally intelligent because they have equal shares of responsibility for their own preservation and that of their progeny. Whereas social life by distributing unequal shares of responsibility among the members of society necessitates an accumulation of intelligence at the periphery, in the unprotected, in the most responsible, in the most isolated. This, however, is not as argument in favor of the cruel competition of our individualistic, capitalistic society in which a majority break their necks and waste their brain energy in their hopeless fight against insurmountable obstacles, their souls being dwarfed, mutilated, or killed

by a tantalizing anxiety as to the future, and a minority of the brainless individuals, sons of men in power, find upon entering life's battlefields too smooth and slippery a path without any obstacle to hold them back from gliding down into the abyss of degeneration, imbecility, insanity: they degenerate because nobody and nothing hold them back from over-gratifying those psycho-physiological functions which yield immediate pleasures. The economic dependence or slavery of our capitalistic system brings into close, compulsory, and indissoluble connection men of the most divergent intellectual abilities and inclinations. The more capable and the more ideally inclined are thus hindered in their onward and upward course of life; they cannot advance, they cannot venture to express any opinion that is likely to meet with hatred, jealousy, opposition, or at best with mere indifference. In a socialistic society where every individual will have a right to employment, where men will be dependent merely on the community and, hence, economically independent of particular individuals, intellectual progress will become an easier, more common and less risky affair. A more intellectual or more altruistic individual will not risk anything in trying to invite less gifted fellow men to travel along the same path which he pursues; because he will be in a position to dissolve his contingent and loose connections with such individuals as prove to be opposed to progress, and to associate with more willing, more progressively predisposed individuals, or even to isolate himself psychically from his contemporaries if his pursuits are of such a nature as to appeal merely to posterity.

Close, intimate, continual association between fellow-creatures, between mother and child, between action, feeling and thinking, between master and disciple, . . . is possible and necessary during the initial stage of de-

velopment, during the stage of weakness, maladjustment, simple organization, imitativeness, singleness of purpose; but it becomes impossible, stifling, detrimental, if kept up during the age of maturity, strength, adaptability, initiative, complex organization, many-sided pursuits: This stage is best subserved by a loose, voluntary, soluble, intermittent association. It is not sufficient that an individual should feel and know his own interests: he must also be able to act towards their preservation. For the defense of general interests, however, it is at present better to divide this work among thinkers, poets and men of action: He who acts has no time and no original ability to find out the vital needs of the masses, nor is he able to create the emotional or poetical stimulus to action; likewise, the thinker who spends his energy in finding out the real needs of mankind and the ways of realizing them, has no patience for leadership and agitation. Only among primitive peoples pursuing few and simple ends is it possible for every and for one and the same individual to think and feel for the people, and to lead them at the same time. And it will be so again in an advanced democratic society. Close and continual association exerts an accelerating or stimulating influence on individuals who naturally and spontaneously move in the same direction; but it is a source of tyranny, disturbances, mutual obstruction, between uncongenial individuals, i. e., between individuals who naturally follow different paths.

Motion, variation, progressiveness, spontaneity, is the primary, original, uncaused condition of isolated beings, unicellular organisms, elements, atoms; close, indissoluble association or aggregation is a cause of stagnation, inertia, unprogressiveness, imitativeness, oscillating or undirected (aimless) movement; an increase in the bulk or size of the aggregate leads, how-

ever, to a regrouping, differentiation, division of the tasks, and hence to a restoration, rehabilitation of progressiveness, individuality, variation, or, more correctly, it leads to a higher plane of progressiveness. The previously seemingly homogeneous group splits into several smaller groups loosely or flexibly connected among themselves, so that a progressive individual does not need any longer to have the approval and followership of the entire mass in order to effect an innovation: He merely needs the consent of the members belonging to the same group. If bodily progressiveness or direct adaptability has almost reached its limit, it is partly because an affected organ is hindered in its tendency to change in conformity to outer stimuli by its being too strongly interrelated or correlated with the rest of the body. If even our indirect or psychical adaptability and variability stagnates in small communities, and, after a certain period of development, begins to stagnate even in large cities, it is due in the former case to the strong, indissoluble, rigid ties between the exceptional, original individual and the rest of the community, and in the latter case it is due to the ties of economic dependence, to capitalistic oppression and repression of all spontaneity in the exploited. Fear of the majority in small communities, and fear of a despotical, predatory minority, which soon gains control over the jobs and lives of the majority in large cities, inhibits all tendencies towards originality and is one cause why the man of genius avoids the communication of his thoughts through conversation, through personal contact with his fellow-men, but does so from a distance, through books, the press, etc. The pressure of the majority in small communities hinders the putting into practise of innovations. On the other hand, the despotical independence of the leading minorities in large cities and capitals encourages only such

innovations as are beneficial to themselves. The remedy does not lie, however, in the Tolstoian return to the land, in the so-called Rousseauian return to Nature, to the isolation and liberty of roaming of the ungregarious primeval man, but in the democratization of society, in ascending to a higher plane of independence or of isolation, viz., to a voluntary isolation in the midst of society, to the freedom or opportunity of associating and cooperating with like-minded individuals and hence of easily dissolving one's connections with uncongenial people. Progressiveness will be reenthroned as soon as mutual control, and continual exchange of members, between the various social classes will be established; as soon as the bulk of the nation will constitute itself into a final court of appeal and ultimate judge of innovations affecting the general welfare; as soon as a socialistic régime will guarantee to every man the right to employment, the right to a decent and secure livelihood, the right to transfer from one line of employment or one place of abode to others on the basis of mere personal fitness and of mere personal responsibility, and not on the basis of references, recommendations, influence, etc.

Division of Labor.—Division of labor, which is an effect of inequality of talent or of opportunity, becomes in its turn a cause of increasing inequality and differentiation between human talents and opportunities by enabling single individuals or classes of individuals to devote more time to one line of pursuit. In primitive communities all the members of which had the same occupations and were each self-sufficient, as soon as certain individuals, owing to greater talent or opportunity, began to make certain things better than the other fellow-tribesmen, there arose in the less gifted or less favored the desire to exchange a greater quantity of their other productions for a small quantity

of such products of better quality; and this demand, increasing with the density of population as well as with the intercommunication between tribes, became an inducement for the gifted or fortunate individuals to give up producing things which they could get in exchange for their favorite productions. Unfortunately, however, with the appearance of division of labor and of the exchange of values between various producers there was also made room for the quasi-parasitical class of middlemen; and later, when exchange became facilitated by the introduction of money or a conventional medium and unit of measure, there sprang up from the midst of the non-productive class of middlemen the still more dangerous predatory class of financial speculators.

It is probable that the first producers who had been relieved of the unprogressive condition of a Jack-of-all-trades were those who in their leisure time produced artistical works or articles of luxury, next came the men who were capable of producing useful things of a better quality or at least with an artistic flourish; only lately has division of labor been degraded from a promoter of talent and of quality to the rôle of increasing mere quantity, to the rôle of making the industrial exploiters independent of and masters over the workers, and hence to the rôle of stultifying, philistinizing, enslaving, automatizing the masses.

Human and Animal Intelligence.—The four-footed ancestor of man, owing to his greater intelligence, specialized his fore limbs for the prehensile function, and his hind legs for locomotion and for supporting the whole weight of the body. He began to use his fore legs, not only occasionally and temporarily, as the now living apes do, for the purpose of reaching for things at a height greater than that of his body when resting on all four legs, and for the purpose of handling

various natural things or objects (stones, bones, sticks, . . .) as tools; but he preferred to persist in the erect posture, in spite of its requiring painful effort in the beginning, even when he had nothing to handle or to reach for, probably for the reason that the erect posture enabled him to have a larger visual horizon and hence, to detect his enemies at a distance. To say with some anthropologists, Munro for example, that the erect posture is a cause of human intelligence, or of an increase in human knowledge or intelligence, is just as wrong as to say that the use of tools and machines make man more intelligent, make man invent other machines, and make him come to a better understanding of self and Nature. As a matter of fact, we see men using machines and becoming more stupid in consequence of a constant use; whereas improvements upon existing machines come from those workers who make a less steady use of them; and entirely new inventions do not come from machine-workers, but from brain-workers. Of course, intelligence alone, without natural material to work upon, and without natural suggestions to start from, could not have invented anything. Without seeing animals clinging to floating trees, man would not have invented the boat; without caves or hollow trees, offering refuge in case of inclement weather or of pursuing wild beasts, man would not have invented the house, etc. But if Nature or chance suggests the use of floating trees, caves, sticks, . . .; the improvements upon these spring from intelligence alone.

I do not maintain, however, that the intelligence of our four-footed ancestors created the erect posture: It merely seized upon, and held fast to, it, after having struck it unintentionally, accidentally, while the fore limbs were busy grasping objects, and because the hind legs proved adaptable for the support of the entire

body weight. Mental energy cannot spend itself on remote objects or pursuits, before having dealt with more immediate, nearer, urgent needs and desires, without having been entirely absorbed by the latter; just as a spring of water can give birth to a river only after having filled the cavities first met with, and only in the case when the cavities are not too large to absorb the whole quantity of water and, thus, to prevent it from overflowing. To say that man took to the use of tools because of his erect posture, because of having thus the fore legs set free, is tantamount to saying that the river is due to the smallness of the excavations met with by the spring water in the beginning of its course. If the water had no potential energy, it would not overflow so as to create the bed of the river: it would merely form a lake of smaller or larger extension than the cavities. To say that man owes his increase of intelligence, his civilization, his superiority over animals, to the mere fact that his erect posture leaves his hands free, leaves a surplus of energy to be used in tool-handling: to say that means to maintain that human mental energy does not differ from animal mental energy, not even in quantity, let alone in quality, potential, pressure, or capacity for aspiring. Moreover, this theory leaves not only the nature of intelligence just as mysterious as before, but it also leaves the erect posture itself a mystery: Why of all animals has the erect posture become a permanent characteristic in man alone? If human progress is due merely to a surplus of energy, why do the strong wild beasts and the favored domestic animals spend their surplus of energy in mere aimless play-activity, whilst man alone spends it in serious, purposeful activity? The truth seems to me to be that the only cause of why the surplus of human mental energy, in distinction from that of animals, is teleological, directed towards new goals,

is that mysterious quality of a high potential, inborn pressure, discontented restlessness. This higher potential of human intelligence enables it to rise from the sensational level, on which the animal mind normally dwells, to the perceptional level, which is the normal place of abode of the philistine mind, and finally to the highest or conceptual planes where the superior intellects feel at home.

In the human species racial experience is transmitted non-compulsorily, through education or social heredity rather than compulsorily, through physiological inheritance, and also through generalized, non-specialized, vague instincts, that leave room for individual adaptations, additions, or modification and evolution, rather than—like in animals—through well-defined and fully developed instincts, that leave little room for individual initiative or for exerting individual intelligence. In animals not only habits or acquired characters but also actions performed but once may become instinctive or hereditary modes of behavior, i. e., they may leave behind an organized physiological mechanism, which is immediately set going whenever the original internal or external stimulus of the instinctified actions recurs.

CHAPTER III

TYPES OF SUPERIOR MEN, INTELLECTUAL HIERARCHY

TYPES OF SUPERIOR MEN

Observation and Interpretation.—The different types of geniuses taken as a whole differ quantitatively from the class of average men, but they differ qualitatively among themselves and from intermediate types.

A common characteristic of all geniuses is combining and creative imagination. Observation is mostly required for scientific creations; interpretation or explanation is the main requirement for philosophic work. The technical and the artistic genius have a maximum power of observation and of constructive imagination built thereupon; the philosophical genius has a maximum power of interpretation; in the scientific genius the two abilities are balanced. The specific ability of the technological genius is clear perception and imagination of movements, i. e., of correlated space and time relations. From a large number of observations, the scientist draws a few conclusions, the talented scientist draws less general conclusions than the scientist of genius; from a few observations the philosopher draws many conclusions, or more general conclusions than those of the scientist.

The genuine, born, original, pure observer observes spontaneously, unintentionally, involuntarily, disinterestedly, without any foregoing conscious aim of satisfying an intellectual or bodily need, nor under the im-

pulse of any preconceived idea or hypothesis; but the elaboration, the mental digestion, the interpretation of the observational material, is voluntary, interested, self- or hetero-imposed. The reverse is true of the original, born, pure thinker, speculative mind: Except the minimum of observations which form the ground-work of his reasonings, all the other and subsequent observations occur under the impulse of interest, will, intention, in the view of confirming or invalidating theories which come to him naturally, spontaneously.

The philosopher's mind's-eye being accommodated for the embracing of vast horizons, for bird's-eye views, rather than of details, is, therefore, liable to become intellectually far-sighted; whereas the scientist who is in the habit of paying more attention to particular phenomena, to narrow generalizations, is, therefore, likely to contract intellectual myopy, contempt for (arising from the inability to attain) wide generalizations. An excess of metaphysical speculation leads to mental presbytia; an excess of positivism leads to mental myopy; and vice versa.

The philosopher is indirectly interested in particular phenomena; he deems them worthy of his attention in so far only as they allow him to ascend through them to general views, for he is more interested in the harmony, relation, between things than in the things themselves. To the scientist, and more so to the technologist, generalizations are a mere means to a better comprehension or utilization of things, of particular facts.

The objective, positive, naturalistic or experimental thinker approaches men and things from without; he displays a maximum activity of the perceptive or receptive organs and a minimum of reasoning, i. e., a minimum activity of the associative or combinative brain organs; he reifies men, i. e., he is inclined to obliterate

the distinction between human, vital and mechanical phenomena; he advances from the simple to the complex by adding, synthetizing elementary properties; he abstains from accepting hypotheses as long as the sense data are scarce; to rise above things upon a weak factual foundation terrifies him, nor does he feel any necessity for doing so; he preferably dwells in the low, prosaic regions of facts and actualities; if he is original, it is in observation, in the discovery of new facts. The subjective, humanistic, or speculative thinker approaches everything from within; he displays a minimum of observation, perception and a maximum of interpretation, combination; he humanizes things and animals, i. e., he is inclined to attribute to them too many human qualities; he advances from the complex, from his own ego, to the simple by means of abstraction, subtraction, simplification, analysis; he prefers any provisional hypothesis, no matter how wildly speculative, to none; disconnected, unexplained, brute facts are a burden to him, his mind cannot digest them unless held together by or diluted in theories; his usual and favorite abode are the high, poetical regions of abstract concepts and general views; his originality consists in inventing new theories to include, to shelter the new facts discovered by the observer or by the experimenter, or dimly foreseen by himself.

Both the positive and the speculative thinker naturally dislike, and even ignore, unless compelled by public opinion or by professional interests to take notice of, each other. Both admire and accept as teacher the happy genius who is both positive and speculative at the same time and who in his turn understands how to learn from both speculators and observers.

Subjective or humanistic speculation can be easily perverted by, and pressed into the mercenary service of, egoism, commercialism, profit-seeking. Such a per-

verted form is pragmatism, which is a new name given by modern representative sophists to the old sophistic theory that man is the measure of all things. One need not be surprised that pragmatism or instrumentalism arose or was rather revived and brought into vogue in the United States of America, and in England under the more original, hence more innocent name of humanism; for, the English-speaking race being the commercial or predatory race *per excellentiam*, it was natural that the self-seeking commercial standards should have first exerted their influence on, and been echoed by, English-American philosophy. Let us hope that the philosophers belonging to other less predatory nationalities will resist the contagious effects of such a mercenary and morally perverted philosophy.

Impressibility.—The poet has more impressibility but less clearness of consciousness than the thinker. The poet depicts the world and the soul as they impress him under certain peculiar psycho-physical circumstances; the scientist describes the world as it impresses him under relatively constant or normal psycho-physiological circumstances.

In ordinary circumstances, the philistine is very little impressed by things not belonging to the sphere of his bodily needs; the psycho-technical artist and the physico-technical artist or technologist are impressed by certain things at the expense of others, or by some aspects of things exclusively: The artist, in the narrow sense of the word (poet, painter, sculptor, etc.), by the emotional or beauty aspect; the technologist, by the practical or utilitarian aspect; the scientist and the philosopher pay more attention to the harmony of things, to the harmony of various aspects: the scientist deals with partial harmony, relative truth; the philosopher with total harmony, absolute truth.

Sentimentalism and Cogitation.—The youth, igno-

rant of life's obstacles and of his fellow-men's meanness, looks with sentimental hopes forward into the future; the old man, mentally and bodily weakened, looks with sentimental admiration and regret back to an idealized past; the prosaic man, who finds nothing poetical in real life, becomes sentimental when human life is represented on the stage or in novels. What is the common characteristic of all the above-given cases of sentimental attitudes, what does sentimentalism mean?

Sentimentalism means one-sideness; cogitation is many-sidedness; prosaic attitude means no-sidedness or affective blindness. Sentimentalism means that the mind recurs periodically to and dwells a long time on a few things or aspects of things; whereas in cogitation the mind dwells a relatively short time on many things or aspects of things. Opposite aspects awaken opposite feelings that partially neutralize each other, and thus free our mind from a narrow sentimentalism.

Just as there is no motion or force independently of matter, nor matter in a state of absolute rest; so there are no sentiments independently of ideas, nor ideas lacking a sentimental aspect. Sentiments are motion, commotion of ideas; ideas are psychical matter in motion. Too strong a sentimental shock produces confusion, dissociation or disintegration of ideas and of mental functions, hysteria, stupor, hinders precipitation of pure ideas; a moderate sentimental shock stimulates thinking, facilitates combination, colligation, fusion of ideas.

Emotions and ideas are not separate states of mind. Emotion and idea are inseparable constituents, combined in various proportions, of one and the same state of mind. The emotion is the centrifugal, materializable, dynamical constituent; the idea is the centripetal, statical, ethereal part. With increasing clearness, meaningfulness of the idea, i. e., with increasing associations

between the idea and other ideas, there is a parallel decrease in the intensity, explosiveness, immediacy of motor discharge in the emotion. With decreasing clearness or associative links, with increasing independence or isolation of an idea or system of ideas, there is an increase in the emotional and volitional (motor) constituent. The fact that strong emotions go together with confused, vague ideas, leads many psychologists to the *prima facie* plausible theory that emotions are nothing else but obscure ideas, as if there were not plenty of confused ideas in the human mind without any appreciable emotional fringes.

Vague, inarticulate longings which shift around aimlessly on the stormy ocean of the sentimentalist's soul; simple, undifferentiated, elementary states of mind, in which the emotional constituent is prepotent and the idea is almost reduced to zero, find their most adequate or most beautiful expression in music—including dance or acted music—which is the lowest, most primitive art, hence the favorite art of women, children and philistines. With increasing complexity in the states of mind, with increasing clearness in the cogitational constituent, and with decreasing impetuosity in the emotional part, higher arts (sculpture, painting, poetry, drama, novel) are resorted to. States of mind in which the cogitational element dominates and the impetuosity of the emotional element is reduced to a minimum, find their best expression in science and philosophy.

Mysticism (spiritualism, occultism, theosophy, . . .) is an intermediate step between pure emotionalism and clear thinking: it may mean an ascending stage towards clear, original thought, or a descending stage of decay into emotionalism, into primitive confused ideas. In mystical minds, the boundary lines between related and analogous concepts is totally obliterated, hence the concepts are confounded, interchanged.

There is no fundamental antagonism between cogitation, reason, knowledge, science, . . . and emotion, sentiment, feeling, art, religion. . . . Only those emotions are dispelled by increased knowledge which are illusory, which have no objective foundation, which owe their apparent, idealized, or magnified value to the intellectual mist which enshrouds the ignorant and to the hypnotic suggestions of the charlatans who exploit ignorance.

Genuine, objective, useful sentiments persist—nay, they thrive better—in the light of truth. Thus the atheist who does not believe in any divine sanction of morality, nor in future reward and punishment of human actions, is not less—nay, he is more—moral and altruistic than the religious; the naturalist, the physician, the scientist, who study the sexual organs and the other mechanisms of the human body in all its nakedness, are not less exposed to falling in love than the ignorant common mortal; the psychologist who cannot idealize his parents and children, does not love them less, nay, he loves them more sanely, than the ignorant man loves his idealized family. The love of the enlightened is sane, constant, pure, unalienable. . . . Enlightenment or science does not attack or destroy genuine or metaphysical religion, i. e., the cosmic sentiments or the consciousness of our being one with, an integrating part of, the whole universe; the sentiments of wonder and awe inspired by infinity, by the mysterious and unknown potentialities of nature; the sentiments of modesty, good will and humility inspired by the frailty and ephemeralness of human life, etc. Science merely attacks superstition, fear, ecclesiastic non-sense and exploitation. Reason does not destroy instincts; it only renders them modifiable, adaptable, useful. Knowledge and truth are not incompatible with sentimentalism; they merely do not tolerate error, illusion, ignorance,

fetishism, ungrounded opinions, sentiments or actions. Mature, masculine reflection does not go together with youthful and feminine (explosive, impulsive) enthusiasm. But there is not the least reason for regret; for such an enthusiasm is unstable, short-lived, unreliable, it either remains inactive or overshoots the mark.

No amount of theological sophistry will ever succeed in covering up the irreconcilable conflict between science and anthropomorphic religion, as manifested in the invocation of supernatural help, in prayer and ritual; for the office of science is to promote progress by teaching us how to gain knowledge of and mastery over nature, whereas prayer is a hindrance to progress, a mere faded relic of the primitive man's magic rites, by means of which he both gave vent to his desires and vainly hoped to influence the course of natural events in his favor.

In short: Just as in social life the parasitical institutions or organizations, the fraudulent reputations and the absurd customs, can subsist and thrive only on condition that they shun the light of public criticism, of free discussion, of a comparison with similar but useful institutions, and on condition that they seek the protection of darkness, secrecy, legal suppression of free speech (through laws against libel, lèse majesty, contempt of court, etc.), taboos, terrorism, etc.; just so in individual life the injurious emotions, the phobias, the parasitic or fixed ideas, the hypnotically instilled beliefs, the bad habits, can subsist and thrive only on condition that they shun the light of consciousness, of self-scrutiny, of reason, of a comparison with objective and useful mental acquisitions, and on condition that they seek protection in the darkness of the subconscious, in isolation, in opaque or adorned linguistic garbs.

Subject-Matter and Method.—The subject-matter of art, taken in its broadest sense, i. e., including useful arts also, is formed by the harmonies and the conflicts

between desire and reality or knowledge; the end pursued is beauty or utility. The subject-matter of science is formed by knowledge, that of philosophy is the harmony of various classes of knowledge or the underlying reality; their direct aim is truth, and indirectly they lead to the useful.

A practical art is a system of useful, perceptual, concrete, individual, particular, implicit knowledge. The knowledge of an esthetical art is about emotions, passions, states of mind and their outward manifestations. A science is a system of explicit, verified, conceptual, general, class knowledge. Philosophy is a system of the highest, ultimate, most general conceptual knowledge of both mind and cosmos. The artistic or esthetic sense represents the lowest or initial stage of unselfish human interests: it is a vague, emotional, unselfish, general or undifferentiated, and formal or superficial interest in cosmic and human nature. Whereas the scientific and the philosophic spirit represent clearly-defined, intellectual, unselfish interests in the essence of the universe.

When we perceive a thing a single time or for the first time, we certainly have no way of telling what belongs to the thing perceived and what to its environment, to its setting, i. e., to the other things perceived simultaneously and more or less connected therewith; so that we cannot recall the thing without recalling its context. After repeated experience, however, i. e., after having perceived the thing in various contexts, with various emotional fringes, we come to separate the thing from other things with which it is fortuitously or merely contiguously associated, we come to separate the objective from the subjective aspect; we become able to evoke free ideas, the image of the thing without being encumbered by a mass of other irrelevant, unrelated images; we become able to recall the things in

consequence of a mere resemblance with other things thought about; we become able to use it, not only as an object of revery, but also as an object of classification, thought, as an element of reasoning. Experiences *sui generis*, unclassified and emotional experiences, belong to the realm of Memory and of Imagination. Frequent, recurrent, common, objective experiences belong to the realm of knowledge, of thought. The poet, the artist, deals with the individual, exceptional, subjective, emotional, unclassifiable, unanalyzed part of human experience; he deals with objects of Memory and of Imagination. The thinker takes his subject-matter among the typical, general, objective, recurrent, communicable elements of human experience; he deals with objects of thought, with experience stripped of the contingent, accidental, purely individual, incommunicable elements and of the variable emotional fringes.

In Art, knowing and doing are inseparable, continually cooperating and mutually furthering. In Literature (Poetry, Drama, Novel), Science and Philosophy, knowing is separated, differentiated, from doing: Knowing merely sets aims to our doing, but does not prescribe, or busy itself too much with, the means to be employed and the single actions to be performed. In Literature, unlike Science and Philosophy, laws or the conception of constant, causal, intimate relations between things and phenomena are not presented explicitly or separately from the described particular phenomena. In Science more attention is paid to the changing, diversifying, superficial relations between things than to their underlying, deeper, constant, unifying relations. Philosophy prefers to search beneath the troubled surface of striking and ephemeral appearances, for the slow but steady course of cosmical and human events; it searches, beneath historical and geographical superficiality and diversity, for psychological profundity and

similarities; beneath political exaggeration, bluff, noise and vicissitudes, it looks for economic truth, stability, or slow progress; behind dazzling and changing forms, it sees the permanent, indestructible essence or spirit.

All the grandiloquent, sonorous talk of our professorial and academical philosophers and scientists about methodology consists mostly of empty phraseology. The methods of thinking, acting, investigating cannot be followed separately or one at a time like the roads leading to a city. Thus no complex can be analyzed without separating its elements by synthesizing them with other elements. We cannot think out one problem without seeing more or less the parallel or analogous problems in other fields of knowledge, and the supra-ordinated or more general problems, as well as the sub-ordinated or more particular and practical problems to which the problem under consideration leads. No generalization can be reached by induction without making sure of every upward step by looking down, I mean deductively, to the further particular facts supporting it. We cannot start from the simple and advance towards the complex, unless we admit that the simple presents itself to our consideration without being looked for. As a matter-of-fact, we do not know that we are in the presence of the simple unless we start from complexes of various degrees and compare them among themselves. The experimental method cannot be followed without the speculative; the most insignificant step in experimenting starts from a supposition, it starts as the verification of some anticipated succession, coexistence or other relation of phenomena; all conscious activity is guided by ideas. Only verbally, i. e., in exposition, can we afford to follow a single method, to simplify and separate what is in reality complex and connected; but in thinking and invention such a simplification is impossible.

The main method of art is synthetical; the analytical is of secondary importance only, i. e., analyses are made in the view of subsequent larger syntheses. In science the reverse is true: Description, the concrete, paves the way for explanations, for generalizations, for the abstract. In philosophy, both methods seem to be of equal importance. Synthesis in Art and Philosophy is constructive, it creates concrete or abstract organic wholes; synthesis in science is classificatory, it arranges in order to handle more easily, it prepares the raw material for the former.

Analysis puts into our hands the inert matter, the substance, the body, the anarchic elements of things and of ideas; but it lets escape their collective or resultant motion, their associative energy, their souls, their spirit of cooperation. Art synthesizes anew or recombines the scattered elements of cosmic and human nature into new, more beautiful or more useful wholes. And Philosophy synthesizes the scattered, disconnected scientific concepts into a more or less unified, consistent, life-guiding or life-illuminating system.

What the psychologist, the scientist, the philosopher express explicitly, in abstract form, the artist and the technician express implicitly, in a concrete body, in a work full of life, or in a mechanism of far-reaching usefulness.

Point of View and Aim.—Art looks at the world from *one* point of view, science from *an indefinite number* of points of view, philosophy tends to embrace the world from *an infinite number* of points of view, *sub specie aeternitatis*. Art attains subjective truth (beauty or utility), science attains objective relative truth, philosophy strives after objective absolute truth. Primitive art looked at the world successively from many points of view; hence, no perspective and lack of congruity. Modern art looks at the different parts

of a whole simultaneously from one point of view. The artistic type of mind does not mistake the inferential rectification of the primary perceptions for the latter, what is seen from one point of view for what would be seen from a more habitual or more practical standpoint, the result of unconscious inference for immediate observational data; in the psychical combinations he does not lose sight of its elements, he distinguishes what is given to his senses from what is added by his imagination and intellect.

What is said about the artist in the sphere of perceptions holds—mutatis mutandis—of the scientist and of the philosopher in the sphere of the concrete or abstract concepts.

First Cause, Ultimate Result.—The first cause and final aim of art, science, philosophy, is normally a general increase or intensification—and abnormally a compensatory, unilateral intensification—of the psychophysiological rhythms. This rhythm-intensification of our life functions is produced by Art directly, through the intermediation of one sense by the lower arts (music, dancing, color-painting, etc.) or through several senses plus lower intellectual organs by the higher arts: it is great but transitory; it arises and ceases almost immediately with the stimulus: it throws the individual under its influence into ecstasy, exaltation, self-estrangedness: it makes him a docile instrument in the hands of the person exerting this intensification.

The rhythm-intensification induced through coarse dance and music or other physical and emotional intoxicants (religious, sexual, gambling, self-deceptive or other exciting practises) is not only unstable, ephemeral, uncontrollable, unavailable for constructive, uplifting purposes, a fruitless reaction against mental decay, an inadequate, though the easiest, means of appeasing discontent or the thwarted evolutional impulse,

but is also followed by a swinging of the mind to the opposite extreme of bestiality, torpor, paralysis, inertia, weariness of life.

The rhythm-intensification produced by, and giving rise to, Science and Philosophy, is small but permanent; it is communicated indirectly through the senses; it appears much later than the stimulus, and may never disappear; it enriches the individual, it renders him aspiring, it makes him a willing colaborer of his teachers and congenial minds.

Science tunes the individual in harmony with the world as it is; philosophy tunes him in harmony with the world as it tends to become.

Philosophy—I mean real, self-created and not verbal, school philosophy—tunes the human mind in harmony with eternity, infinity; it lifts man above the stormy, cloudy, impure, narrow, petty-minded, discomforting, disconsolate every-day life; it lifts man above vain, illusory, fragile hopes and above ungrounded, unavoidable fears.

The physiological criterion of a normal or general intensification of the vital ryhthms, is an increase in the demand for more and better nourishment, for an intenser and richer field of activity; the psychical criterion is a state of optimism, of psycho-physiological euphoria, or at least of hopefulness.

Science (s) looks mostly at the divergence, dissimilarity, differentiation of phenomena, of things (I differentiates, falls into, 1 and 2; II into 3 and 4; A into I and II).



Philosophy (p), on the contrary, looks at the convergence, similarity, origin, unification of phenomena and of things (1 and 2 unified into I, I and II unified into A).

Ability and Sphere of Interests.—Sometimes not a difference in the prevailing ability, but a difference in the predominating interests, will determine the type of superiority to which an individual will belong: Many philosophers could have become scientists, were not their sphere of interests too vast to permit a prolonged sojourn in a single domain of human knowledge. Likewise, many scientists could have become technologists, had they been more patient and their intellectual horizon narrower. What makes the thinker unfit for action, for so-called leadership, is, not inability or ignorance of human nature, but his broader and unselfish interests, his greater self-respect, his greater morality, his higher ambition, viz., the ambition to be a leader of leaders, a leader of seeing, enlightened, thinking men, and not of blind, credulous, ignorant, easily deceived masses.

No amount of patience and of voluntary effort can enable one to accomplish things which he may be interested in, but which he is not fit for; although interest aroused by education and other external circumstances, if reinforced by concurrent heredity, may succeed in creating, after one or two generations, the corresponding ability. Thus, the reproductive artist (singer, actor, . . .) cannot, by dint of mere will or effort, rise to the level of a productive or creative artist (composer, dramatist, . . .). Nor is the observer able to rise to the level of the thinker, i. e., to rise above the low region of brute facts, and to see the subtle connections between them. Nor can the purely scientific thinker, who dwells at a certain height above the region of brute facts, rise to the still higher level of the philosopher, who dwells in a region above that of con-

crete or scientific concepts, and who soars so high above the region of brute facts that these almost disappear from his view.

But a little voluntary effort can enable a man of higher abilities to accomplish—although less efficiently than the specialist—things that require lower abilities. For those who have risen to a higher intellectual sphere must have passed through, or dwelt for a certain time in, the lower sphere; nay, more, they cannot throw off entirely the lower kind of mental work and shift it on to the shoulders of the intellectual subordinates. In the intellectual world, unlike the economic world, men capable of higher activities do not feel themselves entitled to the privilege of keeping the biggest profits for themselves and of being exempted from all lower or simpler activity: they only feel entitled to giving less time and less attention to lower mental work. Thus, the thinker must come down from time to time into the region of observational and experimental workshops; the productive or creative artist must do a certain minimum of reproductive or imitative work.

One cannot simultaneously exert one's ability or intelligence, and become equally skilled, in two diverging, let alone in two opposite, lines of activity: in both the pursuit and shunning of truth, in both cherishing love and bearing hatred for one's fellow-men, in both sincere effusion and crafty reticence, in both self-expression and self-denial, in both invention and imitation, in both progressive and regressive adaptation, in both paving new ways and submitting to the established order of things, in both talking sense and keeping up a conversation by means of platitudes and conventional non-sense, etc. One cannot become skilled in things that one does against one's will, reluctantly, merely on external provocation or compulsion, without previous preparation. Even in lying, cheating, preying, under-

mining, torturing, oppressing, . . . one cannot become skilful unless one does these things continually, naturally, spontaneously, for their own sakes, even in the absence of external compulsion or of urgent needs, disinterestedly and not only with a view to getting personal benefit therefrom. The good-natured and sincere individual does not display any tact, inventiveness, intelligence, foresight, mindfulness of his own interests during his justified outbursts of anger, indignation or revolt; for, judging others by himself, he is never prepared to see them misconstrue or deliberately distort his words, belittle or question his pure intentions, betray and misuse his confidence. Whereas the bad-natured, venomous, hypocritical individual displays a diabolical intelligence, tactfulness, resourcefulness, calmness in his vindictiveness and rapacity; for he is planning evil all the time, before he can make use of it, so that he is never unarmed or taken unawares in cases of friction with his fellow men.

Contact with the Daily Life.—The artist stands in direct and continual touch with the daily life of the common mortal, and with Nature (hence, the personification thereof); whereas the thinker is somewhat estranged from the plain man's sphere of interests. The artist accentuates the ideal germ contained in the prose of the daily life; he forms a connecting bridge between the low regions of the daily life and the high regions of thinking.

Specialism and Many-Sidedness.—The many-sidedness of the philosopher is acquired by a simultaneous consideration of various fields of knowledge; that of the scientist is successively acquired.

There is no conflict, no antagonism, between specialization and polyhistory or philosophy. The true or profound specialist ends by becoming a philosopher, or, at least, philosophically minded; the objective phi-

losopher ends sometimes by concentrating his interests upon one specialty more than upon others; the former ends by acquiring, and the latter ends by objectively corroborating his previously purely subjective sense for proportion or sense for the relative and unequal importance of the various fields of human endeavor. The specialist begins by concentrating his interest upon one science (S); and, as he advances further into the domain of his science of predilection (s approaches S),



he comes necessarily in contact with the other sciences (S_1, S_2, S_3 . . .), and lastly he begins to suspect, to seek a harmony between all the fields of human knowledge. The polyhistors or the philosophers begin with many points of view, with a diffusion, dissemination of their interests. They begin to glean simultaneously in various fields of knowledge (a, b, c, . . .). When their partial acquaintance with the various fields increases, they begin to perceive a philosophical system.

Every science—especially psychology—is an avenue leading to, and ending at, the Heights of Philosophical

Contemplation. The contempt for philosophy of those scientists who did not succeed in advancing far enough on the rough, arduous, and thorny road of their own specialty to be able to cherish the hope of arriving soon at the Philosophical Heights: the contempt for philosophy, I say, shown by this kind of narrow-minded scientists springs from the same source as the contempt of the fox in the fable for the sour grapes.

There is antagonism between superficial specialism and dialectic, speculative philosophizing. The superficial specialist does not know enough of his own specialty to see the innumerable ways of communication between the field of his specialty and the fields of other specialists. The speculative philosopher knows too little about the different domains of human knowledge to find an objective harmony between them; therefore his lazy mind establishes a fictitious link between his scattered ideas, and he mistakes this fictitious connection for an objective philosophic system. This dialectic, romantic, ideologist, idealistic, parasitical type of speculative thinker is largely responsible for the existence of mental poverty and confusion; just as the parasitical type of financial speculators is largely responsible for the existence of economic poverty and slavery.

Theoretically we do not see any reason for stopping at, and resting satified with, ultimate explanations; but practically we have to do so, we have to hold in check our explanatory aimless *Wanderlust* which is a relic of primitive unbridled imagination, a relapse into the primitive aimless wandering of animistic thought; just as the *Wanderlust* of the tramps is a relic of or relapse into the wandering instinct of our nomadic ancestors. The purely speculative philosopher is a scientific tramp and parasite: just as the regulations, norms, drudgery, unnecessarily complicated machinery of our economic world, form an unbearable burden to the

tramp; so are the norms, methods, propædeutics, unnecessarily long preparatory work of the scientific career to the speculative philosopher; he prefers to live and travel around in the world of imagination at the expense of scientific, experimental workers, just as the proletarian tramps and particularly the idle aristocrats or privileged tramps live and travel around at the expense of manual workers. Just as nomadic *Wanderlust* could with impunity be gratified as long as there were uninhabited regions, and regions inhabited by weak races; and just as parasitism will become impossible in an ideal society in which the working classes will manage their own affairs: Just so will pure metaphysics become impossible when every science will not shrink from working out its own metaphysics, after having established a firm, practical, experimental foundation.

Not to do injustice to the genuine, ideal metaphysicians, we must rather compare them to the explorers of unknown and of the polar regions: they have, it is true, the nomadic instinct of *Wanderlust*, like the tramps, but they subordinate it to and apply it in the pursuit of higher aims of life, in the exploration of the misty unknown regions of metaphysics. The scientifically poorly-equipped speculator either perishes in these metaphysical lands, or returns without bringing any new information about them except the phantoms of his own mind exalted by fear. The verbal, adventurous, or pseudo-metaphysician returns without having reached the misty, frozen, as yet uninhabited land of metaphysics; but he makes more fuss about his excogitated exploration than real explorers. The antipathy felt by scientific specialists for philosophers has its analog in the economic world in the antipathy felt by settled or routine people for nomadic or traveling, adventurous individuals.

INTELLECTUAL HIERARCHY, CLASSIFICATION

The Man of Action.—Intellectually, the pure or ordinary man of action does not stand much higher than the philistine. He is, as a rule, a pseudo-intellectual man, and, often, a morally pseudo-superior man. Although mercenary and success-worshiping historians, and the credulous masses, erect him monuments and immortalize him in various other ways, the impartial student of human nature cannot assign him any high rank in the hierarchic scale of psychical abilities. Human progress would be more continuous and less subject to disturbances or retrogressions, if the thinkers, the genuine superior men, exerted direct guidance over the masses. The man of action needs the suggestions and guiding ideas elaborated by the thinkers; but the latter—if they had their choice—could dispense with the intermediation of the former—not, however, with the intermediation of technologists, but merely with that of leaders, statesmen, professional reformers, ethical culturists, organizers. . . .

The pure man of action has the following characteristics: Activity, restlessness is his life. Solitude, inaction, revery, thinking for its own sake, thinking that cannot immediately be communicated and put into practise, is a dread to him. His mental activity runs in simple, unilateral, unramified circuits, leading to immediate muscular discharge. His knowledge of men and things is purely empirical, and of no general or theoretical nature. He does not care for the "why"; he merely cares for the "what." In other words: He merely cares to know how to act quickly and efficiently upon a particular class of men or things, and how to make them react; but he does not care to know about physical and psychical behavior in general, nor about their inner, hidden causes. If he is a leader of men,

all he cares to know is, what pleases and displeases them, what prompts them to action, what gains their confidence, what are the safest means of using them for the gratification of his material and egoistically-vain pursuits—if he is a pseudo-morally active man—or what are the safest means of making men work in their own interest and for the gratification of his altruistical vanity—if he is a genuine morally active man, i. e., an ideal man of action. But the fact that he knows how to lead men does not at all prove that he knows and understands them. On the contrary! If he really knew and understood men, as a genuine psychologist does, he would be less enthusiastic; if he had a clear idea of how empty of reality the pursuit of immortality is, and of how insignificant human life and struggles are in comparison with the infinite, eternal processes going on in the universe, he would probably be more sober and less impulsively active. Comparatively speaking, the physically active man or the technologist knows more about the substances acted upon than the socially active man or the leader knows about his flock. Both act for the sake of getting useful results. Knowledge is a mere means to them. Too much, too general, too deep knowledge would be a hindrance to them. Hence, they avoid it, and are averse to it. They tolerate Science, Art, Philosophy, purely intellectual pursuits, so long and in so far only as it serves their purposes so to do. If the socialistic philosopher works hand in hand with socialistic leaders and organizers, it is—not because he does not know their aversion to intellectual pursuits, but—because he knows that they will bring about a social organization under which there will be more leisure and more liberty than under the capitalistic spoliation régime, hence more opportunity for intellectual pursuits.

The man of action is necessarily narrow-minded, one-

sided, oligo-ideistic, or even mono-ideistic; for one cannot pursue many practical aims, i. e., the realization of many ideals, as one can pursue many trains of thoughts. To put into practise a single idea and to preserve the practical results against degeneration or destruction, requires—in our human society which is spoiled by an anarchical, cut-throat competition—untiring attention, uninterrupted application, and readiness to act at any moment; whereas a train of thoughts may be dropped for some time and resumed later, without any detriment, nay, with positive advantage. The pursuit of a practical end, on the contrary, does not allow any interruption, and jealously forbids the pursuit of any other practical end; it requires steady preoccupation with details and with trivial matters; it also requires direct contact with the objects or persons acted upon. The greater the mass to be acted upon and the greater its ignorance or intellectual blindness, the greater is the chance for its falling a prey to unscrupulous, criminal rulers or leaders whose so-called executive ability unmasks itself, on closer inspection, as consisting of mere flattery, terrorism, intrigue and bribery.

The distinction between active and contemplative men is not always a distinction between two kinds of men; it is more often a distinction between two degrees of activity. What is commonly known and spoken of as the active type of men consists of men who are prompt in putting into practise whatever they see, think or is suggested to them; who feel the necessity of being always doing something—be it even something useless, something they do not believe in, something that does not appeal to their interests—rather than do nothing or indulge in thinking and deliberating; who prefer to do something now, at the risk of having later to undo it, rather than deliberate, plan the whole scheme of action, and postpone action or agitation until the en-

tire scheme is worked out in their minds; who feel the impulse of exhibiting themselves, of drawing the people's attention upon themselves; who learn to do by doing, and learn such things only as they themselves can do or put into practise. Whereas what we commonly call the contemplative class of men does not necessarily or entirely consist of inactive men. The contemplating man is not prompt in acting, nor does he like to be continually active. He does not act before having planned the system of means to be employed, before having weighed and valued the consequences, before having made sure that the trouble is worth his while and will yield lasting results. He has no patience for carrying out details and for remaining active in a single cause; nor can he rest satisfied merely with immediately realizable or working knowledge. The man of action acts promptly, much and continually, but achieves very little; whereas the thinking man acts after deliberation and mature conviction, he acts little and but rarely, but achieves much. Left to themselves, the thinkers and philosophers of mankind would have accomplished long ago the international peace, general culture and universal brotherhood which the men of action have been promising and claiming to pursue for so many thousands of years.

Poet and Thinker.—From the evolutionary standpoint, the thinker, the philosopher, must be regarded as superior to the pure poet; since sentimentalism goes together with an immature age, is only a stage of transition in the life of the thinker, whereas philosophic and scientific thinking comes with maturity. If we admit that the evolution of the superior man during his individual life represents an abridged copy or recapitulation and an anticipation at the same time of the evolution of mankind, we have to accept the conclusion that art, in general, and poetry, in particular, repre-

sent a lower stage of development than science and philosophy.

The thinker may exceptionally redescend into the warm regions of poetry; and the poet, the artist, may from time to time ascend into the serene regions of philosophical thinking. But, in spite of occasional deep philosophical insights or intuitions, the poet remains a superficial, confuse, obscure, inconsistent or immature thinker. Even Goethe, the philosophical poet *per excellentiam,* makes no exception thereto.

The poet is a primitive type of thinker: He thinks in images, mental pictures, not in concepts; he expresses, therefore, his thoughts in pictorial language; he thinks the general and the abstract in the form and by means of the particular or concrete; he thinks the new, the inanimate, the impersonal in terms of the old, traditional, animate, personal. Since conflicting or antagonistic images, unlike conflicting concepts, cannot coexist—but only succeed each other—in consciousness, we understand why poets are partial, one-sided, inconstant, inconsistent, sentimental.

Juvenile and Mature Types.—Psychical maturity is characterized by a better, more rapid perception of wholes, of manifolds, and by conception of the abstract, of the content, of remote ends; psychical juvenility has a clearer and more objective perception of parts, of details, of the concrete, of form, of immediate ends.

What is true of maturity and juvenility in common mortals, holds also of the different types of superior men. The artist represents the juvenile type in comparison with the scientist and the philosopher, who represent maturer types. And within each class we can make the same distinction: one artist may lay more stress on details, form: he belongs to the juvenile type of artists; another one may pay more attention to the whole, to the conception, idea: he is a philoso-

pher-artist, he belongs to the maturer type. Exclusive emphasizing of form or of idea is a symptom of complete immaturity or of complete decay. Theology is either the immature, juvenile or the senile stage of metaphysics.

The tenth step does not cost any more energy than any preceding step did consume (it only requires a greater effort, on account of the fall in the normal level of vital energy), but the tenth step cannot be made before the ninth. The same holds true of mental processes. Abstract mental processes do not absorb more energy than concrete processes, but the concrete is the foundation of the abstract. To start with the concrete and end with the abstract presupposes an intellectually richer, higher, maturer individuality than to remain forever in the concrete sphere.

The juvenile or immature novelist and dramatist do not go much beyond the fantastic stories and fairy tales heard during their childhood; at best, they merely repeat, in a more or less altered form, what they have heard from gossipers or what they have read; they describe men and things as seen from the outside; they concentrate their entire attention upon a single individual or a few individuals to the exclusion of the rest of the world, or as if the rest of mankind were mere appendages and had a purely incidental existence; they either disregard reality altogether, or reproduce indiscriminately, like a photographic film, the most insignificant, trivial, obvious, encumbering, minute details; if they possess some introspective ability, they depict a single emotion, a single pursuit of their hero, as if he were obsessed day and night by it and had no other needs or aims in life. The maturer, psychological, philosophical novelist and dramatist have the gift to fathom beneath the surface of things, to scrutinize their own souls and to penetrate into the souls of all

types of men; they disclose the type or class behind or around the individual characters which they depict; they give the reader glimpses of broad views or of life-conceptions while dealing with particular experiences of particular individuals; they open vistas into the future while dealing with the past or present; they afford glances into the whole complex structure of human society while dealing with one social stratum in particular; their fine sense of proportion enables them to separate the vital from the irrelevant, the instructive and interesting from the trivial, causal connections from mere chance connections.

Classification.—Strictly speaking, we ought not to base our hierarchical classification of superior men merely upon the prevailing mental function, for all mental functions are implied in any mental process, nor upon the proportion between the observational and the interpretative (speculative, hypotheses-making) ability. In other words, we ought not to make a distinction between speculative and non-speculative or observational thinkers, we ought not to make speculation the *differentia* between philosopher and scientist; for there is just as much theory, fiction, arbitrary—although not explicit—assumption in the latter as in the former. The experimental chemist does not imply less speculation in his account of analyses and syntheses of simple, palpable chemical substances than the social reformer makes in his ideal reconstructions of mankind; the physiological psychologist, who scoffs at the philosophical psychologist, is not aware that he is forging just as many unverified and even unverifiable theories in his psychometrical experiments and in his analysis of sensations as the latter does in his combinations of concepts, mental functions, etc.; metaphysics is based just as well upon observation as is physics; only physics builds upon its observations an intellectual edifice of

ordinary altitude, whereas metaphysics builds upon its observations a gigantic tower. In reality both philosopher and scientist start from observations; then they forge hypotheses in order to connect and organize them; then they proceed to further observations and experimentations in order to test the strength of the hypotheses which are usually modified and multiplied to meet the demands of additional facts, and so on. The real difference between the speculative or philosophical thinker and the non-speculative or scientific thinker is a difference in the complexity of the problems attacked. The philosopher having a wide mental grasp, a broad intellectual horizon, higher aspirations, great intellectual boldness, many-sided and refined intellectual interests, attacks highly complicated problems which are not within easy reach. The scientist having a narrow intellectual horizon, very few and rougher intellectual needs, little intellectual boldness or spirit of adventure, ventures therefore merely into the lower, immediate, simpler, handier realms of knowledge.

It is not proper to classify mental superiority merely on the basis of predominating abilities (observation, memory, imagination, reason) without taking into consideration the fundamental aims or interests. For we perceive, remember, . . . spontaneously, quickly what we are directly, constantly interested in; and we learn to withdraw our attention from whatever we feel to be against our aims. Thus women notice in one second more things referring to the clothing, hairdressing, talk, etc., of passers-by than the best man observer could notice in one hour; the self-important individual, the ego-maniac, the born auto-biographer, will remember the most trivial happenings in his and others' life, if they only seemed to flatter his self-love. The philosophically minded individual, i. e., the individual who is interested mostly in broad, general views, eternal

values, higher thoughts, will as a rule hardly notice or remember persons, things, events of mere actual, transitory interest, and still less will he notice or remember gossip, formalities, conventions, petty intrigues and rivalries, matters of fashion, fads, verbal knowledge. . . .

What distinguishes scientific from non-scientific observation is not the accuracy and quickness of the mental process, but the interests that guide it and preside over it, and the subject-matter of the observational process. Likewise with introspection: It is erroneously assumed that the psychologist has a generally keener introspective, self-scrutinizing, self-analyzing ability than the non-psychologist. But this is not necessarily true. If it were so, psychiatrists could not rely on the morbid self-analyses of their patients. What distinguishes the self-analysis of the psychologist from that of the non-psychologist is the fact that the latter observes trivial, personal, strange states of mind, whereas the former notices and remembers only those of his states of mind which are of general interest, which lead to some broad conception or general truth. The philosophical psychologist has a keener self-observation in concepts and complex mental states; the physiological psychologist displays keen introspection in sensations and elementary states of mind. The poet remembers his emotions, the psychologist remembers rather the thoughts stirred up by them. The born psychiatrist will be a keen observer of all deviations from the normal in his own mental life and also of their outward manifestations in others. The ethical psychologist is steadily on the alert to detect any frank or disguised and devious intrusions of impure, selfish motives into his own consciousness, and also manifestations of such intrusions into others' minds; and in his meditations on any psychological problem he can-

not help starting from, or landing into, ethical considerations, just as any individual with inborn, constant, predominating interests cannot help taking these as a center of perspective, or as a reference point in any of his preoccupations.

If certain individuals are called observers, this does not mean that they confine their mental activity to mere observing, and refrain from recollecting, imagining, conceiving, reasoning, theorizing: it merely means that all the latter mental operations are subordinated to and pressed into the service of observation; whereas the thinker, if he observes or uses the observations and experiments of others, it is for the sake of reasoning about them, it is for the sake of using them as stepping-stones for the attainment or supporting of higher points of view, broader outlooks, general conceptions.

What distinguishes the observation of the thinker from that of the pure observer is the fact that it is an end-in-itself for the latter, whereas for the former it is a mere means, a mere method of verifying old hypotheses and of stimulating the conception of new hypotheses. To the pseudo- or professional superior man, knowledge, art, morality, are mere means or methods of furthering his personal interests. To the genuine or vocational superior man they are ends in themselves, and only occasionally, secondarily, means of earning money or fame. Food, shelter, clothing, material possessions, are aims to the philistine, but mere means to the intellectual individuals. For the technologist, mathematics, physics, chemistry, are mere means or methods of attaining and testing practical ends. The mathematician, physicist, chemist, see in the technical construction a mere embodiment of scientific principles, a mere method of illustrating scientific theories. To a linguist the literature of a nation is a mere means of getting at linguistic peculiarities and principles. To

the *Kultur Historiker* language is a mere means of getting at the literature, at the intellectual treasures of nations. Whoever is interested in a certain subject, in certain problems, must have some interest in the methods of approaching, of formulating, of solving, and of applying them. Thus the scientist who has no natural interest in, no inborn or specific ability for mathematics, or for Logic, may nevertheless gain a clear insight into mathematical and logical methods, as soon as he feels the need of applying them to his own field of scientific interests. A mathematician and a logician, on the other hand, for whom mathematics or logic are an aim and not a means, a science and not a method, may fail in applying correctly these methods to complex matters which do not interest them; they must, however, take some interest in simpler matters, in general scientific questions, as means of illustrating and of grasping their methods. Art and technology are for science mere means or methods of getting at, and of utilizing, knowledge. Science, in her turn, is for philosophy a mere means or method, a mere stepping stone for getting at ultimate truth, at the supposedly unique reality underlying all the various classes of scientific knowledge.



Hierarchy.—Lowest on the hierarchic scale of intellectual superiority, just a little above the level of average men, we have to place the thoughtless observer, the mechanical experimenters, the purely reproductive and imitative artists and writers. Just as the greedy money-maker consumes his entire activity and ability in the simple aim of amassing money to such an extent that in the end he loses—if he ever had—the capacity of enjoying his wealth, and must regretfully see how others more capable of enjoying life stretch their arms towards his so dearly paid-for pile of money; just so the thoughtless observer, the empty-minded experimenter, amass piles of facts and figures without stopping to digest part of them, in the hope—they claim—that the more gigantic their heap of raw observations will grow, the more easily will knowledge be extracted therefrom; but, alas, their minds end by losing—if they ever had—the capacity of digesting the intellectual wealth which, much to their disgust, they must hand over to the youthful minds of thinkers which are more capable of drawing intellectual food and enjoyment therefrom. The purely observational, extrospective, descriptive, experimental, intellectual man has no real, many-sided, comprehensive, deep thirst for knowledge, for otherwise he could not confine his mental activity for a long time, and often during his whole lifetime, to a particular, narrow class of objects, to which his attention is usually drawn by popular or scientific fashion.

Within the observational field itself a difficulty meets us when we have to decide who stands higher on the hierarchic scale: the observer of pathological cases, or the observer of normal cases (for instance, the psychiatrist or the psychologist proper). For, on the one hand, the genuine observer who does not stop at superficial descriptions, who does not rest satisfied with



mere shadowy, speculative ideas as to the essence of things and processes observed, applies himself to the pathological field, for essential and distinctive features of things are better detected in the caricature, abnormal condition; but, on the other hand, it takes more genius to perceive the essence of things in their normal than in their abnormal condition.

The bulk of the army of geniuses is formed by scientists and technologists, the vanguard by philosophers, the rear by poets and artists. Or, more correctly, talented men form the bulk of the army, and geniuses are leaders, officers.

The poets, *qua* poets, conserve and revive the past;

the scientists and technologists represent the present in its evolutive course; the philosophers anticipate the future: They are the first to catch the only glimpse it is allotted to mortals to attain of ideal beauty, of absolute truth.

It is needless to emphasize the fact that Nature knows of no such rigorous classification, of no fixed demarcation lines. There are no absolutely pure thinkers; no absolutely pure poets, etc. The only difference between a thinker and a poet, characterized as such, is that what is the rule, an aim, with the former is the exception, fortuity, with the latter, and vice versa.

The poet compared with the psychologist is what the practical man is when compared with the scientist. The psychologist observes his own soul directly and the souls of others indirectly in an impersonal, objective, disinterested, impartial way; and so does the scientist with respect to the external world. Whereas the poet, the artist, observes his own soul and that of others for the sake of an emotion, in a subjective, partial, personal way; and the practical man notices the exterior world in so far only as it furthers his own interests. To the psychologist, concrete situations are a means to illustrate, or impure material from which he extracts, pure abstract thoughts and laws. To the poet, thoughts are a means to make concrete situations interesting, to characterize a personage or the hero; a hidden skeleton to support a concrete living being; a mere scaffolding by means of which to build a new ideal social organization.

As we advance from the class of artists and technologists to the highest class, to that of philosophers, the motor aspect or motor arc decreases in favor of the sensory aspect or sensory arc. Poly-ideists are oligo-active. (Does not this fact point to, or suggest, the theory that psychical energy is physiological energy

accumulated in a latent state? And, continuing this line of thought, emotional energy would represent a highly condensed or explosive form, whereas cogitational energy would represent a better available form of latent cerebral energy.) Of two men standing on the same level of many-sidedness, the more active, the experimentalist, is superior to the less active, to the speculative. Of two men of equal activity, that one is superior who is more many-sided. But the division of labor being a general rule, we very seldom meet with an experimenter who does not borrow his ideas starting-point from the speculative thinker who, in his turn, looks for confirmation of his original ideas to the experimental researches of others.

The speculative thinker (I do not mean the dialectic, parasitical, or dishonest type) is too rich in original ideas, too lofty and many-sided in his interests, to have time and patience for experimenting, for going deeply into details and consequences. The experimenter, on the contrary, especially the mechanical experimenter who in the intellectual world is the analog of the worker in the economic world, is too poor in original ideas, too poor in inner intellectual impulses and needs, to let go so easily an original idea of his, such a *rara avis*, or one adopted on account of its being *en vogue;* it is easier for him to fathom, and to experiment upon, one and the same thing than to go over to a new order of things. "Too much of an experimenter to be a deep thinker" ought, therefore, to become a stereotyped phrase.

Without corroboration on the part of the patient scientist we could never distinguish the fruitful speculation of the genius from that of a lazy mind, the divination of intuition from the mere idle guesswork or fancies of a superficial, verbal speculator. And vice versa: without a guiding speculative idea the scientist

would never know what to observe or what to experiment on.

To the moral genius no single definite place can be assigned on the hierarchical scale of genius and talent. He may be found anywhere. He may be intellectually a philistine; in this case his morality is manifested merely in action, in lending assistance to particular individuals. He may be an artist, poet, novelist: in this case he depicts with predilection the oppressed and the disinherited class; he invites our attention and cooperative sympathy for the latter. He may be a scientist (economist, sociologist, psychologist), a philosopher: in this case he searches after Truth about social conditions, he plans schemes of increasing social happiness or of reducing human suffering. What is common to all these classes of moral geniuses is their aim, viz., the increase of social happiness and solidarity. They only differ in methods, means: one uses direct, personal action and persuasion as a means (radical reformers, ideal politicians, ideal teachers and priests, agitators . . .); another one pursues the same aim through the medium of art, literature, science, philosophy.

Curves of Development.—The artist advances further than the average man along the line of receptivity (observation) and reproductivity; the scientist and the philosopher advance further than the average man and the artist along the line of creation and interpretation. The mental and bodily development of the genius are not so strictly parallel as in the normal philistine. (See figure on p. 150.)

Part of the development curve drawn in detail so as to show the rhythm or periodicity of the abilities in their yearly (a), seasonal or quarterly (b), monthly (c), daily (d), etc., variations, is represented by the figure on page 151.



I. Curve of development of the average man.
II. " " " " " artist.
III. Curve of development of the scientist.
IV. " " " " " philosopher.



Scientist and Philosopher. Realistic and Romantic Thinker.—Just as we perceive things better if we expect or anticipate the perception, or if—at least—we have had previous similar perceptions, just so do we understand general statements and conclusions drawn by somebody else from his particular experiences, if we have incipient, vague tendencies towards the same generalizations, or if—at least—we have had identical or similar experiences to those of the man who dares or is capable to draw general conclusions. Just as remote objects are quasi non-existent for those who did not follow the objects in their movement, and for those whose attention is not directed towards the dim, distant objects; just so do general statements—especially those of the highest degree of generality or the philosophical—remain meaningless, mere sounds, mental non-entities, mere mental shadows, at best lifeless ideas for those who have not followed the trend of particular, concrete experiences moving towards the summit of general, philosophical views; and also for those who are left in the dark as to the experimental,

factual, concrete structure which supports on its top the dimly seen general, abstract, philosophical statement.

All the factual, scientific avenues lead to the same summit of philosophic views. No matter along what scientific avenue one travels, the highest philosophical summit reached is the same for all. If not all the philosophers agree, it is because many stop exhausted on the mountain slope, or on a lower summit accessible through but one scientific avenue, which summit they mistake for the highest; and also because on a higher level many lose sight of what they experienced on a lower one, so that these experiences become obliterated, non-existent for this kind of philosophers, known under the euphemistic name of idealists. Realists alone, on their higher, subjective, introspective, conceptual standing ground, do not forget, and do not lose the connection with the lower, objective, extrospective, perceptual standing ground.

The realistic philosopher, i. e., the philosopher who, while rising to ever higher points of view which enable him to embrace ever broader horizons, does not lose sight of the single, particular objects, individuals, pursuits, events, met with in the low regions of concrete life: only this kind of philosopher, I say, is in a position to assign to everything its real place and significance by comparison with the entire field of human and extra-human activities. Only he is in a position to warn the philistines against the danger of allowing themselves to be exclusively and forgetfully absorbed in trivial, ephemeral pursuits; in noisy but empty, artificial, perishable humbug performances of exploiters, while paying no attention to approaching catastrophes which spring from unchecked human parasitism. Only he is in a position to remind the intellectual proletarians of the real, fundamental eco-

nomico-ethical problems that must be solved before any other, and thus to save them from being caught in the nets of fictitious, shallow, nebulous, idle, formalistic, truth-shunning capitalistic philosophy. Among modern philosophers the only one who, in my opinion, is fully entitled to the name of a genuine, consistent, unshakable, many-sided realistic philosopher is Max Nordau. If the caste of academical, state- or capital-supported philosophers ignore him, it is on account of his plebeian manners, love of independence, non-official, non-technical, plain, unguarded and unsparing language, lack of grandiloquent and customary scholastic verbosity, disrespect for time-honored and school-sanctioned doctrines or authorities. Wundt, in spite of his great abilities, is too much of a hairsplitter, too selfish, too fame-seeking, too thirsty for the applause of all living philosophasters, too much entangled in the nets of academico-capitalistic philosophy, too busy displaying useless erudition and systematizing or assorting already existing doctrines, to work himself up to a realistic world-conception which is accessible only to bold, independent, disinterested, solitary, vanity-free, proletarian thinkers. Spencer lacked the life experiences of the proletarian to remain true to the philosophical and sociological realism of his early years.

Only the realistic philosopher is in a position to see the chaotic conditions prevailing both in our intellectual and economic world, where fundamental activities are neglected or given but scanty attention, and badly remunerated or even despised; whereas unessential, playful, childish, useless, and even harmful pursuits are indulged, paid for from public funds, highly esteemed, given undue importance, and munificently remunerated.

One may be a realistic thinker in matters of philosophy, individual psychology, cosmological science,

and still remain an unrealistic, romantic, idly speculative, ideologistic, nebulous thinker in matters sociological, political, economic, ethical-psychological. And this for the simple reason that in the former fields there are no hereditary privileges: Every thinker must start out with personal observation and experience, with sensations, and rise gradually to perceptions and thence to ever broader concepts; whereas, in the field of political, economic, social relations, ready-made fictitious concepts and spurious ideals are imposed upon the children of the privileged classes, and no chance is given them to get closely acquainted with the real predatory substratum of the social edifice. Only the intellectual proletarian is in a position to study the whole structure of human society from the bottom upwards and to fully realize its defective, tottering condition; for he is born in a lower social stratum, which has to carry daily the crushing burden of human uncertainties, hardships, oppression; but, owing to his superior intellect, he is able to get access—either bodily, or mentally, i. e., through reading—to the higher social classes and to thus extricate the net of subtle causal connections between the simplified, brutalized, struggling, harassed life of the men at the bottom and the increasingly refined, complicated, privileged, dream-indulging, smooth life of the upper classes. If he is also a moral genius, then, even if he has worked himself up to a secure position, he will never lose sight of the fundamental, vital needs and problems of mankind to allow himself—like the thinker who is born into a privileged class—to be carried away by sociological and political abstractions, fictions, grandomaniacal dreams. What has been said about the reasons for the sociological realism of the intellectual proletarian, also holds, although in a reversed order, for the impoverished middle class thinker (Karl Marx, for instance) and for the

temporarily or permanently disinherited, persecuted aristocratic thinker (Peter Kropotkin, for instance) who begin their life among the privileged classes and are afterwards driven into the ranks of the desperately struggling proletarians, where they learn to rectify and complete their world-conception, or to see men and things in their true significance.

CHAPTER IV

CREATIVE LIFE

Imitation and Creation.—Imitation and creation do not exclude each other. The particularity of an individual, nation, race, manifests itself just as much in what they imitate as in what they create independently, just as much in the suggestions received as in the suggestions given out or exerted upon others. Suggestion alone can but intensify or minimize, accelerate or retard, start or arrest, associate or dissociate mental processes that are potentially or actually existent in the mind of the influenced individual; but it cannot give him what he lacks absolutely, it cannot make a blind man see, it cannot make an empty mind think, it cannot make an empty heart feel. Hence, to explain all the identical or similar myths, customs, beliefs, practises, found among distant races, nations, tribes, merely as results of contact, diffusion, imitation, is just as one-sided and childish as to explain them merely as aboriginal, spontaneous, independent creations, as proofs of the fundamental identity of men's souls the world over.

Not only truth and knowledge, but also error, illusion, beliefs, are based on the observation of real phenomena and of real things. Only the latter are built on incomplete, inaccurate, second-hand, emotionally obscured observations. There is no error, no belief, no legend, no myth, without a kernel of truth or fact therein—be it ever so small and hidden from view. All creation, all original work, must be based upon, and contain, some amount of imitation. All speculation

must take its starting-point from some amount of observation. The human mind can not create anything entirely from its own resources, without being assisted, stimulated, fertilized by suggestions coming from external Nature. Even music, the so-called subjective art *per excellentiam*, draws inspiration, not only from the human heart with its mysterious longings and passions, but also from the vast and mighty organ of Nature, from what Karl Merz so beautifully describes as the music of Nature: The wind that howls in caverns, and sighs through the pines, and whistles upon reeds; the wave that moans, the rivulet that laughs, the thunder that peals, the ocean that roars; the music of shifting sands, the mysterious sounds of the waters rushing through coral caves; the wild concerts of the animal world, the songs of birds and of insects; the yelling and screaming waves dashing against the rocks; man's own outbreaks of emotional expression, etc.

The genuine original man is original even when he tries to imitate and believes that he is imitating; he is original against his own will; he finds out at his own expense (for originality is mistaken for stubbornness or haughtiness, and hence offends and irritates those deprived of it) that he differs from others, but often he does not know it, or does not fully appreciate it.

Whereas the pseudo-original man imitates while trying to create; if insane, he loves originality for its own sake without especial regard to the matter upon which his originality exerts itself; the affected originality of the pseudo-superior man aims at success; the pseudo-original is original in form, trivial matters, words, when he believes to be original in substance, important matters, thoughts. Verbal or formal originality spends itself on inventing big words for small thoughts; uncommon, roundabout, humoristically ambiguous or obscure expressions for common, every day, simple, plain,

trivial facts. Verbal originality tries to hide ugly platitudes under stylish, adorned, picturesque linguistic garbs; just as women try to please, not with what they have in themselves, but with nice, colored dresses and borrowed feathers. Whereas philosophical, general, soul-uplifting, socially useful truth is too sublime in itself to stand in need of showing itself in an adorned, picturesque, stylish, linguistic garb.

Verbal originality repeats one and the same idea in various forms, giving thus the appearance of having exhausted the subject; or it finds an original form, an original exposition, for old, common-place truths which on account of their new garb are mistaken for new truths. Real originality expresses, presents, many original ideas, new truths, in one and the same linguistic garb. Variation in ideas, novelty and originality of conceptions, thought-wealth, go often together with a monotonous style, with linguistic poverty. And vice versa: linguistic wealth, variation in the stylistic forms, go usually together with mental poverty, with monotonous repetition of the same common-place truths. It is with ideas or thoughts as with men: ordinary, common-place, empty-minded, philistine individuals often walk around in fashionable, brilliant, eye-catching, exceptional garments; likewise, common-place, meaningless ideas often circulate in high-sounding, brilliant, fashionable, scientific linguistic garments.

Originality in certain things presupposes imitation in others; originality in ideas, essence, wholes, conception of the end, goes very seldom hand in hand with originality in form, details, conception of the means, and vice versa. We cannot be teachers in certain things without being disciples in other things. The speculative thinker is original in ideas, ideals, aims; the original experimenter may be original in means and ways of testing, applying, realizing them. The former

is original in broad views, large syntheses; the latter is original in finding out details, in analyzing. The former sees many aspects, things, complexes, at a single glance; the latter sees many details of one and the same aspect, thing, complex. The speculator looks at things from above; the experimenter from a-near. The former looks for relations, causes, reasons, where the latter looks for facts, effects, consequences. The former looks for outer, complex relations; the latter for inner, simple relations. The former knows intuitively, simultaneously what the latter finds out by reasoning, successively. The former perceives *unum in multis;* the latter *multa in uno.*

Out of a great mass of vagaries and non-sense, a very slight but very precious quantity of deep, fertile truth can be extracted; but it takes a specialist in clear thinking and in penetrating, comprehensive, critical sense to undertake this delicate and difficult task of extracting it; to all others the scarce, subtle, precious truth, which is almost inextricably lost within the inexhaustible layers of metaphysical mud, escapes between their fingers, and nothing but metaphysical mud remains in their hands.

An original man undertakes repugnantly the task of merely reproducing, popularizing, compiling, expounding, commenting upon others' opinions, others' scientific or philosophic work. If his ability consists mainly in creative and explanatory work, he will never excel in imitative and descriptive work. As a rule the knowledge acquired through reading and school education exerts merely a catalytic or stimulating action upon the mind of the genius, i. e., it merely helps, spurs, encourages his own thoughts to emerge, to enter new combinations, to give birth to new creations, without this knowledge itself being consumed, utilized, absorbed in these original products.

The premature longing for originality, for intellectual wealth, induces many to mistake tautologies for explanations, verbal for real similarities and distinctions, to falsify reality semi-consciously, to shun laborious verifications, and to bring forth theories having no foundation. These pseudo-originals forget that very often a little original thought is the result of long and laborious observations, experiences, just as a small quantity of gold is extracted from large masses of ore. An original idea which seems to have risen instantaneously from a single observation, may in reality have lain prepared by many previous observations in our sub-consciousness, and this single observation may be that negligible quantity which by and through itself could never give rise to an original thought, but is just able to turn the scales, to lift the unconscious idea into consciousness.

Both the premature and the decrepit yearning for originality, i. e., the yearning which is not yet or no longer accompanied by the power of being original or creative, manifest themselves in various manners: in indulging in physical or emotional intoxicants; in paradoxo-mania; in the spirit of contradiction; in philosophical negativism; in hunting for verbal originality, for superfluous neologisms; in ignoring, belittling, ridiculing the real originality of others; in persecuting contemporary genuine superior men; in getting easily wounded by—and, therefore, anxiously avoiding—criticism, except for advertising purposes; in semi-conscious, self-deceptive plagiarisms; in counterfeiting ideas by coining new words, etc.

As an example of how pseudo-originality manifests itself in philosophy let us take the master of modern sophists, Henri Bergson. He identifies, combines, fuses concepts which the human mind has taken so many pains to discriminate: To him space and time are identical, spirit is pure duration, intelligence is

pure space, the physical is merely the psychical inverted. On the other hand, he dishonestly avails himself of the fact that the same ideas appear under different names; by combining such names he gives himself the appearance of handing out explanations, new truths, when in reality he hands out tautologies, empty phrases; by insinuating that such names stand each for a different idea, he simulates a greater intellectual wealth than he really possesses. Such dissimilar words denoting in reality one and the same concept, with which this philosophical magician is juggling, are: time and duration, space and externality, etc. "Mutual externality," he says, "is the distinguishing mark of things which occupy space." The abstract concepts of philosophy, and the same old worn-out disputes about time, space, motion, free will, and even the more recent theories which he does not hesitate to reject in their usual wording, he clothes and repeats *ad nauseam* in his own hybrid language formed from a combination of physical, chemical, mathematical, mechanical terms. Thus he declaims about: "fluid concepts capable of following reality in all its sinuosities," "ontological affinity between knower and known," "intuition refracted into concepts and propagated to other men," "reflective consciousness solidifies into sensible qualities the continuous flow of reality," "Nature is a neutralized consciousness," "the mind diluting its quality into quantity," "reality can pass from tension to extension by way of inversion." The old assertion that all accurate knowledge must lend itself to mathematical expression he dishes up as an invention of his by disguising it in his hybrid linguistic garb: "All the operations of intelligence tend towards geometry as their perfect achievement." He disconnects things that belong together, such as intelligence and instinct, in order to shift the burden of explanation for his pseudo-

theories from the one to the other at will. He dethrones Reason, Logic, Intellect, because it is too democratical, it does not lend itself to bribery, and because every man can directly appeal to it and find redress in its court against the harm done by falsehoods forced upon him by philosophical charlatans. He conspires with the other less brilliant sophists to reenthrone, under the new mask of Intuition, the Revelation or Inspiration of the oracles, the mystics' and spiritists' direct communion with God or spirits, Hartmann's Unconscious; for the common mortal is not admitted into the precincts of such a ceremonious, secluded, capricious, despotical, autocratic Ruler, but must appeal through the intermediary of privileged courtiers, such as Bergson, William James, Rudolph Eucken, and their hangers-on. He dazzles, bewilders, confuses with picturesque, wildly metaphorical, symbolical, sonorous language. He does not use his wild metaphors, like the honest thinker, as mere illustrations, as vehicles for conveying abstract ideas or rather for carrying the readers along the upward path of analogy to the heights of general concepts; he expects us to take his metaphors literally, to stare at them and to admire their author, but not to use them as vehicles for higher and independent thinking; his metaphors are unredeemable promissory notes that cannot be exchanged for real, solid, nourishing facts. He combines the most unexpected words, the names of mutually exclusive abstract concepts, but is smart enough not to play the same trick with concrete concepts and with percepts, for fear lest the majority, who live on the perceptual level and hence cannot be bluffed in their own domain, should not declare him fit for an insane asylum. Thus he declaims without a smile about: "spatialization of time," "materialization of spirit," "concretion of durations," "duration increasing in tension,"

etc., which is just as meaningless as to speak about painting noises, humidification of dryness, smelling a color, etc. He revives the primitive man's personifying, materialistic, anthropomorphic way of thinking under a more modern garb. Thus he says: "The Universe is a great individual akin to ourselves," "intelligence has been deposited by life on its march," "spirit contracts into intelligence," "by turning and twisting on itself, the faculty of seeing becomes identified with the act of willing," "matter is ballasted with geometry," "intelligence insinuates itself into matter, adopts its rhythm, concentrates itself on it," "the movement which issues in spatiality deposits along its route the faculty of induction as well as that of deduction," "mathematics in general represents simply the direction in which matter refalls," "physics comprehends its rôle when it pushes matter in the direction of spatiality," "automatism lies in ambush for our freedom," "our activity leaps from act to act." The naïve, materialistic, primitive theory that our ideas are copies, reflections, emanations, imprints of real things reappears in his babbling about: "fluid conceptions," "the inability of the human intellect to grasp the dynamical," as if the idea of a movement ought to be a moving idea and the idea of infinity ought to be infinite; to know something means to him to become identical with it, to be in it; to perceive means to him to carve pieces out of the big stream of continuous reality. He thinks he writes metaphysics, when in reality he rewrites physics using abstract concepts as subjects instead of the names of material objects. And these ruminations of the little bit of physical, chemical and mathematical knowledge stuffed into his mind at school he has the insolence of regaling us with, as if it were a new, fresh philosophical dish. He abstains from defining—at any rate, from clearly defining—his terminology, in order

to be able to use it arbitrarily, to twist it according to his needs, to make it hide his tricks and plagiarisms. The commonplace truth "Nature knows of no sharp demarcation lines between things" he twisted beyond all recognition into the seemingly new dynamic theory of "fluid conceptions," "dilution of quality into quantity," "spatialization of time," "concretion of durations"; but he is shrewd enough to behave sanely in the region of percepts and not to maintain, for instance, that Paris may dissolve or dilute into Berlin because the frontiers between Germany and France are conventional, or that East flows, melts into West because the cardinal points are merely relative and not fixed. This clever sophist boldly speaks about knowing things intuitively, absolutely, from the inside, from their own point of view; but is careful not to make himself ridiculous by coming down from the realm of abstractions and speaking to us about smelling a flower from inside, about tasting an apple from its own point of view, about seeing the absolute shape of a table by placing ourselves inside its drawers, about feeling the absolute action of things upon ourselves by avoiding the ether waves proceeding therefrom and placing ourselves at the origin or center of irradiation. To give a glimpse into Mr. Bergson's philosophical kitchen, into his method of seasoning his undigested, confused school knowledge with some nonsense of his own so as to disguise its origin and dish it up as a philosophical discovery of his, let us consider this notion of absolute, intuitive or inside knowledge and see how he manufactured it: He had a confused recollection of a convenient simplification used in Mechanics which consists in substituting a simple fictitious, so-called apparent or relative movement from A to B in the place of 2 real or absolute movements, say of a falling body from A to C and of a vehicle moving towards it from B to C.

This simplification is convenient, because the effect or impact of the falling body against a man sitting in the vehicle would be exactly the same as if the vehicle were still and the falling body were moving along AB away from its real vertical path. This does not mean, however, that the man in the vehicle has no other way of knowing the real movement of the falling body except by transporting himself to its interior. Nor does it mean that he always forgets his own displacement toward the body and cannot escape the illusory impression that the latter moves towards him away from the vertical direction.



One kind of nonsensical paradoxes, in which Bergson and the philosophical humbuggers of all times take special delight, consists in pouncing upon correlated and hence inseparable concepts—such as space and time, change (flux) and permanency, motion (energy, force) and matter, subject (mind, *nous*) and object (matter, cosmos), etc.—and to deny the reality of one set or reduce it to a mere derivative, form, shadow of the other set. These humbuggers avoid, however, very carefully playing the same trick with correlated percepts. Thus they do not care to apply their vagaries to concrete cases and to tell us, for instance, that the flight of the birds is the only real thing whereas the birds are pure fiction, or that one can appease his hunger by imagining that he takes food, etc.

Just as a quickly revolving wheel becomes impenetrable to bodies thrown against it, and behaves as if the interstices between the spokes were filled with matter, just so a quick, sanguine, practical, preoccupied, busy, enthusiastic mind (a mind in which the associated ideas, idea and action, follow each other mechan-

ically, quickly) becomes impenetrable, impervious to original truths, incapable of really assimilating, incorporating, taking in new doctrines which are floating around in the intellectual atmosphere.

Spontaneity or passivity means the transformation of physiological into psychical energy. The reverse process, the transformation of conscious psychical energy into physiological energy, forms the voluntary or active processes. The will does not produce or create; it merely reproduces, arranges, directs the data of spontaneity. Will in its initial stage is self-imitation. A personality manifests itself in imitation as well as in creation: We cannot imitate what does not exist in us as a tendency at least. Avoidance of pain and pursuit of pleasure are the causes of voluntary action, but mere results of spontaneous action. The causes of the latter are purely physiological, viz. a surplus of energy tending to expend itself in new channels, if the old ones are sufficiently supplied with energy.

Human desires stand like doorkeepers at the entrance of our consciousness, and do not admit but anticipated, expected impressions, or impressions harmonizing with them. Any other impressions and memories are left outside, in the darkness of unconsciousness, until accumulating and associating they become able to force their way through. In conservative, custom-bound, letter-worshiping communities where originality or mental productivity is not tolerated, there it manifests itself in the shape of ingenious interpretations of and commentations on traditions, old texts, authoritative, classical and time-honored works or institutions: It reads new meanings into old words; it hides the new, the unfamiliar, under the familiar, old cloak of the traditional, of the customary; it confines

itself to mere hints, to timidly raised questions, to parables, myths, symbols. Where intellectual energy is repressed and is not allowed to discharge itself freely in the form of a continuous, illuminating life-calling; there it bursts forth from time to time in the form of flashes—I mean of proverbs, short poems, winged words or phrases, epigrams. Invention or creation hides itself under the cloak of imitation; hopes and ideals are presented in the form of real, historical, past events.

Inspiration, Intuition.—The cooperation of the senses and of the motor centers is simultaneous, instinctive, automatic: What one hears, one generally tends to look at, touch, smell, act upon, imitate, etc., except when experience advises not to do so. Whereas the cooperation of the higher intellectual functions (perception, memory, imagination, reasoning, . . .) is willed, spontaneous, occasional, capricious, difficult to attain, given to but few individuals at certain moments and on certain topics only. The chance cooperation of the higher mental functions and of sentiment constitutes inspiration, intuition. If the abilities of the superior man are a prognostic of human evolution in general, then we may hope that the next higher mental acquisition to be made by mankind in a very remote future will be an automatic, constant, general, simultaneous cooperation of all mental functions at any moment, on any topic, in all men.

Just as social happiness will be the result of instinctive, voluntary cooperation of men; and the highest esthetic enjoyment will result from a wise cooperation of all arts, as dreamt of by the semi-insane genius Wagner: just so the highest amount of truth, quasi-absolute truth, will result from instinctive, simultaneous cooperation of all intellectual functions.

Lack of cooperation between sensory and motor functions is the main cause of illusions, errors, fallacies.

Lack of economic, disinterested cooperation between men is the main cause of social insecurity and misery.

Quest of Truth.—Truth, like woman's love, does not tolerate any rivals in the heart of him who longs for it. Truth reveals itself only to him who renounces the pursuit of success, fame, social recognition, wealth. . . .

The attractive force of truth is so powerful for the genius that he abandons his dearest illusions in order to follow its paths. Truth is an organic necessity, a permanent function, with the genius, and a mere luxury, or an adventitious function, with the others.

Primitive, inferior creatures do not thrive in the sunlight. Likewise, morally inferior men shun the light of Truth, for their mind's eye is blinded by it.

In our quest of truth, we can easily fall a prey to prejudice, a guide who spares us trouble, spares us the effort of seeing with our own eyes. It allows us to indulge in laziness, to rest satisfied with the knowledge of classes and substitute it for the knowledge of individuals, to substitute the knowledge of the past for the present. Prejudices lose their subjective value long before they lose their value of exchange or market value. Hence an additional difficulty in eradicating them.

Expectant or anticipating attention, preconceived opinions and feelings, prejudices, are serviceable if we do not rely too much on them, if we put them to a test from time to time, if they merely help us to start our thinking or to overcome the initial mental inertia, if we do not allow ourselves to be blindly guided by them, if we do not allow them to take the place of, or to hold in check, our own thinking. The hypnotic state is characterized by temporary, transitory, but strong, obsessive prejudices in one or a few directions;

whereas the mental condition of a normal average individual is that of slight but permanent prejudices in many, if not in all, directions.

Our imagination, anticipation, expectation, pre-perception of things or events, is both an aid and an obstacle to our perceiving them, according as we use it as a mere stimulus to or as a substitute for further objective thinking. We perceive things where they are not to be found and events prior to their occurrence, and fail to perceive them where they are or when they occur; because our anticipation does not correspond to reality, is too much relied upon, or is too one-sided. Thus, in looking for a certain book in a library we may happen to stand right in front of it at the beginning of our search and still fail to see it, because we did not expect such a quick success. In examinations, the easiest questions prove often to be the most puzzling, because the candidates expecting hard questions become suspicious even of the most obvious simplicity. Even moderate, conservative, complimentary statements made by avowed socialists, anarchists, communists, alarm the prejudiced philistine, arouse his spirit of contradiction and of vindictiveness; whereas the remonstrances, criticisms, revolutionary statements, the betrayal of common secrets coming from confrères, from so-called respectable or conservative citizens, and high dignitaries he either listens to indifferently, thoughtlessly nodding consent, or responds to with his habitual stupid, fawning laughter, as he responds to whatever passes for a good joke or clever trick. New truths unpretentiously expressed in plain language by an obscure, poor, non-academical, proletarian thinker are either ignored, belittled or ridiculed by our self-important, grandiloquent, verbose professors who, true to their mission of retainers of the money lords, do not expect any manifestation of

intelligence, originality or initiative on the part of the unsuccessful toiling class, for this would contradict their teaching and belief that all material success is the reward of higher intelligence: they do not expect any new truths to come from below, from the so-called lower social strata, but merely from above, from the acknowledged, official spiritual leaders who enjoy the confidence and approval of the master class.

The broad-hearted or moral genius is not prejudiced against any human being. Every one is welcome to his sympathy and interest if he only proves to be worthy of it. He takes interest in any human and living being, without any side-intentions to use them as instruments for his own welfare. He judges and treats every man without regard to the latter's influence or social rank, but merely according to merit. He does not shrink in horror from approaching even the so-called outcasts, for he is driven by the altruistic desire of finding out the kernel of goodness left in them and of using it as a handle for moral uplifting. No human being, no matter how low sunken, is given up by him as a hopeless, incurable case.

The broad-minded or intellectual genius is not prejudiced against any object of thought. He welcomes every idea that knocks at the door of his attention, no matter whether the idea is related or not to other ideas which are in vogue, popular, or at least in scientific fashion; no matter whether the time and energy spent on the ideas yields material profit or not. His main concern is intellectual profit, and such profit is always the reward of exerting our reasoning power, even if the results are negative and the welcomed theory has to be discarded. He takes the trouble—at the risk of being ridiculed and ostracized by academicians—of listening to the claims of the so-called exploded, risky, boycotted theories. No theory is con-

demned by him without being first impartially and critically examined into. Just as our parasitical leaders keep jealously watch over the social functions and offices usurped by and entrusted to them, and do not allow any new type of men—I mean the altruistic and truth-loving type—to join their ranks, just so the views, opinions, beliefs, artificial desires or interests instilled in the minds of the masses keep jealously watch over the entrance gates of their senses and do not admit into the court of consciousness any facts which tend to contradict them. The masses see merely what the hypnotizing leaders suggest to them; and they pass by blindly the facts and things which they have been warned against.

The more pains a writer takes in chiseling, studying, and adorning his style, diction or phraseology, the less eagerness for truth is to be expected from him. The more he thinks of pleasing as many readers as possible, i. e., the more he loves himself, the less love is put by him into the service of Truth. The more preoccupied he is with the impression to be made upon readers, the less preoccupied he is with the object of thought, with the problem he deals with.

The genius does not need statistical data to draw his conclusions; a few observations—often, one only—form a sufficient basis for his generalizations. The genius prefers a simple, accurate, spontaneous, unlooked-for personal observation of a phenomenon undetached from the context of antecedent, concomitant, and succeeding phenomena to a host of inaccurate, isolated, looked-for observations made by others on supposedly identical or similar phenomena detached from their context, and to a whole series of artificially prearranged experiments.

Nor does the genius have much use for the "questionnaire" method when he wants to get an insight into

the soul and heart of his fellow men; for this method of questioning others about their convictions, feelings, impulses and the causes thereof presupposes that everybody knows and understands himself, and secondly that everybody is willing and able to make impartial statements about himself. Statistical work is a good field for talented men, who can thus verify, modify, extend, apply the results attained by geniuses. In the flight of his imagination the genius overlooks at a single glance a wider horizon of facts and of relations than the scientist in his reptilian crawling on the surface can explore in a lifetime.

Thought and Language.—Thoughts arise like plants: a certain period of life and a certain composition of the brain are the prerequisites for their sprouting. Like plants, they remain for a long time in an embryonal state in the dark subsoil of subconsciousness before appearing into the light of consciousness as a fully developed intellectual plant.

Language is no adequate translation of thought, not even of abstract thinking: there is no parallelism between the categories and sub-categories of language (parts of speech) and those of thought. Language is a translation of our most important, latest, concluding thoughts and states of consciousness. Superficially thinking individuals are more talkative and more graphomaniacal—to use Lombroso's term—than deeply thinking individuals; for they reach quickly conclusions, their premises or preparatory and generating thoughts are incomplete, the concluding or resulting states of mind are never differentiated, separated, distinguished from the generating states, the genuine generating thoughts are not clearly discriminated from collateral and antecedent states of mind, no hierarchy of valuation exists between the various conclusions attained, and hence no difference in their

claims on publicity or vocal expression.

Clear thoughts are expressed in clear language. The reciprocal is not necessarily true, but the opposite is always so; confused, mystical language is apparently only concealing deep thoughts.

To be rich in words does not save one from remaining poor in ideas; for there can be appearance and no reality behind it, or—more correctly—different appearances may conceal one and the same reality instead of different realities, or different shades of the same reality. Increasing wealth in thoughts does not immediately bring about a parallel increase in terminological wealth. The balanced original man tries to get along, as far as possible, with the existing stock of words. The unbalanced inventor invents useless things, new words for old ideas, entirely new names for slightly original concepts, unusual groupings of words to express banalities, he makes use of abstract and general terms to express very concrete and particular facts, the appearance of originality is more to him than the reality of it, he hunts for the appearance of originality to deceive others and himself as to his mental sterility. It is just as pathological to delight in self-deception as to our declining creative power as it is pathological to delight in euphoria when our bodily health is getting poorer and poorer. A less unbalanced semi- or pseudo-original man worries about his declining creative power; and if he takes refuge in verbal originality, it is because he wants to keep alive the admiration of his disciples, to prevent his name from disappearing from publicity.

"Ignoti nulla cupido." He who hunts for originality, creation, must have, or have had, at least a germ of it, must have tasted its pleasures. Only in the abnormal craving for originality do the desire and the will transcend the power, the physiological limits,

instead of being adapted to them. It is not abnormality to seek pleasure, consolation, in appearance when reality is unattainable or lost (it is merely a symptom of mental weakness), for this is practised by the great mass also in their various beliefs, customs, etc.; but it is abnormal to delight in an appearance, in pseudo-originality, as if it were a reality, true originality. Between the true geniuses who are original both in form and in content, in expression and in thought, and the philistines who are intellectually sterile, there is the class of semi-original individuals who are original either in content, thought, or in form, expression: In the former case, i. e., in the case of persons richer in taste than in creative power, the original ideas remain in the darkness of unconsciousness until they find an appropriate garment or form given them by genuine geniuses; in the latter case we have pseudo-geniuses who give new forms to old ideas, who steal others' intellectual property by hiding it under their own linguistic cloak.

We treat words as we treat men. Some words become popular, not in consequence of their being meaningful, useful, but in consequence of their noble descent (from Latin, Greek, French, the language of the dominant class . . .) or in consequence of their pleasing sound or appearance. Such words are entrusted with all kinds of offices, they are called upon to represent the most varied ideas even if they are not fit for the purpose; they are called upon to convey so many ideas that they end by conveying the opposite meaning or nothing at all, and by lingering as idle, meaningless sounds. On the other hand, we see strongly correlated functions or meanings, which could be best conveyed by one and the same word, subtly distinguished and torn apart by our academicians and assigned to several words so that not only waste, but also increased

mental confusion, is the outcome. Words that express the same idea with equal fitness are treated differently on account of their difference in sound; nay, they are mistaken for having different meanings; and the supposedly noble words are assigned to sinecures, better offices, colleges, etc. The genuine superior man, who has many and real ideas to communicate, uses therefore plain, transparent, honest, unequivocal words which fitly convey his ideas. Whereas the pseudo-superior man, who has very few or no ideas to impart to his fellow men, prefers to use rare, high-sounding, intoxicating, vague, aristocratic, technical, caste language with a mere semblance of meaningfulness, depth, novelty, uniqueness.

Just as in our modern social organization many kinds of useful work are left undone, whereas many kinds of purely ornamental, useless or even harmful work are done, nay, overdone; just so with our language or expression of ideas: many useful, beautiful, lofty ideas clamoring for the daylight hardly find any linguistic garb in which to present themselves, and remain therefore hidden from view or are presented in inadequate, worn-out, ambiguous garbs; whereas many a trivial, uninteresting, meaningless idea has at its disposal a rich selection of linguistic garments to disguise its ugliness or deformities therein.

Articulate language, which to the thinker is a means of imparting, gaining and exchanging ideas or knowledge, arouses in the mind of the philistine merely confused ideas and emotions, and is used by him as a mere channel of motor discharge, as a relief valve in case he is not allowed to expend his energy in the direction of the gratification of his needs, or as a motor channel for expending a surplus of energy which he does not like to store up by transforming it into sensory energy or idea-forces. He who talks to a

philistine with the intention of conveying general views to him is usually painfully surprised to meet with anger, resentment, wounded self-love; for words do not convey any clear ideas to the philistine: they merely arouse in him feelings of like and dislike, love and hatred, self-complacency or self-degradation; he cannot understand how anybody can speak with any other intention—if with any intention at all—than that of pleasing, flattering, courting or irritating, insulting, humiliating, teasing his interlocutor. This explains why a speech without strong intonation and unaccompanied by gestures or emotional language does not appeal to the masses, does not move them to action and only bores them.

The attention of the genius is like a sensible balance; a very small weight or an ordinary, by common mortals unnoticed, fact suffices to change its center of gravity, to stir up the activity of his ideas and sentiments. I do not mean to say that attention is a power, a faculty. It is a quality of mental processes, it is their intensity and the communication of their intensity to allied suggested processes.

The streams of consciousness are quicker and richer in thoughts in the genius than in the ordinary man; it takes, therefore, the genius such a short time to bring into contact certain thoughts, to find their connection, as to give the appearance of intuitions to his reasonings.

Perhaps the only difference between the consciousness of a common mortal and that of a poet, a thinker, is its subject-matter, its contents, the thing which it responds to.

And who knows whether consciousness can be called a purely human attribute? Do not plants and animals respond to atmospherical changes where man remains blind? Are not plants geniuses in nutrition, whereas

man is a nutritive philistine and parasite? And within our own body, can we deny some sort of consciousness to individual cells? Do they not respond to influences concerning them alone, and not the organism as a whole? Whereas what we call consciousness may in reality be but a higher consciousness concerned in matters referring to the organism taken as a whole, just as social consciousness, the state, is concerned or rather ought to be concerned with general interests and not with those of classes and of particular citizens. The common man is more conscious of his daily needs; the poet is more conscious of the emotional aspect of human experience, he is often blind and tactless in practical matters; the thinker is rather conscious of the cognitive aspect, frequently blind in emotional and practical affairs.

Probably the cells forming the animal colony or animal organism have less consciousness than the independent cells in single-celled creatures; just as individuals living in uninhabited spots, isolated from their fellow-men, at a distance from civilized centers, can better appreciate the advantages of protective social organization than individuals living in towns or cities. The distribution of consciousness is analogous to that of static electricity in conductors: it does not reside in every particle, but accumulates on the external surface and in prominent points.

The man of action, the experimenter, the imitative artist, are not fully conscious of all their aims and motives; they are rather conscious of their intended actions or movements, of their immediate aims and means to be employed. Whereas the thinking or contemplative man is rather conscious of ultimate aims, motives, ends, than of immediate aims, actions to be performed, means of realizing the former.

The creative artist, the poet, the technician, are con-

scious of, and explicit about, concrete, particular things or events, details, single phenomena or states of mind; but they are only dimly conscious of, and express implicitly, incompletely, vaguely, hesitatingly, in hints only, tacitly, the classes, wholes, laws, general conceptions, towering above the little bit of reality which forms the subject-matter of the artistic work. The reverse holds of thinkers, scientists, philosophers. The philosopher, particularly, while being fully conscious of, and giving clear, bold expression to, general laws, comprehensive views, sweeping generalizations, world and life conceptions, is not quite aware of, and gives but an implicit, vague, timid, tacit expression to, the endless multitude of particular cases, concrete events and consequences that might be subsumed thereunder or derived and deduced therefrom.

Just as each of the cells constituting the animal colony called human organism is rather conscious of its own condition and immediate relations to other cells, whereas the brain is less conscious of its own condition and more preoccupied with the general condition of the body and with the ultimate, remote external and internal forces acting upon the latter; just so with the social organism or human society: the moral philistine who represents but a cell of the social organism is conscious of his own immediate condition, needs and relationships; whereas the moral genius who is the brain of the social organism is less conscious of, less sensitive to, his own needs, risks, sufferings, and more preoccupied with the common weal and woe of the group, nation, race; he is seriously concerned with the remedies and fundamental causes of human misery or social maladjustment.

Form is at the same time a means for and an obstacle to recognizing the matter, the substance, the content embodied in it; language both expresses and

conceals the thought contents.

One and the same form, language, expression, cannot fit different kinds of contents, states of mind, thoughts. The fitness, definiteness, adequacy of a form, means its capacity of conveying, exteriorizing, communicating a certain state of mind. It is nonsense to speak of music as a vague, indefinite language, without adding with reference to which states of mind it is so. Music is the most adequate, the most definite, the clearest language or expression of pure emotions; only if it attempts (I allude to Wagnerism) to express ideas, does it become inadequate, vague. The same thing is true of articulate language: Words are comparatively definite, clear, generally understood expressions of ideas; but for the purpose of expressing pure emotions they are too inadequate; nor is mere talk the proper expression of volition. The contents of music, however, i. e., the states of mind conveyed by music, are vague and indefinite in comparison with the contents of articulate language. Dance or acted music, and music proper, sculpture, painting, poetry, drama, novel, science, philosophy, express states of mind of an increasing degree of complexity, with an ever-increasing predominance of idea over emotion, of sensory and postponed motor activity over impulsive motor activity. What has been said of the various means of expression holds also for the varieties of one and the same expressional type. Thus the articulate language which fitly expresses concrete experiences is too vague, too misleading, for philosophical concepts, and vice versa. Mathematical language which is so adequate to express simple quantitative relations is entirely out of place and pedantic in Psychology, Philosophy, . . . where we deal with qualitative, complex relations.

Just as analogy is both a means of facilitating, and

an obstacle to, the understanding of the unknown, invisible, complex, unusual, psychical, . . . in terms of the known, visible, simple, physical, usual, . . . according as the illustrations or explanatory terms are taken for what they are or are mistaken for, identified with, or more attended to than, the terms explained; just so language, form, outer appearance, symbol, . . . reveal or conceal thought, substance, reality, truth, . . . according as they merely arouse or captivate our attention.

Form, language, the letter, symbols, manners, customs, rituals, . . . —as long as they remain simple, natural, transparent—are a vehicle, a receptacle, serving to convey, to perceive, to suggest content, meaning, thought, social feelings, the spirit, morality, truth, religiosity. . . . But as soon as they become complicated, adorned, conventional, they become untrue to their original mission; they captivate and absorb our attention, our interest entirely, and thus prevent us from looking into their contents; nay, more, we are blinded by their fascinating appearance and forget the more important reality which they are supposed to contain.

The genuine original man does not need, and disdains to blind the people with, a pedantic, over-technical, neologistic, figurative language; for his original, fully developed ideas do not fear the transparent garb of a simple, natural, commonly understood language, just as the harmoniously developed bodily forms of the ancient Greeks were made visible by their simple garments.

If even honest, matter-of-fact, vocational writers hunt to a certain extent for unusual, high-sounding, so-called stylish expressions for their ideas, it is under the pressure of our age of word-idolatry, it is under the pressure of form-worshiping publishers and read-

ers. Whereas the dishonest, wilfully nebulous, professional writer, preacher, teacher, orator, overstep all limits in their desire to hide falsehood, common-place, inconsistency, intellectual prostitution, empty-mindedness, behind eye-catching, attention-absorbing, hypnotizing, intoxicating, non-transparent, ambiguous, sophistical, evasive phraseology.

If even an intellectually honest and original thinker like Kant mistook himself for more original than he really was and did not see, for instance, that most of his explanations were mere tautologies and that his celebrated categorical imperative ("Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law") is nothing but a modification of the generally accepted maxim "Act as you expect others to act" and of the old wise maxim, "Do unto others what you want them to do unto you," couched in a formalistic, nebulous, grandiloquent garb; it is due to the fact that he, as a professor, was compelled to accept the traditional academical verbal originality or linguistic method of imposing upon the non-academical world. And since deception of others, particularly unintentional deception, goes together with more or less self-deception, we understand how even the great Kant had become the dupe of his academical hairsplitting, word-idolatry, verbal originality and had come to mistake them for real, objective, original thinking.

The use in religious services of dead, archaic language and of archaic implements or symbols, that no longer convey any clear ideas but merely arouse confused, thought-paralyzing emotions, is mildly or timidly ascribed to the conservatism or to the emotional mission of the church, instead of being ascribed to its deceitful, parasitical pursuits and instead of being classified together with its other deceptive,

money-extorting devices: shutting out of the fear-dispelling bright daylight, lugubrious music, subdued or soul-depressing colors, meaningless and thought-confusing hocus-pocus, appeal to fear, to the imaginary horrors of hell and to other paralyzing feelings. The use by other pseudo-superior men of the not yet commonly understood vague, abstract, conventional, technical, insinuating, suggestive, covert language for trivial purposes, or even of the no longer commonly understood language of smiles, frowns, sneers, gestures, facial contortions, twinkling of the eyes, queer intonation, etc., is ascribed to their smartness, instead of being ascribed to its real motives: cowardice, hypocrisy, malice, evasiveness, moral crookedness. Among the languages of civilized nations, German—as used by academicians, professors, the cultured—will stand as a monument of linguistic deception and imposture. In no other nation does the language of the upper or parasitical class differ to such an extent, in every respect—in grammatical forms, illogical order of words, far-fetched relation between word and meaning, undue use of abstract words, unnaturally long and intricate sentences, etc.—from the language of the masses as to appear to the latter almost like a foreign tongue.

If the poet shows predilection for archaisms, personifications, pictorial language, figures of speech, concrete words reminding of outgrown beliefs or modes of life, it is not out of intellectual dishonesty; it is merely because the poet represents a primitive type of thinker and hence makes use of a more primitive mode of expression.

Language is an inadequate, unidimensional, abbreviated, selective, superficial, and merely suggestive expression or translation of thought. Language is but a very imperfect instrument of thought expression. Words represent, but they may also misrepresent

things, thoughts, feelings. Thus "to save appearances" or "diplomacy" is identical with "telling lies," "intriguing and bluffing," but it does not shock anybody because it is presented in a different linguistic garb, because it is better dressed than its *alter ego*. Language gives the appearance of fixity, unchangeableness, non-variability, ripeness, univocality, real existence, richness of meaning to what is changeable, variable, dynamical, growing, multi-vocal, imaginary, poor in or devoid of meaning. Not only identical things can be expressed by many differently sounding word combinations, but also the most dissimilar things, diametrically opposed feelings and convictions, circulate under one and the same name. Thus those who cannot shut their eyes to the absurdities and puerilities of Religion, but do not dare to differ from the great mass or from their beloved beings, drop—often, without knowing it—the thing, but cling to the name: they cover under the cloak of Religion their new convictions which are rather science, philosophy, ethics, everything but religion.

As there is greater abundance of forms than of matter, we can understand why the same discoveries are made independently by many, but we cannot expect them to be expressed in the same form also.

Sentimental natures can grasp bits of truth, but never a complete truth, since the flight of their imagination does not allow itself to be guided by the will. The speculative or subjective thinker is more of a poet than of a thinker: he flies on the wings of imagination over the surface of things, and only from time to time does he condescend to come in touch with them.

The greater the impressibility an original man has, i. e., the more systems of ideas are stirred up, shaken by a new idea, the more difficult is the harmonizing, its acceptance, but the more stable is the subsequent

harmony; whereas those who easily accept foreign opinions do not in reality assimilate them.

Thinking and consciousness play the same rôle with respect to emotions and unconsciousness as the commutator of a dynamo with respect to the alternating currents: The spontaneous, discontinuous, sporadic, rhythmic, periodic emotive and subconscious processes are transformed into voluntary, continuous, constant processes; discontinuous enervating effort is transformed into continuous, calm, regulated volition; painful ideas occurring but once or very rarely give place to painless or even pleasurable steady preoccupations.

Another function of thinking is to store away volitional or motor energy for future use; to prevent emotional and volitional energy from spending themselves wastefully or uselessly in the form of immediate muscular activity, and to store them away in the form of dynamic ideas until the most unobstructed and most appropriate channels are found; to prevent fluctuating and antagonistic impulses from manifesting themselves in the form of mutually destructive actions, until a way has been found of making them harmonize or cooperate towards the same goal; to preliminarily perform an action potentially or in one's mind, with or without the assistance of a concomitant experimentation on a small scale, thus saving the troubles, irrecoverable expenditures of energy, non-retractable consequences of immediate, impulsive large-scale action; to transform impulses towards blind, aimless, wasteful, incoordinated, explosive, exhausting, destructive, mutually neutralizing actions into tendencies towards teleological, far-sighted, economical, coordinated, regulated, wholesome, constructive, cooperating activities; to prevent the undue accumulation of pent-up emotional energy and hence its sudden, explosive, uncontrollable, harmful discharge in the form of in-

coordinated muscular activity. The emotional individual swings back and forth between extreme, opposite, mutually destructive lines of action, without advancing in any definite direction, without reaching any definite goal or settling on a higher plane of life. Whereas the thinking individual or the man who is guided by Reason advances steadily towards a definite goal, towards higher and ever broadening horizons. In freeing himself from the fetters and restraints of tradition, custom, routine, externally imposed obedience and uncriticalness, the thinking man does not yield to the natural, first impulse of overstepping the limits of the golden mean and of going over to the extreme of freedom from all restraints: from the artificial, externally imposed, unnecessary or socially harmful as well as from the natural, self-imposed, necessary, socially useful restraints; from fear of innovations, from deep reverence for existing doctrines, beliefs, the established order of things and the powers that be to cynicism or disrespect for everything that is sacred to others and to paradoxomania; from indiscriminate, rigid morality to extreme laxity or indiscriminate immorality. Unlike the emotional individual, the thinker does not yield to the first impulse towards destroying everything that proves obsolete or a hindrance to progress, but consults his reason which advises to build first something provisional at least in the place of what he intends to destroy; he does not throw overboard what is a hindrance in his onward course together with everything that is connected therewith, but checks his first impulse and separates what is worth while keeping from what really deserves being discarded; if he happens to belong to the class of the robbed, exploited, down-trodden, he does not yield to the impulse of becoming a robber and exploiter in his turn who makes no distinction between those who de-

serve his revenge and those who are innocent, but turns against the causes, sources, roots of the entire exploitation system; he does not yield to the first impulse towards freeing himself not only from intellectual restraints, but also from moral restraints, not only from drudgery, but also from restful and remunerative work. It is natural for the thoughtless, stultified or intellectually intimidated individual to swing from one extreme of action over to the other extreme before settling in an intermediate course of action; for instance: from submission to an oppressive, despotical government, from blind faith in stultifying dogmas to bloodthirsty rebellion, fanatic iconoclasm, political and intellectual anarchy, absolute skepticism. The thinking man, however, instead of actually passing from one extreme to the other, does so potentially only, i. e., in his imagination, but not in his actions. The foresight of the consequences and of the unnecessary oscillations around the safe and sound intermediate line of action makes him save or omit the succession of mutually destroying and contradictory actions and proceed slowly but firmly towards the right course of action.

The pedant clothes banalities in technical language; the popular writer, on the contrary, clothes abstract, scientific ideas in the narrow language of the people; the true man of science adapts language to thoughts. The pedant appropriates the form of culture; the popularizer, the contents; the scientist, both.

Thinking and imagination are our mental microscope and telescope. They transform the invisible and the distant into the visible and near, the past into actuality, the impossibility into possibility. They form an extension of our senses, of our preceptions.

Art, Poetry, Psychology.—Art pursues beauty, i. e., adequate, concrete, palpable forms and symbols for

thought, truth, reality, ideas tinged with emotion, i. e., implying either fundamental, or higher vital interests. We need not complain that the subjects of poetry are exhausted already. As long as the human heart, the human passions, do not change in their essence, we have no use for new subjects: The main function of poetry is to give an adequate expression to our nobler passions and longings, to find the appropriate language, the best form for human vital hopes and fears. Poetry is not so much a matter of content as a matter of form. The form is more changeable, more destructible than the essence. Hence, there is a rich field for poetical originality.

The remoter an object is from the sphere of our senses, the less intense is its mental image; if it leaves the sphere of our senses to pass into that of our imagination, instead of a presentation, we get merely a vague image, a representation of it. Since nothing can be represented if it has not been previously presented; in other words, since nothing can pass into the sphere of imagination if it has not previously been in the sphere of our senses; we understand why ideals cannot be wholly created, they are merely new vital combinations of representations, the corresponding sensations of which have been experienced already. The ideals arising in our imagination act back upon the sphere of our senses, and induce us to create corresponding objects in the sphere of reality. Ideals are a product of our past experience, and a factor, a cause, of future experience. The spheres of imagination and perception, and the spheres of volition or desire and power, overlap partly. Some of our perceptions do not recur in our imagination, and some of the actions which we have the power to perform do not recur in our wishes. The common part of the two spheres is formed by elementary perceptions and spontaneous

actions which constitute the raw material for new imaginative and volitional combinations. Many of our imaginations and wishes remain forever outside of, and incapable of being incorporated into, the sphere of perceptions and powers. Outer volition is the psychical antecedent of muscular movement, or—objectively defined—it is cerebro-spinal movement immediately preceding and exciting muscular movement; whereas thought is cerebral movement which is not—or is only indirectly and mediately—followed by muscular movement. Abulia is not a disease or defect of will, as the illustrious Ribot maintains. It is a defect of power, of the muscular system. The muscles of the abulic, like those of the sleeping individual, are too tired, too inert, too relaxed or atonic to be easily set in activity by mere volition, without the assistance of some outside stimulus.

Both the poet and the psychologist carry the materials for their study, for their creations, and their laboratory, mostly in their own soul. Consciousness is their microscope, their scalpel. Experimentation and observation are merely means of verification to them.

The born psychologist finds his best and most reliable subject of experimentation in himself. He does not put others or himself under artificial, prearranged circumstances in order to get a clearer insight into the human soul; but he takes his daily, natural, uncalled-for experiences as material to draw general conclusions therefrom. Nor does he try to get an insight into the souls of others by directly questioning them: he merely watches their actions, outward manifestations, the unintentional betrayals of their true peculiarities during their talk and during their actions when they believe themselves unwatched. Human life with its manifold relations and vicissitudes offers a sufficient change in one's point of view, in one's ex-

ternal situations and corresponding states of mind; it offers ample opportunities to bring out one's abilities and to lay bare the most hidden nooks and corners of one's soul; it offers enough opportunities to upset one's *a priori* opinions about and expectations from others. Nay, more, is not human life itself a continued psychological experimentation with one's own self and with others? Is it not a continued series of trials and errors, an uninterrupted chain of framed, discarded, modified, or verified hypotheses about our own abilities and pursuits and about others' willingness to cooperate?

To know what men really think, feel, desire and strive after, the genuine psychologist judges them, not by what they deliberately or parrot-like profess in books, in newspapers, on platforms, in public, but by their manner of acting, living, dealing with their fellow-men, and by their unguarded gestures, utterances or remarks; not by their written, professed moral code, but by their customs and by their unwritten, acted upon, privately disclosed code of morals; not by their isolated, exceptional actions, but by their habits and daily practise; not by their overt behavior towards superiors, equals, patrons, publicly known men, independent and socially protected individuals, but by their behavior towards inferiors, subordinates, servants, socially obscure, defenseless and dependent individuals; not by their compulsory, professional, bread-earning activities, but by their spontaneous, voluntary, recreational, self-chosen, disinterested activities; not by their professional, interested, business friendships, but by their disinterestedly chosen, private, intimate friends; not by their manner of acting under artificial, abnormal, experimental conditions, but by their manner of acting under natural, normal, ordinary circumstances.

The scientist and the psychologist control the simplified and idealized past of their recollection and imagination in the light of the present; whereas the poet tries to mold the present in conformity with the imaginary world of his recollections and hopes. The true poet exaggerates reality, truth, not in order to deform them, but in order to throw them more into relief. He exaggerates the form, the accidental parts, in order to give prominence to essence, to permanent and eternal parts.

Reality alone can normally interest us, can gain our attention and sympathy. Not the daily, obvious and banal reality, but that one which is inaccessible, unknown, exceptional, still ideal, the ideal tending to become real, the exceptional tending or deserving to become the rule, the ideal built up by means of realistic constituents, the exceptional and pathological in so far as it is an exaggeration of what is good and noble in human nature. The ideal, to interest us, must have points of contact with our real life, with our daily experience. This explains why the great mass of naïve novel-readers ascribe historical reality to the events and personages; whereas more educated novel-readers look at least for psychological reality or verisimilitude.

Even the consumers of sensational, blood-and-thunder literature (shockers, dreadfuls, dime-novels) take interest therein because they believe it deals with the realm of reality and possibility. People who lead a life of monotonous daily drudgery, a life devoid of all opportunities, and who are kept in ignorance as to how the world's affairs are administered and as to how the spoils are divided, soon forget—if they ever knew—how to discriminate between wish and reality, between what is probable or possible and what is improbable or impossible; they lose the sense for various degrees of probability. Since they are tied hands and

feet, and have to feed their souls on empty hopes, why not hope for the highly improbable and even for the impossible, why not enjoy in their imagination the wildest dreams or adventures, when it does not require any greater mental effort to do so than it does to dream less ambitious, more modest, but equally unrealizable dreams? Why not reach for the moon, for the remote, if things nearer at hand are just as inaccessible? Why should not the servant girl, the shop girl, dream of a prince, a millionaire, a great hero, when even a seven-dollar-a-week clerk looks down upon her and is just as much beyond her reach?

The poetical description differs *toto orbe* from the scientifical: the former is subjective, personal, unilateral, i. e., written in the view of arousing certain emotions; the latter is objective, impersonal, multilateral. A poetico-scientifical description unites the two sets of qualities, harmonizes the subjective and the objective point of view.

The difference between the scientific or professional psychologist and the practical psychologist or knower of men (diplomats, detectives, business men, etc.), and that between the psychologist and the poet is not a difference between analytical and synthetical psychological knowledge. It is a difference between general, theoretical, explanatory and particular, practical, factual, empirical psychological knowledge, between knowledge as an aim in itself and knowledge as a means. The practical knower of men and the poet do not care why men, or whether all men, act, feel, and think in a certain way in given situations; they care to know, not to understand, how men, or only a certain class of men, act or feel under special circumstances with respect to things of importance to the former.

The philosophico-poetical genius infuses new life into

abstract, dry thoughts; he gives a new, palpable, more attractive body to spiritual values which either he himself or an analytical thinker has extracted from the actual semi-prosaic life. He not only restores to life what has been extracted therefrom, but restores it to a higher and better plane of life. He revives the Past, not only as it was, but also as it might have been or as it tended to become. He represents not only the Present, but also the embryonal Future which is contained therein, which gives meaning and value to the former and is also destined to supersede it.

Poets, artists, novelists, technicians, sentimental natures, may grasp bits of general conceptions; but consistent and harmonious thoughts cannot be expected of them. They may for a moment rise to such a height of cool, abstract thinking where they catch a glimpse of the common ethereal bonds that unite, and of the hidden unique reality that underlies, the manifolds of seemingly disconnected particular situations; but they forget all about it as soon as they come down from the Philosophical Heights to the concrete world of physical events, of human actions and passions.

The purely poetical genius is impressed by events, personages, concrete social conditions which are pregnant with great ideas and ideals, which are the carriers of deep and eternal truths; but is himself unable to generalize, to separate the general from the particular, the abstract truth from the concrete, changeable, perishable receptacles: he rather feels than knows the eternal, valuable truths expressed in his own creations and in the dramas of real life. The philosophical thinker who congratulates himself on having found a *Gesinnungs-Genosse* in a novelist, dramatist or poet who happens to describe concrete events similar to those from which he himself has extracted his general views or theories, is soon bitterly disillusioned if he

gets better acquainted with the poet and finds that the latter has rather confused and inconsistent general views—if he has any—about the very same concrete happenings which he so beautifully renders in his works. The pure poet, the pure artist, reproduces more or less faithfully what he has seen, heard, and felt, without much speculation as to the causes, meaning, underlying psychical laws; without much speculation as to what is typical, constant, eternally and universally human, and what is individual, accessory, superficial, transient in his poetical or artistical paintings. If he were interested in, like the philosophical thinker, or if he intended to bring out, the typical, the hidden truth, the inner driving psychical forces, he could not pay attention to, and still less remember, the little details and accessory events which lend life and give the stamp of reality to his descriptions and creations. The poet, the novelist, the artist, stand much nearer, than the philosopher or the critic think, to the masses of philistines and of semi-intellectual people. They share with the latter an almost exclusive interest in concrete events, in brute, uninterpreted, unsifted facts bearing on the daily life and struggles of men. They only differ from the masses in emotional wealth, in emotional sagacity, in the ability to render and to synthetize what they see, hear, feel. Morbidly intensified and differentiated emotions may transform even a philistine into a temporary poet, novelist: it makes him notice things which he normally does not pay attention to; it makes him connect events and actions which he normally does not link from lack of sympathetic understanding of their agents; it makes him step out temporarily from his narrow sphere of personal and practical interests. The pure poet, the purely emotional genius, is normally never held back by social class barriers, he normally has no class preju-

dices, he moves around and feels at home in all social elements, he partakes mentally in all human dramas without regard to the social or geographical stage upon which they are played (enacted). The philosophical poet, and still more so the philosophical thinker, rises above mankind; he is free from human or anthropocentrical prejudices; his place of abode is above the low regions of actual human life; he participates mentally in everything that was, is, or will be, going on in the infinite, eternal universe. The poet detaches, frees himself only of his caste, of his narrow social element into which he happens to be born; the philosopher frees himself of contemporary mankind, of the Present, of Mother Earth.

The true poet knows how to discover the poetry hidden in the darkness of unconsciousness of the lowest type of men; for even the mean aims of a criminal may be a means used by the genius of the species in its striving for higher ideals; individual perversities are sometimes symptoms of undercurrent social ideals; human hypocrisy, defined in optimistical language, means a manifestation, a betrayal of our being conscious of our own imperfections. The genuine poet discovers also the prosaic egotism hidden behind the manifested poetry and simulated altruism of a pseudo-superior man; he discovers the eternally valuable in the insignificant acts of the most humble; he discovers the ideal kernel in perversities, the striving for harmony in the midst of contradictory and hypocritical complexes of acts. He discovers behind the egotistic, criminal exploitation of the poor by capitalists, behind their conscious striving for material wealth he discovers, I say, the wonderful concentration of scattered unproductive individual efforts, the preparation for solidarity, for a socialized concentration of work; he sees in capitalism a wonderful, but dearly paid for les-

son given by individual egotistical capitalists to the government as to what it has to do in order to do away with misery arising from unsocialized, uncontrolled, scattered efforts.

The true thinker does not so easily become enthusiastic about deceptive, dazzling appearances, i. e., mere superficial resemblances with, or imitations of, truth and goodness. He discovers stagnation, or very slow progress under apparently rapid progress; he detects persistence of old superstitions, iniquities and parasitism, unsettled difficulties under modern eulogistic names, under the appearance of altruism and social service, outgrown points of view. He sees the old slavery, superstitions, intolerance, vandalistic invasion and rapacity, dogmatism and scholasticism, etc., persisting more or less behind modern proletarianism, spiritism, Christian Science, forced civilizing of inferior races, missionary proselytizing, positivism and evolutionism, etc.

The talented novelist, the talented poet, can never take their present and recent experiences as subject-matter of their creations, for our present and recent experiences dominate us: we are still living in them, among them, and not above them, we are still actors, and not yet critical spectators. The novel-reader identifies himself with the novel; whereas the novel-writer is above it, is equal to it plus an additional dose of wisdom. The present personality of the poet is a purified form of his past personality. Only the humorist is—as it were—self-estranged: He sympathizes with his past emotions, beliefs, etc.; but he ridicules them at the same time, for he does not share, or profess them, any longer. The poet of genius who can build upon the present experiences is like those abnormal individuals who suffer from a double personality without amnesia: he is himself, and, at the same

time, above himself. When a genius seems to utilize his recent experiences for his creations, it is in reality his old experiences ripened under the influence of the recent ones that he works out under the name of the latter.

The genuine, creative poet or artist extracts from his experiences only those events and aspects of events which are of a general and permanent human interest. This requires a survey of the whole class of similar experiences. In order to accomplish this, the experiences to be utilized must lie in the past, must have become objects of memory. For the field of actual, recent experience, and of perception, is too confused, too narrow, too much entangled with selfish interests: It does not give us simultaneously the similar materials from whose comparison permanent, common values can be extracted; it gives us a mixture of a few dissimilar, unrelated experiences, in which personal and general values are intermingled. Only memory is the common, hospitable, broad repository in which related, cooperating experiences have a chance of coming and of being evoked together. In memory the beautiful can be easily separated from the ugly, the true and disinterested can impartially be separated from error, illusion and interestedness. Women are too much engrossed with their own personality and with their present experiences to become creative artists or poets. In order to be creative one must soar so high above real events and experiences as to be able to imagine the various possible harmonious combinations between these ill-assorted elements. To create means to call into life an ideal complex of human relations by simply bringing together characters, things, events, which in real life, for want of favorable conditions or owing to social barriers, unfortunately remain apart and therefore run to waste, but which would harmonize beautifully and

would fulfil a high mission if they could meet or happen in the order and connection indicated by the creative artist, poet, novelist or dramatist.

Play and Serious Activity.—Play, in a restricted sense, is an abridged, smoothed copy of a serious activity taken from our own experience (self-imitative play), from the experience of others (hetero-imitative play), from the experience of the race (instinctive play), or arising spontaneously (creative play). Play is activity in the direction of habits, instincts, spontaneity. Play is activity minus asperities and precipices, minus the impulse of necessity, minus the tyranny of an externally imposed aim. Play, in general, and art, in particular, begin with a quasi-imitation of real life, and end with the tendency to model, to transform it in agreement with the life of play and art: it becomes creative in the end. In its wider sense of self-imposed activity, play includes children's plays, idlers' games, and also art, science, philosophy, in their immature stage. On the one hand, play recreates us from, reminds us of, prepares us for, serious action; on the other hand, it disgusts us of it, by way of contrast, and prepares us for an ideal life. The world of play, art, imagination, is a world of refuge for those tired of, and disgusted with, the real prosaic world; and also a prototype, a model, for the real world to come.

In the case of a surplus of energy, we feel pleasure in extra-organic activity or expenditure, independently of the manner in which it is expended (play or serious action); in the case of a normal quantity of energy, the pleasure feeling depends on the manner of its being expended, on the "how" (play, revery); in the case of a fall in the normal level, pleasure arises from non-expenditure or intra-organic activity (recreative play, rest).

If we include under the name of play-activity any kind of activity—mental or sensory, and physical or motor—which is spontaneous, involuntary, purposeless, non-oriented, an aim-in-itself, or at least self-imposed, revocable, . . .; we can see that both theories of play-activity—that of Spencer which finds the cause of play-activity in a surplus of energy, and that of Groos which claims that play-activity arises from a complex of useful, life-preparatory instincts—are incorrect. For play-activity sets in and takes the place of serious or teleological activity both in the case of a surplus of energy and in the case of a slight deficit or of moderate exhaustion, as well as in all cases of a normal level of vital energy, as soon as the external or the internal control, i. e., as soon as the pressure of an ungratified need or of fear, is relaxed or removed. If children play, it is because they are being taken care of, it is because and in so far as neither their own consciousness nor their guardians compel them to care for the gratification of their needs. For the same reason many women and rich individuals remain children all their life long, i. e., they indulge permanently in bodily and mental play-activity (sports, games, day-dreaming . . .). If more geniuses arise among the hopefully struggling social middle classes, it is because the children of such parents have inborn, inherited aims of life. As soon as a social class is allowed to live and to thrive without any exertion on its part, it relapses from serious, purposeful, teleological, directed, voluntary activity into playful, aimless, undirected, automatical, capricious, illusory, dreaming, thoughtless activity. In preglacial times when Nature was a kind mother to men and animals, when food was in abundance and there was no need of shelter and of social organization, play-activity, revery, thoughtlessness, was the rule, whereas serious activity, thinking, was but an

exception, an anomaly, a puzzle in need of solution. Play-activity which puzzles the poor, the struggling, the adults, is the natural or given state of mind and body for the rich, the idlers, children and women. Intellectual pursuits (artistic, scientific, philosophic, social) which may become serious aims of life for men, for thinkers, seem to women and to philistines a mere anomaly, luxury, a curious kind of play-activity which requires explanation. The child does not take very seriously anything, either his bodily or his mental needs. The genius has in common with the child his lack of seriousness and of perseverance in pursuing personal, material, bodily interests; and is therefore looked upon as childish by the philistines and the pseudo-superior men who are more serious about these matters. The philistine remains a child in his intellectual pursuits, and is therefore being ridiculed by the genius who is more mature in this direction.

To call all art a play-activity means to adopt the philistine's point of view, who does not seriously, i. e., persistently, passionately and consistently, pursue anything but his material or economic interests. To the real artist, artistic creation is a more serious affair, a more irresistible pursuit than the accumulation of money, and just as much of a need as eating, drinking and sleeping. I do not deny that the art of the aristocratic philistine, the art which caters to idlers, parasites and would-be parasites, is playful, petty-minded, shallow, fantastic, thoughtless, merely meant to amuse and to lull men's minds to sleep. Nor do I deny that all arts, like all other serious activities, are derived and in their immature stage indistinguishable from play-activity. It is natural for those who believe that all play-activity springs from a surplus of energy to consider Art and Literature as a kind of play-activity; because serious, realistic, thought-stimulating, socially

useful Art and Literature, which springs from inner, organic needs, is so rare as to be hardly known to the public at large, whereas ephemeral, immature, pseudo-artistic and pseudo-literary works which are the product of leisure, ennui, vanity, imitation, overflood the market.

Just as consciousness, reflection, deliberation, do not necessarily and always mean an advantage over, or a progress in comparison with, automatism, sub-consciousness, instinct; just as it is advantageous, a sign of progressiveness, to be conscious of, to reflect upon, or to deliberate about, new, complex, unusual circumstances, and a disadvantage, wastefulness, a sign of regressiveness or backwardness, to do so under old, usual, recurrent, simple circumstances; just so with serious and play-activity: a play-activity may sometimes mean a relapse from a more advanced, serious activity into a more primitive, aimless, demoralized one; and sometimes it may mean an advance from a primitive, cruel, unavoidable, compulsory, materialistic serious way of action to a loftier, free, intellectual, sociable, amusing way of action. Thus, for instance, it is probable that art, or some arts at least, began as a refined, voluntary, sociable, leisurely way of imitating (painting, describing, mimicking) fights with beasts and other tribes, hunting for food, meeting with accidents in primeval forests, etc., into which primitive men were driven by dire necessity. It is probable that some primitive dramas were nothing but the imitation of real grievances brought before the tribe or the elders of the tribe by two quarreling parties that were afraid and forbidden to use personal, direct revenge or the club-law; while it meant a serious or practical matter to the litigants, it proved to be amusing, interesting, worthy of reproduction or imitation, to the people. It was, however, a still greater advance when these amus-

ing representations of real or mock grievances, fights or other events came to be used, not only for amusement or time-killing purposes, but also for the serious purpose of instructing, elevating, influencing the masses. To learn things for present, immediate use is a serious activity dictated by the struggle for bread, but to learn for future, possible use, although a play-activity from the practical or bread-and-butter point of view, may be considered as an advance over the former way of learning, if it is taken seriously from the intellectual point of view, i. e., if it gratifies an intellectual need and is not merely one of the means of discharging a surplus of energy. The amateurishness of the rich in questions of art and philanthropy, their love for animals, are certainly regressive, degenerate forms of play-activity, i. e., perverted and declining serious human activities.

From play-activity we advance to a higher type of serious activity, and from the latter we advance to a higher type of play-activity, and so on; just as from theory we go over to practise, and from the latter to broader or more solid theories which in their turn lead to new and more useful applications, and so on. To ask "which is prior, serious or play-activity?" is probably just as foolish as to ask "which is older, the hen or the egg?" Just as each hen is older than the eggs she lays and younger than the egg she has been hatched from, and just as at the beginning of animal life or in the case of many single-celled animals there is no differentiation, no distinction between ovum or egg and animal; just so with play-activity and serious activity, theory and practise, thought and action, intelligence and instinct: Primitive activity partakes of the characters of both serious and play-activity without being either in particular; in spite of Bergson's pretentious attempt in his "Evolution Creatrice" to make out of

instinctive activity something *sui generis*, something entirely different from intelligent activity, the two are in reality just as correlated as parent and child, as lower and higher, play and serious activity. Only academic philosophers can go on disputing forever *in abstracto* whether thought is prior to action, intelligence to instinct, play-activity to serious activity, etc., or vice versa, without going to the trouble of opening their eyes for a moment and just watch how every thought, every intelligent act, every play-activity is based upon, arises from, follows after some actions, instinctive acts, serious activity, and in its turn gives rise to, or is followed by, other kinds of actions, instinctive acts, serious activities.

Wit and Humor.—Wit is an intellectual play-activity. Humor stands between wit and serious intellectual activity: in its form it is still intellectual play-activity, but its aim is already serious. Both wit and humor differ from serious literature in the fact that the latter presents meanings, thoughts, realities in usual, adequate, natural, commonly expected and commonly understood words, forms, appearances; whereas wit and humor present them in disguised, roundabout, indirect, unusual, inadequate, unexpected, incongruous, condensed, figurative forms. Wit manufactures incongruities between expression and meaning, roundabout and puzzling ways of expressing simple and obvious relations; it plays upon words; it ridicules serious affairs; it sneers at sacred pursuits and virtues; it uses tragic, dignified, general, abstract, big expressons for comical events, trivial affairs, commonplace occurrences, concrete things, platitudes, small ideas, and vice versa. Whereas humor discovers real incongruities and contradictions in human nature, between appearances and realities, between real and professed intentions; it ridicules masked vices, sham virtues; it ridicules persons,

things and customs which are undeservedly treated like serious, important affairs; the humorist does not spare himself and his own shortcomings. To the witty individual wit is an aim-in-itself, a wasteful discharge of superfluous energy, or a means to a frivolous, personal end, or a means for selfish amusement. Wit is sometimes a device resorted to by unsubstantial writers in order to hide their scanty substance beneath a mass of sparkling verbal foam. Wit is often the shield of the coward who does not dare to openly vent his real feelings towards and opinions about others. Whereas to the humorist humor is a means to a serious, moral end; humor is amusing and instructive or uplifting at the same time. Humor is one of the weapons of the morally courageous individual. The humorist uses the very same mask, disguise, and perverted or sophistical language of the persons ridiculed in order to defeat them with their own arms, in order the better to unmask their hidden hypocrisy, cowardice and immorality.

The only aim which the philistine pursues seriously (persistently, consistently, thoroughly, whole-heartedly, . . .) and which absorbs almost his entire time and energy is bodily comfort, food, shelter, clothing. And so does the pseudo-superior man; only he does not do it openly, directly, like the philistine, but under the guise of higher, disinterested, generally useful pursuits. Higher pursuits the philistine is either frankly averse to, or treats them playfully, superficially, wittily, as a pastime, but does not degrade them to a business like the pseudo-superior man. The philistine may enjoy wit, which approaches playfully the mere forms or appearances of higher pursuits; he may even enjoy humor which seriously pursues higher aims, but adopts the playful, adorned, figurative, incoherent, superficial, roundabout method of making others acquainted there-

with; but he has no understanding whatsoever for the serious thinker who goes straight to the mark both in his thinking and in the exposition of his thoughts, for serious intellectual pursuits require more intellectual energy, courage, independence than even the materially successful philistine selected for survival by our spoliation system can dispose of: his independent, critical judgment and spontaneity have been crushed by exploitation, his energy is absorbed by drudgery or uncertainty, wasted on artificial needs and ridiculous fashions imposed upon him by a shrewd commercialism, and side-tracked by the example of parasitical aristocrats into the channels of unsatiable, degenerative, antisocial pursuits of luxury, wealth, empty titles.

The humoristic writer saves mental labor and effort to his hearers or readers by caricaturing reality, i. e., by exaggerating, throwing into relief, personifying, visualizing its hidden characteristics or vitally important parts and by suppressing, ignoring, simplifying, distorting the other parts, in order to irresistibly draw attention to the former. Whereas the serious thinker who is anxious to depict complex reality and to give due emphasis to all its constituent parts, does not appeal to the masses who are unable to concentrate their attention on more than one thing at a time, and to grasp the subtler relations between things, particularly the remote, mediate, hidden relations between classes of things.

Dream and Dramatic Activity.—In revery or day-dreaming, trains of ideas and feelings which have been rejected or suppressed during teleological, purposive thinking emerge spontaneously into the light of consciousness. There are two kinds of revery: (1) revery as a reaction against, and as a consequence of, mental exhaustion caused by fruitless teleological thinking; (2) revery caused by a surplus of mental energy left

after gratification of immediate needs.

The main difference between night- and day-dreaming is the fact that in the former purposeless, suppressed trains of ideas easily displace each other, thus obscuring and truncating the meaning of the dream; whereas in the latter the imaginary drama is followed into the most insignificant and trivial details. Another important difference between day- and night-dreaming is the presence of a dim or clear consciousness of its unreality in the former; whereas in night dreams imaginations, unrealities, are mistaken for realities, because we do not experience clear sensations at the same time in the light of which we should be able to recognize our imaginations as such, as mere distorted copies, or combinations of past experiences; because it is natural to mistake copies, imitations, secondary, unusual, derived experiences for the originals, models, primary, usual experiences. Dreams are usually transmutations, translations of bodily, cœnesthetic, organic feelings into psychical feelings of which we do not become directly and immediately conscious, but merely as the results or as the kernels of dream-dramas which are improvised from experiences of vital, customary hopes and fears.

The difference between the revery of the layman and the dramatic thinking of the novelist, artist, poet, etc., is the fact that in revery our own ego forms the main personage; our own wishes, hopes and fears form the content of the drama; whereas the drama, properly so-called, is of a more general human interest, of a more permanent and social value.

Dream Activity.—Between waking mental activity and dreamless sleep there is an infinite series of all degrees of mental activity, ranging between highest rationality, coherence, richness in symbolical meaning and extreme irrationality, incoherence, meaningless-

ness, lack of control; so that it is almost impossible to establish a sharp line of division between dream and waking activity. If we compare the dream activity immediately before waking up or immediately after falling asleep with the waking mental activity, we can merely say that the former is not controlled or regulated by sense impressions; it draws all its material from memory, from stored-up impressions; only its starting point may be an isolated peripheral or organic sensation, it does not terminate in motor response or muscular activity (except in the somnambulist). Those, however, who are waked up in the middle of dreams taking place long after having fallen asleep or long before the natural or spontaneous awakening, will, of course, emphasize the lack of coherence, harmony, meaning, rationality, etc. The most important and almighty law of dream activity is determined by the course of cerebral fatigue: Those brain centers fall first asleep which have been most used, most fatigued; and those centers begin first to enter into activity which are most easily recreated. This explains why thinking in images, long-forgotten or never-thought-of individuals and incidents, nay, even ancestral experiences, reappear in dreams. This explains why clear sense impressions and motor response are most lacking in the dreams of normal sleep; for the senses and the muscular system are the most fatigued, the most overworked parts of the organism. During normal sleep our sense-organs are almost closed, almost inaccessible to external stimuli. And even if a stimulus succeeds in making some impression, it usually impresses only one sense-organ. This is the reason why in dream we always misinterpret or exaggerate our sensations: Because they are vague and isolated, we do not know to what objects they have to be referred; isolated sensations lead to illusions, hallucinations;

associated, they lead to perceptions.

In spite of his ingenious use of dreams for diagnostic purposes, Freud's interpretation of dreams as imaginary realizations of unfulfilled wishes, which have been repressed during waking hours, is certainly one-sided and incomplete. It does not cover the whole field of mental activity as it occurs in dreams and in related states of mind (insanity, day-dreaming of the exhausted). Not only our wishes, but also our dreads, come true in dreams. Freud's attempt to reduce these apprehensions or fears to wishes of early childhood is certainly ingenious; but, unfortunately, it does not correspond to reality. If we dream about the death of beloved beings, it is not because at some early period we may have wished their death. Still less can one interpret incests committed in dreams as due to early impure sexual wishes. A candidate never wishes to fail in his examination. Nor does an actor wish to be elsewhere and unable to get to the theater when it is time to ring up the curtain; and still they often dream of such situations. The only true explanation of the incoherent, pictorial, hallucinatory, primitive way of thinking during sleep, insanity, some cases of day-dreaming, is to be found in the laws of cerebral fatigue. The effects of fatigue—no matter whether cumulative or sudden (shock)—upon a cerebral organ (sensation, perception, apperception, memory, imagination, conception) are inversely proportional with the amount of disposable or specific energy of the organ and directly proportional with the amount of work performed by it. Both the oldest and the most recent cerebral organs, i. e., the perceptual and the conceptual organs, are most exposed to fatigue, hence are out of work during sleep. The motor and the perceptual brain centers become exhausted or obtuse, because too much used; and the reasoning centers become exhausted because they have

but little energy at their disposal. Hence, the dream stuff is mostly made of pictorial thinking, of recollections and imaginations which—for want of vivid perceptions to be compared with—are mistaken for realities. What has been said about the various fields of mental activity, holds also within every field: Only such recollections and imaginations are evoked and thought about in dreams as have not been under- or over-worked, repressed or over-fatigued during the waking condition. Thus, the more we think of a person during the day, the less do we dream about him or her; we begin to dream about deceased beloved beings, as soon as our grief becomes less absorbing during the daytime. If both apprehensions and wishes are dreamed of as if they were actual events, it is because primitive, infantile, pictorial thinking has no way of distinguishing between desire, belief and knowledge, between will and power, actuality and possibility, affirmation and negation, intention and ability. If more primitive ways of feeling, thinking and doing (crimes, selfishness, laxity, impulsiveness, playful moods, . . .) come into play during dreams, it is because the more recently acquired inhibitory, purposeful abilities are out of work.

Philosophy, Science, Ultimate Concepts (Categories). Idealism or Philosophic Romanticism.—From the heights of philosophical contemplation, the low regions of facts and objects, the solid ground peopled by individual men and animals, are lost sight of or are seen so dimly and confusely that a great many philosophers (idealism, solipsism or idealism carried to its logical extreme, monopsychism) are prone to deny the existence of this object or external world altogether, to regard it as a complex of mere ideas or imaginations. Were not these naive gentlemen compelled to go down into these lower regions to gratify their bodily

and lower intellectual needs, they would deny the existence of this world not only in words but also in their deeds, as some lunatics suffering from negativism do.

The idealists forget that imagination cannot create new attributes, new elements; that all it can do is to create new combinations. They neglect to ask themselves: Why should our imagination endow some of our states of consciousness with the attribute of externality, or space, to the exclusion of others?

If sometimes (in a state of hallucination) one can perceive objects in the external world without there being any, there arises naturally the suspicion that what we call objects, the external world, in the so-called normal state might also be a kind of hallucinations, a kind of mental constructs, a kind of internal or imaginary world.

But leaving aside the nonsense into which this doubt raised by idealists would land us, viz., to talk about an *internal* world when we deny in the same breath the existence of an *external* world, as if internal had any meaning without reference to external, to which it is correlated; leaving aside, I say, this logical objection, we can raise the following psychological objection. If what we believe to be external objects may be unmasked as internal, imaginary, subjective constructs, it never happens that what we first know to be a purely novel imaginary being should prove itself later on to be a real object; the external world is the cause of our internal world, but our internal world never creates new elements in the external world, nor does it create complexes in the external world out of imaginary elements.

Scientific Laws.—Scientific laws, it is said, express constant relations between phenomena; they prove the uniformity of Nature. We forget that what is approximately constant for us may be variable in the

highest degree for beings having an acute mathematical sense, for whom an error of one-millionth of a millimeter or of a second means very much. What is equilibrium for us may be a very quick succession of imperceptible inclinations now in one direction and now in the opposite, since even the adjacent portions of a small environment are not absolutely homogeneous. What would we think of a savage who, having no concept of a number greater than 10, would establish a scientific law that never do more than 10 immigrants arrive together on his island?

Men do not suspect how little uniformity, constancy or periodicity there is in the phenomena of Nature. The layman does not know how much uncertainty and disagreement there is in Science and Philosophy; just as the ordinary citizen does not suspect how much arbitrariness, personal machinations and hostilities, usurpation, iniquity, favoritism, law-breaking or anarchy, and how little protection there is in the governmental institutions. The ordinary man projects his own ephemeral constancy, conservatism, monotony, loyalty, into external Nature and into his rulers or supposed protectors. If Nature seems to him constant, and his leaders seem to him to be in possession of certain, clear, positive knowledge; it is because and so long as he does not venture beyond the limits of the sphere of his practical, immediate interests; it is because he does not pry into the workshop of Nature or of his teachers and preachers; the government, the Law, seems to offer him reliable protection because and so long as he is not badly in need thereof. If theories seem to be reliable guides, it is because in practise one never depends entirely on their guidance; just as men can rely on each other in proportion as they can dispense with and are independent of each other.

Causation.—Our belief in the constancy of nature

is an effect of psychical inertia (persistence in old ways of thinking, resistance to changes). A visible, an easily accessible, an outer quality *A* has been associated in our past experience with an invisible, not easily accessible, inner quality *B*. In virture of the law of inertia, it is natural to expect *B* when *A* presents itself again in our experience. If some subsequent experience presents to us *A* dissociated from *B* we first refuse to accept the reality of this dissociation, but finally our former association becomes weakened, doubted. Or, instead of doubting the univocality *(Eindeutigkeit)* of the association, we may transfer our doubt to the reexperiencing of *A*, i. e., we may doubt whether the *A* dissociated from *B* is really identical with the *A* we had experienced formerly in association with *B*.

What is true in the realm of perception is also true in the realm of concepts. The conviction that the same or identical causes produce the same or identical effects (which statement does not exclude the possibility of practically identical effects being produced by practically dissimilar causes), is also an effect of the law of psychical inertia applied to the whole of our experience, and is corroborated by our ability to foretell future events by means of past events.

To the objection of subtle philosophers that, owing to the continuous flux of things, no identical events and causes can recur, hence no identical effects can be expected, the answer is very simple: When we speak of identical things and causes we mean what may appear to us as identical; if our imperfect senses are not able to detect slight variations in the causes, they will also be unable to detect the non-identity of the expected effects with the really occurring effects. And this is all we want, for we do not care to perceive and foresee things as they may appear to some superior

minds, or as they may be in themselves (if there be any meaning in the word *things-in-themselves*). We care to foresee things as they impress our actual imperfect human senses.

What distinguishes mind from matter is the fact that in mind effects often precede causes, whereas in matter causes precede effects. The effects and the causes of our conscious activity are identical in essence, and differ in form only. Pleasure-causing sensations, conceptions, perceptions, given as unintentional, fortuitous, indirect effects, or consequences of our activity, become, in the shape of representations, images, symbols, the aims or causes of repeating the same or a similar activity.

Bergson calls the psychical causation circular in contradistinction to the physical which is rectilinear. It seems to me more correct to say spiral instead of circular, for in a circular causation there is no room left for progress, variation.

In the physical world the complex of causes must also be considered identical in essence, or quantity with their effects, if we admit that motion can only be transferred, added to, or subtracted from, existing motion, that motion can never create motion just as matter can never create matter. If it seems that sometimes identical effects can be produced by dissimilar causes, it is either an illusion easily explained by our inability to disentangle the true causes from the complex of indifferent circumstances of which they form a part, by our confounding partial with total causes, remote and mediate with immediate causes, by taking the whole reaction of a body as the effect of the action of another body, forgetting that in this reaction is also included the activity of the body previous to the action exerted upon it; or it is because the dissimilar causes have some common property which alone is responsi-

ble for their similar effects, whereas their uncommon, peculiar properties have not participated in the effect under consideration.

Thus it is a mistake to regard laughter as an effect which can be produced by dissimilar causes. A close observation shows that the purely physiological laughter of hysterics differs *toto orbe* from the psychical laughter, and this in its turn differs according as it is the expression of pure, genuine joy, or of simulated joy, or of joy mixed with irony, hatred, hypocrisy, envy, etc. Laughter being a complex phenomenon is naturally due to a complex of causes. And the varieties of laughter are to be explained by the predominance, supervening, absence of some ingredients of the causal complex. What they all have in common, however, is due to one and the same partial cause, viz., an incongruity between appearance and reality, the actual and the ideal, aim and achievement, thought and expression, etc., that tickles our self-conceit or self-love. But if, philosophically speaking, unlike causes cannot give rise to like effects, for practical purposes they may sometimes be considered as such.

If we admit that all phenomena can be reduced ultimately to transfers, additions, and subtractions of movement; if we admit that the state of motion is the natural, original, primordial state of the smallest particles of matter, and that their rest is but suspended movement, i. e., an artificial, unstable state resulting from equal but opposite impacts: We can understand how an effect may be actually, perceptibly, a new creation, i. e., different from its causes in both quantity and quality, although potentially the effect cannot contain either more or less motion and matter than its causes; we can understand how poisons may give birth to non-poisonous substances, how light added to light may sometimes result in darkness; we understand how

children born of the same parents under varying circumstances, and even unrelated individuals, differ actually rather than potentially.

To solve the great mystery of the origin of organic life means to solve the question, How has the rectilinear anorganic causation been changed into a circular and spiral causation?

Acquisition and Limitations of Human Knowledge.— The average man pursues pleasure, happiness, whereas the genius pursues truth. Since truth can never be so completely and easily attained as pleasure and satisfaction; since truth is rather a fortuitous, contingent product of spontaneous activity, whereas pleasure and satisfaction are the direct outcome of instinctive, habitual, imitative activity; we understand why the activity of the average man is rather circular, self-repeating; whereas that of the genius is rather spiral, ever advancing, never wholly repeating itself.

Philosophers having a rigid system of their own, or an adopted one, are usually blind to new facts that do not fit into their system, so much so that they do not yield even to coercive evidence. Just as political parties, or rather politicians, differ in theory but not in practise, so do philosophical systems and philosophers differ rather in labels, etiquettes, phraseology, a few paradoxical assertions, than in fundamental concepts and views. Philosophers without a system and those with a flexible system are more open-minded and more open-hearted. The common mortal admits even absurdities and impossible relations, especially when they flatter his desires, fears and hopes. Superstition stands at both extremes of the human hierarchy: negative superstition at the top, positive superstition at the bottom.

Abstract reasoning is almost nil in the higher animals, and even in many human beings. Hence, we may

regard it as a late acquirement of the human species. Whether mankind, in its further development, will ever acquire a new and higher ability, or will merely improve upon the old ones, we cannot decide.

Our knowledge of and about the world begins with dark ignorance as to the elements, and ends with confused ideas as to their more complicated combinations, colligations: Darkness within and darkness without the sphere of human knowledge. A system of philosophy working synthetically upwards from the elements has as little advantage over a philosophy working analytically downwards from complexes: both begin and end in doubt and perplexities.

Both the macrocosm and the microcosm, the infinitely large and the infinitely small, the beginning and the end of things, the primary cause and the ultimate goal of events, . . . are hidden from view, and will probably remain forever beyond the grasp of human understanding, for the simple reason perhaps that they have no real, objective, absolute existence. Thus, what is imperceptible, extremely small and simple, a microcosm for man, may be perceptible for a thinking or philosophizing microbe—if there be such a one—and may impress it as infinitely large, exceedingly complex and heterogeneous, as a—nay, as the—Universe.

The farther we try to follow up an event, a process, a thing, in the light of the little knowledge and of the few discoveries in our possession—no matter whether we follow it up in the direction of effects, consequences, futurity, end or in the direction of causes, antecedents, past, origin, beginning; no matter whether synthetically or analytically; no matter whether deductively or inductively; no matter whether in the direction of greater, more inclusive wholes, of the macrocosm, of the infinitely large, or in the direction of ever-smaller constituent parts, of the microcosm, of the

infinitely small—the deeper grows the darkness, ignorance, uncertainty and mysteriousness which enshrouds our feebly shining intellect; the less reliable become the experiences of single individuals, of few generations. The attempt to infer or to trace indefinitely, illimitably backward and forward the course of events by means of what we know about a definite, limited number of events, is certainly too bold and beyond actual human ken. The failure of such an attempt, however, is neither a sign of its eternal futility and of scientific impotence, nor is it a justification for theological beliefs; for—we can answer with Diderot—if the light of our intellect is like a candle that illuminates but an infinitesimal part of our path, and hence does not enable us to overlook at a single glance the entire path, and to see whence it begins and whither it leads; this is no reason why we should blow out our candle and grope in the dark, guided by mere blind faith which is built on a mixture of fear and hope, of unrealizable wishes and ungrounded fears. How can one ask for positive information about the past and the future, when we hardly know much of what is going on in the present? We are so little conscious of things that act directly on our senses; how, then, do we expect Science to give us unquestionable information about things and phenomena which do not act at all or act but indirectly on our senses?

The common mortal receives knowledge impressed from without; in the genius knowledge works its way from within; in the superior man (great talent) both methods work towards each other, like in tunneling a mountain. Hence, the quicker and the more successful acquisition of knowledge by the great talent.

To acquire knowledge of something through inner evolution, and to get it verbally, from without, are such different processes, or have at least such different

forms, that the man of genius is usually unable to identify their results when they have reference to one and the same thing; he often believes to know two different things where in reality he knows but one, he does not recognize his original ideas in those of others. This is a similar phenomenon to the internal "autoscopie" of hysterical persons, studied and explained by Dr. Sollier. The autoscopical knowledge of the inner organs cannot be identified by the patients with the verbally obtained knowledge about the same organs; just as the blind whose sight has been restored are at first inclined to look upon the objects seen as new and entirely different from the objects of their tactual experience.

Every classification of sciences presupposes a philosophic system as a center of perspective from which they are looked at. Changing the philosophic system, or the center of perspective, we change the number and kind of sciences which appear on the same vector; what was coordinate, subordinate or superordinate from the standpoint of one system, is not so from the standpoint of another system. The ideal is a center of perspective at infinity, from which but one classification is possible, or no classification is necessary.

Pseudo-superior men jealously keep watch over artificially established boundary lines between nations and sciences. They forget that an advanced science, like a civilized nation, cannot be self-sufficient. In order to advance, sciences, not less than individual men and nations, must obey the principles of division of labor, i. e., every science must confine herself to accomplishing such tasks only which she can do most efficiently; she must make use of the methods, results or acquirements obtained by other sciences, and give in exchange her own. Nay, more, just as in modern times the workingmen of certain nationalities begin to realize what their exploiters (kings, noblemen, cap-

italists, . . .) have realized long ago, viz., that they stand nearer to, and have more interests in common with, the workingmen of other nationalities than with the other social classes (capitalists, bureaucrats, clergy, teachers, . . .) belonging to their own nationalities; just so a certain class of knowledge which is commonly considered as belonging to one science may be brought into close community of interests with classes of knowledge commonly assigned to other sciences.

Facts and Hypotheses.—Hypotheses are supposed to explain the distant, past, future, unexperienced, complex, unknown, unusual, imperceptible, microcosm in terms of the near, present, experienced, simple, known, usual, perceptible, macrocosm. Does not this mean that truth is already in our possession in germ or in essence; that truth has not to be discovered, but merely uncovered, unfolded? Is it not ridiculous to raise our impotence of transcending the data of our senses to the rank of a law of Nature, of a scientific law, of a logical necessity?

Diagrammatic representation of the evolution of hypotheses, theories, philosophical systems.



I.—First or rectilinear stage explains or links a few facts: a, b
II.—Second or circular stage is more inclusive, broader: it explains the additional facts or systems of facts: c, d, e
III.—The third or elliptical stage, and
IV.—The fourth or parabolical stage, are still broader

To support a theory, facts must be unexplainable on any other theory. Facts are the material, the bricks or stones; hypotheses, theories, are the cement, the mortar; both are means for constructing spiritual edifices for the delight of human souls. A purely speculative system is like an edifice constructed out of mortar only; a purely experimental system, if there be any possibility for it, is like an edifice built out of bricks or stones only. Both are extremely vacillating.

It sounds so comical to me to hear experimenters, observers, scientists, even philosophers, maintain seriously that they want to remain within the boundaries of facts, of science; that they do not want to venture into hypotheses, speculation, metaphysics. First of all, every fact, every experiment, every science, is based upon some theory, speculation, metaphysics, and leads to more comprehensive and bolder speculations. We do not see things and connections between things entirely as they are, but largely as we imagine them to be. The only difference between matter-of-fact thinkers and speculative or hypotheses-framing thinkers is that the former use theories, metaphysics, implicitly and unconsciously, and are not able to separate fact from theory, physics from metaphysics, nor are they able to rise from a few facts and narrow theories to the conception of the whole class of similar facts, and to a more comprehensive theory; whereas the latter use hypotheses explicitly and consciously, and are able to advance to ever-higher points of view, to ever-broader outlooks. It is so comical to hear our self-important academical philosophers belonging to the various classes of the so-called idealistic philosophy maintain that ideas, feelings, the mind, or only the writer's mind, are real facts; whereas objects, the external world, matter, are mere hypotheses, are non-existent or unknowable and utterly beyond our reach. If objects

are non-existent, why cannot the idealistic writers make a single statement merely in terms of ideas, without implying objects? If objects are beyond our reach, how did we come to speak about them? The same contradiction is observed in those who maintain that energy, force, movement, change, is the only reality; and matter, permanence, is but an appearance, hypothesis, mental construct. If so, why cannot these dynamists or energists make a single statement without making use of matter? And those who reduce matter to energy, electricity (electrons), or to a mere unstable form of ether, thinking that they have thereby dealt a death-blow to matter, fail to see that they speak about ether, electricity, energy, corpuscles, in the same way as atoms, matter, have heretofore been spoken about, they fail to see that ether or energy is to them what matter has been to the materialists. These learned gentlemen, who would doubt the sanity of an individual who could not understand why a sentence must necessarily consist of a subject and a predicate, fail to see the insanity of their analogous assertion that there is movement but no moving things, there is a perceiver and perceptions but no things perceived.

Progress in Knowledge and Understanding.—As long as there are no absolutely isolated things, no absolutely isolated states of mind, knowledge is necessarily comparative, relative, dynamic. This does not mean that we know only changes, only relations, only similarities and dissimilarities, associations and dissociations between things. We cannot know changes without knowing more or less the state preceding the change, or the thing changed; we cannot know relations between things without knowing more or less the related things themselves. We cannot know our ego without knowing other egos and the external world with which it stands in constant and changing rela-

tion. Just as reaction has no separate existence from, and no meaning without, action; just so knowledge of things, i. e., of their actions upon our mind, goes together with some sort of knowledge of our states of mind, i. e., of the mind's reactions to external or organic actions. We cannot know things without knowing their relations or connections with other things; for things are nothing but centers of irradiation or bundles of relations, or, more correctly, things are nothing but places of intersection where relations are more condensed, more numerous, just as nerve cells are the crossing-places or irradiation centers of nerve fibers. The difference between thing and relation is merely a difference in complexity, density, a difference between the whole and its parts, but not a difference of kind or of materiality.

Knowledge is a general or collective name for sensing, perceiving, conceiving, being conscious. Understanding is a special case, or a higher, deeper, more general, more comprehensive, more penetrating, conceptual, causal kind of knowledge. To know a thing means to compare it with others, with ourselves; to associate it with, or to attend to its relations to, certain things, which necessitates a dissociation, or an abstraction from its relations to, others. One and the same thing impresses us differently according to the point of view, according to the setting in which it presents itself to us. Thus one and the same kind of work may be tedious and appear as never-ending, or it may be pleasant and seem to last but a while; according as it is considered as a whole or as a heap of disconnected parts, according as our attention is concentrated upon the result or upon the means, according as our attention is entirely absorbed by it or distracted in other directions. To speak about knowing things-in-themselves amounts to speaking about knowing

things that do not act on our mind; it is tantamount to speaking about seeing things that do not impress our eyes, and hearing sounds that do not reach our ears, etc. Likewise, to know our mind-in-itself would mean to know a mind that does neither act upon nor react to external events; it would mean to be conscious of our unconsciousness, which is certainly a contradiction in terms.

To say that reaction is equal to action means to deny all spontaneity, independence or self-activity, to objects. Even if we say that the total reaction of a thing is equal to the total action exerted upon it, we do not bring our statement much nearer to reality. For this means that everything derives its whole being, existence and behavior, merely from outside, from the rest of the world; it means to conceive of matter, of the world, as naturally inert—a conception which would involve us in more inextricable difficulties than those we try to escape. Hence, it is more accurate to say that reaction is proportional to action. If consciousness or knowledge is a kind of total or unitary reaction of the mind to external actions, we understand how there can be many different degrees of knowledge of one and the same thing or action, merely because of varying internal conditions or degrees of self-activity of the mind itself. If too many things force themselves or act simultaneously on the mind, or if a single thing acts too strongly and exclusively on it, it can no longer respond as a whole: It splits into smaller, separately reacting parts; it sinks to a sub-conscious or disintegrated state. The mind can perceive but successively. To gain in simultaneity or comprehensiveness, it must lose in clearness, i. e., it must deal, not with the things themselves, but with mere symbols or images.

Consciousness and self-consciousness are the two

inseparable aspects of one and the same process. From this inseparable connection, or parallelism, between the consciousness of objects as known and the consciousness of knowing objects, between the consciousness of matter or of not-self and the consciousness of mind or self, it follows that it is a fallacy to say that we understand mind better than matter; that we explain matter in terms of mind, or vice versa. It is rather true that we are equally ignorant of or equally acquainted with the nature of both mind and matter, with the two antithetic aspects of knowledge. We understand others, the individual, mankind, the soul in so far and so much only as we understand ourselves, society, the environment, the cosmos.

If the knowledge of our body comes through identically constituted nerves as the knowledge of the external world, if the understanding of our self goes hand-in-hand with the understanding of the not-self, if the substance of our experiences is inseparable from some form imparted to it by our mind, it follows that the concept of causality is not first abstracted from the voluntary part of our inner life, and then transferred, by analogy, from our movements following upon the efforts of our will to the successions of movements and changes observed in the external world. If causality were a purely subjective concept, like animism, which has been reified or projected into the objective world, men would sooner or later free themselves from it; whereas the contrary is seen to happen: its importance, its grip on human reasoning, is steadily increasing. Moreover, causality or causation is nothing but a short-hand name for the mutual influences between things, which no sane man denies.

The progress in *understanding* the human soul is strictly parallel, contemporaneous with the progress in understanding the external world. Only the prog-

resses in *knowing* are not parallel. Our internal relations are regulated without necessitating any conscious effort, whereas our relations with the external world are not so constant as to become automatical. Hence, we are more interested in learning facts about the external world than about the internal world: our noological knowledge lags behind the cosmological. In antiquity when the struggle for existence was extrasocial, against nature and other tribes, it was more useful to have knowledge of external facts. In the modern individualistic society in which the struggle for existence is rather intrasocial, against fellowmen and fellow-citizens, noological knowledge is of greater importance. The average savage was rather a naturalist and so is the villager; whereas the average civilized man, and particularly the city dweller, is more of a psychologist, if I may use these terms for knowledge devoid of understanding.

Our body is just as external to our consciousness as the surrounding physical world. Hence the knowledge of our own body does not differ in the way of its being obtained from the knowledge of the surrounding world; the former kind of knowledge cannot be said to be more objective, or more certain, than the latter. The reason why we know from direct sources less about the processes going on in our own body than about the phenomena of the external world, is the constancy, regularity, rhythm, of the former, and the irregularity, continual change, lack of perceptible (I do not say conceivable) rhythm in the latter. The organic, inner nerves do not differ in construction from the peripheral, outer nerves. The knowledge of others' minds is just as inferential as the knowledge of any material object which does not impress all our senses (distant objects, like stars, etc.) or which does not impress them directly (electric and magnetic phenomena). If

the cerebro-molecular movements of others would directly impress our highest or synthetic cerebral center, instead of communicating with us through their rougher and superficial muscular discharges, we would know others' minds just as much or just as little as we do know our own mind. With increased power of observation, of voluntary attention, we come to notice ever greater differences between the behavior of material, inanimate objects, of other men, and our own behavior; and we succeed in freeing ourselves from animism, from personification of material—especially of movable—objects, from projecting behind the acts of others thoughts, feelings, and intentions identical with our own: for no matter how similar-looking the actions of different persons are, especially in their rough and superficial part, they always differ in their inner and less striking parts, as long as they proceed from different psychical causes. Maybe our power of observation is in reality not increasing, is not greater than that of primitive people: we merely notice better than they did the less striking, less immediately useful things and events, the configurations of wholes, because the knowledge of the striking, of immediately useful things, of the details, has been transmitted to us, or at least facilitated by our attention being drawn to them, so that a surplus of intellectual energy is left to us to be used in the acquisition of more general, more refined, more theoretical knowledge. The philistine is ignorant of his own self, because his evolution comes very early to a stop, because there is no change and no variety in his pursuits, thoughts, feelings: he neither differs from his neighbors, nor from himself at different stages of his life. Whereas the superior man is impelled to self-analysis by the constant change in his aspirations, or rather in the width of his intellectual horizon, and by the difference between himself and

his fellow-men which is painfully brought to his attention in various ways, through many disappointments in his expectations, through ill-treatments inflicted upon him by philistines and especially by pseudo or parasitical superior men whom he mistakes for ideal men, i. e., for his equals.

Sensation, perception, memory, imagination, judgment, reason, are not like receptacles or grinding-machines that have a separate existence from and independent of the materials to be stored away or ground. In the animal mind, functions and experiences or data to be worked upon are interdependent, mutually determining. Only such external vibrations give rise to experiences, sensations, perceptions, for which we have corresponding sympathetically vibrating brain centers. In the absence of such centers, vibrating sympathetically with the external vibrations, there is no real, objective, definite experience: there is only a shock, often a painful destruction of nerve tissue. Thus the human brain having no centers vibrating sympathetically with electric waves cannot respond adequately, and without danger to the organism, to the impact of electric waves; many microbes having no optical sensibility perish under the impact of light waves. If quick and intense electric discharges, like those of lightning, were a common aerial phenomenon, men could not exist unless they would develop a brain center vibrating sympathetically with these electric currents, and thus preventing rupture of tissue. To take analogous examples from the social environment: men, like the genius and the insane, who do not vibrate sympathetically with, who cannot imitate, their neighbors, their fellow-men, with whom they come in contact, are not tolerated, nay, they are persecuted; their lives are endangered, especially in the midst of primitive, compact communities and small towns where every

individual is constantly in contact with and watched by the others; the motto is "either imitate or starve." If the social organism would have real philanthropical institutions vibrating sympathetically with the criminal, extra-social element, it would be less endangered and less undermined by the latter. The moral genius is a man whose brain vibrates sympathetically with all the exploited, disinherited, ill-treated social classes; and whose intelligence is pressed into the service of his altruistic experiences. No amount of intelligence can make the rich egoist see our system of cruel spoliation in its true light, for he has no sympathetic feelings with the condition of the exploited. The somnambulist, the hypnotized, the mentally absorbed, the fanatic, the man of strong one-sided opinions, i. e., individuals in whom some ideas are over-active, over-conscious, are blind to everything except to events with which their minds vibrate sympathetically at the time. During the individual lifetime very few brain centers are being created. Most of them, if not all, are hereditarily predetermined. Owing to such hereditary predispositions—which in their turn are largely due to the frequency and intensity, to the cumulative impressions, of external stimuli—we notice much better animate beings than inanimate, animals than plants, moving things than stationary things, men than animals, the opposite sex than our own sex, things of immediate bearing on our well-being than things of mediate bearing. Hereditary predispositions, i. e., interests and sensitiveness, and the intensity or the frequency of the actual, individual experiences, are responsible for the adequacy and for the extent of our mental reactions. One and the same experience may stop in some individuals at the level of sensation, of brute, partial feeling, or perception; in other individuals, the memory centers are also set into action, and the perception is thereby completed

or transformed into apperception; in other individuals the process goes a step higher, it arouses the activity of the synthetic or conceptual brain centers: parts of percepts and related memories are synthetized into a more comprehensive whole; in imaginative individuals, memories rise spontaneously into consciousness and new connections are thus established between them, etc.

Intelligence or mental adaptability, i. e., the capacity of acquiring new experiences, of acting accordingly, of relating them to similar past experiences, of synthetizing them into classes, is in reality not a simple, undivided ability, but a collection of partial abilities dependent on inborn interests or hereditary predispositions and on external opportunities or sources of experiences. An individual may be very intelligent in one line of activity, and be quite stupid in all other respects. Thus a passionate man may display intelligence in inventing means and devices of gratifying his passion, but he remains blind to the damage resulting for him from the passion as a whole: his intelligence, his mental field of vision, does not extend beyond the sphere of his passion; the commercial philistine may be clever in his narrow sphere of profit-seeking, but he unmasks himself as a stupid fellow when he comes to discuss about higher pursuits, such as religion, to which he naïvely applies his give-and-take logic, and sees the weightiest reason for his compliance with the externals of religion in his assertion that it is more profitable or at any rate safer and less risky to do so than otherwise; the stupidity, the credulity, of children, of some intelligent men, is due to lack of experience. Every perception, in order to be complete, objective, presupposes the collaboration of memory, imagination, judgment, reason. But beyond a certain point, these functions cease to collaborate

equally. Perception, observation, predominates in some individuals; memory and imagination, in others, etc. So that intelligences differ, not only in the kind of material or experiences on which they exert themselves, but also in the kind of function which predominates (observers, poets, artists, thinkers, . . .). In a more restricted and modern sense, intelligence means knowledge and understanding of men, for in our technically advanced but parasitical society most inhabitants of large cities live on their wits, on their ability to make others work, on their ability to please—which presupposes the ability to understand—others.

Evolution of Knowledge.—When an object impresses for the first time the mind of a baby it probably causes a complex of vague, weak, undifferentiated sensations. The accidental qualities are on the same level of indistinctness as the essential or permanent qualities. If the same object is presented again to the baby's mind, the essential, permanent or unchanged qualities will be better perceived than the accidental or those depending on every alteration in circumstances, for the impression of the former adds itself to their impression left the first time, whereas the impression made by accidental qualities is different with every presentation of the object. Hence, to perceive an object means to notice what is common to all its impressions upon our mind made at different times, i.e., to notice what is repeated. Likewise, if objects belonging to the same class are presented, the baby notices more easily what they have in common than the individual qualities, for the former are repeated and added. The class attributes are known before or better than the individual attributes. To conceive means to notice what is common to many objects coexisting in space. To form concepts of a higher order means to notice what is common to related concepts of a lower order.

If the knowledge of perceptible class qualities precedes the knowledge of individual qualities, the reverse holds for the knowledge of individuals and of groups or classes. First, all the individuals belonging to the same class are mistaken for one and the same, or for identical individuals; then those individuals are distinguished from each other and the correlated notions, "individual-class," "part-whole," are acquired. First, such groups are distinguished which differ perceptibly much from each other and are mutually exclusive; then those classes are distinguished which stand nearer to and include each other. The scientific or logical hierarchy of classes does not, of course, run parallel to that of psychological or common-sense classification whose grounds of division are mere superficial or perceptible qualities of things.

What has been said about the genesis and evolution of objective knowledge can be repeated—mutatis mutandis—about our subjective, inner or introspective knowledge. When we begin to pay attention, not only to the content of our mental processes, but also to their form, i.e., not only to the "what," but also to the "how" of our experiencing, feeling, reacting; we notice that there is something constantly recurring in the manner in which we take cognizance, feel or react, and this something is independent of and prior to the matter or cause of cognition, feeling, volition. This constant form, this bed in which our streams of experiences are flowing and to which they must conform themselves, we call our self, our ego, our character and temperament, our individuality. Like the bed of a river, our self is, on the one hand, preexisting to our experiences, and, on the other hand, it is deepened and broadened by the early experiences; nay, more, its direction may even be changed by these early experiences. But the self, the bed of our experiences or

streams of consciousness, once formed, exerts a molding, shaping, and directing influence on later experiences. The genius, in distinction from common mortals, has a self which is more or less fully developed at birth, and which will, therefore, rather mold, select and direct the individual experiences than be formed or dug by the latter. The self of the genius is active from the beginning; that of common mortals is passive with regard to early individual and suggestive or educative experiences, and active with regard to later ones. The self of average men is teachable, a result of deliberate and of unintentioned external human influences; the self of the genius is unteachable, it is a cause of change in human attitudes. There is just as little, or rather just as much mystery in understanding the identity of self as there is in understanding the identity of the not-self, of the objective world. If the external world—and our own body may be considered as a part of it—furnishes the stuff for our mental processes, and our mind gives the form, we may say: Amidst the changing contents and the changing forms of our thoughts there is something constantly recurring, ever the same, which constitutes the two interacting principles called self and not-self, mind and cosmos.

What for logic is an ultimate concept, a category of thought, is psychologically primary, given in the form of meaningless, vague sensations. What for logic is last, is first for psychology. We can best notice this gradual advancement from vague, meaningless sensations of objects or of relations to the interpretation of these sensations, i.e., to the linking of these sensations with images of other sensations associated therewith from our previous experience: We can best notice this, I say, in the case of a distraction of our attention while sensing or after having sensed some-

thing. If our mind is absorbed while an external or internal impression calls on it, we first feel that *something* is going on; but it takes a certain time before we make out what that something is before we *interpret* it or give it a meaning. Likewise, if we have decided to do something and our attention is diverted before we have begun to carry out our decision, we notice that we forget the aim of our incipient movements, sometimes we even forget the movements to be made and remember only that we intended *to do something*. We remember a vague impulse, but forget its direction or goal. Logically, the notion of the class comes after the notion of the individuals constituting it. Psychologically, the class attributes are known before the individual attributes. Logically, the notion of animal cannot be grasped before the notions of vertebrates, fishes, mollusca, worms, etc. Psychologically, we may know clearly what an animal is, without ever getting a clear idea about the subdivisions.

Knowledge of Other Selves.—We describe mechanical phenomena and movements by means of words referring to human actions and human movements, because the latter have been noticed and, hence, endowed with names prior to the former. Likewise with human mental processes. We speak of the semi- and of the unconscious processes in terms of, and therefore we mistake them for, conscious processes; because the latter have attracted our attention prior to, or more directly than, the former, and have therefore received names before the former. If a psychologist, a knower of human nature, has to describe the dimly conscious operations, the flow of semiconscious intentions, feelings and thoughts in introspectively less gifted individuals, he cannot help using descriptive terms which apply to analogous conscious processes in his own mind, and which convey therefore the idea of clear

consciousness in the agent described. He describes the mental processes of his nonpsychological fellowmen as these would describe them if they were fully conscious thereof. The psychologist cannot help ascribing to others the same clearness of thought and of intentions as he has himself; just as the sincere and honest man believes in the sincerity and honesty of rascals, or, if he is too much of a sharp-eyed, objective psychologist not to notice their tricky and mean ways of acting, he considers them as hypocrites and intellectual prostitutes who knowingly do what they themselves consider as wrong. He cannot understand that there is such a thing as self-deception, self-sophistication, insincerity with one's self, self-hypnotising into seeing men and things according to or in agreement with one's desires or self-interest.

The pseudo-superior man who makes a business out of everything, who uses everybody and everything to further his own interests, cannot believe in the existence of genuine superior men, i.e., in men who love truth, knowledge and art for their own sakes, who disinterestedly take others' troubles to heart, who argue merely for the sake of getting at some truth without intending to belittle others and to extol themselves. Such individuals the pseudo-superior man looks down upon as either unskilled fakers or cranks.

In our attempt at getting a glimpse into the soul of other men, into the soul of animals, and into the nature of so-called inanimate things, we can just as little help taking our own soul as a starting point as, when we wish to go somewhere, we cannot manage to be there at the moment of conceiving the desire but must patiently start out from the place where we happen to be. To understand others we must wander in our imagination either upward, onward, in the direction of our aspirations, visions, hopes, tendencies

or backward, downward, in the direction of our recollections, past, prenatal and prehuman conditions. It is neither possible nor useful or desirable to know men and things in themselves, from their own point of view, from inside or intuitively in the Bergsonian sense. Nor is there any meaning in such a knowledge, for knowledge presupposes a mutual interaction between knower and known. Bergson alone seems to know the secret of such absolute knowledge, but he does not care to reveal it to us common mortals: it is enough honor for us if he condescends to point out to us that he is endowed therewith. The only drawback resulting from judging others by ourselves does not lie in the fact that we must start from ourselves, from our own experience, from our preconceived opinions, but in the fact that we are too lazy to go beyond that, to budge from the place, to shift our point of view in order to compare and coordinate the partial experiences gained under various angles. We prefer either to identify others with ourselves, as children, philistines and savages do; or we assume and compel others to be what we wish them to be, as parasites or exploiters do with the poor. The productive individual, who relies on his own abilities, starts by assuming that his fellowmen are like him and treats them accordingly. Experience, however, and objective thinking, i.e., thinking guided by experience, teaches him that not all men are alike and willing to cooperate with him. He thus attains objective knowledge, he learns to associate with his own kind, to modify his preconceived opinions and conduct and to shun parasites. The parasitical, predatory, unproductive individual, on the other hand, in his indifference to real or disinterested knowledge, in his desire to live indolently on the toil of others, assumes and persists in his subjective or a priori assumption that his poorer fellowmen are noth-

ing but what he wishes and compels them to be, viz., tools, stupid automata, animals born to do his bidding, unworthy of proper or individual names, which are in need of his supervision in order to get along in this world; those who refuse to do his bidding or to look up to him as a master and try to assert their individuality, he hates and exterminates as being morbid, abnormal cases; he overlooks the fact that if the few altruistic and independence-loving proletarians are abnormal because they differ from the majority, then both his class and his prostituted defenders, the official psychologists and psychiatrists, also belong to the abnormal, pathological, degenerate class, as they, too, are in a minority, and hence deserve just as much—if not more so—to be persecuted and exterminated by the exploited masses. Whereas the honest, creative, aspiring thinker sees in the downtrodden masses the crippled souls of dimly aspiring men, who have been hypnotized and frightened into intellectual torpor and blindness by their exploiters; the rich who use them as mere tools, and hence want them to be nothing else, prefer to deny them all higher needs, nay, all human feelings, because this conception suits better their materialistic, predatory, anti-social pursuits.

The same applies to our conception of the animal mind. The vegetarian, the kind-hearted and nonvoracious man, are inclined to look upon their animal cousins with unprejudiced eyes, to perceive that they, too, are stirred by passions, hatred, love, joy, sorrow, care, and are capable of appreciating fair and loving treatment. The liking of children for animals springs not only from the fact that they—like our preglacial ancestors whose life history every child briefly recapitulates—stand psychically nearer to the animals, but also to the fact that the preglacial man was a vegetarian and hence had no reason for denying a soul to

his animal cousins, as the exploiters do with their poorer brethren, and the Americans do with their immigrant wage slaves, in order to be able to feed remorselessly on their blood. Nay, more, the child, like the primitive man, is rather inclined to overestimate the psychical qualities of animals by analogy with their superior physical qualities; just as, conversely, he cannot conceive of a superior, extraordinary intellect possessed by a small man with an insignificant exterior. The egoistical, voracious, flesh-eating individual, on the other hand, prefers to see in animals nothing but automata, stored-up food or energy, just as the carnivorous animals, when hungry, probably look upon man and upon the herbivorous animals.

To know others we must have been, at some stage of our development, similar to them. For this reason, the best detectives and policemen are recruited from among ex-criminals and men with a criminal predisposition. The best laquais, valets, butlers, servants, are to be found among aborted or would-be aristocrats. If the socialist is better able than the congenitally noble-hearted anarchist or communist to understand the psyche of a capitalist, it is because the socialist has passed during his immature years through the parasitical stage before he reached the humanitarian plane in theory at least, if not in practise. The capitalist, however, who does not evolve morally beyond the plane of jungle life, remains devoid of all understanding for the mentality of a socialist: Thus, Gustave Le Bon, a very capable scientist of the predatory class, who, like all capitalistic writers, is manufacturing voluminous and numerous books for want of some more useful occupation, when he attempted to fathom the soul of the socialist in particular and of the revolutionist in general in his "Psychology of Socialism," "Psychology of Revolutions," etc., made a sorry mess out of it;

whenever he seems to talk sense, he merely repeats what he has appropriated from socialistic writings; but whenever he talks in his own name, he talks nonsense, and all he succeeds in discovering in the minds of socialists is the reflected image of his own hidden qualities, viz., hatred of superiority, envy of wealth, morbid or aimless restlessness and discontentedness, and such-like. If the intelligent man is able to understand the fool, and if the sane man is able to understand to a certain extent the insane man, it is because the former's thinking processes pass through the fool's and madman's stage of nebulousness, incoherency, impulsiveness, dissociation, subjectivity, etc., but do not stop at that stage and do not go over into action or into talk until the entire related experience of the past has been consulted and until all the thinking material has been sifted, distilled, purified, worked up into valuable concepts or rules of conduct.

The Various Organs of Knowledge.—Just as in the field of social activities the accomplishment of any kind of work requires the cooperation of, and the division of the task among, helpers, workers, foremen, superintendent, manager, promoter or initiator; just so in the narrower sphere of individual activity the successful performance of any act requires the cooperation of, and the division of the task among, reflex movements, instinctive acts, habitual acts, imitation and individual initiative or reflection. There is no strictly or purely manual, automatic work: The work of the helper cannot be done without some amount of brain work (attention, reflection, discrimination, etc.) or individual initiative; only his reasoning power exerts itself on single or simple matters, while that of the promoter exerts itself on more complicated or more numerous matters. Hence, instead of speaking of hand-workers and head-workers, of mechanical and intel-

lectual work, we ought to speak of simple, subordinate and of complex, higher work.

What has been said about outer or muscular activity holds also of inner or mental activity. Every mental process, to attain truth or objectivity, requires the cooperation of the senses, memory, instinctive knowledge or intuition, spontaneous activity (imagination, reflection, analysis, synthesis, . . .). The difference between sensation, perception, memories, intuitions, imaginations, conceptions, is the complexity or number of objects which cause the mental process. If a mental process is designated as perception, and not as recollection, imagination, conception, . . . it is not because it lacks the cooperation of the latter processes, but because the latter are in the background and their cooperation is of a secondary importance or of an auxiliary nature.

Up to a certain point, thinking and doing, feeling and expression, go together, collaborate simultaneously, work side by side; but beyond this limit they have to part company, they have to cooperate separately or successively. What has been said of outer (muscular) and inner (mental) activity holds also of the components and sub-components of each. Thus the various mental faculties (perception, memory, imagination, conception) work side by side, simultaneously or in quick alternation in simple matters; but in more complicated problems it is best to let them work separately or in succession. Likewise with each single mental faculty: Passive or receptive perception, if allowed to become dominant or to rule continually—as in some savage or degenerate peoples—excludes observation or active, selective, purposive perception. Reproductive or imitative and productive or creative imagination, in order to grow, must part company at a certain stage of development. Verbal, perceptual (pictorial),

discriminating memory is inseparably connected with ideational, conceptual, assimilating (synthetic) memory in simple and easily understood questions; but in more important and more complicated affairs, the more attention we pay to, the better we try to remember and to comply with words, forms, the letter, particular phenomena, details, differences, . . . the less do we observe, remember, assimilate, comply with, keep before our mind's eye ideas, substance, the spirit, classes of phenomena, wholes, similarities or unifying principles. Since our mental faculties or abilities cooperate either simultaneously or successively; since the successive faculties draw their energy and material from the preceding ones; it follows that one cannot test one mental faculty or ability without testing the other faculties or abilities at the same time. Thus one remembers clearly what one has perceived clearly—the clearness may result from a single but vivid perception, or from imperfect but repeated perceptions; one perceives distinctly and quickly what one understands and attends to; one pays attention to and understands only such things as one is interested in, i.e., such things as one deals with or thinks about spontaneously or without external stimulation or suggestion.

Perception rests on sensations, memory rests on percepts, imagination rests on memories, and conception rests on imagination. A higher faculty, like the upper stories of a building, affords a broader—if vaguer and more easily misleading—outlook upon the world, life and their potentialities than do the lower faculties, upon which it rests. In other words, we may remember things which we can no longer perceive or feel; we may imagine things which we no longer remember or perceive, or which we cannot render perceptible as yet, or which are non-existent; and we may conceive things which are not accessible to either imagination or per-

ception. If Kant had kept this familiar fact in mind, if he had not—like all idealistic or nebulous philosophers—reached for clouds or empty concepts while allowing the solid ground of facts to slip from under his feet, and if he had not run after the mental shadows called absolute truth or things-in-themselves, he would not have involved himself in what he called the four antinomies or seemingly inextricable, irreconcilable, contradictory concepts (finiteness and infinity, freedom and causation, contingency and necessity), and he would not have had to resort to a sham reconciliation of these contradictions by attributing them to a confusion between the noumenal and the phenomenal spheres. He would have seen that the infinite divisibility of matter, which seems possible to our imagination because we cannot help picturing to ourselves the invisible ultimate elements of matter by analogy with visible wholes, is shown to be absurd by our conception or reason which tells us that the infinite divisibility of matter implies the existence of infinitely small particles, which practically means particles of zero dimensions, hence non-existent particles. To the matter-of-fact thinker—who knows that all truth is necessarily relative, which does not mean changeable—there is no contradiction between necessity, causality, natural law and freedom, contingency; for a certain event may at the same time be contingent, independent of or uninfluenced by another event and caused by or dependent on other events. More correctly, between two seemingly opposite concepts—such as necessity and contingency, greatness and smallness—there is neither contradiction nor harmony; contradiction sets in when they are applied to one and the same thing as compared to another thing; a thing cannot be both greater and smaller than another thing, or both influenced and uninfluenced thereby. About the world as a whole it

is, of course, meaningless to say that it is necessary or contingent. Our imagination cannot make us realize the infinity and eternity of the world, but our conception can. Our imagination is not always able to show us that what is true of wholes is not necessarily true of parts and vice versa, but our conception helps us realize that although wholes are changeable, perishable, still their ultimate elements must be eternal, indestructible, indivisible, uncaused, uncreated. If everything had to be accounted for as an effect or a product of something entirely different, then, of course, we would become involved in an endless chain of causes and there would be no meaning in speaking about uncaused causes, that is, about uncreated, eternal things and uncreated, spontaneous movements.

All knowledge is relative or comparative; but this does not mean that all knowledge is equally valid or reliable. Only that knowledge which is based on a constant, fixed point of reference or of comparison, or a practically invariable unit of measure, is valid, reliable, useful, communicable, objective. Thus if the temperature of our body were always fluctuating between extremes as in fever, our thermal nerves could never give us reliable knowledge about the changes in the outside temperature. If our spontaneous activity would vary between extremes without the aid of any external stimulation, or would be of such an explosive, unstable nature as to be radically changed by the slightest external stimulus, as it happens sometimes or periodically in women and emotional men, we could never gain adequate, objective, differentiated knowledge about other men and the external world that impresses or stimulates our senses. To gain such knowledge, our inner activity must be more or less constant, it must have a small range of fluctuation, and the changes caused therein by external stimuli must be proportional

to the latter. The irritable or explosive individual who expects things to happen according to his wishes and needs, and who, therefore, never makes an effort to meet men and things half-way, is bound to be subject to illusions, errors, disappointments, shocks, unhappiness.

All knowledge is knowledge of relations, actions, interactions; for there is no such thing as isolated, unrelated, inactive, inert things. Even latency and potentiality do not mean absolute inaction, suspended action or suspended movement: they merely mean imperceptible, intra-molecular, intra-atomic or intra-corpuscular action. If relative knowledge holds only for a certain time, place (point of view), individual, this does not mean that it can turn into untruth, error at some future time, for other individuals and for different points of view. It merely means that in order to know anything there must be an observer occupying a certain position in space and time; but if the mood of the observer changes owing to organic disturbances, or his point of view is shifted, he has no right to claim that the external object changed. Nor does relativity of knowledge mean uncertain, incomplete, partial knowledge. It merely means that we cannot know men, things and ourselves except as related to, acting upon, or acted upon by, other men and things. What is an individual, a thing, a self, from one point of view may be but a part of a more comprehensive whole or self, when seen from another point of view. In so far and so long as a number of things or men act simultaneously, concertedly and similarly on another group, they constitute or become a single object or whole. The conflicts between men are invisible from an extra-terrestrial, philosophical point of view, and the human species appears as a single being striving toward the same goal and acting on the external world in a single,

definite direction. But if the intra-human conflicts are neither seen nor felt by an extra-terrestrial being or aristocratic closet philosopher, they are none the less harsh realities for men.

To expect knowledge and truth to be independent of time, of space, of the human mind and its points of view, means to expect things to be motionless, unchangeable, inactive, homogeneous, unreal, for there is no such thing as absolute rest, inaction, simplicity. Nay, knowledge itself is a process, an activity of the human mind, an interaction between the human mind and external things. To say that things would still exist even if all men and sentient beings should die out and hence cease experiencing them, means to say that things will still act on other things; it means to say that things are related not only to the human and animal mind, but also to each other. Existence is more comprehensive than being experienced: a thing does not cease to exist if it ceases being experienced by men, but it would cease to exist if the rest of the world could be annihilated.

Truth is nothing but a general or class name for all actual and possible human and animal sensations, feelings, perceptions, conceptions, views and relations between them. If, instead of disputing *in abstracto* as to whether or not there is absolute truth, i. e., truth independent of the human mind and of all relations, we would descend to the concrete realm of our sensations or particular experiences, and would ask, for instance, what is the color of a thing in the dark or when not looked at, we would soon agree as to the absurdity of our search after absolute truth. Quantitatively, truth is more comprehensive than knowledge and existence, for it deals with actuality and potentiality, with past, present and future, and transcends experience, whereas knowledge is coextensive with ex-

perience. Qualitatively, however, truth is poorer than knowledge; for it does not admit of any degrees, whereas knowledge may be certain (facts), merely adhered to (faith, belief), or doubtful, conjectural, hypothetical. To say that truth cannot transcend experience, or to say that the human mind cannot know things *a priori*, is just as absurd as to say that the human mind can merely react to, but not act upon, the external world; it means to deny the spontaneity, self-activity or very existence of the human mind; it means to deny prevision, it means to confine our knowledge to the past, it means to deny the link between past and future. But, on the other hand, from the fact that human knowledge can transcend or go beyond experience, it does not follow that it can grow in any other soil but that of experience. All knowledge is empirical, i. e., it draws its origin and food from experience, and is also transcendental, i. e., it does not remain confined to mere past and actual experience, but surpasses it: it anticipates and creates new experience.

Potentiality.—To make clear or to explain and define the meaning of a concept we have to distinguish it from its super-, co-, and sub-ordinated concepts; to give a description of its intension and extension; to trace its psychological genesis which may coincide with its historical genesis. Thus potentiality can be subsumed under the categories of existence and of energy, according as we consider it statically or dynamically. Potential existence is never separated from some form of actual existence: the tree exists potentially in the seed; before being recollected our ideas exist potentially in our memory; before becoming dynamical, psychical, conscious, our ideas are statical, structural, physiological, unconscious; combinations exist potentially in their elements. Potentiality is appealed to to explain hereditary transmission, the recollection of forgotten

things, the continuity of our individuality during sleep, the reestablishment of a disturbed stable equilibrium. Physiological energy contains potentially psychical energy; achievement, actions, are contained potentially in our abilities, thoughts and feelings; a body in a higher position exists potentially in a previously occupied lower position; ethical ideals exist actually in moral geniuses, but merely potentially in the great mass of morally average men; potential molar energy is actual molecular energy; an increase in the quantity of heat communicated to a body manifests itself first in expanding its volume, i. e., in a molar form, and then in changing its state of aggregation, i. e., in a molecular form imperceptible for us.

To make the usual definition of potential and actual energy more inclusive, I would define potential energy as energy of condition, and actual energy as energy of action. All cases of impeded movement, of impeded action, would be special cases of potential energy. The distinction between actual and potential existence would disappear, say the spiritists, for a being endowed with the, to us incomprehensible, ability to look into temporal sequences alternately and at will back and forward as we can do with respect to spatial sequences: everything would exist actually for such beings moving freely in time as we do in space. But on closer inspection this spiritistic high-sounding speculation unmasks itself as a nonsensical assertion: If time were a kind of space, sequence would be a kind of coexistence.

Coordinated concepts of potentiality are: latency, possibility, immanency, etc. Potential existence depends more on the hidden qualities of the evolving thing than on external circumstances; the reverse holds for possible existence. In latency the idea of evolution is not implied. In immanency we do not ascribe any

efficient causation to external conditions. Potential energy accounts for energy which is not yet manifest for our senses; latent energy accounts for energy ceasing to manifest itself in a perceptible or external manner, for energy being absorbed and expended in internal work.

The concept potentiality arises from the inconceivability of a creation *ex nihilo*, from our need to conceive causation as an unbroken chain of necessary sequences. Looked at prospectively, the concept of potentiality furnishes an explanation of evolution; retrospectively it interprets causality and continuity; aspectively it accounts for the imperceptible. The naïve concept of potentiality is that potentiality is of the same nature as the resulting actuality, but reduced in size, in magnitude; that the external conditions have merely a catalytic influence. The riper concept of potentiality says that the potential is a form of the actual, the actual is a resultant of the potential and of certain external conditions, in which resultant, however, the contribution of the potential is greater than that of the conditions.



Just as the magnitude of angles does not depend on the length of the sides, so the potential differences between individuals (I, II, III, etc. . . .), between the genius and the philistine, between the male and the female, are given congenitally, and hence do not vary with age, with growing achievement (OI, OII, OIII

. . .). But the distances between the sides increase with the length of the sides; just so do the actual individual differences vary in quality and quantity of achievement with age. If all children seem to be alike, it is on account of our inability to see in the small present differences between the individualities the great potential differences which determine their future careers; it is because we have not the prophetic gift of seeing the future in the present, of seeing great future results in humble beginnings; it is because we are mentally blind and judge men, not by their abilities and tendencies, but by their visible and momentary achievements, not by their thought-out opinions, but by their memorized and professed opinions, not by what they really do, feel and think, but by what they imitate, pretend to feel and to think.

Truth and Error.—Theories, opposites, ultimate categories of thought which seem irreconcilable, irreducible to one another, indefinable in terms of one another, from a fixed point of view, may be unmasked as mere abstractions, as relative, interchangeable, interdefinable, reconcilable, complementary theories and concepts, as soon as our scrutinizing critical mind begins to shift its point of view. What from a lower standpoint is regarded as reality, continuity, permanence, individuality, unrelatedness, quality, facts, absolute truth, beauty, importance, etc., if viewed from a higher, conceptual standpoint, becomes appearance, discreteness, instability, element, relatedness, quantity, relations, relative truth, ugliness, insignificance, etc.; or it disappears altogether. Confusion, illusion, error, begin to arise when we transfer our knowledge gained from one standing ground to—and take it for—what we see from another point of view. The mind's eye, like the bodily eye, has first to accommodate itself to the new horizon which it tends to overlook; it has to

shake off the disturbing positive or negative after-images, after-thoughts, after-affections. What holds for philosophy does not hold, or may be irrelevant, for the scientific, artistic, and practical points of view; what is real for the conceptualist whose standpoint is existence in time is an empty word for the nominalist whose standpoint is spatial existence; not all we know about mathematical space, time and numbers, about a class, can be indiscriminately applied to the corresponding physiological and psychological concepts of space, time and numbers, to individuals; the real, the experienced, is partly prior to and a cause of, and partly subsequent to and an effect of the imaginary. Truth depends on three factors, on the point of view, on the observer, on the objects observed. If truth happens to be the same for different observers, it is so in so far as they are alike.

Truth, as I said above, depends on three inseparable factors: on the observer or thinker, on the object observed or imagined and its setting, and on the point of view. By this I do not mean to say, like the commercially-minded pragmatists, instrumentalists and other philosophical hypocrites, sophists, inconsistent minds, that there are many kinds of truth; that truth is subjective like, nay, identical with, value; that truth is merely a tool; that what is true for one individual, for one point of view, for one science, for reason, for direct observation, from anear, is not necessarily true for another individual, for another point of view, for another science, for feelings, for indirect or roundabout observation, from afar, and vice versa. What I mean is only this: that the whole truth is not accessible to every man, at any time, under any circumstances, from a single point of view, to a single science, to pure reason, etc. The truth perceived from one standpoint is only a part of the whole truth; is invisible from or

obscured and irrelevant for another standpoint; is not antagonistic, but complementary to the aspect of truth as seen from another point of view. Memory and imagination help us to synthetize the bits of truth or the various aspects of truth as perceived from various points of view into a harmonious single truth. Memory and imagination complete actual experiences, fill in the deficiencies and gaps, make good for the deficits of perception, enable us to dispense with a minute and fatiguing observation.

To ask for absolute truth, for truth independent of the observers, for truth about things-in-themselves, for truth about things independent of their settings and independent of the observer's standing ground; to ask, in other words, how a thing looks when nobody looks at it, and how a thing would look if nothing else would exist in the universe, is a mere play of words, a purely verbal, i. e., meaningless question which no sane-minded man except an idealistic philosopher would persistently try to answer. We might just as well ask, How does a man feel when he is dead, what becomes of the light when the candle is put out? etc.

We mistake the imaginary, the dream, for the real; the abstract for the concrete; mere words and symbols for thoughts and things; the inanimate, impersonal, unfamiliar for the animate, the personal, the familiar; the new, unusual, individual for the old, usual, class; the conventional, voluntary for the natural, spontaneous. For the imaginary, the dream, are more or less distorted copies of the real; the abstract does not exist apart from the concrete; we are used to associate signs, symbols with things, with objects of thoughts or objects of perception; we use for the abstract, the psychical, the imaginary, the same words which originally designated concrete, bodily, real things; habitual, organized, actual, hereditary ways of thinking and of

acting cost less effort than the unhabitual, individual, acquired ones; will and convention are derived from spontaneity and nature.

Mental inertia, exhaustion, laziness, habit, distraction, preoccupation, are the sources of all errors and illusions. Owing to them, the knowledge gained, the feeling and attitude of mind aroused, under past, usual, old, subjective, personal, narrow . . . circumstances, are wholly taken over, indiscriminately applied to present, unusual, new, objective, impersonal, wider, . . . circumstances; or vice versa.

In mature life it is hard to separate the direct and immediate data of our senses from the corrections and additions due to inference, memory, imagination, subconscious reasoning. But in moments of distraction when our minds are absorbed in associative or centrally arising mental processes, we can sometimes get a glimpse of what our peripherally incoming experiences or sensations are in themselves, and thereby of what they were originally, in babyhood. Thus, in moments of absorption we can catch ourselves believing that two objects belonging to different planes are in one and the same plane. This shows that pure visual perception does not contain the quality of distance and solidity which are rather a result of subconscious inference.

Abnormality does not consist so much in the experiencing as in the despotical persistence of illusions, errors; not so much in acting in response to them as in acting inadequately; it consists in indulging in mutually exclusive illusions. Just as ignorance and wrong opinions, in distinction from stupidity and prejudices, are curable, corrigible; just so the illusions and delusions of the insane, in distinction from the errors and illusions of the sane, are incorrigible, incapable of rectification.

Our reason (apperception, memory, imagination, conception, understanding) being but an extension, an aid of our senses, it is not proper to make either the former or the latter exclusively the judge of Reality or of Truth. The criterion of Truth is rather the agreement between both Reason and Senses. Only in matters which are indirectly accessible to the senses, the criterion of Truth is to be looked for in Reason alone (electrical phenomena, past and probable events, distant events, the microcosm and the macrocosm, the minds of others, . . .). And in simple, habitual, normal, constantly recurrent experiences, we can entrust the senses alone with the criterion of Reality. The lowest senses, the so-called chemical senses, of smell and of taste, give us little information about a few bodies, and that only when a part of these bodies is absorbed by the corresponding nerves. The mechanical senses, the muscular, the thermal, the tactile, give more information about innumerable bodies, but only when the bodies act directly on our nerves. The sense of hearing can be acted upon at a distance through another coarse medium (air, liquids, solids). The sense of sight can be acted upon from a much greater distance, through the most subtle medium called ether. Memory and imagination enable us to complete and to anticipate actual experiences. Conception enables us to survey in a minimum of time and with a minimum of effort vast fields of experiences, without having to pay attention to every particular experience. Conception also enables us to know things that act but indirectly, or imperceptibly, on our senses.

Under usual conditions, all our senses reveal Reality more or less perfectly. The older senses (tactile, muscular) reveal the general and relatively unchangeable or primary properties (pressure, weight, . . .). The senses acquired later (sight, hearing, . . .) re-

veal the particular, changeable, secondary properties (color, sound, . . .). Under unusual conditions, our senses interpret the new experiences in terms of the old ones, giving thus rise to illusions which are corrected either by adaptation of the senses or by reasoning in the light of past experiences.



II.—Frequency curve of materialism, monism, realism, mechanism, sciences . . .
I.—Frequency curve of spiritualism, dualism, idealism, vitalism, religion . . .

Truth of Opposite Theories.—It is exceedingly hard to decide by statistical methods between opposite philosophical views as to which is in the ascendancy, i. e., is the true one. To decide this point, we ought to know the number of real adherents of each theory, of both I and II, at different successive periods, in order to be able to construct the frequency curves I and II, and to infer therefrom the general tendencies of declining or of rising—the underlying assumption being that Truth gains the upper hand in the long run. But a better and easier proof of the truth of II, is the fact that, at an advanced stage, the adherents of I act mostly as if they were adherents of II; and in action—we know—true convictions betray themselves better than in professed theories. There is no such thing as a compromise between the two. The compromise is possible only in words, but not *de facto*. I do not mean to deny that a man may profess I but

act according to II, from lack of inner harmony, from timidity, owing to suggestion or hypocrisy. Thus preachers and religious people cling so tenaciously to life and its pleasures as to disprove thereby the sincerity of their belief in a hereafter. The spiritualists attribute so many material properties to the human soul that their belief becomes a purely verbal idol or a party shibboleth.

In matters of vital, general importance, in matters having a direct, immediate bearing on human well-being, truth, i. e., conceptions, generalizations, views built directly or indirectly upon a broad sensational substratum, can be tested by the general amount of agreement between men, by counting the opinions pro and con. For people who are blind to truth in such matters either perish or end in insanity. But in matters of indirect, remote, impalpable bearing on human well-being, in scientific and philosophic matters, agreement between many is no reliable test of truth: one man's opinion may be true, and the opinion of thousands may be wrong. Truth, of course, gains continuously adherents; whilst error may also gain ascendency, but it cannot maintain it for a long time. Thus the fact that scientist after scientist, and philosopher after philosopher, attribute to ether all the general properties of matter except weight, does not prove in reality that ether has no weight. For they forget that if ether seems to be imponderable, it is because we live in an ocean of ether of which we cannot get out, in which all the worlds are floating, which surrounds and penetrates all the other forms of matter. They forget that air would also seem imponderable to us if we had no means of producing a vacuum in a bottle, and hence of weighing the bottle before and after pumping out all the air. Likewise with water: the weight of water cannot be measured by means of scales

immersed in it. They forget that weight being a special case of attraction between two bodies when separated or when at a distance from each other, cannot be measured directly when the distance is zero, i. e., although the attraction is supposedly at its maximum. The tendency towards association, the power of cohesion, is measured by the required force of dissociation, of separation. If we had any means of separating the ether from other substances and from the earth, we could tell whether it has any weight or not; just as in the psychical world, individuals do not always realize how much they love each other, how much they are attached to each other, until some external circumstances threaten to separate them.

Belief, Doubt, Law of Conservation.—Originally we are inclined to believe, to rest satisfied with, to accept as real, objective, permanent, constant, absolutely and generally true, everything we experience, or are told.

Doubt, the distinction between reality and appearance, objective and subjective, absolute and relative, permanent and changeable, is imposed upon us by increased knowledge, by contradiction coming from subsequent experiences about the same objects. A new theory, a new doctrine, which shatters our belief in a former experience, in an old doctrine, does also harm to our belief in its own implications; the microscope destroys not only our belief in the homogeneity of the cell, but also our belief in homogeneity, continuity, etc., in general; just as a slanderer destroys not only our confidence in others, but also in himself. Our ultimate concepts lose their validity; but our belief in their relative validity becomes, in its turn, absolute, in a certain sense: it transcends the experience of which it is a result. We believe in persistency, constancy, as long as we do not experience change. If our belief in the persistence of things, of phenomena,

of the known, is shattered, we transfer this belief over to forces, noumena, to the unknown, substrata; and from these we transfer it over to a hypothetical primitive energy and substance, of which the actual forces and substances are supposed to be forms, manifestations.

The law of conservation of energy and matter is not so much a law of Nature as an approximation to it, a means of understanding the world, it is rather a product of our mind, of our aspirations and desires, than of our actual objective experience. It is rather a corollary of our instinct of psychical and bodily self-preservation. Only when there arises a conflict between permanence in the external world and permanence in our self, do we sacrifice the former for the benefit of the latter, do we admit miracles; or we modify our concept of self-conservation, immortality: From immortality of the statical, physical, whole, conscious, of men, . . . it becomes an immortality of the dynamical, psychical, part, unconsciousness, cosmos, . . . Or it might as well be maintained that our instinct of self-conservation is a corollary or mental aspect of the cosmical law of persistence of energy.

The maturer thinker comes to see that body and mind *qua* personal are perishable, and the only way in which our thoughts, feelings, tendencies, become immortal or permanent is by becoming common property, impersonal, detached from our individuality, decorporalized.

Truth, Beauty, Utility, Morality.—Corresponding to the three constituent elements of every state of mind, viz., cognition, affection, volition, there are three constituent qualities in the objects arousing the states of mind, viz., reality (unreality), beauty (ugliness), and utility (harmfulness). Reality refers to the essence, to the permanent, hidden qualities of objects;

and it reveals itself in our sensations, perceptions, concepts. Beauty refers to the form, outer appearance, changeable qualities of such things as tend to intensify our life rhythm or to gratify general vital needs; and it reveals itself in our affections of pleasure and pleasantness. Utility or value refers to the capacity of things of satisfying our particular needs, of filling in the gaps in our psycho-physical organism. By an extension of its meaning, beauty is attributed, not only to things that tend to gratify general vital needs, but also to things which are symbols, products, reminders, fore-runners of generally favorable and life-stimulating circumstances. Hence, beauty is also justly ascribed to moral intentions. Entirely unjustified, however, is the mystical identification of the beautiful in general with the ethical.

Not only external objects arouse states of mind, but each state of mind in its turn may become an object of thought, of memory or of imagination. In this case, the object of thought is true if it is based on a sensational substratum; it is beautiful if it fits in or agrees with a vaster system of states of mind; it is useful if it leads to a more stable equilibrium and to a richer or intenser life; it is moral if it is useful to the community, species, groups to which we belong.

Just as idea, affection, and volition are irreducible, untranslatable in terms of each other; just so reality or truth, beauty (ugliness), and utility (harmfulness) are irreducible qualities of objects. Reality, beauty, and utility may go together or cooperate; but they may also part company and work against each other. Thus a thing may be real, a concept may be true, but neither beautiful nor useful. Illusions are often beautiful and temporarily useful. Truth is not always useful; nay, it is detrimental to certain social classes; but it is never detrimental and often useful to man-

kind as a whole. The capitalistic philosopher (the pragmatist or sophist) and the church-devoted philosopher (the scholastic) are, therefore, prone to reject such truths as are not useful to the exploiting class. Of course, they conceal their materialistic, selfish and artificial criterion of truth under the more respectable cloak of social value. Truth goes always together with intellectual usefulness in the truth-lover, i. e., in the man to whom truth or knowledge has become a need, an aim of life.

Truth from the Capitalistic Point of View.—If the revelation of truth depends on the observer's mental constitution and point of view, it follows that the capitalist's conception of life, human relations, society, and of the world must differ from that of the proletarian. It follows that the class struggle, the disguised war waged between the capitalistic, parasitic, predatory class and the toiling masses on the economic-industrial-political field is only one manifestation of the fundamental psychical and often physical difference between the members composing these two varieties of men; and that this manifestation, called the class struggle proper, cannot successfully be combated and studied apart from the other manifestations of this fundamental or constitutional difference on the intellectual field (Religion, Ethics, Philosophy, Art, Literature, etc.). The productive, gregarious class can just as little afford to accept the false, narrow doctrines conceived by capitalism or its perversions of true and broad doctrines as it can afford to accept the intolerable economic conditions imposed upon it by the latter. Capitalism and socialism are two antithetic, mutually exclusive systems of philosophy, ethics, art, and methods of struggling for existence. It stands to reason that the human beast of prey, who only consumes, destroys, interferes with production,

must needs have a different conception of himself, his fellow-men, etc., from that of the productive, creative, peaceful individual; nay, the exploiter's conceptions or rather the conceptions of his spokesman, the pseudo-superior man, are the exact opposite of the producer's conceptions as expressed by his spokesman, the genuine superior man. What appears true and good from the capitalist's narrow, low, selfish, predatory, local, momentary point of view is certainly false and bad from the socialist's broad, high, humanitarian, constructive, cosmopolitan, eternal point of view. Many a genuine superior man has been prevented from rising to an understanding, let alone to an original conception of, a purely, consistently socialistic philosophy, ethics, world-conception by his dependence on capitalistic publishers, patrons, employers, by the influence of capitalistically-biased friends, hearers, readers and of a capitalistic education. And the fact that among intellectual proletarians the interest in history, economics, literature is naturally more widely spread than the more difficultly attainable and more leisure requiring interest in philosophy, psychology, ethics explains why the first-mentioned fields of knowledge have been and are being rewritten from a socialistic point of view, whereas the minority of philosophically-minded proletarians have to try in vain to quench their intellectual thirst at the inaccessible, dried-up, infested, muddy fountain of academic philosophy.

The capitalists and their retainers look upon their unfavorably situated fellow-men as living tools or stupid beasts of burden that must be driven to work either by compulsion, fear, intimidation, or by deception, flattery, jollying. Judging others by himself, by his inability and unwillingness to produce, the active parasite or exploiter feels and acts as if the Earth were not big enough for all, as if she were step-mother-

ly, as if poverty were a result of over-population and not vice versa, as if the means of existence were non-multipliable, scarce, and hence must be grabbed as quickly as possible. He is naturally an admirer of war—both in its primitive, military form and in its modern, disguised, competitive form—because he always reaps the benefits without risking his skin. Even the greatest American sociologist, Lester Ward, who is fair enough to admit the wide-spread reign of deception, greed, and parasitism, does not find anything wrong or blameworthy therein; on the contrary, he defends it and considers it just as irrepressible and just as little conscious or guilty of its immorality as a devastating stream of lava; nor can he see the horrors, the hideous and destructive rôle of war, for, as a member and retainer of the predatory class, he sees only the immediate, selfish, apparent benefits resulting therefrom for his class. The predatory individual lacks the sense and hence the understanding for universal kinship and cooperativeness, for the unifying and strengthening power of love, for the ultimate superiority of truth over falsehood, for the far-reaching and constructive potentialities of cosmopolitism. He who denies the class struggle and the class differences, when their ugliness is laid bare by socialists, is the first to spread the beliefs in "blue blood," aristocracy of birth, reward of ability, God-ordained rulers, etc.; he is the first to keep away and to accentuate his difference from the toilers. Life to him is an interesting game of mutual deception and of outwitting others. The world is a stage for the display of histrionic talent, and not a place where a mission or duties are to be fulfilled. His conception of altruism or benevolence is something to be simulated, expressed in words only; at best, it means a little moderation in, and not the giving up of, his predatory pursuits. His relations to the imaginary

deity he conceives of as business relations, i. e., as an exchange of what costs little or nothing for something of greater pecuniary value. His conception of intelligence is the ability of deceiving others, of cheaply winning their favor and support. He cannot conceive of intellectual and humanitarian pursuits as ends-in-themselves, but merely as means of acquiring fame, wealth, bodily comfort. A man who really finds happiness in disinterested, non-lucrative intellectual or humanitarian pursuits impresses him as a fool or a crank. Of religious and moral practises he conceives as of something good for him, if and so long as other people indulge therein. His conception of language is a means of concealing his own thoughts, intentions, affairs, weaknesses, and of making other people betray theirs. Virtue to him means something that it is advisable to simulate and to urge others to practise; whereas vice means something which he himself may practise secretly, and which others must be openly dissuaded from. Truth to him means views which it is advantageous for him to hold or at least to profess. His conception of social service, leadership, cooperation, the aim of human society, is to make noise, to command, to act busily and self-importantly, while leaving the real work to others. A good man in capitalistic language means a man who can be either easily fooled or easily silenced and bribed. Capitalistic art and literature are romantic, fantastic, morbid, effeminating, prostituted, sensational, shallow, playful, amusing, petty-minded, eccentric, and not realistic, penetrating, serious, instructive, uplifting. Capitalistic science is prejudiced, exclusive, formal, a mere display of wit, a pastime, idle and grandiloquent talk, or an instrument of exploitation, and not an earnest search after truth and socially useful inventions. Capitalistic ethics is double-faced, sophistical, deceptive, intended to blind

the masses to the true significance of our social organization, to the real and only justification of gregarious life, viz., the increase in every individual's security, happiness, efficiency, opportunities; it is also framed so as to hide, and idealize the ugliness of, the real, predatory, destructive, demoralizing rôle of the so-called upper classes. Capitalistic philosophy is a mere perversion, caricature of the genuine philosophy taught by the great thinkers of the world; it is lifeless, barren, verbose, nebulous, word-worshiping, estranged or removed from daily life, from the market place whither it was carried by Socrates, Jesus, and other genuine philosophers; it is destined to lull its upholders in dreams of self-conceit or of imaginary superiority over the herd of common people. Capitalistic charity, reform, government, administration of justice, are a mere farce, a mere excuse or cover for cruel sport or for shameless graft, or a cheap device for pacifying, bribing and fooling the exploited masses. Corresponding to their double dealing or moral duplicity, the capitalists and their chaplains, the pseudo-superior men, also use a double vocabulary: a laudatory, hyperbolic vocabulary to designate their own qualities and actions; euphemisms to designate their own crimes and vices; and a denigrating vocabulary to designate the qualities and actions of their victims, the disinherited. Their language is vague, nebulous, ambiguous, paraphrastic, pedantic, deceptive, evasive, distorted, perverted or diverted from its natural mission of conveying ideas. When the capitalist declaims about the blessings of liberty, *laissez-faire,* competition, private enterprise and initiative, he does not mean by these words what Herbert Spencer meant and what the individualistic anarchists mean, viz., the free and fair exchange of services between men capable and willing to make themselves useful in one respect or another:

he simply means the undisputed right of the deceitful, parasitical individuals to prey upon the producers; just as to the female parasite, to the sex-parasite, a single moral standard for both sexes does not mean that the same sexual purity should be demanded of men as they demand of women, but it means that women be granted the same right to sexual laxity and licentiousness as is tacitly granted to men.

The logic displayed by the exploiter, when his privileged position is at stake, will form an inexhaustible source of fun for future generations, and would be so for us, too, if unfortunately we did not have to pay so dearly and often with our own skins for its foolishness and fallacies. Thus it seems quite natural to the exploiter that he should be entitled to an easy, comfortable, happy life; but it is beyond his comprehension why the modern toilers, instead of looking up with envy to him and his class, do not rather draw consolation for their poverty by looking down to the paupers or by looking back to ancient times when even a king did not dream of such comforts as many a workingman enjoys nowadays. That he, the parasite, has been accustomed to luxury from early infancy appeals to his logic as sufficient justification for keeping his privileged position; but the poor men's desire and capacity for also becoming quickly accustomed to such privileges and good things does not strike him as just as valid a claim as his. He does not see anything wrong, nor does he feel the least remorse, when he idles away his time and hunts continually for enjoyment while his fellow-men are at work, ruin their health and cripple their minds in exchange for a bare existence or for the mere daily bread. It does not occur to him that he commits a crime if he shuns work while enjoying the fruits of other men's labor; but he becomes quite indignant if some poor devil also tries to enjoy what

he has not produced. If he, the idler, despises labor and the man on the fruits of whose labor he condescends to live, it is natural and there is nothing ungrateful about it; but if a starving propertyless man shows no respect for usurped property, it is an atrocious crime that calls for the severest punishment. The propertied, pot-bellied, well-fed, idle parasites, who under the shield of laws made by themselves or by hirelings prey continually and with impunity upon the entire nation, do not find it ridiculous in the least to sit in judgment on a hungry, hollow-cheeked, poor devil who in a moment of starvation has dared to steal something from a single individual; it seems to them an undisputable right of theirs to sit in judgment upon the poor, whom they rob of their lives, liberty, health, self-respect, etc., but they cannot see anything but insolence and "contempt of court" in the latter's attempt at also passing judgment upon their master's doings and decrees. The workers or the poor, says the capitalist or his prostituted spokesman, the pseudo-superior man, ought to blame themselves, i. e., their lack of ability, ambition, thrift, etc., if they do not rise to sinecures, high, better paid or supervisory positions; he does not think for a moment that even if all the workers were equally highly gifted, they could not all serve as supervisors or as his slave-drivers. The parasitical aristocrat is proud of his ancestors on the ground of their supposed superior qualities or valuable services; it does not, however, occur to him that he who lacks such qualities or is incapable of rendering such services ought to abdicate his privileged position and be ashamed of himself. He is proud if he can trace his pedigree farther back than the toilers, as if the latter's ignorance of their ancestors' names would imply that they have sprung up spontaneously from the ground or that they cannot claim the same Adam and Eve or

the same kind of anthropoid apes as their ancestors. The American parasite or parasitically inclined imbecile finds reason for feeling superior to the immigrants in the mere fact that he has been born on American soil, as if the atmosphere and soil of this country had anything to do with his mental make-up and had a different chemical composition from that of other countries; it never occurs to him to push his deep process of ratiocination a little farther and to see in the Indian his superior, the typical American aristocrat, for the Indian has had the privilege of inhaling more of this ennobling, soul-transmuting American air than he did. It seems beyond dispute to him that men who cannot speak his language are his inferiors and uncivilized; that his ignorance of their language and customs could just as well be imputed to him as a mark of inferiority, does not disturb him in the least in the cocksureness of his logic. If the exploiter preys upon the poor on the strength of laws and agreements, in which the poor had neither a voice nor any choice, his conscience feels at ease; but he would indignantly jump up in the air if it were pointed out to him that he is even worse than a highway robber who says plainly to his victims, "give me either your life or your purse," and that his way of acting is exactly similar to that of a hypothetical highway robber who, before robbing his victims, would first satisfy his legal conscience by politely requesting them at the point of his pistol to sign a written agreement to their being relieved by him of all their burdensome valuables. It seems axiomatic to the parasite that he is entitled to get out as much remuneration as possible for as little services as possible and even for mere hot air or sham services, and that he is fully justified to squeeze out of his employees the last drop of energy, as long as they themselves have agreed to it; whether the agreement has practically been extorted at the

point of a pistol, I mean, under the compulsion of dire necessity, imminent starvation, the threat of being sent to the workhouse, etc., he assumes to be no concern of his. To the intellectual prostitute (the college professor, preacher, rabbi, journalist, pot-boiler, official scientist, etc.) it seems quite natural that he should be well paid for his platitudinous, thrashed-out, rehashed, or stolen and adulterated lectures, sermons, stories, articles, etc.; but he contemptuously and mercilessly laughs out of court the pretension of some poor genius who also wants to live on his wits and takes it into his head that, if plagiarisms and empty imitations are so richly rewarded, his original poems, heart-felt stories, altruistic social schemes, fertile ideas, also deserve some public reward. If here and there a few moral geniuses arise who take to heart the sufferings, degradation and demoralization of the downtrodden masses and try to arouse the latter against their exploiters, our prostituted academical psychologists and psychiatrists come quick to the rescue of their employers and with their insolent cocksureness declare these moral geniuses as abnormal, morbid, eccentric, mal-adjusted individuals on the ground of their differing from the majority, on the ground of their being in a minority, careless of material success or of social disapproval, etc.; they neglect, however, to apply the same logic to themselves and their masters who, being also in a minority, nay, more, in a minority that acts against the interests of the majority, have a better claim to the title of abnormal, pathological individuals. The exploiter does not doubt for an instant that he is a useful member of the human society and that without his orders the toilers would not know how to perform the world's work, although he is unable to show us the standard or unit of measure by means of which his usefulness could be estimated quantitatively or at least

qualitatively; but as soon as the socialist stands up and advocates that the price of commodities and the remuneration of services should be determined principally and above all by the amount of useful labor spent or by the amount of social labor saved, he immediately cries out against the impracticability, injustice, arbitrariness and conventionality of such a standard that fails to completely take into consideration individual differences, the inconvertibility of quality into quantity, or of one kind of labor into another kind. That the labor standard of value with all its drawbacks and difficulties still towers high above the arbitrary, fluctuating, life-poisoning, commercial standard, is beyond his narrow, self-centered field of vision. That men who have not done a stroke of real, useful work during their lifetime have the right to bequeath to their heirs their usurped property, or rather their titles to the fruits of the poor men's labor, does not strike the parasite's intellect as absurd, nor does it impress his heart and conscience as an atrocious crime; but that men who have toiled and suffered all their lifetime should leave their children unprovided for and a helpless prey in the hands of beasts of prey such as he, seems to him compatible with both logic and ethics. To him the only reprehensible form of theft is to appropriate something without the verbal consent of its owner; but from his low, selfish standpoint, the capitalist cannot see that it is an incomparably more dangerous theft to monopolize common property (land, water power, forests, mines, public offices, . . .) with the consent of a few bribed officials who have no right to give away what is not theirs, or to enslave one's disinherited fellowmen with their consent which they must give anyhow unless they prefer to starve or to be sent to the workhouse as vagrants. The problem of unemployment does not give much trouble to the capital-

ist logician. He solves it quite promptly: the cause of unemployment he finds in the unfitness of the unemployed, and the remedy, of course, lies in technical training, vocational education, extirpation of the unteachable, etc. That under our régime of usurpation or private monopoly the number of applicants must and does always exceed by far the number of positions, and that this would be the case even if all applicants were equally fit, does not occur to the capitalist's defender; still less does it occur to him that to speak of general unfitness in our age of extreme specialization, simplification or division of labor and machine production, is pure nonsense.

Quantity and Quality.—Quantity and quality are correlated terms, i. e., they are inseparable from each other, and neither can be expressed in terms of, nor reduced to, the other. But just as the fact that the terms father and son are correlatives does not mean that a father is not in his turn the son of somebody else, and that a son cannot become in his turn a father; just so the fact that quantity and quality are correlated does not mean that what is quantity in one sense, or in relation to certain objects can never be at the same time a quality when looked at under a different angle, or in relation to other objects.

Thus matter and energy (motion) form an inseparable couple of quantity and quality. But matter may present itself in so many various combinations which from certain points of view differ so much among themselves as to be considered as different in kind, or as qualitatively different substances. Motion (force) is in its turn both a quantity (magnitude, velocity, acceleration) and a quality (direction). Various motions may enter into such combinations as to give rise to qualitatively different energies. Time and space form another inseparable couple of quality and quan-

tity. But just as time admits of quantitative subdivisions, so does perhaps space draw its origin from qualitative syntheses. Differences between varieties of the same species appear to be qualitative or differences of kind from a lower, emotional, practical, narrow point of view; but from a higher, intellectual, theoretical, broader point of view, i. e., when the varieties of one species are simultaneously compared with the varieties of other species, the self-same varietal differences will appear quantitative, whereas the difference between species will appear qualitative. From a narrow point of view the pursuits of superior men seem altogether different from those of philistines; but from a higher, more eternal or philosophical point of view the pursuits of superior men differ from those of philistines only in quantity, in the remoteness of the goals aimed at. In its advanced human, complex stage, mind seems to be an energy *sui generis* which has nothing in common with the other mechanical energies and which defies the laws followed by the latter (law of conservation, law of equivalent transformation); but future investigations may succeed in tracing all the energies back to their common point from which they begin to diverge. Maybe Jacques Loeb's study of tropisms will prove to be the path towards the discovery of the origin of mind.

Does the Actor Create?—The genius of the actor —if it deserves that name—consists in the ability of auto-hypnotization, in his ability to evoke the consciousness of a certain personality, to identify himself with it, and to act accordingly. This imaginative ability, of course, presupposes, as Nordau says, an undeveloped, unstable, fleeting or multiple personality of the actor himself, i. e., a mind with a shiftable center of gravity or a shiftable nucleus of dominant interests.

Owing to the persistence of the infantile imitative

instinct; owing to the constant observation of his own and others' outbursts of emotions, the actor gains voluntary control over his emotional expressions, over his gesticulations. And this control over his physiognomy is often enhanced by auto-suggestibility, i. e., by the hysterical ability to conjure up various successions and combinations of emotions, by the ability to identify himself with any dramatic or living character.

The actor must be classed with the lowest class of artists, i. e., with the purely emotional, reproductive, formal, juvenile type. He expresses in his own face, attitude, bodily movements, voice, . . . the same emotional states of mind, the same human passions, as the painter and the sculptor express through external material means; just as the dancer expresses and arouses through his own rhythmical bodily movements the same emotions and vague, indefinite states of mind as Music tries to express and arouse through external means (air vibrations).

The actors of the future will no longer be recruited from hysterical and epileptoidal persons whose multiple or rather unsettled personality enables them to impersonate a number of characters. The actors of the future will be normal individuals; for—owing to economic independence—they will have merely to impersonate a dramatic hero or personage of their own type; they will have to represent themselves on the stage, or rather idealized or caricatured forms of their own personalities. Acting will be a vocation, and not a profession. Our modern theaters, being commercial enterprises, cannot afford to engage normal, sane-minded, self-respecting actors who can play but one character, and who are not willing to lead an irregular, nomadic, lax life.

All the pseudo-superior men (professional moralists, preachers, orators, politicians, leaders, rulers, organiz-

ers, . . .) must be put in the same class with actors or imitative geniuses, as we might call them. The main difference between the actors of the stage or actors in the restricted sense of the word and the actors of the pulpit or of the platform, is the fact that the latter make their task easy by playing, as a rule, one single rôle, hence they can afford to be mentally more balanced. Another difference is the honesty of the stage actor, whereas the pseudo-superior man is a dishonest actor, i. e., an actor who wants to be mistaken for the hero whom he impersonates. If he is a priest or a rabbi —particularly a reformed rabbi—or a professional ethical culturist, he poses as a moral genius; if he is a politician, leader, or ruler, he poses as a patriot or even as a social reformer; if he is a professor, journalist, orator, he poses as an original thinker; if he is the head of a hospital, charitable institution, etc., he poses as an altruist. And so on. The relationship between actors and pseudo-superior men is so close that it is not an uncommon occurrence in a country like the United States, which is comparatively free from the fetters of tradition, to see actors, politicians and journalists becoming preachers or priests, and vice versa.

Authorship.—The thinker, the genius, becomes an author, a writer, when his amorphous, scattered, fragmentary thoughts find a central idea, around which they group themselves, like the crystals around the center and axis of crystallization. In the merely erudite author, the central ideas alone are original, the rest is work of compilation; but more often it is only the method of exposition that he can call his. The erudite author proceeds systematically, methodically; he can appreciate the far-reaching bearings of original truths, but lacks the power of attaining them. The author of genius, on the contrary, reaches easily original conclusions without his being fully aware of the how, why,

to what purpose.

In the poet, an emotional commotion (inspiration) brings into contact ideas and sentiments converging towards the same emotional effect: the dominant emotion attracts, selects such ideas or such of their aspects only as can be brought to a common focus. The originality of the poet does not lie in his ideas, it lies rather in their arrangement, in the language expressing them. Hence, the absurdity of changing poems into non-poetical prose.

There are two types of aphoristical writers. Some write in aphorisms because they are unable to think out a whole problem under its various aspects, or because they are not learned enough to fill in the gaps between their original glimpses of truth with others' opinions about those parts which remain hidden to their own observation or introspection. They usually overestimate the import of their scattered aphorisms, because the whole context is lacking within which every aphorism ought to get due proportion. Others write in aphorisms because they do not like much talking about and around a question, because they do not like to repeat over again what others have already said, because they do not like to present an original germ and gem of truth in a vast setting of erudition, because they do not believe that truth is not sufficiently beautiful and imposing if not adorned in linguistical and scholastical gowns with long trains. If their own aphorisms prove in the long run to be but the *disjecta membra* of an intellectual edifice on the way of being organically, unconsciously built up, well and good: they are glad then to be able to present mankind with an harmonious whole, and not with mere intellectual bricks or amorphous material to be made use of by more powerful geniuses, by more broad-minded spiritual architects.

Original knowledge being mainly drawn from per-

sonal observations and experiences, from the School of Life, under the catalytic or merely stimulating influence of knowledge acquired directly or indirectly from the works of other original men; we understand why the writings of a genius are hardly interspersed with quotations; whereas the writings of talented men which consist mostly of common-place truths plus new restatements with but few modifications of or improvements on old knowledge, are so much interspersed with, and often consist only of quotations from original writers, whose names are not always mentioned, especially if they do not happen to be of universal fame, or not in a position or mood to vindicate their intellectual property. If original works contain comparatively scarce quotations for the reason that creation goes together with a minimum of imitation, it does not follow that the converse is also true. Scarcity or lack of quotations does not necessarily point to originality; it may result from unconscious or unavowed imitation, or from purely verbal originality, or because of anonymous, common-place truth.

The clear-headed thinker does not feel any impulse to writing until he has come to clear, definite conclusions; nor does he feel the need of burdening his readers with the wanderings and errings of his mind, or with the many personal, trivial, accidental, irrelevant thoughts and feelings from which the few valuable conclusions had to be extricated. Whereas the nebulous, inconsistent, mystical thinker begins to write and to teach before having reached any agreement with himself, nay, he begins to write and to teach in the hope that some truth will reveal itself to him while doing so; he communicates to his readers and hearers everything that passes through his mind, in order that they shall find out for themselves what is valuable, true, or to their liking, and discard—if they choose—the trivial,

the erroneous, the disagreeable.

The less original the central idea is and the less clear it is to the author himself, the more does he like to indulge in preliminary, methodical, formal remarks; the more does he talk around and about the matter, without getting to the point, to the kernel of the matter, or *in medias res*. The less valuable an author's opinions are in themselves, the more careful is he to postpone their presentation to the expectant reader, the more careful is he to present them in good company, i. e., in the midst of time-honored and authoritative opinions, in the hope that the indisputable reverence for the latter will reflect part of its aureola upon his own meager ideas. Whereas the original individual speaks to the point and goes straight to the mark without any—at least, without many—introductory remarks, without obscuring the main idea by wrapping it up in flourished, paradoxical, complicated, attention-distracting, linguistical garments, or by presenting it in a setting of imposing, mystifying, hypnotizing erudition. At the risk of being stigmatized as dogmatical, the original writer hastens to present his general conclusions, and support them—if feasible and necessary—by means of only a few, but typical, well-established, personally observed, easily accessible facts.

The disinterestedly truth-loving writer does not overcautiously or self-importantly beat around the bush, but goes straight to the mark. He does not selfishly sell or keep to himself the wisdom that he could not have acquired without the help of the common intellectual property bequeathed by the thinkers of past generations. Unlike the pseudo-superior man, he does not keep his readers in painful suspense or work up their curiosity to a high pitch before imparting to them the new truths that he has in store for them. Nor does he expatiate on his new views in order to impress his

readers or hearers with profundity, originality, wisdom. He does not select his words according to their pleasing sounds, nor does he care much about the order of exposition.

The selfishness, self-glorification, idleness, indulgence in dreams, formalism, appearance-hunting, shallowness, conventionalism, word-idolatry, deceptiveness of the parasitical, dominant class reflect themselves in the literature, philosophy and certain sciences (economics, sociology, theology, history, . . .) of their hired artists, academicians, historians, priests, moralists. . . . Unlike the honest thinker, the capital-owned, mercenary, deceptive thinker tries hard not to be understood, not to convey any ideas, not to talk the plain, unambiguous language of the people, but merely to frighten his readers or hearers into adoring him and distrusting, or despairing of, their own judgment and mental capacities.

The pseudo, unfair, or intellectually dishonest critic ignores, passes lightly over, or diverts the public attention from, the strong, convincing points, good sides, original portion, practicable consequences, real merits of the content of the refuted doctrine; and insists exclusively or unduly on the weak points, bad sides, non-original portion, apparent, irrelevant and purely speculative difficulties, formal or linguistic defects. His praise is insincere, confined to trivial or unimportant details, meant to inspire confidence in his destructive criticisms. He condemns social, ethical, religious movements in the name of general usefulness, humanity, civilization, patriotism, liberty, etc., when in reality he thinks of the welfare, liberty of preying of his class, party, caste, clique. He condemns theories and artistic works in the name of truth, objectivity, logic, etc., when in reality he does so with a view to personal aggrandizement, out of personal dislike for same or for

their authors.

The honest, genuinely original thinker clearly defines his words and unambiguously sets off his own opinions from those refuted by him, not because he does not know that words have no fixed, unchangeable meaning and that there are no sharp boundary lines between what is one's own and what belongs to others, but because he is sincerely concerned with truth and right, and hence prepared to defend or abandon his ground according to the impartial verdict of human Reason: he is willing to take not only the credit but also the responsibility and blame for his claims. Whereas the dishonest, sophistical, fame-seeking, self-advertising writer abstains from definitions—from clear definitions, at least—and from clearly circumscribing his own contentions, in order to be able to encroach upon the domain of others while jealously keeping watch over what he claims to be his own, in order to be able to claim as his what really belongs to others or has become common property, in order to appear original and reap credit without exposing himself to blame, detection, or the burden of responsibility. Thus—to take a single example of such an intellectually dishonest method of undeservedly reaping credit—Bergson, one of the fashionable sophists and phrase-mongers, in his defense of free will raises the sophistical claim that "free will" is indefinable, in order to be able to appropriate for his own use any facts that by right could be claimed by determinists; he also obliterates, whenever convenient, the distinction or boundary line between time and space, in order to be able to move undetectedly back and forth and to find refuge in one of these conceptual domains whenever his position becomes insecure, i. e., whenever his weaknesses or tricks become too apparent, in the other conceptual domain.

CHAPTER V

AFFECTIVE LIFE

Solitude.—Although endowed with so much vital energy, the superior man suffers—and this suffering leaves deep traces behind—when he has to break away from the beaten paths, when he has to abandon the dear old illusions of the average man, and, after throwing them overboard, to start on a new lonely road, to venture upon untrodden ground. But in another sense, the superior man is never quite lonely, for he carries a vast world of thoughts and of sentiments within himself; he lodges the times gone by and those yet to come in the sphere of his imagination, he communes with the best of mankind through the intermediary of the thoughts they have bequeathed to us. Whereas the common mortals are afraid of solitude, of the company of their internal world which is but a vast desert; hence their rush into outside amusements and distractions.

What makes the superior man so solitary in this world is the fact that those who love him do not understand him, and those who do understand him are strangers to him. His loneliness is a two-fold one: he is isolated from the common mortals who are living in regions much below him; he is isolated from the other superior men, who, although living on the same plane or in the same sphere, very seldom follow the same paths.

If thinking were the rule, the end, and not the exception, a mere means for the vast majority, the thinkers would not have to lead a solitary life, they would

not be *rari nantes in gurgite vasto*. Thoughtless activity (playing ball, cards, etc.), unbridled imagination (poetry, wit), are more sociable qualities than logical thinking. To become sociable, the thinker must imitate and thoughtlessly approve what others do or say; he must, more or less, deny his nobler self. The novelist and the psychologist, who get the impulses for their creations from society, are more sociable than those thinkers who get their creative impulses from the inanimate world; and they are more so during the period of conception and the final period or that of communication than during the period of incubation and creative activity which requires a solitary, undisturbed life.

The novelist who is interested in particular human events, is more sociable than the psychologist who is rather concerned with the laws of human thinking, feeling and conduct. The ethical psychologist, the moral critic, who is anxious to discover the true hidden motives of human action and the psychical roots of the social evils, must keep at a greater distance from his fellow-men than the non-ethical psychologist; for too intimate relations and too great community of interests with one's fellow-men are obstacles to a clear vision in moral matters and their general trend. The unfortunate whom nature has endowed with both intellectual and moral genius, feels solitary and uneasy both in the midst of the intelligent few and in the midst of the philistine masses: he likes the latter for their frankness, directness, unspoiled kernel of morality and altruism, but their stupidity and ignorance exasperate him; he likes the educated for their understanding of higher aims of life, but his warm, broad, sincerely loving heart freezes in their selfish and hypocritical atmosphere.

The moral genius is particularly anxious to keep aloof from the character-destroying and ideal-stifling

organizations, parties, cliques, whose only aim is to hunt for power, authority, privileges. He prefers to watch their doings from a safe distance, to infer their plans or intentions from occasional glimpses, and to compel them to fulfil their promises by fearlessly denouncing their trickeries or evasions and by teaching the people—either directly as an agitator or indirectly through his writings and readers—how to keep control over their supposed representatives and how to insist upon tangible results.

But most unbearable to the intellectual-moral genius is the company of the aristocratic and would-be aristocratic philistines who are both egotistic, self-adoring, self-conceited, stone-hearted, greedy, envious, full of venom, snobbish and stupid, dull, empty-minded, uninteresting, slaves to formalities and conventions.

His soul-penetrating knowledge of men, his ability to read indifference or even hatred behind words of friendship, to read what is left unexpressed behind what is expressed, to discriminate mere friendliness and politeness from friendship, make the superior man—much to his regret—less expansive, less effusive, less enthusiastic, less society-seeking, which, however, differs *toto orbe* from the wilful stiffness, self-conceit, assumed air of importance, and selfish reserve of the merely financial or sham aristocrats and of the pseudo-superior man.

The superior man is often unjustly accused of misanthropy, because he does not associate with philistines. We might as well call the great mass of average men misanthropists, because they do not feel at ease in the company of thinking men.

The idealist passes lonely through life, making no or very few real friends; for he expects just as deep, pure and sincere love as he gives; he prefers to lose in quantity in order to gain in quality.

If thinking and love of truth were the rule, and not mere exceptions, the genius would not be solitary, he would feel more at ease among his fellow-men. The pseudo-superior man is only apparently sociable. Except for exploitation or demagogical purposes, he keeps at a distance from, and looks down with scorn and antipathy upon, the masses. And even when approaching them, he does it with a condescending, simulated kindness, and not without continually and diplomatically reminding them of the favor he confers upon them, of his superiority, of the persisting psychical distance in spite of a momentary reduction in the physical or geographical distance. He selfishly enjoys his little intellectual superiority over the ignorant masses, and he tries, therefore, to maintain them as long as possible on their low plane of intellectual stagnation. Horace speaks in the name of pseudo-superior men when he sings "*Odi* profanum vulgus *et* arceo." Had he been the spokesman of genuine superior men, he would have changed his verse to "*Amo* profanum vulgus *sed* arceo." If the genuine superior man keeps at a distance from the masses of the philistines, it is not from antipathy, misanthropy, or because he enjoys being different from and superior to them. On the contrary, it pains him that the masses are under the spell of pseudo-superior men, it pains him that they have not yet reached such a level as to be able to understand him and to follow his upward path leading plainly and straight to happier and sunnier regions, instead of allowing themselves to be guided by profit- or fame-seeking pseudo-superior men who prefer tortuous, sinuous, dark, mysterious, wearisome paths in order to prolong and increase their own importance, and in order to make their leadership indispensable and lucrative. Likewise: If the intellectual genius does not feel at ease in, and hence keeps away from, the company of women, it is

not because of misogyny or morbid antipathy against the female sex; on the contrary, it pains him that so few women are as yet fit for and worthy of intellectual intercourse. It is merely because he cannot breathe in their philistine, materialistic, prosaic, *terre-à-terre* atmosphere. If exceptionally an intellectual genius like Goethe seems to take special delight in female society, it is due either to sensuality, or to vanity, or to both, and not to any higher motives as he would have others and himself believe. Far from being a woman-hater, it pains the man of genius that the female sex has not succeeded so far in producing more than single and widely scattered specimens of an Aspasia, Cornelia, Mary Wollstonecraft, Rahel Varnhagen, George Eliot, Olive Schreiner, Ellen Key, Ida M. Tarbell, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Clara Zetkin, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Emma Goldman, Mother Jones, etc.

Communicativeness, effusiveness, talkativeness that does not restrict itself to definite, conventional subjects, is certainly a sign of sincerity and of genuine sociability. The proletarian philistine displays this kind of communicativeness. If the genuine superior man, who is certainly honest and desirous to impart knowledge to others, does not often show communicativeness, it is not because—like the hypocritical, misanthropic pseudo-superior man and aristocratic philistine—he lacks the need for disinterested sociability, or has little to say, or desires to hide his ignorance and real individuality, or speaks only for the sake of displaying superiority and when something can be gotten out of the persons spoken to, or refrains from communicativeness when he is afraid of encouraging thereby familiarity and inquisitiveness; it is merely because he pursues serious aims in life and therefore hates to talk platitudes, nonsense, about conventional topics merely for the sake of companionship or for the sake of killing

time; it is because he likes to seriously discuss things worth while, but sees that his words will be wasted, i. e., they will not meet with any real response or understanding; it is also because—unlike the philistine whose only audience is formed by his neighbors and chance acquaintances—he also has access to the channel of written works and hence consoles himself over the unappreciativeness of his acquaintances with the hope of reaching through his works appreciative readers sparsely scattered over the entire globe and among the future generations.

Pain, Pleasure, Emotions.—That the superior men are more sensitive to moral pain than the average man, does not embitter their life; for they are also more sensitive to moral, esthetic, and intellectual pleasures. In addition to this, their affective resources being very rich, they can easily find consolation and compensation for any loss. If they had no other pleasures besides those of creation, they would be compensated more than enough for any abnegations. The intellectual joys of creation have, of course, their concomitant physical pains which, however, do not leave any traces in a balanced superior man; just as the pains of childbirth do not kill a bodily normal woman, and are more than compensated for by the ensuing and enduring intellectual joys of maternity.

Wisdom does not consist in killing our emotions; it consists in keeping them under the control of reason. The emotions, affections, of the superior man are intellectualized: they are not so violent, not so explosive as in the average man, but they are more enduring, more constant, more conscious of their origin and aim. He is not irritable, not impulsive, but he is sensible, deliberating. His opinions are not enthusiastic, intolerant; but they are constant, tolerant. What he loses in impetuosity or intensity, he gains in duration; his emo-

tive energy, instead of overflowing with violence, is distributed and directed into useful channels; instead of being expended at one moment and over one opportunity, it is distributed over all his life and all his experiences. He avoids extreme exalting emotions in which the soul is unable to preserve its equilibrium, in spite of having the entire mental energy concentrated on a unique aim; in which the human soul is exposed, at the least shock, to tilt over into the other extreme. He avoids both extremes of emotions, the depressive as well as the exalting, which are equally intoxicating, equally destructive of mental and bodily equilibrium or health.

The main stream of his esthetical joys and pleasures shifts its bed: from the philistine field of sensation and perception over to the field of concepts and ideas, from the concrete to the abstract, from the known to the unknown. That some geniuses have no esthetic taste may mean only that their esthetic sentiments are wholly transferred into the region of broad concepts, abstract truth. The child, the savage, enjoy sensations of sound, color, etc.; the youth, the common mortal and the sentimental men, enjoy perceptions: paintings, statues, etc.; the thinker enjoys the beauty of a theorem, of a scientific law, of a social scheme, of a philosophic generalization. A higher esthetic pleasure does not necessarily wholly exclude a lower one.

The genuine intellectual man has a disinterested, direct, self-sacrificing love for knowledge, i. e., he loves Truth for its own sake, as an aim-in-itself. The pseudo-intellectual man has an interested, indirect love for knowledge, i. e., he loves knowledge because and in so far as his material interests and his vanity are gratified thereby; but he is willing to sacrifice or adulterate it in case of conflict. The intellectual philistine is frankly indifferent, or even hostile to abstract, impersonal knowledge. At best, intellectual pursuits are

a mere play or aimless activity for the pseudo-superior man and for the philistine.

Likewise in the realm of morality: the genuine altruist loves disinterestedly, often self-forgettingly, his fellow-men and other living beings. The pseudo-altruist loves other men interestedly, i. e., he loves them really or apparently because, and in so far as, it is in his own interest to do so. The moral philistine is frankly indifferent to the weal or woe of others. To love disinterestedly men, or truth, does not necessarily mean to love them more than one's self—although this kind of altruism or of truth-loving occurs. It merely means to love them for their own sake, as ends-in-themselves, and not as means either actual or prospective.

The balanced intellectual genius is often mistaken for an egoist, for more selfish and less altruistic than he really is; because more altruism is expected of him than of other mortals; because he has not much regard for the little material comforts of others, nor for his own, especially when preoccupied by intellectual pursuits; because his altruism or love for others is rather passive than active, rather general than individual, i. e., he loves men but does not mingle much with them, he does not confine his love to a few related or known individuals, but he rather distributes it over a larger group extending in both time and space; because his love and enthusiasm are shared by too many pursuits; because he shows or expresses less love than he feels; he has neither time nor patience to express his affections in trivial matters, in conventional ways, on conventional occasions.

A dog that barks is certainly less to be feared, less dangerous, than the one who bites from behind without betraying himself by barking. The same with men: The common man or the proletarian philistine who easily gets irritated and immediately gives vent to his

fury, is socially more useful than the pseudo-superior man who does not explosively or visibly get irritated, but never fails to take revenge sooner or later, to bite from behind when unnoticed and undetectable. The most useful are the genuine superior men who neither get irritated against nor meditate revenge on their malefactors, but merely confine themselves to openly despising and shunning the latter.

The same motive that impels the dog, before and after he has succeeded in stealing a bone, to hide himself or to assume a threatening, bullying attitude, viz., his guilty conscience or rather the fear lest his plans be thwarted while he is lying in wait for the opportune moment, and the fear lest the stolen bone be snatched away from him, also underlies and explains the predatory philistine's narrow gamut of base emotions and his queer behavior: it is to be found at the bottom of his unsociableness, unapproachableness, reticence, secretiveness, over-cautiousness in selecting his partners, horror of intimacy, suspicious attitude towards strangers and towards the harmless proletarian philistines, proneness to see nothing but envy in socialism, fondness for veiled blackmailing, readiness to bluff, distrustful disposition, incapacity for friendship or love, assumption of an air of superiority, aversion to fearless and critically-minded individuals, morbid sensitiveness to and vindictive resentment of criticism, eagerness to disguise his parasitical pursuits under the cloak of social service, etc.

The volitional courage of the ignorant and of the insane flows from over-estimation of their own power and from under-estimation, or even ignorance of the external resistances. This courage is, therefore, quickly followed by deep discouragement. The volitional courage of the vain or pseudo man-of-action consists in unscrupulously and dishonestly imposing his

will upon others, in order to make others and himself believe in its strength. The volitional courage of the ideal man of action prefers self-imposed rather than compulsory obedience. The ideal man of action draws his energy from the conviction that the direction of his will leads to socially useful results. He knows his volitional strength, his steadiness of purpose, too well to be in need of breaking and subduing others' wills, in order to feel the strength of his own. He is also fully aware of the magnitude of the external, both physical and social, resistances to become over-enthusiastic and to triumph anticipatingly over his success. The same remarks apply to the intellectual courage or assertiveness of the naïve, of the pseudo-thinker, of the genuine thinker; to the emotional courage of the naïve, of the self-conceited, of the genuine poet. The naïve individual dares to express his opinions or feelings because and so long as he does not know those of others, or assumes that others have the same. The self-conceited man imposes by all means his convictions or feelings upon others, not because and in virtue of his convictions or feelings, but because of strong self-adoration, self-worship or vanity, whereas the intellectual courage of the thinker flows from the strength or irrepressible objective truth of his convictions; and the emotional courage of the poet flows from the strength or general, impersonal, eternal worth of his emotions. The courage of the naïve does not know, and hence does not avoid obstacles. If, by a happy chance, the naïve man does not come across any obstacles, contradictions, visible disapproval, his courage persists. The courage of the pseudo-superior man is kept up by ignoring, going round, jumping over, the obstacles; by intimidating, removing, or bribing opponents. The courage of the genuine superior man consists in facing and trying to overcome fairly and once for all the resistances met

with in the form of selfishness, indifference, inertia, wounded vanity, ignorance, superstitions that cannot be shaken off on account of their being interwoven with dear human sentiments.

Wisdom and Aspirations.—The true superior man is ever the same amidst changes and vicissitudes; he does not become dizzy upon the summits of Glory and Fame. Only the artistically superior man has a fickle, capricious and irritable temperament, i. e., his lower or reflex centers are dissociated from, or not strongly associated with, his higher or sensory centers; his motor reactions, his reactions dictated by emotions and desires, predominate over his sensory, cognitive reactions, over his reactions dictated by knowledge and reflection. This dissociation is either structural, permanent, pathological, or merely dynamical, transitory, due to the fact that the mind being absorbed, the higher brain organs being centrally set into activity, oppose resistance to peripherally incoming nervous currents which are thus compelled to discharge themselves at a lower, reflex and emotional level; or the higher centers may be too exhausted to be able to influence the lower ones.

Human happiness is still in many respects in conflict with the natural course of things: we wish for constancy, continuity, duration, persistence, essence . . . where nature offers inconstancy, caducity, rhythm, periodicity, form. . . . But the vicissitudes of life grieve little souls only; the superior man is freed of vanity's yoke by the contemplation of the frequent changes in human destinies.

Wisdom is ambition in its maturer stage. The ambitious man desires not so much to be, to become superior, as to be honored, to have the appearance of superiority. The superior or wise man strives to be, to become perfect, and finds satisfaction in the forum of his own consciousness. The desire to please is for him

no direct incentive to action; for the judges of his merits are not the blind ephemeral philistines, but the impartial soul-penetrating thinkers of all times and places.

With developing intelligence, the objects of our aspirations change: A higher stage of development aspires to things of a more enduring value, of a value less subject to vicissitudes. Apathy makes room for vanity, vanity for ambition, ambition for wisdom; empty-mindedness makes room for curiosity, curiosity for thirst for knowledge; respect for form makes room for respect for content or essence; sentimentalism makes room for cogitation; stupid or cowardly abstinence from passing judgment on one's fellow-men makes room for gossiping, newsmongering, malicious, petty or purely aimless criticism of particular individuals, which in its turn makes room for social criticism, ethology, a disinterested study of the various types of men and of their influence upon the welfare and progress of the human species.

Morality, Success.—Average morality, average goodness, is a product of circumstances; superior morality is a factor, a cause of change in circumstances, a cause of the creation of new social circumstances. The man of superior morality is moral in spite of adverse circumstances; the man of average morality or the moral philistine is moral if the circumstances allow and require it. Unlike jurisprudence and school ethics which concern themselves merely with acts of direct and immediate moral consequences, the ideal ethics includes also in its sphere the thoughts, feelings, intentions, tendencies leading thereto, and also the remote, indirect consequences flowing therefrom, in so far as the agent is conscious of them.

Moral philistinism, which finds its expression in jurisprudence, shortsightedly concerns itself with—and

hence judges human actions from the standpoint of—narrow, immediate, local, personal and class interests, professed intentions, more striking though less important effects; it wastes its wit and time on the prosecution of individual culprits for some of their crimes; it cannot devise any better means for maintaining the existing social order than laws, courts, the police, the army, etc., which—even if we make abstraction of their corruptibility—can only grapple with crimes after they have been committed, with the few visible and less important effects of men's detached actions, and have no other guidance but that of pervertible precedents, empty traditions, arbitrary decisions of a few unscrupulous self-constituted authorities.

Whereas moral genius, which finds its expression in socialistic ethics, is rather concerned with—and hence judges human activities from the standpoint of—vital, general interests, social welfare or general happiness, and in this valuation is guided solely by logic, reason, common sense; it cannot rest contented with mere jurisprudence, penology, patch-reform; it goes to the bottom of things, it studies the ultimate causes of—and hence the means of preventing—crimes and misery; it concerns itself with types of men and not with single individuals, with lifelong pursuits and not with detached, momentary actions; it points out the social and the anti-social or parasitical types of men, the effects of various life-activities or professions upon human society; it demands therefore radical changes in our economic, political and other institutions, the control of men's entire life-activity and not of some striking disconnected actions; it insists, not upon the reformation and extermination of criminals, but upon the abolition of our *laissez-faire*, predatory system, which creates them or favors their multiplication; it does not believe in the preservation of order by setting

up a group of corruptible men to protect the vast masses of men against each other, but it believes that order, fair dealing, is best insured by intrusting each and all therewith, by implanting good will in each man's heart and self-control in each man's brain. To the moral genius our entire intricated, unwieldy, and outwardly imposing legal machinery is nothing but a pitiable makeshift, and its working is doomed to remain a farce at bottom, as long as it leaves untouched the predatory economic basis of our social organization, that is, as long as no stop is put to the parasitical, profit-seeking, privilege-hunting spirit, as long as production is carried on primarily for sale or profit instead of being carried on primarily for general use and only secondarily for international exchange, and as long as the most fundamental human right, viz., the right to employment, is not secured for every able-bodied adult. When, however, legislation will decide to put into practise these preachings of the moral genius, it will be ripe to disentangle itself from all the dangerous weeds by which it is overrun at present to such an alarming extent: From its present-day bewildering confusion and inextricably growing pseudo-complexity, our legal apparatus will return to its original normal state of a few plain, common-sense rules, which will be immune against the distortions or perversions of professional jurists or legal sophists, and whose interpretation will not leave any room for the verbiage and hair-splitting ingenuity of college professors.

Superior morality is not the exclusive property or appanage of intellectually superior men. It is found near the two extremities of the human scale: in simple-minded working people, and in the great talents; it is rare at the extremities, in the weak-minded and in the one-sided geniuses; it is still rarer in the middle of the intellectual scale, in the "smart" and talented people.

Just as water flows from a higher to a lower level, so does wealth flow from the higher moral level of the working class and of the superior men to the all-absorbing lower moral level of the "smart set" and talented men: In the animal kingdom the strong survive, whereas within the human species it is the self-seeking, the hypocrites, the cunning and their protégés who survive and succeed; only in an ideal, solidary society we shall have selection of the morally superior men.

What the moral genius regards as a duty, is for actual mankind a sacrifice, a meritorious act; what to him is a crime, does not yet fall under the jurisdiction of actual ethics.

The average moral man calls himself good if he does his duty, if he lets the world run its usual course, if he does not participate directly, actively, in the increase of human "misery"; whereas the moral genius calls a crime our indirect, unintentional contribution to the world's iniquities, nay, he calls a crime our passivity, our attitude of indifferent spectators with respect to the bloody dramas played upon the world's stage; he calls a crime our enjoying life's pleasures while being conscious of the innumerable heartrending tragedies that fill the daily embittered lives of our fellow-men, fellow-citizens, colaborers in the making of our happiness; he calls immoral the rulers, scientists, poets, professors, journalists or professional gossipers, etc., who find mere words of compassion for the disinherited working class where they ought to act, to fight energetically to make a human life possible for human beings. Not those living within human society and enjoying its benefits, can judge about its imperfections and iniquities. Truth about social matters comes from outsiders, from moral geniuses leading a quasi-extrasocial life, excluded from the banquet of the so-called sociable men. Only these moral bohemians are in a position to

overlook, geographically and historically, in space and in time, human society as a whole, and thus to discover that it misses its way. Only these disinherited moral geniuses are in a position to hold up before actual human society the image of its horrid criminal face; only they are in a position to foresee the fatal consequences of mankind's false step, and thus to give the cry of alarm in due season.

Morality varies inversely as the intensity of our aspirations for success, for external possessions. Therefore, it is easier for a man striving for self-perfection to reach the summits of morality than it is for an ambitious man.

"Tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner" is true for superior men only. For others we ought to say, "Tout oublier c'est tout pardonner."

What self-control, self-consciousness, is for the superior man, public opinion is for the average man. The former is controlled from within, the latter from without. Public opinion is a substitute for and a forerunner of self-control, just as politeness is a substitute for or forerunner of love, sympathy.

Under the modern competitive system, with its complicated, large and, hence, unsolidary and uncontrollable communities, it is not the harmoniously developed, the wise and altruistic, the many-sided and balanced superior men who attain authority, leadership, success: it is the degenerate, the one-sided, the men of a single pursuit, the usurpers, the greedy, the unscrupulous, the hypocritical cowards, the obtrusive self-constituted authorities, the morbidly vain, the bluffers or hunters of appearances who succeed, lead, rule, control the means of existence, and hence impose their standards of living and acting upon the great masses.

If superior men, as a rule, seem timid, awkward, irresolute, inactive, unsociable, unfit for money-making

occupations, unable to gain popularity, it is because they lack the deceptive ability and the disguised aggressiveness (euphemistically called diplomacy, histrionic ability, self-reliance, spirit of enterprise, etc.) of the commercial, would-be aristocratic philistines and of the pseudo-superior men; it is because they like to deal with men and things thoroughly, conscientiously, feelingly, whole-heartedly, and spurn to rely upon studied ready-made, stereotyped, conventional phrases, gestures, manners, platitudes, which outwardly fit every occasion; they spurn to respond superficially, verbally, unfeelingly, thoughtlessly to the appeals of their fellowmen, nor can they rest contented with such sham responses on the part of others to their heart or soul effusions; they are not as prone as the notoriety-seekers to engage in public activities where there is no chance to accomplish something worth while, let alone to redeem the promises made to the people; they are too serious-minded, engrossed with higher, intellectual, unselfish aims of life to feel at ease and to be welcomed in the company or in the employ of frivolous, materialistic, selfish, pleasure-seeking individuals; they are too straightforward, frank, open-hearted, fair-minded to resort to the crooked, devious, hypocritical, cowardly, aggressive and predatory ways of the business world (I mean the world where everything, commodities, religion, knowledge, philanthropy, etc., is degraded to a business) and of so-called Society; nor are they successful with the honest but intellectually blind masses of proletarian or toiling philistines, who mistake the demagogue's flatteries for personal friendship and compliments, his promises for good intentions, his stage heroism for genuine courage, in short, his pretenses for realities.

Happiness, Love of Approbation.—Many-sidedness saves the *amour-propre* of the superior man from

degenerating into megalomania, for it shows him how insignificant his abilities are in comparison with those he has not, or has in a very slight degree only.

The happiness of the common mortal consists in living in conformity with instincts, habits, traditions, in following the beaten paths, whereas the happiness of the superior man results from opening new ground for future generations. The philistine feels a desert in his soul when he breaks away from routine; the superior man suffocates in the narrow horizon of philistine monotony. The philistine feels lost and becomes horror-stricken when a superior man invites him to leave the narrow grooves of conventionality and to follow him into the vast untrodden fields of possibilities which are full of promises for him who is not afraid to explore them.

The balanced superior man, in whom the critical sense is not mutilated by vanity and impulsiveness, knows his own merits and defects. He is therefore unsnubbable and less vulnerable when insulted, or when he does not meet with approbation. The common mortal, who has no introspective criterion of his own personality, for whom the only way of knowing himself and the worth of his possessions is external approbation, praise, envy, etc., the common mortal, I say, suffers very much, for this reason, when he is disapproved, blamed, ridiculed, shunned by his fellow-men.

In pseudo-superior men, in philistines, especially in women, even self-knowledge and self-esteem are determined from without. A pseudo-superior man, a philistine, a woman, respect themselves in proportion with the respect shown them by others. Let some one show them disrespect, and their entire self-confidence is shaken thereby, their self-love becomes incurably wounded and unquenchably irritated. They avoid therefore such occasions, nay, they crave and pay directly

or indirectly for a little flattery, for undeserved compliments; they are so little convinced and conscious of having good or superior qualities and abilities that they feel the need of being repeatedly complimented by others for their supposedly superior advantages; they try to please by all means and especially to oblige those who assume the rôle of critics, of panegyrists, in order to hear compliments and praise in exchange. Unable to command respect through his real personality, through his real knowledge, the pseudo-superior man hunts for marks of distinction, titles of nobility, diplomas, social rank, mysteriousness, secrecy, odd manners and expressions, etc., in order to reach that goal.

The high opinion that the megalomaniac has of himself is subjective, i. e., it does not admit the existence of greater personalities, it is not a continuously and slowly increasing quantity, it is ostentatious, egotistic, proud, cruel. The self-esteem of the superior man is objective, i. e., based upon knowledge of his own merits, upon a comparison of his own achievements with those of others; it increases proportionally with the increase in the manifestations of his originality; it is inclusive, modest, not ostentatious.

While the intellectual courage, self-confidence, high opinion of self increases in the balanced superior man with his increasing knowledge of self, of others, and of the world; with increasing manifestations of originality, of foresight of coming events, of hypotheses proving to be true, there is a parallel decrease in his suggestibility or blind, uncritical obedience to, and belief in, what others say, command (directly or indirectly) or do.

The genuine intellectual genius, unlike our college professors, academicians, etc., is less sensitive to criticisms, and takes no offense at refutations; not only because he loves Truth for its own sake, but also because his merits are sufficiently numerous and sufficiently sure

of being acknowledged sooner or later, so that he does not need to hunt for undeserved recognition, and he has no difficulty in consoling himself over abilities denied him by nature.

The moral genius, unlike the professional moralists, preachers, ethical culturists, social workers, labor organizers, etc., can afford to have his intentions, feelings, actions and superiority criticized; not only because he is convinced that genuine, real, superior morality cannot be demolished, but also because he does not make a business out of Ethics, and hence has no pecuniary interests at stake.

Unlike the philistine who is entirely engrossed with the present and does not see much beyond the narrow circle of men in whose midst he happens to live, the genius can enjoy, anticipatingly, the remote future, the potential, the distant, which to him are more real than the present, the actual, the near. The philistine exaggerates both momentary joys and momentary troubles, for he lacks the sense of proportion, i. e., he lacks the broad outlook of the Imaginative Heights from where the present and the immediate past and future, which constitute his entire world, are seen in their true infinitesimal magnitude: what to the philistine appears fearful, colossal, all-powerful, tremendously important, endless, dwindles into insignificance and ephemeralness when looked down upon from these heights. The genius does not become broken-hearted, despondent and self-distrustful because of poverty, obscurity, because his benighted contemporaries ridicule him, or because the exploiters hound him; for, just as the explorer of uncivilized lands, or the missionary, is more than compensated for the scorn of savage hordes by the esteem of his few companions and by the thought of his far-away countrymen's gratitude or admiration, just so can the pioneer of the land of the future perceive at a

dim distance, behind the scorn of the present-day generations, the admiration and gratitude of the as yet unborn generations of better and more enlightened men; he can enjoy, anticipatingly, the sunnier and happier life of these future children of men because of having followed the path pointed out by such despised dreamers as he. His dream of immortality is not the philistine's vain and childish dream of a bodily resurrection; his is a dream of intellectual immortality, of the persistent influence exerted upon future generations by his intellectual creations, by the new truths, by the higher potentialities and worthier aims of life revealed to his mind's eye. His failure to meet with a congenial life companion and to enjoy domestic felicity does not render his life empty or aimless; for he finds consolation in his vision of the future woman, for whom he tries to prepare the ground, and who will be economically independent, man's colaborer and faithful life companion, and not an empty-minded sex-parasite like the majority of present-day women. He is not in the least surprised that superior men are very seldom happily married, for after so many ages of vegetation and seclusion women have drifted so far apart from the male sex as to form almost a distinct species devoid of understanding or sympathy for man's higher aspirations and seeing in him nothing else but a provider of food, shelter, dresses, luxuries, protection, means of gratifying her vanity. The existence of so many intellectually and morally crippled human beasts of prey, in whose midst he is doomed to live a lonely, harassed life, do not make the superior man despair of the human species; for he can enjoy in his imagination the sight of a nobler, big-hearted, broad-minded type of men and women who will thrive under the cooperative régime which the small and scattered army of moral geniuses strives to bring about.

CHAPTER VI

STRIVING LIFE

IM REICHE DES MAMMONS

I

Ach, wie ist das Leben
In der Gross-Stadt, hier:
Kampf und rastlos Streben,
Selbstsucht, Neid und Gier!
Menchenfluten strömen,
Wissen kaum wohin,
Stürmisch, nicht zu zähmen,
Bald her, bald dorthin.
Alles läuft in Eile,
Gönnt sich keine Ruh.
"Bald, noch eine Weile,"
Sagt man ab und zu,
"Sind wir schon am Ziele,
Ist das Glück erreicht."
Doch! wie endlos viele
Gehen zu Grund so leicht,
Im Wirrwarr des Lebens,
Wo man ohne Rast
Kämpft, bekämpft vergebens
Der Begierden Last!

II

Wahrheit nur und Liebe:
Wenn dies unser Streben
Hier auf Erden bliebe,
Dann nur könnt' es geben
Wahres Glück hienieden,
Allen gleich beschieden,

O. L. S.

Berlin, October 19, 1901.

Theory and Practise.—The theoretical man sees in succession what the practical man sees simultaneously.

To profess something theoretically does not mean to possess the ability of putting it into practise. For practise is the resultant of component forces which do not usually act in the same direction: theory, emotions, habits, instincts, external suggestions.

Theory is not quite another aspect of practise, it is usually its complement: The less idealism in our actions, in our practise, the more do we put into, do we profess in, our theories: we make up in our professed and auto-suggested theories what we lack in actual practise. If theory were a mere translation, a potential or mental equivalent of action or practise, we ought to expect most idealism, altruism, moral progress, tolerance in priests, preachers, moralists, religious people, orators, leaders and least in materialists, atheists, plain men; whereas the reverse is usually true. In an-harmonious and in disharmonious individuals, the professed and sometimes auto-suggested convictions C, which are expressed in speech, mannerisms, dress, etc., are the complement of actual practise P, which is the outer expression of their habits and instincts H & I.



$(C+P=V;\ C<P;\ C\backsimeq L+M+\ldots\ldots;\ P\backsimeq H+I)$.
In harmonious, morally balanced individuals, convictions, habits, and instincts concur in action. $(C+H+I\backsimeq;\ P\backsimeq V;\ C<P)$.

The majority live in flat contradiction between theory and practise; for their theory is impressed upon them from without, by way of suggestion exerted by superior men, whereas the motives of their practise come from within, by way of heredity, habituation. The genuine superior man alone lives comparatively in harmony between theory and practise. All wise things have been said long ago, all wise maxims have been preached already, and are on every one's lips, even on the fool's; but the wise man alone acts accordingly, the ideal man alone takes them seriously to heart.

So little are thinking and acting correlated in philistines and especially in pseudo-superior men that those who preach—no matter in what form, no matter whether in books, editorials, from the pulpit or platform—honesty, idealism, poetry, chastity, . . . do very seldom act honestly, ideally, poetically; nay, they act as a rule dishonestly, materialistically, prosaically. . . . And vice versa: Those who preach dishonesty, theft, murder, prose, sensuality, . . . act very seldom accordingly; nay, as a rule, they act honestly.

By this I do not want to insinuate that the moral preachings of the dishonest hypocrites are entirely valueless; or that the apotheosizing of cruelty, murder, theft, egoism, lasciviousness, by mentally but not actively perverted individuals is for that reason less dangerous. I merely want to maintain a commonplace truth that it is better for the welfare of human society to have to deal with frankly, consistently virtuous and vicious individuals, i. e., with individuals

who act as they think and preach, whose influence on the people is obvious, of a definite, constant, ascertainable direction. The consistently vicious individual is less dangerous, because less confidence-inspiring and more easily detected; the consistently virtuous individual is more useful, for he compels not only verbal, but also active assent to his preachings or teachings.

He who feels the need of inner consistency as well as of others' approval and hence tries to verbally justify or defend his intended or already performed actions which go against custom, law, public opinion, is certainly harmless and unsuccessful because he betrays himself, hesitates, regrets, and often confines his originality and immorality to mere talk. Whereas those who instinctively, unhesitatingly, and secretly act selfishly and immorally, without wasting any time on, or feeling the need of, a verbal defense of their motives and aims, and who rather hide the hideousness of their actions from others as well as from their own perverted conscience by verbally advocating a moral course of action, are really dangerous or anti-social, because they are neither detected by others nor hindered in their action by scruples, moral reasonings, or by any need of concurrence, cooperation, agreement between theory and practise, between words and deeds. This disguisedly anti-social type of men—while publicly and most noisily professing or preaching unconditional respect for and strict enforcement of abstract principles, regardless of the men affected thereby; blind confidence in the impartiality, ability, good will of the appointed guardians of law, peace, order; belief in the ultimate conquest of truth and justice, and in the quasi-automatic, spontaneous establishment of equilibrium between human interests and relations; implicit trust in the efficacity of good-sounding laws, principles, political promises, irrespective of the kind of men by

whom they are made, interpreted, executed; the necessity of obeying and enforcing even bad laws until replaced by better ones—this type of men, I say, instinctively, secretly and in their actions betray the least adherence to their professed ethical creed and the least confidence in men's nobler selves, and follow rather the path of violating the moral and legal codes, of flattering, courting, bribing, conspiring and making friends with, buying favors from, prostituting themselves to, those in power, and of tyrannizing, terrorizing, robbing, exploiting, blackmailing, persecuting, undermining those who naïvely rely upon the incorruptibility of the supposed protectors or upon the impossibility of perverting and misinterpreting the established laws, the apparently unambiguous constitution.

Our capitalistic or predatory system has no use for, and hence tries to eliminate, the harmoniously, many-sidedly, normally developed individuals, who do not lend themselves very well to being used as tools, for monotonous, stultifying, hard work, and whose idealism, altruism, visions, speculations, theories, assume definite, clear-cut shapes and hence clamor for realization, thus interfering with the spoliation business of the master class. More welcome to our masters are the intellectually crippled, or one-sidedly developed philistines who are glad to serve as tools, and the inharmoniously developed, hypocritical or muddle-headed pseudo-superior men whose idealism or theorizing is so vague, indefinite, shadowy, lifeless, playful, so much reduced to mere talk, so much divorced from, and hence without any interfering influence upon their practise, actions, instincts, material and vain pursuits as to be harmless if not positively beneficial to the parasitic classes.

Thinking and Acting.—The main source of their happiness lying in themselves, in their creative power, we understand why the balanced superior men seem

less striving, less active than those whose happiness depends on others, on success, on approbation, on wealth. The superior men *omnia secum portant.* In reality the superior man strives as much as, if not more than, the ambitious; only the results attained by him are not so manifest to others, are not so immediate like those attained by the ambitious man. The intellectually superior man strives to attain lofty ideas and ideals, but he does not fight for their realization among the masses. This task is left over for the emotionally richer men, agitators, leaders, reformers, statesmen, etc.

The truth-loving, many-sided, contemplative thinker usually leaves the realization of the ideals, which he foresees more or less clearly and preaches more or less explicitly, more or less whole-heartedly, over to the mono-ideistic, emotional, enthusiastic, whole-heartedly striving, naïve, altruistically vain, uncritical, non-skeptical, often semi-insane agitators, social reformers; and to the unscrupulous self-seeking, materialistic, egotistically vain, hypocritical statesmen, rulers, politicians, leaders, demagogues, who never embrace a noble cause unless it can be made subservient to their vanity and personal interests. Ideas and ideals in themselves do not spur to action, if they are not fed with energy coming from emotions aroused by antagonistic ideas and ideals. We could never fight for justice, for the rewarding of merits, if injustices, under the actual reign of charlatans and hypocrites, would not wound us in our innermost feelings and strivings, in the most essential conditions for our existence on earth. The intellectually superior man, being less vulnerable by human injustice than the emotionally or practically superior man, cannot, therefore, be a leader in the holy battle for justice, for the reign of merit, of love, of true solidarity. Under our actual reign of hypocrites,

parasites, masked criminals, flatterers wearing the mask of servants, but being cruel masters in reality, the noble-minded are doomed to a life of abnegation, renouncement, self-denial; for the price of material well-being is too dearly paid for by honestly striving people. Who wants bodily comforts has to pay no less a price than his own soul. We cannot serve two masters, especially when they are in a state of warfare with one another, like material success and self-perfection. Sham merit reigning almighty everywhere, we can easily understand why the natural desire for social recognition and approbation has decayed in the ideal man from the rank of intentional aims of life, from pre-causes, productive causes or motives of actions, to that of fortuitous aims, post-causes, maintaining causes.

In the emotionally superior man, in the reformer, statesmen, men of action, the ideals have rather a sub-conscious than a conscious existence; their ideals form far-reaching associations with the darkest corners of their souls, hence their unshakable energy. With the intellectually superior men, the ideals have to pass from the vast field of sub-consciousness through the narrow gate of consciousness: the ideo-emotional complexes are necessarily split up, their association power is partly lost, hence their lesser efficacity than with the reformer.

The reformer lends an inhospitable ear to skepticism, whereas the skepticism welcomed by the intellectually superior man as a good assistant ends by gaining mastery over him, by paralyzing his actions. A certain degree of skepticism may be useful in our analysis, but its dissolving power is harmful to emotional syntheses which lead to, or prepare for, action. The ideals of the reformer are not so lofty as, but more rose-tinted than, those of the pure thinker; they are more *terre à terre*, more in touch with those of the common people, too closely connected with those of

daily life, hence their indomitable impulsiveness and urgent demand for realization. The thinker acts directly on the men of action, and through them upon the mass.

The thinker may fight against scientific prejudices, but he has no sufficient emotive power to fight against social prejudices, to free mankind from rudimentary ideas and rudimentary, atrophied, burdensome social organs. For it is less dangerous for the fighter, polemist, although as little hopeful, to espouse the cause of scientific freedom from prejudice. We cannot fight against prejudice in general; for, in its broadest sense of judging particular, present and personal experiences in the light of generalized, past and transmitted experiences, it is useful and inherent in human nature. We merely fight against its despotism. Prejudice, prejudgment, should be a pre-thinking, a preparatory stage, but it should not supplant thinking altogether.

Observation and interpretation, imitation and creation, consciousness and self-consciousness, acting and thinking, cannot coexist with equal intensities. The curve of the one lags almost 90 degrees behind the curve of the other. Or, in other words, a maximum of thinking, observation, goes together with a minimum of acting, interpretation, and vice versa. Thus is explained why thinkers are very little active during the rise of their development curve, and become relatively more active after reaching maturity, or stagnation in the development of thinking. The so-called men of action, on the contrary, begin to devote their life to pure thinking when their goal is reached. What is true of every single process, is true of the individual and social life taken as a whole. Thinking and acting, sensory and motor activity, contemplation and striving, are two successive parts of the same circuit. In addition to this, in the mind of the thinker, there are

at a given moment many parallel circuits, many streams of thought. This is another cause for retarding his external activity. The pure man of action, the pure agitator, concentrates his energy on the putting into practise of a single line of ideas; he acts, therefore, promptly, enthusiastically, under high pressure. Whereas the thinker has his energy divided among many lines of ideas which either diverge or converge. His action in the former case is prompt, but under low pressure; in the latter case it is under high pressure, but delayed.

The genuine, honest superior man may become a man of action in his mature age, after having acquired settled, definite, workable convictions. The born man of action, the ambitious, the born leader, the pseudo-superior man, begins to be active in his childhood, before he has any real convictions to put into practise; he usually adopts others' convictions in so far and so long only as his personal interests are furthered thereby. The pseudo-superior man, like woman and unlike the genuine superior man, never forgets to make impression and to extol himself in the midst of his seemingly most fiery, enthusiastic, and self-forgetful speech. He never allows his audience or readers to lose sight of his personality and to become entirely absorbed in the impersonal ideas defended by him.

One very seldom finds real or willing martyrs among men of genius. Do they shrink from self-sacrifice because this method merely stirs up emotions and does not conduce to enlightenment, or because they cannot attain the summits of altruism, or because they feel that their life must not be sacrificed for one idea, when they have to produce so many? Martyrs are usually oligo-ideists, therefore poly-emotionalists, and hence inclined to overestimate the value of their convictions and to remain blind to the inadequacy of martyrdom

as a means of enlightenment. Moreover, religious and patriotic fanatics do not value their life on earth very highly, as they have been hypnotized into looking upon death as a mere stepping-stone to eternal life.

Aims and Activity.—The philistine is intellectually inert, lazy. Ready-made opinions, dogmas, pre-judgments (pre-judices), pre-feelings, foreign initiative, easy methods of getting at a little truth or beauty, are, therefore, welcome to him. The genius is bodily lazy. He prefers, therefore, to leave to others the bodily actions which are necessary for the preparation of food, shelter, clothing, comfort, amusement. Both, however, are honest and consistent: They are willing to exchange their services and to reduce their claims to the fruits of the labor performed by the other. The philistine rests satisfied with gossip, sensation, simple and superficial knowledge; the genius ungrudgingly renounces comforts, luxuries, food delicacies, if his ability happens to be non-lucrative. Between these two honest producing types stands the dishonest middleman type of the pseudo-superior man who poses as an intellectual producer when he deals with philistines and as an economic producer when he deals with the genius; he buys and sells the productions, the services or the labor of both philistines and geniuses; he robs the genius of the fame and public gratitude due to him, and the philistine masses of the material possessions and comforts produced by them; he never makes a mental or a bodily effort for the pleasure of being active, but only when he can derive some personal benefit therefrom.

The common mortal strives to please, to imitate, to act according to the requirements of public opinion or social consciousness, in which he is also a shareholder, for it represents an externalization, and a summation of innumerable fragmentary opinions on

the essence of an ideal, desirable citizen and of an ideal society. The superior man strives to act according to the ideal he carries in himself, an ideal which does not contradict public opinion, does not wholly destroy it, but merely completes and supplements it. The common mortal accepts the actual organization of the world; the superior man strives to change it, not to overthrow it. He acts more upon public opinion than he is acted upon. The intellectual genius pursues truth; the emotional, beauty; the practical, utility; the moral, social happiness. A one-sided superior man is inclined to ignore, to depreciate, or to sacrifice the other aims of life for the sake of the one he is striving after. Any aim which is earnestly pursued, any wish or desire, exerts, not only a guiding, but also an energizing or dynamogenic influence, either by concentrating all the scattered abilities or by withdrawing the energy spent in other directions, or by doing both at the same time. Laziness, apathy, timidity, shyness, are not always a sign of weakness or of a lack of energy, but may merely mean ignorance of one's own strength and ability; or it may spring from a lack of stimuli, aims, interest, proper channels of discharge for the apparently and compulsorily stagnant energy. For inaction, rest, is an exception, a mere anomaly in our universe. Motion, activity, is the rule; to live—nay, to exist—means to act. On the other hand, display of courage and activity is not always a sign of physical or mental strength. It is often based on the cowardice or stupidity of others. Or it is often merely a sign that a certain aim is being pursued with such great eagerness and seriousness as to make us forget our weakness and the dangers to which we expose ourselves. Thus even the timid female animals—the hen, for instance—display unwonted courage in defending their brood. The moral genius, in spite of his poverty, social obscurity, bodily weakness, lonely

and unprotected condition, dares to attack the deeply rooted prejudices of the masses and to disclose the hidden criminal pursuits of the authoritative and well-protected rulers or leaders; because moral uplifting is an inborn, irresistible aim of his life. If the moral genius, in the face of so much egoism, cruelty, unscrupulousness, immorality, does not lose his courage and confidence in men, and persists in his fight, it is because he knows that the majority of self-seekers resort to immoral means, not because they take pleasure in exploiting and torturing their fellow-men, but because under our actual social organization they do not see any other means of satisfying their impulsive desires for wealth, comfort, leisure, liberty, social prominence. The miser, driven by greed, dares to defy the burdensome contempt of his fellow-men, and even the threats of murderous burglars. Great vanity has made many heroes out of men who in reality trembled for their lives and had neither physical strength nor any serious patriotic aim in view. It is due to the credulity of the masses and to the reticent self-interest of hangers-on that the real cowardice of such historical heroes has remained a family secret. The spasms of agony are the last energizing effects of the will to live. Even a timid animal when driven to despair, or when driven into a corner and seeing no escape from its pursuer, turns momentarily into a bold offensive animal, under the stimulus of the desire to live. Unexpected and unescapable dangers have often made heroes out of cowards. To gain the love of a woman, many an apathetic youth has become energetic. The more quickly and directly a certain line of activity leads to the realization of our aims, the more eagerly and with the more pleasure do we follow it. Thus, if self-seekers or pseudo-superior men seem to be more energetic, more enthusiastic than genuine superior men in de-

fending national, humanitarian, ethical, scientific, or other ideal causes, it is because the defense of such causes is a mere cloak to hide their selfish pursuits. If the thinker seems to be less active than the philistine, it is because he has different aims of life and because his activity is inner, mental rather than muscular or outer.

If the genuine superior man avoids popularity, it is not because he is entirely free from vanity; it is because he knows or instinctively feels that the admired man, the idol of the intellectually blind masses, i. e., the man whose exterior is being looked at, whose words are eagerly listened to, whose movements and doings are being watched and imitated, in short, the man whose outer appearance and manifestations are the object of the people's attention, is thereby compelled to neglect introspection, self-scrutiny, absorption in inner, lofty, impersonal, disinterested, impartial thoughts, and to come down to the low regions of appearances, self-complacency, personal, petty, trivial preoccupations: he is compelled to pay attention to, show off, exaggerate, the quantitative, superficial, irrelevant, unessential but more striking or eye-catching parts of his individuality to the detriment and at the expense of the qualitative, inner, deeper, invisible but important or significant side.

Man is essentially an aspiring, upward and onward striving animal, so much so that if he is debarred therefrom, either by inability or by external obstacles, he does not stagnate like animals on the level of elementary pursuits (food, shelter, sexual intercourse) but rather degenerates, i.e., he spends his excessive energy in over-indulging these animal pursuits (gluttony, luxury, display, sensuality, collecting mania, rapacity, greedy accumulation of wealth, aimless traveling or wandering, etc.). A hideous picture of such degeneracy is presented by the female parasites of the well-to-do classes

who morally and intellectually are completely crippled and whose only concern is the criminal display of wealth, the pursuit of selfish pleasures and the preservation of their bodily attractiveness or sensual power over the male sex. Man's need of always hoping for or striving after something higher makes him pursue any distant object—be it illusory, spurious—rather than none; it makes him idealize and espouse the cause of lower objects of pursuit, which he would not care for in the least if worthier or higher aims of life were pointed out to him. Thus we see the enthusiastic sons of aristocrats and of industrial exploiters spend their surplus of youthful energy in noisily and self-importantly embracing the cause of the downtrodden peasants and workers, whom they really neither like nor understand and whom in later years, when they will have to look themselves after their money supply, they will exploit in the same way as their fathers did. Likewise, the enthusiastic American youths of the parasitic class who—following the hypnotic suggestions of the *Zeitgeist* or their inner impulse towards higher pursuits—fought for the emancipation of the Negroes, did so for lack of other aims of life and not because they really worried over the miserable lot of the black men: Had they really been concerned with the black man's troubles, they would not have stopped at gaining for him the mere liberty of shifting for himself, the spurious liberty of choosing between starvation and a new, more cruel, wage-paying master. The pseudo-superior man is too materialistic to have time and patience for higher, non-lucrative pursuits; but his aspiring instinct compels him to at least deceive himself by idealizing his low, materialistic, selfish pursuits, or to make himself and others believe that the latter are merely incidental, unintentional, mere means to his higher, unselfish, spiritual ends.

The philistine unconsciously aspires to and craves for friendship, justice, general happiness, beauty, deeper insight into the mysteries of the world and of life, etc. But his inability to attain and to appreciate such genuine values makes him idealize, rest contented with, and vent his enthusiasm on, the empty imitations thereof. What he calls friendship is a mere farce, a mutual exploitation under the mask of mutual services; a ridiculous sample of such spurious friendship is the giving of Christmas presents to those from whom we expect more than we give or at least an equivalent amount. What the philistine calls education, spiritual edification, charitable work, public service, is mere high-sounding phraseology, ritualism, ostentatiousness, self-aggrandizement. What he calls Religion is mere superstition, idolatry; what he calls patriotism is mere blind hero-worship, stupid flag-idolatry, hatred of foreigners; what he calls conversation is mere gossip, exchange of platitudes, meaningless talk; what he calls monogamy is mere covert polygamy, and at best mere bodily chastity; and so on with the other aims and ideals. The philistine's inability to strive for genuine love, knowledge, beauty, altruism, religiosity, self-perfection, . . . makes him welcome the pseudo-superior men who spare him this trouble by giving him a manufactured, ready-made imitation thereof, and by maintaining him in the sweet illusion of being in possession of the genuine thing. Incapable of anticipatingly enjoying the remote future as portrayed by socialists, communists, anarchists or other ideal men, the philistines prefer to feed their striving instinct on the pseudo-superior men's false promises, adulterated hopes for immediate results rather than give up all hope and striving; for *aut Cæsar aut nihil* is not the slogan of philistines, but of men who have the stuff of a Cæsar. If not only the idle or parasitic classes, but also the workers flock from the monotony

of their daily routine to horse races, prize fights, ball games, gambling dens and other such stultifying excitements, and buoy up with the vain hopes artificially induced thereby, it is partly because their aspiration instinct has no better or worthier channels of discharge; it is partly because they are ignorant or incapable of, or excluded from, the hopes and excitements of higher, uplifting, socially useful aspirations.

Reward for Right Acting.—To work under the impulse of the desire for immortality or enduring fame, has a reward as real as that attained by materialists. Even if the superior man does not attain fame during his individual life, as long as he believes in its attainment in the future, the reward for his life full of abnegations and resignations is as real as the success attained during the individual life; for man does not enjoy so much what he has attained as he enjoys what he hopes to attain, and even the means used in attaining it: the pleasure expected from the attainment of a goal overflows partly upon the means that lead us to it.

One cannot gain the admiration of distant places, future generations (posterity), and of select people without renouncing the admiration of one's own country (city, or district), of one's contemporaries, and of the masses. One must choose between ideal pursuits and glory or success during one's lifetime, for the two are incompatible. If an ideal man happens to have both during his lifetime, it is not because his idealism is appreciated by his contemporaries or by the philistine masses: it is on account of his inherited or otherwise acquired social rank, influential position, wealth, etc.

If, incidentally, the superior man strives for wealth, it is not because he is a slave to the howling mob of desires. It is because to him wealth means independence, and independence is the main condition for self-

perfectioning.

Both the materialist or the self-seeker and the idealist, the ambitious and the wise, the pseudo-superior and the genuine superior man, act logically, but they start from different premises and axioms. The acts of the one, seen and judged in the light of the aims and principles guiding the activity of the other one, will necessarily appear as illogical, ephemeral.

The axiom guiding the life of the materialist, of the ambitious, of the pseudo-superior man, is: Do whatever leads to your success. A corollary of this axiom is: Try by all means to please those on whom the attainment of your success depends; over-estimate and glorify your own vocation and achievements. The axiom guiding the striving life of the idealist, of the wise, of the genuine superior man, is: Do whatever leads to truth, beauty, general happiness or morality. A corollary of this axiom is to repress all those natural and legitimate aspirations towards fame, material well-being, etc., if and in so far as their gratification has to be purchased at the expense of the nobler aims of life.

The materialist and the idealist are in practical life what the conceptualist and the nominalist are in philosophy. What is real for the conceptualist and for the idealist is an empty word for the nominalist and the materialist: both are right from their own standpoint. Looked at *sub specie aeternitatis* the concepts, the species . . . are more real, more permanent than perceptions and sensations, or individuals. From the standpoint of spatial existence alone, the reverse will be true.

Leadership.—Ability for leadership seems to me proven by experience to be due rather to deficiencies, defects, lack of character, i. e., lack of imperturbable guiding convictions, than to excesses, merits; to a minus in moral scrupulousness, in sincerity, in altruism, and

in seriousness rather than to a plus of energy; to a minus in paralyzing influences rather than a plus of will power and forethought; to vanity and ambition disguised under the mask of wisdom rather than to true wisdom, for it is well known *quam parvo ingenio mundus regitur*. This holds good especially of leaders who impose themselves, who are neither expected nor needed, for whom the soil has not been prepared by social circumstances.

Leaders, organizers, politicians, etc., of this sort are congenitally immoral, or amoral; they lead a life of moral duplicity; they follow a double moral code, one in private life, hermetically sealed, and another one in public life, always open for inspection; they act morally or immorally, according to the requirements of their personal and party interests; morality to them is a means, a pure idea, and not an end, an idea-force, an aspiration; morality may be in their acting, but not in their feelings and intentions; moral acting springs from their reason, but not from their instincts. Some are endowed by nature with *physiological* mimicry, i. e., with an ambiguous or a strikingly harmless-, innocent-, and kind-looking face. Others have the gift of *linguistical and mental mimicry*, i. e., the faculty of concealing natural cruelty, falsehood, and egotism behind a rich stock of memorized, easily handled, friendly, heart-winning, and smoothly flowing gestures, words, phrases; the faculty of assimilating verbally others' opinions, sentiments and aspirations. Fluency and easy handling of sentimental phraseology ought therefore to be looked upon as a suspicious symptom in a moral diagnosis, for genuine feeling does not so readily find such suitable terms to express itself. Oratorical ability is often a cause and an effect at the same time of moral and intellectual shallowness, laziness: Why act originally and acquire intellectual

wealth, if unusual combinations of words simulate originality, and if verbal wealth conceals intellectual poverty? Why act and think if mere words can pay for deeds and thoughts? Why assimilate noble and abstain from base thoughts, sentiments, actions, if it is easier and sufficient to adopt the language and manners of those who are thinking, feeling, and acting nobly; and if it is an easier matter to preserve prosaic pursuits under changed eulogistic names? A Jesus, Buddha, Confucius, Moses, Karl Marx, . . . would not fall under this rule. But even of these ideal leaders we can say that they did not live up to their potential idealism, their actual individuality remained behind their potential individuality, because they had to act directly upon the impure feelings and obtuse ideas of the intellectually blind mass. Even the morality—paradoxical though it may sound —of socialistic and of ethical movement leaders, although superior to that of other political leaders, is as a rule inferior to that of simple members.

No wonder that the masses are so easily captivated and led astray by demagogues, social quacks, pseudo-leaders; for after so many ages of slavery, exploitation, oppression, drudgery, extermination of the intelligent, self-respecting and independence-loving individuals or peoples, the toiling masses consist largely of individuals who are too stultified, brutalized and degraded by economic dependence and uncertainty, too much crippled by oppression, too much preoccupied and worried by urgent, immediate, material needs to be open to the direct, personal influence and leadership of the moral geniuses who look too far ahead into the future, whose enthusiasm is spent more on lofty dreams, potentialities, ultimate and vital aims, spiritual ends, than on trivial actualities, immediate and material aims, who appeal to reason and try to reawaken the lost faculty of thinking rather than stir up blind emotions, who

are too fair-minded to compliment the masses on their as yet unspoiled kernel of unselfishness and idealism without calling them down at the same time for their lack of self-respect, for their servilism and stupid submission to degrading conditions. In spite of his confidence in the regeneration of mankind through the toiling masses, owing to their moral superiority over the unproductive classes, the moral genius can neither ignore their degradation nor compliment them on high qualities that they do not possess, as the demagogue does. Nor can he maintain with the naïve altruists that the people's stupidity, inferiority, degradation, is wholly and directly due to lack of opportunity, to the molding rather than to the selective influence exerted by the environment and by exploiters, and hence will vanish as soon as more favorable economic conditions will be provided for all. The genuine leader of men takes his mission too loftily, too seriously, too disinterestedly to accept any compromises, to make any concessions, to spare any influential scoundrels and widespread prejudices, to allure with vain promises, to tolerate insincere, mercenary or vain colaborers, to encourage a thoughtless, sheep-like following of or obedience to his admonitions. He is too much concerned with the welfare of the entire human species, of future as well as of present generations, to concentrate his entire love and attention on the few with whom he happens to come into contact, and thus win their adherence and, through them, that of others. He is too uncompromising and outspoken to gain the tolerance and unintentional cooperation of the beastly supporters of the predatory system. He betrays too easily his contempt for and distrust of the powers that be, titled parasites, high-placed crooks and imbeciles, not to arouse their open and immediate persecution or oppression of any movement directly led by him.

Pursuit of Truth, and Struggle for Existence.—Just as suicide, alcoholism, abnegation, flattery, servilism, etc., are negative ways of struggling for material and emotional well-being, or are rather symptoms of impotence or exhaustion than of ability or action; so in our pursuit of truth, extravagant transcendental explanations, mystical language, denigration of logic, reason or science, apotheosizing of faith, instinct, intuition, of the Unconscious on sentimental or pragmatical grounds, etc., are rather symptoms of cessation than of continuation in our intellectual pursuits; at best, they mean a negative way of pursuing truth.

Writing in obscure, abstract language, if it is done semi-consciously, betrays not only an obscure, mystical, chaotic mind, but also a desire to attract the attention of the thoughtless mass, a desire to overawe public opinion, a desire to reap credit for what one did not say or for the meanings unconsciously supplied by the readers.

The whole difference between the striving life of the genuine balanced superior man and that of the ordinary mortal, and of the pseudo-superior man, is that the former subordinates his personal interests, his self-love and vanity to truth, whereas the latter subordinates truth, makes it subservient, to his personal interests. What is an organic necessity, an urgent demand, an aim to the former, is a mere luxury, a means to the latter.

Among the pseudo-superior men we can distinguish two main extreme types. The brainier pseudo-superior men with high foreheads or with aquiline noses, in whom vanity predominates over materialism, take to liberal professions, to educational, ecclesiastical, journalistic, legal, indirectly parasitical careers. The less brainy pseudo-superior men in whom materialism predominates over vanity and whose physiognomy is mostly

characterized by a big, massive head whose greatest part is formed by the face, with special development of the jaws, take preferably to political, commercial, administrative, speculative, technical, directly parasitical careers. More common, of course, are the intermediate, less distinct types who are not so particular about the social status of their parasitical careers as long as there is profit therein.

The genuine superior man does not deliberately sell or prostitute his intellectual abilities; he keeps his vocation or intellectual pursuits separate from his profession or means of earning a livelihood; he has very little lucrative talent, i. e., he lacks the immoral ability of exploiting his own abilities, let alone those of others.

The pseudo-superior man or the parasite disguised as a benefactor thrives upon the ungrounded fears and empty hopes; upon the poverty, ignorance, superstitions, illusions, prejudices, antipathies; in short, upon the weaknesses of the masses. Whereas the genuine superior man appeals to the strength, productive power, potentialities, realizable hopes, teachableness, nobler selves of the masses. The pseudo-superior man rules by force, violence, compulsion, persecution, terrorism; by threatening, intimidating, stultifying, confusing the people; by deceit, intrigue, fraud, imposture, false promises; by increasing fear, worry, discord; by stirring up unjustified alarm; by belittling and suppressing the capabilities of the people and by extolling his own knowledge or resourcefulness; by drawing the people's attention to fictitious, and diverting it from real, dangers. The genuine superior man proposes to rule by love, persuasion, by enlightening, encouraging, consulting the people, by arousing discontentedness with the present, but hope for the future, self-confidence, voluntary and intelligent obedience, by dispelling discord, unjustified and paralyzing fears, by pointing

out real but removable dangers, and causes of worry or discontent, by modestly acknowledging his own short-comings and mere advisory or stimulating influence, by inviting and welcoming the cooperation, criticism and control of the people, by exhorting the people to develop their dormant abilities of self-rule, self-education, self-help. If the pseudo-superior man chooses to exploit the optimistic or hopeful side of human nature, he plays upon it in such a way that his victims become so exhausted, stultified, stupefied by indulgence in pleasurable excitement as to unpreventably swing back to the pessimistic extreme of fear, worry, despondency, and thus fall a prey to his colleague who thrives on nosophobia, fear of death, fear for the future, fear of possible accidents, fear of the unknown, disgust with life, etc. The exploiters of pessimism and optimism play into each other's hands. And even if the pseudo-superior man must adopt enlightenment and social reform as a profession, he attacks ignorance and the other social evils only partially, superficially, verbally, half-heartedly, playfully, interestedly, and often in appearance only while remaining secretly the accomplice of the perpetrators of ignorance, fear, unhappiness, slavery. Whereas if the genuine superior man invites the people to serious activity, he does not in the least object to humor and amusement provided they are moderately, intelligently, recreatingly indulged in, and if he attacks evil and evil-doers, he does it seriously, disinterestedly, thoroughly, uncompromisingly, relentlessly, whole-heartedly.

Few novelists have so masterfully laid bare the cleverly covered-up predatory structure of our social organization as Upton Sinclair has done in his immortal work "The Jungle." The spirit and methods of the jungle are disguisedly maintained and perpetrated within human society by the predatory or aristocratic

and would-be aristocratic philistines, in general, and by the pseudo-superior men, in particular. Under the cloak of business, promoting schemes, leadership, philanthropy, religion, spiritual guidance, missionary and evangelistic work, official science, etc., these parasites carry on their business of despoiling the masses of proletarian philistines, or the business of directly or indirectly assisting in this spoliation game. Like wolves, they hunt preferably in packs (gangs, coteries, cliques, exclusive sets), the predatory philistines doing the dirty or menial work and the pseudo-superior men assuming the leadership. To all outside appearance, the predatory gangs and the members of each gang seem to have nothing more at heart than the general welfare and to collaborate harmoniously towards bringing this about; in reality, however, there reigns among them a morally asphyxiating, character-stifling atmosphere of mutual refined blackmailing, bullying, distrust, flattery, bluffing and of steady cowardly quarreling over the dividing of the spoils and honors. The exploiters and their retainers realize very well that their worst enemies are the living moral geniuses, the revolutionists, no matter whether they call themselves socialists, anarchists, communists, or radical reformers. Some socialists find it comical and others feel it as an insult to be identified by these beasts of prey and by their henchmen with anarchists. In reality, however, the capitalists and their hirelings are perfectly right when they claim, from their point of view, that they can hardly see any difference between the various classes of revolutionists, all of whom agree in their desire to put a stop to the jungle spirit and methods under any disguise. What difference does it make to the predatory classes and to their valets if anarchists and socialists try to tear to pieces their finely spun nets by pulling in opposite directions; on the contrary, they would prefer to see

socialists and anarchists pull in the same direction or, better still, pull each other's hair while quarreling over the relative merits of their respective methods. On the other hand, the antipathy often manifested by proletarian revolutionists against so-called "intellectuals" is not entirely unjustified, as the clever socialist writer, John Spargo, would have us believe; nor is it to be mistaken for the natural antipathy of the unlettered, incurably ignorant philistines against the educated. For every genuine revolutionist is himself an "intellectual"—if not in the academical sense of the word, then in its truer sense,—even if he himself is a worker who did not enjoy the doubtful privilege of a school education, and even if he does not know how to handle properly the lingo of the academical caste; nor does he despise the intellectual man who manages to keep away from the clutches of wage slavery, and rather tries to make a living by writing, teaching, lecturing, etc. What the genuine, whole-hearted revolutionist objects to, is the intrusion of self-seeking "intellectuals" into the ranks of the revolutionists in order to facilitate their admittance to, or after having failed to enlist in, the ranks of capitalistic retainers or of intellectual prostitutes.

The genuine superior man is too busy learning and thinking out continually new problems, and he is on the whole too sure of his intellectual wealth to stop his mental work like the pseudo-superior man, in order to take stock of his knowledge, in order to make an inventory of his amount of intellectual superiority over his fellow-men. The more he meditates, the more perspectives open themselves up before his mental eye, the more interesting problems lay claim to his attention; and his brain-work is at the same time such a source of intellectual enjoyment to him, an aim and not only a means of self-aggrandizement, that it never occurs to

him, as it does to the pseudo-superior man, to consider himself intellectually rich enough to be entitled to, and to long for, a life of intellectual idleness and self-complacency.

The apostle of truth, in his naïveté, imagines that the masses are tortured by the same thirst for the light of truth as he is: he cannot imagine how human beings can be at ease and live happily in the darkness of ignorance or in the crepuscular, misty light of illusion. Only when his attempts to awaken in others love of truth meet with ingratitude, derision, or a deaf ear, does he begin to realize that the organ of truth is atrophied or undeveloped in the ignorant, the emotional, the hunters of success, in the philistines just as much as in the pseudo-intellectuals, in women, children, in the immature, confused minds. But neither ingratitude nor derision can discourage the true apostle of truth and of love in his fight against error, ignorance, falsehood, and wickedness.

Behind his abstract thoughts, behind his seemingly impersonal creations, in the background, invisible to others but to himself, stands modestly the concrete, feeling personality of the thinker. Every one of his abstract thoughts is a product of distillation, is extracted from a large mass of experiences mixed with personal joys and sorrows. He might, therefore, fitly preface his thoughts with these verses:

> In diesen Gedanken, so allgemein
> Und unpersönlich sie auch scheinen,
> Liegt ein Stück begraben vom Leben mein,
> Viel Hoffen, Sehnen, und auch Weinen.

It is in the nature of the genius to write, to express only what he is convinced of as being true, beautiful, socially useful, without any regard for the fatal consequences resulting therefrom either to his own interests or to those of a particular influential social class or

institution. Genius and intellectual prostitution are incompatible. The manifestations of the genius are irrepressible, incorruptible. He may postpone the communication, publication, of his concepts; but he can never distort, adulterate, let alone suppress them.

Even when the original or creative man is seen to prostitute his intellectual individuality to save his personal interests, it is only apparently so: a starving genius may be compelled to sacrifice temporarily part of his intellectual individuality in order to save a minimum of practical interests, which are a *conditio sine qua non* for the preservation and development of his better self.

If anybody at all is entitled to economic parasitism, to freedom from the struggle for bread, it is the men of genius, whose creations arise spontaneously, unexpectedly, and do not admit of postponement like the conscious and voluntary achievements of the talented man. But if a genius has to work for his daily bread, and he is free to choose between an occupation requiring thinking and attention—not in the line of his interests and inclinations—and a thoughtless, automatic occupation, I would advise him to prefer the latter as the less interfering with his spontaneous creations, and less diverting his thoughts from their natural course. The genius is not fit for prolonged routine work nor for one-sided intellectual pursuits, for every external stimulus and every emerging recollection are likely to arouse in him new, irresistibly fascinating trains of thoughts, which it would be a pity to repress for the sake of the less promising daily routine task.

To act on command means to repress, to inhibit one's own impulses, wishes, spontaneity, thoughts. And inhibition, we know, is painful especially if imposed from without or dictated by fear. Submissiveness, acting on command, is, therefore, easy to the thoughtless, empty-

minded individual deprived of spontaneity; it is also easy to the imitative, suggestible people; but it is a cruel torture to the genius, to the independent man. If demagogues, leaders, are successful commanders, it is mostly because their commands are really or apparently in the same line with the impulses and wishes of the masses. The ordinary man of action, the man who is in need of activity either as a narcotic, as a means of preventing intellectual pregnancy, or in order to feel his strength, his power over men and things, surrenders and prostitutes his own convictions—if he has any—, embraces any cause provided he be allowed to exert freely his motor activity. The thinker, the poet, the man of contemplation and meditation, on the contrary, prefers to enslave his muscles, his automatic ego, in order to preserve the freedom of his thoughts, of his conscious ego. He prefers mechanical work to intellectual work that is not in the same line with his spontaneity, his originality, or dominant intellectual needs; for mechanical work requiring a minimum of attention and of thinking, does not interfere with his psychical development or natural trends of thought.

Originality or independent thinking being a natural gift that endangers the life of the individual endowed therewith by making him too conspicuous to the misoneistic masses and to the truth-hating and intelligence-hating usurpers of power, of wealth, of privileges (church, monarchs, aristocracy, capitalists, leaders, . . .); we understand why geniuses avoid close contact with men, or try to conceal, to disown their originality by attributing it to divine grace, inspiration, revelation, or by clothing it in the garb of mere reinterpretations of or commentations upon traditional, official wisdom, or by putting on the mask of eccentricity, jocularity, or of madness which arouses pity, scorn, at most mild persecution, but not mur-

derous hatred as undisguised sane superiority arouses.

Pursuit of Social Happiness.—Motion is the primary, original, natural, normal, uncaused condition of atoms; and rest, of bodies. Just so in the primitive, simple living creatures, spontaneous variation, transient adaptation, is a primary, general condition; and stability of form, strict inheritance, persistent adaptation, is exceptional, secondary. Whereas in complex or higher beings, stability of physical—not so much of psychical—type is the rule; and spontaneous variation on the mental side is still exceptional, individual, confined to the select minority of geniuses, and on the bodily side is reduced to a minimum. Travel, mobility, progress, is instinctive, natural with the minority of intellectual individuals, who are comparatively isolated from each other; whereas stagnation, immobility, routine, is natural to the unintellectual compact mass of philistines. Colonization, rapid progess, is more natural to the civilized peoples with their individualistic, social-atomistic organization than to the primitive, backward peoples with their tribal, communistic, social-molar organization, for whom it is more natural to travel (migrate) and to progress *en masse* and, therefore, slowly. The civilized peoples gain in rapidity of progress, in liberty, what they lose in equality, sociability, cohesion, security, of the component members. It will be the task of the moral genius of the future, of socialism, to reconcile, harmonize, combine progress and solidarity, rapid or easy progress and great masses, individual liberty and social adhesion, individualism and cooperation, intellectuality and active morality, freedom and security, migration and sedentariness, and thus to produce general social happiness. If Communism—which has very little in common with modern socialism—proves to be a failure in modern times, though not such a hideous

failure as competition is, it is because it is no longer compatible with human liberty and progress, with a complex social organization and a higher or intellectual type of human happiness.

The moral genius declares war not only against the *extra-social* criminals who expiate their crimes with dishonor, a nomadic, restless, and a peaceless life; but also—and more so—war against the *intra-social* criminals, against the pseudo-intellectual, pseudo-moral, and pseudo-religious individuals, who never come in conflict with the Law, for they never violate its letter, although continually violating its spirit; who enjoy all the benefits of civilized social life; who reap honor, fame, wealth, while living at the expense of genuine intellectual, moral, and religious people; who enslave and discourage honestly striving people; who trample on the most sacred sentiments, aspirations and convictions, and drive the resourceless and friendless people into the arms of vagabondage, and the intellectually and morally poor into the arms of extra-social crime; war against impostors under the mask of saints, against idlers under the mask of busy men, against exploiters under the mask of benefactors, against anarchists under the mask of law-givers and law-protectors; not so much war against institutions as against their imperfections; not so much war against parasites in the form of beggars, tramps, to whom we give from our surplus, but rather war against parasites in the form of aristocrats, capitalists, speculators who indirectly, but none the less inexorably, compel us to feed and enrich them while starving our own minds and bodies; not so much war against parasites as against circumstances and institutions that allow or compel them to be so; not so much war against the effects as against the causes or roots of the social evils.

The moral genius, in his constructive work, takes

more or less consciously the relations between the members of an ideal family as the prototype of the relations between the members of an ideal society. Such relations are based, not upon written laws and stipulations printed on paper, not upon legal justice and equality, but upon sentiments of love and solidarity imprinted in the heart of every member; every one has the rank he deserves, works according to his capacity, and is remunerated according to his needs. Without the repeated, reiterated, intermittent, rejuvenating action of moral geniuses upon language, customs and institutions, these—the academical not excepted—degenerate into lifeless, automatical, meaningless things and become an obstacle to further progress; they degenerate into red tape, that dangerous social gangrene which spreads through the whole social organism and threatens to destroy it, were it not for the alarm and remedies given in due season by social physicians or moral geniuses.

The moral genius feels more or less consciously that the only desirable and useful social elements out of which an ideal, solidary human society can be built up are the hard-working, honestly striving, obscure, unknown, unnoticed, unobtrusive people, and those superior men who gain fame without striving for it. A useless, nay, a dangerous element, does the moral genius see in financial speculators, those sham aristocrats, born candidates for capitalism, and intra-social criminals, those congenitally—hence incorrigibly—greedy, selfish, rapacious, narrow-hearted, insatiable, parasitical individuals whose entire intelligence is consumed in inventing devices for enslaving their fellow-men, and for robbing under the appearance of serving them. Their only ability is to take advantage of others' incompetence, ignorance, poverty, helplessness, confidence, to exploit those being in desperate straits, to

shift the hardships and uncertainties of life's struggles onto the shoulders of the ill-informed and poor class. The moral geniuses, social reformers, have always approached some form or other of cooperation or socialism: they have dimly or clearly foreseen that if all kinds of services rendered to others were regarded as services rendered to the community, and hence were remunerated and regulated as to supply and demand by the latter, and appreciated by specialists, instead of being remunerated and appreciated by the incompetent, or stupid receivers of the services, as it happens in our individualistic, unregulated, competitive society, there would be no divorce and no lagging behind between ability and success, there would be no room for ignorant but cunning charlatans and demagogues living at the expense of ignorant, or stupid clients or voters; to perform one's duties and to please one's superiors and clients would not require two different abilities, would not require a splitting up of our attention, a splitting up of our convictions and morality into private and public. To do away with the uncertain, arbitrary remuneration of services by incompetent individuals, to do away with the horrible disproportion between supply and demand due to unbridled competition, to lack of wise regulation, means to eliminate the most important causes of the soul-destroying economic dependence, of favoritism and nepotism, of greediness, corruption, charlatanism, of waste of time and energy in mere material pursuits, of tyranny and of slavery; it means to prevent in the social organism the pathogenic proliferation of the unnecessary, parasitical professions and connecting elements between producers and consumers.

CHAPTER VII

INFLUENCE UPON THE MASSES

Influence of Thinkers and Artists.—It is no mere figure of speech to say that the common mortal is unable to see with his own eyes, especially with his mind's eye. He sees and does what geniuses suggest to him. The poet spurs, impels to action; the thinker guides, opens up infinite perspectives; the man of action leads. We do not perceive new things or relations until our minds are prepared to do so by intellectual geniuses. Likewise, we do not feel love or duties toward other social classes, other nations, races, until love and duties are implanted in our hearts by moral geniuses. Just as we close our bodily eyes because we feel pain when we pass suddenly from darkness to light: just so do we close our mind's eye when we are brought suddenly from ignorance, illusions, error, to knowledge, truth, insight; for such a sudden passage is too painful, as it gives no time to our bodily and mental eyes to accommodate themselves.

An addition, progress, a step forward, is of very little use if it is preceded or followed by a subtraction, regress, a step backward: without conservation, no real progress. Jurisprudence, legislature, the state, has mostly in view the conservation, the maintenance of the existing moral level, of the moral equilibrium; ethics has in view the raising of the moral level. The former is a moral statics, the latter a moral dynamics; the former requires deeds, facts, the latter requires intentions; the former makes men less dangerous, the latter

makes them more useful, better: jurisprudence is a negative ethics. Above the moral sphere, however, there is the still vaster sphere of sympathy, including the former; morality deals with our intentional acts and the corresponding feelings of responsibility; an extension of this sphere would include our unintentional acts also, together with the effects upon social life, and the corresponding feelings of moral satisfaction or regret; the sphere of sympathy includes, in addition to intentioned and unintentioned social activity, those social happenings which are not appreciably influenced by single individuals. Hence a genius influencing the sympathy sphere fulfils a higher function than one acting upon the moral field, in its narrower sense.

Form is more accessible to our understanding than content or essence; for it appeals to our senses first, whereas the latter appeals to reason. Hence, the greater and perhaps exclusive influence upon the majority exerted by artists, poets, orators, than by thinkers, scientists, philosophers. Thinkers act indirectly upon the mass, through the intermediary of the emotional and of the active men.

The cosmico-social environment acts upon the mind of the superior man. The genuine superior man acts unobtrusively, disinterestedly—nay, often to his own detriment—through his writings and works upon the book-reading public, upon the vain semi- and materialistic pseudo-superior men who in their turn act either *viva voce*, by word of mouth, directly upon the non-reading masses whose only source for acquiring knowledge and new aims of activity is personal contact with real or self-styled well-informed men, or through the press upon magazine and newspaper readers. If we pass from the non-reading public to the newspaper readers, from these to the magazine readers, and from these to the book readers, we notice

a gradual broadening of the intellectual horizon, a gradual change in the intellectual needs and interests: from local, superficial, personal, interested, they become universal, deep, impersonal, disinterested. If the thinker prefers book-reading to the reading of newspapers and magazines, it is not only on account of the narrow, local, trivial facts contained therein, but mainly because even these little facts are adulterated in favor of private and of class interests.

The philistine is not accessible to the impalpable, ethereal influence of ideas or opinions, unless they are coming from a person of prestige whom he sees, hears, or knows of. The magazine and novel reader who stands intellectually a little higher than the orator- or newspaper-worshiping philistine, is more sensitive to the ethereal influence of thoughts; but his sensitiveness alone would not enable him to assimilate any new thought unless its influence is backed up or reenforced by that of a living writer manifested from time to time in the form of incidental personal remarks. Depersonalized, purely scientific and philosophic ideas, i. e., ideas detached or freed from the *viva vox* of the orator, from the prestige of a living author, from the obligations towards and personal relations with the writer, from the alliance with the private or class interests underhandedly subserved by newspapers, magazines and books of the day: such ideas enter and influence only the highly sensitive intellect of a genuine thinker.

Thinkers need not complain of their little direct influence; for this seeming disadvantage is the very condition for the conservation of the purity of their thoughts: Rare is the admired man who does not become the slave or flatterer of his admirers; and, in addition to this, fame, like wealth, attracts its specific parasites.

The admired or prominent man becomes an unconscious flatterer of his admirers. Not so much of those who of their own initiative began to admire him for his original, bold, truthful or beautifully expressed ideas, as of those who admire him out of imitation, who admire him merely because they do not want to be behind the times and because they do not want to be accused of inability to appreciate men of ability or merit, who admire him without knowing his real self and value, who admire him because of his success.

Reason does not convince the masses, suggestion alone can appeal to their attention. The man of genius who is already a recognized authority, addresses the people, and, in his naïveté, flatters himself to meet with understanding and agreement, when, in reality, not his words have produced the visible effect, but his personality, his fame, have produced it. The same eloquent, and even more eloquent, words uttered by an unknown genius would have met with a deaf ear.

The mind of the genius, and of the superior man, is elastic, i. e., if one system of ideas is pulled out from its setting, the other systems of ideas which are immediately and mediately connected therewith are soon and naturally dragged along in the same direction. The mind of the philistine, however, is inelastic; but it is more or less malleable. New ways of thinking and doing must be hammered in slowly and patiently, and old ways must be hammered out by dint of repeated suggestion. If forced to accept at once new ways, it breaks, it becomes demoralized.

In an elastic mind, if a set of ideas is expanded, is drawn along a new direction, the connections of this set with other sets of ideas are not broken: they merely change their configuration, the unity or harmony of the whole being preserved. Whereas in an inelastic, rigid, dogmatic, custom-bound mind, a system of ideas

under the pressure of new directions of thought-movements splits up into disconnected, disaggregated, fragmentary minor systems which lose thereby their firm standing ground and begin to shift around like erratic, uprooted plants, driven hither and thither by water-currents, winds and storms. This explains partly why compulsory, sudden civilizing of savages is always demoralizing, because it overtaxes their natural mental elasticity; the main reason, however, why savages become demoralized and disappear is the fact that they come mostly in contact with, and are mercilessly preyed upon by, greedy adventurers and the scum of the civilized nations.

The needs of philistines, and especially of women, are mostly so vague, so indefinite, so much under the influence of suggestion, so little shaped by real external and internal Nature, that the philistine does not know how to recognize—let alone how to strive for—the objects capable of gratifying them. He feels that he needs a guide, a leader, a teacher, to point out to him what is valuable, what is to be noticed, remembered, striven after, rejoiced over, boasted of, etc. He prefers to have a man rather than a book or Nature for his guide; for in a book the valuation of things must be inferred, and Nature speaks merely in hints, whereas from the living guide's words, gestures, intonation, unmistakable attitude towards men, things, ideas, he can tell immediately, without much reflection, who and what is worth being sought for, and who or what is to be shunned or fought against. Personally, i. e., left to himself, the philistine has neither strong attachments nor strong aversions for men, things, ideas: but suggestion and guidance may inflame his naturally feeble affections and desires into seemingly inextinguishable passions. It is easier, of course, to instil affections into the philistine's heart than to instil ideas into his

mind. It is easier to suggest to him affections for men and objects than for ideas and ideals. And it is easier to suggest to him affections for the form than for the essence of men and things. It is easier to arouse in him enthusiasm for things, like base-ball, races, fights, wars, . . . that give him perishable, useless, and even harmful but momentary and immediate pleasure than for things that yield permanent, useful, beatifying but not immediate pleasure.

Influence of Mystics.—The mystical writers have seemingly a greater influence upon the majority than the clear thinkers; for their writings have the gift of telling every one what he desires to be told; the meaning is not read from them, but any meaning can be read into them. Even earnest and clear-headed men fall victims to such obscure, semi-insane, nonsense talk: in their naïveté they take it as a duty to try to comprehend everybody, even those who do not comprehend themselves.

The mystic and the pseudo-mystic apply abstract names to very concrete, trivial things, and thus they seem to express general statements, generalizations, original truths, lofty ideas, where in reality they have in mind and mean to speak about banalities, commonplace, prosaic, worn-out opinions. Otherwise we could not understand their verbosity, for we cannot speak without having something in our minds to speak about. The only trouble is that the mystical, shadowy, seemingly significant language deceives us as to the real concrete content concealed behind it. We believe to hear a platonic, idealistic, agnostic, wise, impersonal, preaching orator or writer, where in reality there is a sensual, materialistic, anthropomorphic, vain, personal, revengeful pseudo-superior man before us.

The modern mystic (theologian, spiritist, theosophist, etc.) pays homage to Science by adopting her

language—if not throughout, at least in the introductory part of his writings, teachings, and preachings—and is thus mistaken for a scientist, although he lacks and hates the convictions, laborious methods, skeptical attitude of mind, lucidity, and intellectual honesty of the latter.

The clear-headed, truth-loving thinker cannot have many adherents, for he expresses sharply defined opinions—about men and things—which compel either immediate agreement or disagreement, without allowing any third alternative. By his unambiguous, bold statements he challenges his opponents to defend their opinions, or to surrender themselves; no unnoticed cowardly escape is left open.

Whereas the nebulous, mystical, truth-shunning thinker who gropes in the dark, and not knowing himself very well what opinions to cling to, does not compel his readers to bring order into their confused minds and to assign the proper place to every idea. He spares them this trouble. His writings are so shadowy, so misty; he glides so easily, imperceptibly, evasively from one opinion over into its opposite; he swings so quickly back and forth between opposite views, that every reader finds and notices only what he likes to find. What the clear-headed thinker does in the intellectual world, the moral genius does in the politico-economic world. He lays bare the real motives of human action. He compels those who take offense at the ugliness of the motives, in which he claims to have discovered the hidden mainspring of their overt behavior, to prove their innocence by changing their methods of dealing with their fellow-men, and by making good for the socially evil results which they claim not to have intended.

Corresponding to the mystical thinker in the intellectual world we have the pseudo-moralist in the

politico-economic world. The pseudo-moralist, unlike the moral genius, makes no enemies, for his incrimination of evil-doers and of evil-doing is so abstract, so impersonal, so shadowy, that no evil-doer will notice it; and his defense of the victims is of the same sort, and, moreover, weakened by so many interlinear hints at their faults that both evil-doers and victims nod consent.

The intentionally nebulous writer or intellectual demagogue, like his materialistic brother, the political demagogue, poses as everybody's defender and friend. The less gifted and cowardly fame- or office-seeking pseudo-intellectuals, who do not feel able to stand on their own feet (I mean: on their own merits and reasoning power) look up to him for support when that offered by the reverence for tradition and for the powers that be is no longer reliable. And he with unscrupulous boldness promises them his support, while in reality it is they, the more numerous minor impostors, who advertise him and support him by leaning against him from all sides. And if any of these confused-minded and mind-confusing weaklings happen to become suspicious of his honesty, greatness or self-supporting ability when they find out that their antagonists also lean against him, then he hastens to privately reassure them that they are really his favorites whereas the attentions of the others he just tolerates good-humoredly or as a matter of policy. Thus, in our times we behold the intellectual weaklings and prostitutes of antagonistic denominations—scientists as well as mystics, revolutionary syndicalists as well as reactionary theologians —flock to the philosophical arch-demagogue, Henri Bergson, the successor of Hegel, to receive his benediction and protection, without feeling in the least disconcerted by the fact that he welcomes friends and irreconcilable enemies alike.

Why and How Far is the Mass Influenced?—The majority stands under the influence of extreme ideal views; the resultant, therefore, is a mean between these extremes. Only extreme views are logical, but the mean alone is strictly useful or practicable.

The influence of the superior men upon the average men consists in preparing their minds to look at the World and at human life in certain ways; it consists in bringing their minds into a state of expectant attention towards the phenomena of nature and of society.

Before we become able to create we have to imitate, and in order to imitate something we must have at least unconscious tendencies towards it. So that the masses, in order to imitate the geniuses, must possess the same aspirations and ability in germ at least, they must be capable of resonance, of vibrating sympathetically, in unison, with the geniuses arising in their midst. And the man of genius, in order to influence the masses, must strive in the same direction as the majority of average men. Nature and human society can be mastered only by obeying their laws.

We assimilate others' ideas by means of our own; we acquire new ideas by means of old ones; we accomplish voluntarily by means of what we do spontaneously: without intellectual capital—be it ever so small—no intellectual enrichment is possible; without intellectual capital, or potentialities, there are no other issues than to be an intellectual laborer, i. e., to think according to the thinking of intellectual capitalists, just as the financially poor have to work according to the will of the financially rich; the only difference—and this is a tremendous difference which, let us hope, in a more humane human society will be done away with—between the intellectual and the financial capitalist is that the former does not exploit the intellectually poor; on the contrary, he uses his intellectual capital for the benefit

of all.

Helmholtz' theory that we hear such sounds only, and see such colors only, for whose corresponding air- and ether-vibrations we have nerve-fibers vibrating sympathetically, i. e., at the same rate and at the same periods: this theory, I say, applies also, and not merely metaphorically, to perception, thought, assimilation of others' ideas and sentiments. If we understand others, if we adopt or share their feelings, it is because, and in so far only as, our higher brain centers vibrate sympathetically with theirs. From the same books, from the same speeches, from the same dramas, from the same newspaper, people with different mental constitutions learn, assimilate, extract different ideas, sentiments and motives of action: the good make a good use thereof and become better, the bad men use the very same intellectual tools for their predatory ends and become worse or more dangerous; the intelligent become more enlightened, the stupid become more confused. It is, therefore, nonsensical to dispute with our academic repositories of wisdom about the beneficial or harmful influence of books, education, Christianity, religion, the Bible, doctrines, theories, when we have merely to open our eyes in order to see in daily life and in historic records that men cannot be permanently influenced to act against their own nature and economic conditions; that verbal adherence to doctrines has nothing to do with practical or real adherence; that under the same flag different men fight from different motives and for different ends; that mere preaching without a concomitant change in the predatory, slavish-hierarchical foundation of our social organization has never done away with the differences in men's physical and mental make-up; that—in a few words—the real influences which concern the future of the human species are, not the influences of professed doctrines, but the influences ex-

erted in every-day life by the various productive and parasitical types of men upon each other and upon the large mass of atypical, but moldable, plastic philistines. Every one learns from others what he wishes to learn, what is in line with his dominant interests. Every influential man hears from his favorites and hangers-on what he wishes to hear. If kings, financial magnates, rulers, leaders, so-called prominent men, . . . do not hear the truth from their advisers and protégés, it is because they do not want to hear it, it is because they do not encourage truth-telling.

If the cogitational, the emotional, and the volitional geniuses influence the masses, it is because, and in so far only as, they find adequate, clear, harmonious expression, channels of purposeful discharge, and means of realization for the vague, shadowy, groping, purposeless, wavering, timid thoughts, feelings and wishes of the masses. The genius' states of mind are more intense, more differentiated, better liberated from the fetters of subconscious and unconscious elements, from the fetters of routine, from the fear of meeting with social indifference or disapproval, hence are in a more favorable condition for finding expression in words, actions, artistic and technical works, social institutions, etc. To have poetic or artistic taste, to have critical ability, means to have the ability of recognizing, of feeling the adequacy of poetical or artistical forms; it means to have the ability of searching, of welcoming in others the expression of our own states of mind which we do not dare to emit or try in vain to find through ourselves. The man of taste, the critic, the popularizer, are intermediators, interpreters between the masses and the geniuses.

The influence and importance of poets is mostly local and national, the influence of scientists and technologists is of international importance, the influence of

philosophers lies rather in the future than in the present. The life-duration of an intellectual work is inversely proportional with the number of men directly influenced by it. Thus purely artistic, literary works are the most short-lived; scientific productions become antiquated in a few decades; philosophic conceptions alone are quasi-immortal.

Why do we average men—who bodily live near each other, but mentally miles apart—learn about real life from the Stage rather than from real life itself, from poets rather than from real heroes?

In the first place, because we identify ourselves with the personages of the drama, novel, etc., so that the sympathy shown them is in reality sympathy with ourselves. In the second place, even the personages with whom we cannot identify ourselves gain our sympathy, for they speak a clear language, they open to us their souls, they let us gain an insight into the entire mechanism of their motives, so that we understand them better than our fellow-men on the stage of real life. In the third place, even if we do not quite understand their motives, still we can sympathize with them, for our sphere of interests does not conflict with theirs.

Suggestion, in order to be efficient, must take into account the will of the person to be acted upon, i. e., it must take into account the actual streams of consciousness, and those associated with it. The suggested ideas must be gradually introduced into the actual stream, until accumulating they get a directing influence and change the direction of the stream, without the influenced person suspecting the tyranny of a foreign will. More correctly, there is no tyranny of a foreign will, for it has become his or her own.

Just as in the domain of physical phenomena, every action causes an opposite and equal reaction; just so in the domain of psychical phenomena, every command

provokes a manifested or suppressed opposition, except in the case when this opposition is counteracted by fear, or the command is reenforced by love, admiration, confidence, i. e., readiness to act in the same direction with the wishes of the commander, leader, hypnotist. Hence the pedagogical rule, generally ignored and violated: "Do not command or dogmatize before you have secured the love, admiration, confidence, or conviction of your pupils, social inferiors, voters, patients, clients, readers, etc."

In traditional and practical matters, superior men are under the suggestive influence exerted by the mass, just as the mass is under their influence in new and theoretical matters. The genius—especially the one-sided—cannot repress and escape entirely and forever the rhythmically, periodically growing and waning suggestive influences of inheritance, tradition, education, and of the philistine masses in matters which do not belong to his field of originality, and in matters of sport, religion, superstition, custom, mystic beliefs, skepticism, spiritism, animism, anthropomorphism. Rare is the genius who succeeds in freeing himself from the influence of prejudices, errors, false sympathies and antipathies, capitalistic selfishness and perverted standards of life which are continually instilled into the minds of men at school, church, in the press, books, from the political platform, etc.

Suggestion, and particularly hypnotic suggestion, in contradistinction to logical persuasion, is a deceitful way of making people believe that they sense, perceive, think, feel, desire, what in reality they do not. It is in individual life the analog of the deceitful method used in political and commercial life by new men (homines novi, Streber, arrivistes, self-seekers, climbers, . . .) when they try to intrude into the caste or closed ranks of the successful or socially prominent. Since

the sudden and undisguised intrusion of a new idea into the unthinking or philistine mind, and of a new man into the ruling or successful caste, arouses opposition, criticism, severe examination; it is necessary to introduce them gradually, imperceptibly, in disguise, when the ruling ideas or the ruling men are too weak to resist, or are asleep, or have their attention diverted in other directions; it is necessary to bribe or to hoodwink into silence the few opponents that remain awake, etc.

Of course, in a genuinely democratic state where every man has access to the administration of public affairs and where everything goes on in broad daylight, there is no room for deceitful ways of becoming prominent. Likewise with individual relations: There is no opportunity for the use of deceitful ways of suggestion and hypnotism with democratically-minded, unprejudiced, broad-minded individuals in whom every kind of ideas find easy access and meet with acceptance merely on the basis of their objectivity. Socialistic, scientific education, in contradistinction to the stultifying education of theologians, hired historians, capital-owned teachers, does not take advantage of the children's immaturity and credulity in order to instil its teachings into their minds; scientific or socialistic education does not base its teaching upon suggestion, hypnotization, terrorization, deceit, upon notions which are not within the children's sphere of daily experience and interests. Honest politics and an honest church do not take advantage of the people's ignorance, poverty, intellectual blindness, ungrounded fears; they do not need secrecy, mysteriousness, bluff, advertisement, pomp, parades, ceremonies, etiquette, bribing or control of the press; all they need is persuasion, enlightenment, appeal to the people's own feelings and interests.

How Suggestion Works.—The only difference between mechanical, physical, chemical, physiological,

psychical and social phenomena is the increasing degree of complexity. Thus: attraction, gravitation, affinity, assimilation, love, social solidarity and intercourse are analogous phenomena of increasing complexity, governed by the same law with increasing interference of other laws. Sympathy and antipathy, looked at from a physical point of view, could be reduced to phenomena of equalization of two opposite degrees of similar emotional states of consciousness: One suffering less in one respect sympathizes with another one imagined as suffering more in the same respect; one enjoying less in one respect feels antipathy for one enjoying more in the same respect. Lack of sympathy, of emotional equalization, is due to a state of insulation, isolation of one of the parties concerned in this act: The capitalistic class, insulated within the sphere of industrial and selfish interests, fails to sympathize with the poor men's sufferings, although taken individually the capitalist may be or can be made broad-hearted; the class of average men, enclosed in the insulating medium of actual, daily, bodily needs, is unapproachable for the disinterested spiritual pursuits of the men of genius, although the average men broken up into smaller groups can be easily approached by genial, original ideas. The emotional genius works through sympathetic equalization, he breaks the insulating, dielectric medium separating poor and rich classes, nations, races, . . . ; the active genius breaks the insulating, misoneistic medium between idea and act, he rubs off the psychical rust, he prompts to action by acting himself.

The suggestive influence exerted by the man of genius upon the mass is analogous to the equilibration of temperatures when a hot and a cold body are brought into contact. Just as the hot body loses heat, so does the man of genius and his ideals lose in loftiness when he comes in soul-contact with common mortals. Society

degrades the man of genius, but it elevates the average man; in society, the genius simulates banality, and the average man simulates originality, loftiness of ideals, until the simulation becomes partially reality. The equilibration of mental temperatures starts with simulation, but ends with conviction. Only the genius who does not act directly upon the people can maintain himself on a high level.

The average and the pseudo-superior men stand as individuals on a much lower plane, whereas the superior men stand as individuals on a much higher plane, than as members of society, of a public institution, than as holders of public functions, as shareholders of public opinion, and upholders of customs and tradition. Horde life, social, guild life, acts as an inexorable leveler. It levels up the philistines, and it levels down the superior men who have no sufficient economic independence to act directly or indirectly upon the masses and upon the guild or profession to which they naturally stand the nearest, but of which they keep at a distance in order to preserve their intellectual independence, in order to remain unbiased and unrestrained in their search for the unknown. Woe to the genius who cannot sacrifice, in case of irreconcilable conflict, the joys of economic security, solidarity, family affection, to his stronger impulses towards the as yet solitary, uninhabited land of truth! In the society of intellectual men, of scholars, of thinkers, women learn to suppress, to dissimulate their vain, prosaic, explosive, emotional, vulnerable natures and simulate tolerance, reasonableness, cool reflection, idealism.

It is very hard to impose an original idea upon society, for no one dares to differ from the others; but no sooner has an original idea begun to be looked upon favorably by a few representatives of a social class than all the members of the class hasten to profess it, for

no one dares to remain behind them. As we see, the same cause which makes social life an almost insurmountable obstacle to originality at its beginning, makes it the best vehicle or medium for the propagation of original ideas, as soon as the ideas are approved by the leaders. Socialism or anti-parasitism progresses slowly because the so-called leading or ruling class—for very obvious and personal reasons—is opposed to it; whereas other intellectual and emotional movements (Reformation, Renaissance, . . .) which have first won the favor of rulers, have made quick progress among the masses also.

Suggestion, after having diverted the victim's attention, brings into the foreground of his consciousness what was in the background; it aggregates states of consciousness that were before in a state of dis-aggregation; it gives them the first impulse towards passing over into act; and transformed into acts, it gives them direction. A retrograde suggestion works in the contrary sense: it changes an oriented, directed, well-regulated, purposeful, serious activity into a disoriented, chaotic, aimless, playful activity; it reduces action to mere impulses or to a system of pure ideas; it first diverts the attention from the system of ideas, it then dissolves it, or disaggregates it in the darkness of unconsciousness.

The suggestion exerted by geniuses, in order to be efficient, must work from the distance, and intermittently; for geniuses form a minority, and a minority can defeat a majority either indirectly, through intimidation, from a distance, giving itself the appearance of a majority, or directly by attacking it intermittently, for a short time, at different points. Thus, geniuses have little influence in the country, where they live in direct contact with the majority; in cities, the mass of average men are broken up into small minorities, so

that they are easily attacked, assailed by original ideas.

Ideas of universal value gain in momentum, influence, prestige, impelling force with increasing spatial and temporal distance between their initiators and the masses to be worked upon: Contemporaries being in close contact with the masses can never exert any progressive influence upon the latter; the dead rule the living, not so much in virtue of what they have really been or done during their lifetime, but in virtue of the momentum, idealization, purification, divinization, authority, accretions which their ideas and personalities have acquired through the long historical distance traversed, through the many traditional transmissions. A nation, a race, a continent that learns and receives an impulse towards progress from another nation, race, continent, is not necessarily inferior to the latter. It only shows thereby that it has less tolerance, less respect for its own geniuses or prophets than for foreign or distant geniality. It only shows that, in order to progress more quickly and sooner, an external impulse is needed in addition to internal tendencies. There was a time when the Orient was the teacher of Europe; now Europe, in its turn, reacts on Asia which seemed to have lost its progressing power. Contemporary geniuses would never act efficiently and progressively upon the masses if they were not psychically isolated from the latter, if they were not sufficiently isolated and insulated in order to escape the gravitating towards the greater mass of philistines, if the mass of philistines—owing to the principle of the division of labor—were not sufficiently split up into smaller, comparatively isolated groups which are thus prevented from uniting their pulling-down influences upon the minority of geniuses. By being split up into smaller groups the philistines become more accessible to the uplifting influences of geniuses, because these philistine groups are acted upon

separately and successively, certain social classes being elevated first to a higher intellectual and moral level, others later, and so on.

With increasing facilities of traveling and of emigrating, the intelligent, open-eyed and original individuals leave their towns and countries, where they have neither the prestige nor the courage, nor the appropriate means to enlighten others. From the distance, from their adoptive fatherland, under the shield of anonymity or of economic independence, their messages gain in prestige, their words can be more impartially, more objectively and more safely listened to; they can speak more openly and sincerely to their remote, personally unknown countrymen than to their personally known fellow-immigrants; they can shed more light upon distant places than they are allowed to shed upon their immediate vicinity.

Between similar psychical elements there exists a mutual influence in the shape of association, suggestion, fusion; between dissimilar psychical elements, such as sensory and motor, sensation and imagination, there is a mutual influence of induction: the intensity of a belief, and of a conviction, decreases when there comes the moment of its being communicated or put into practise, just as the pressure in a transformer sinks when any kind of resistance is inserted in its circuit.

CHAPTER VIII

APPRECIATION

GROSSE SEELEN VERSUS KLEINE SEELEN

Aus Hass, Gier, neidisch Murren
Besteht das Seelen-Leben
Der niedrigen Creaturen,
Die fest am Schmutze kleben.

Sie haben von dem Geiste
Zwar aüsserlich den Schein.
Es ist doch drin das meiste
Nur Schmutz und erzgemein.

Stets heuchelt es das Gute
Und hascht nur nach dem Schein.
Gift flicsst in seinem Blute:
Nie wird ein Mensch draus, nein!

Drum lasst die kleinen Seelen
In ihrem Schmutze wühlen,
Das tut vor Neid sich quälen
Und wohl im Schmutz sich fühlen.

Dies tut vor Aerger bellen,
Wenn hoch am Himmel steiget
Der Mond auf Aether-Wellen
Und nicht zu ihm sich neiget.

Dies kann nur in Intriguen
Sein kleinlich Herz erlaben,
In Dreck und Fäulnis liegen
Und krähen wie die Raben.

Drum, wer den Drang nach oben
In sich, zum Edlen fühlt,
Der fliege! Möge toben
Im Schmutz was unten wühlt.

O. L. S.

Sniatyn, Oct. 8, 1902.

Singur in lume: e a ta sórtă,
Sĕrmane poete, sĕrmane cugetător;
Sufletu-ți pururĭ fu literă mórtă
Acelor din juru-ți, și-adesea tuturor.
Tu simți durere căt întregul norod,
Nevoile sale sunt ale tale nevoĭ,
Suferĭ cu dînsul chinul, jalea ce'l rod,
Cu el împreună te svîrcolescĭ in noroĭ.
Nimenĭ, dar nimenĭ nu simte cu tine
Ce flacărĭ de patimĭ s'aprind în pĭcptul tĕu;
Nimenĭ n'aude a tale suspine,
Când mintea ți-o mistuĭ cu ginduri mii mereu!

O. L. S.
Berlin, April 4, 1901.

Difficulties in Appreciation.—Our knowledge and appreciation of things, of the outer world, proceeds in a similar way as our progressive knowledge and appreciation of men, of the inner world. It proceeds from the surface to the interior; from the near to the distant; from the dynamic, movable, changeable, ephemeral to the static, steady, permanent, eternal; from the brilliant, eye-catching, obtrusive, to the modest, hidden from view, unobtrusive; from the noisy, boisterous, sensational to the calm, reflective; from dazzling, mystifying sophistries to plain but sublime truth; from mere formal, external beauty to complete, internal beauty; from the macrocosm to the microcosm; from the accidental, unessential to the constant, essential; from appearance, form, to reality, essence, substance; from the superficial, noisemaking, self-advertising, self-glorifying semi- and pseudo-superior men to the deep, modest, contemplative, self-effacing, genuine superior men.

An uneducated fool, or lunatic, is an object of laughter and fun for children, whereas the nonsense talk of an educated borderland-lunatic is taken seriously even by clear-headed thinkers; and causes them to waste time and mental energy in trying to read a meaning into what has none.

Little souls appreciate men according to their clothes, or financial rank; and thoughts, according to their wording. Since deep thoughts are obscure to them, or do not convey any meaning to them, they conclude that any mystical, confused language, any combination of high-sounding, rare words, conceal deep thoughts. Hence, their admiration for mystical writers, for true or simulated mysticism, and their contempt for clear thinkers.

If language is a garment for our thoughts, it follows that it has to fit them, i. e., that the flourished, concrete, picturesque, dramatic language which is fit to express emotional thoughts, is not adapted to express abstract, scientific and philosophic truths; for these are of such sublime simplicity, are so rich in content that no adorned linguistic garment can add anything to their value, it can only divert our attention from the truths or thoughts themselves and cause it to be consumed entirely in evoking the concrete pictures and images conveyed by the words. To talk philosophy in picturesque, metaphoric language, in personifications, will be looked upon some day as we now look upon science expressed in mythological language. Pseudo-superior men, if they happen to be authors, always hunt for adorned, grandiloquent, picturesque, or mystical language in order to divert our attention from the common-place truth or untruth clothed in it, in order to gain a wider circle of readers and admirers among laymen who cannot grasp how deep thoughts or truths can be concealed behind clear, transparent, simple language, just as they underestimate the depth of a river if its water is limpid and hence its bottom visible.

Nul n'est prophète dans son pays, because the ordinary mortals expect to see originality in everything, even in hereditary, physiological and habitual acts. Such little self-esteem do they unconsciously betray

that they expect the superior men to be altogether different from them in every respect.

To acknowledge the merits of one who is in a position to compel acknowledgment through himself, does not certainly require any intellectual honesty on our part: simple self-interest, and tactics, advise us to do so, especially if we have to deal with a self-seeking, self-asserting individual.

It is an easy matter to bow before the acknowledged merit; but to find it out for one's self or to dethrone sham merit, requires genuine critical ability, an intellect and a morality above the average. This inability and unwillingness to expose intellectual impostors and to acknowledge or accept genuine original ideas is especially pronounced in our parasitical, self-appointed critics and in our vain academicians and college professors who carry the unscrupulous competitive, pugnacious spirit of the economic world and the narrow-minded chauvinism, caste spirit, sectarianism of the political arena over into the intellectual world.

The value of average men lies in their muscular strength or skill and in their capacity of associating themselves with others; they shine by reflecting the light thrown upon them by the groups or social constellations to which they belong; they are satellites revolving around, and moving or advancing with, the leaders of the group who, in their turn, revolve around distant, to the great mass invisible, geniuses, those majestic solitary stars of the human species, whose intense light, first accessible but to the psychological telescopes of a selected minority, endures and reaches the naked eyes of the great mass of common mortals many, many years after their extinction.

The philistine mistakes the popularizer, the journalist, for the original man, for the thinker; the brainless, pleasure-seeking fraternity-student for the real, knowl-

edge-seeking student; the musical performer for the composer; the reciter for the poet; the professor of philosophy for the philosopher; the law-giver, the ruler, for the law originator, social reformer, social benefactor; the flatterer, the demagogue for a friend, an altruist; the preacher for the moral genius; the gossiping writer for a novelist; the phrase-monger for an original man; the actor for the dramatist; in a word, he mistakes the pseudo- or self-styled and semi-superior men for the genuine superior men whom they merely impersonate, or echo, and whose inspirations they carry out but slowly, imperfectly, incompletely, unfaithfully. This mistake in appreciation is due to the fact that the pseudo- and semi-superior men are nearer and more similar to the philistines; and, driven by vanity or material interests, they obtrude themselves upon the notice of, make themselves known and apparently understood by, the masses.

It is strange that men, the supposedly brainiest animals, should be least capable of distinguishing a genuine leader from an impostor. Instead of following the genuine leader, i. e., the man who is willing to stand at their head, at the place of greatest danger and hardship, they worship dignified-looking scoundrels, cowards masquerading as heroes, parasites posing as guides, who hide themselves behind or in the midst of their adherents in order to use the latter as shields to protect themselves against attacks or as a ladder upon which to climb to prominent, privileged, secure, well-entrenched, unassailable positions. Men are the only animals that fight their leader's battles against his rivals; the other gregarious animals let the candidates for leadership fight it out among themselves, and then follow the conqueror, that is, the strongest.

The value or importance of negligible quantities is usually over-estimated when, by their being added, an

equilibrium is disturbed, a turning of the scales occurs. Thus, we over-estimate men of little talent, and pseudo-superior men, when they espouse the cause of lofty ideals floating in the air, and on the point of being realized. He who has a fine scent to find out ideals of this sort, and knows how to drift with the stream, has not only the advantage of being mistaken for an ideal man, but he can also with impunity gratify his grosser materialistic cravings. A pseudo-superior man conceals his lack of noble sentiments behind apparently altruistic acts, and by an effusion of simulated sentiments he conceals his unwillingness to act. Under the mask of an apparent even-mindedness, reflective calmness, gravity, the pseudo-superior men conceal their frivolity, petty-mindedness, their obtuse, frozen, self-centered heart; under the mask of an ever-smiling, kind-looking physiognomy, they conceal the lack of social sentiments, the lack of genuine sympathy. The assumed air of gravity—which is but a refined form of the terrifying or bullying instinct of beasts—is also intended to frighten others into submission and respect.

The masses in their appreciation of a superior man do not know how to distribute their praise and admiration. They either admire everything he said or did, even his faults, vagaries, intellectual weeds, semi-insane acts; or they ridicule everything in him, even his most humanitarian, most significant fertilizing ideas and actions. They do not know how to combine in due proportion, how to harmonize, praise and blame one and the same person; they do not understand how a sane, superior mind may be insane, deficient in some respects; they do not understand how a man who is superior to them may have the same weaknesses like many of them; they rather prefer to see in these weaknesses mere appearances, or necessary concomitants of the higher qualities.

The mass, in its appreciation of men and things, confuses extremes; for it takes into consideration unessential, superficial similarities. Thus, ordinary mortals mistake an insane man for a genius, and vice versa; for genius and insanity often go together, and both are original; they mistake nonsense for depth of thought, for both are inaccessible to their understanding. The philistines can not grasp that the originality of the insane is equivalent to a deficiency in inhibitory capacity, to a despotism of vanity, whereas the originality of the genius means a surplus of energy; that the incomprehensibility of deep thought lies in its abstractness, in the vastness of its views, whereas that of nonsense lies in the incoherency between the ideas.

The genuine superior man may dislike posthumous fame, he may complain of the lack of admiration and recognition on the part of the masses during his lifetime; but for the progress of society as a whole, the ingratitude of the contemporaries is very advantageous. For the admired genius falls, against his will, under the spell of mass suggestion. In exchange for the admiration shown to him, he has to tolerate the puerilities, the bodily and mental malformations, the nonsensical and grotesque beliefs of the masses; nay, more, he has to invent eulogistic theories in defense thereof, he has to make a compromise between his lofty pure ideals and the *terre-à-terre* impure aspirations of the multitude.

Those who maintain that geniuses have to be encouraged in their creative work by admiration, social recognition, material assistance, do not know the real nature of geniuses; they do not know the spontaneous, the irresistibly impulsive, the self-rewarding character of genius; they do not know how necessary psychical isolation, social obscurity or lack of social prominence, is for the preservation of the loftiness and the purity of genial creations.

The envious praises one man in order to be able the better to decry another one, or he praises a part of a man's merits in order to open an easy access for his censuring the more essential merits. Praise is, with the envious, a means, a tool of his hidden destructive intentions, a means of getting the appearance of impartiality and thus gaining the confidence of his readers or of his audience.

Language and thought are a discontinuous, inadequate translation of our conscious mental activity, or rather a synthesis of its most prominent parts; conscious activity, in its turn, is discontinuous with respect to our sub- and un-conscious mental activity; the latter is a discontinuous translation of external influences acting continually upon our senses. Hence, the difficulty of reading the real thoughts of a genius behind his words, especially when he reads new meanings into old words.

Artistic and technological geniuses clothe their creations in tangible, palpable, concrete forms. Hence, their greater chance of being appreciated during their lifetime and by their own nation than thinkers, scientists, philosophers, whose merits belong to the invisible, but very real, world of ideas, of morality. Moreover, the creations of the former are usually of an actual, direct utility to mankind; whereas scientific and philosophic creations are of a future, potential or indirect usefulness.

The mania for experimenting and calculating in modern psychology is so widespread and highly esteemed that it is carried on and allowed even there where the same results are already attained in a much less laborious way through observation, even there where no real results are reached or likely to be reached. This is a case of scientific idolatry, fetichism for numbers and apparatus. We forget that experimenting, cal-

culating, are only instruments of verification, means of the human intellect; that their returns are in proportion to the capital, stock of knowledge and ability we bring with us before entering upon the business of experimenting, calculating, deducing formulas. Our respect for the experimental method is transferred over to the experimenter and his work, even if he has no aim before his eyes and attains no goal, even if the conclusions drawn from his piles of figures and pseudo-facts are so poor that to say about them "*parturiunt montes, nascitur ridiculus mus*" would be a compliment.

An intelligence that can be read on one's face is an intelligence that exists merely on the sur-face; for genuine intellectual activity is going on deeper, it does not easily betray itself on the surface. A lively face may characterize a man of fine perception, a smart, open-eyed and clever man; but disinterested intellect is not continually on the alert to find out what is going on in the external world. On the contrary, deep, inner mental activity goes often together with a seemingly sleepy face, with intermittent perceptional obtuseness.

Under normal circumstances, and excepting cases of physiognomical mimicry (positive mimicry or the simulating and expressing of feelings that one does not feel; negative mimicry or suppressing the expression of one's inner state of mind), one's physiognomy reveals and betrays not so much or not so clearly the momentary state of mind, the acquired temperament or character, the feelings and motives one is conscious of, the surface of the soul, what one is, the soul of the individual, one's thinking, . . . as it does reveal and betray the usual or relatively permanent state of mind, the inherited temperament and character, the feelings and motives one is not conscious of, the depths or bottom of the soul, what one tends to be in virtue of hereditary

influences, the soul of the ancestors, one's feeling. . . . The genius has neither the stupid, expressionless or monoexpressional face of the philistine nor the wide-awake face and alert eye of the superficially, practically intelligent business man. His physiognomy expresses calmness, serenity, dreaminess, sojourn in the far-away realms of Thought, no or only partial participation in what is actually going on around him.

Our parasite-infested social organization, with its despotical, deceitful, predatory ruling class at the top and the downtrodden, oppressed, fear-stricken toiling masses at the bottom, has brought about a curious lack of correspondence, nay, a curious contradiction between physiognomy and character or intelligence. Thus we see members of the predatory class in whom the ability of mimicking, simulating, exclusively cultivating and exaggerating the form, outer appearance or manifestation of whatever is commonly held in high esteem has reached such a degree of perfection that it is not only inborn, organic, but is also expressed in their anatomic features: They are deception incarnate or personified; they have larger heads, higher foreheads, more expressive eyes, a more defying or challenging attitude, a more smiling and confidence-inspiring face, in short, a more intelligent-, kind-, or brave-looking physiognomy than the intellectual proletarians in comparison with whom they unmask themselves as intellectual pygmies and cowards; they improve upon the outer appearance of their parvenu ancestors, while neglecting to prevent the escape of even the little content of shrewdness which enabled the latter to rise on the backs of the toilers. Whereas among the members of the toiling class—who must hide, repress, give up all individual peculiarities and serve merely as tools of the exploiting class—we meet with men whose intelligence seems to have escaped persecution by hiding itself behind a stupid- or insignifi-

cant-looking face, whose real courage cannot be guessed from their inherited timid look and shrunken body, whose good nature and self-sacrificing love of men seems to be contradicted by their sorrowful, sour, or embittered faces: The indelible marks of stultification, fear, submission, worry, left on their faces, tell the class or race to which they belong, but do not betray their real individuality, their hidden streams of thoughts, their noble, courageous, hopeful, tender hearts beating within their rough, hardened, ugly bodies.

Every man, superior or inferior, has to be appreciated in his own sphere of interests; for interest is the main prerequisite for the attention: what we are not interested in, we do not attend to; what we do not attend to, we are inclined to overlook, to judge illogically. A poet of genius may be a poor logical thinker; a deep philosopher may be a superficial scientist, but he remains none the less a deep philosopher.

The true genius must be more or less of a philosopher; for, even if he be not a born philosopher, advancing far enough in the field of his own specialty, he must necessarily trespass sooner or later on the fields of the other sciences and arts, and thus be brought before the question, What is the connection between all sciences, what is the underlying reality, harmony; in other words, he becomes philosophically-minded.

The speculative thinker, the philosopher, is too much interested in general, final, comprehensive views, in higher syntheses of concepts, in *Weltanschauungen*, to spend his energy in observation, experimenting, which must necessarily confine themselves to a single aspect of a single class of facts; just as the workingman in our specialized, complex modern industrial organization confines his work to an almost infinitesimal detail; whereas the manager, the financial speculator, turn their attention to the entire complex field of a certain

industry, to the entire actual and possible field of production, distribution, transportation, selling, consumption, influencing or bribing the government, etc. Just as in the industrial world, an intelligent, sober, greedy, ambitious, unscrupulous, hypocritical workingman may rise to the dignity of a foreman in a special department of the factory, industrial or commercial concern; then, judging by analogy, he may come to acquire a superficial but for business purposes sufficiently accurate knowledge of the work carried on in the other departments of the concern; and finally, at a more advanced age, he may rise to the top, to the dignity of an active partner, manager, etc.: just so, in the intellectual world, an observer or experimenter of superior intelligence may advance to the dignity of a scientist; by analogy with his own specialty, he may acquire a tolerable knowledge of other allied sciences; and may finally, when advanced in age, rise to the top of philosophical speculation. Just as, in the industrial world, a man of inborn commercial proclivities, and financially well situated, in order to open a manufacturing business, must not necessarily start as a simple specialized workingman, but may simultaneously gather information about all the factory operations and their order of sequence, importance, etc.; just so, in the intellectual world, a man with inborn speculative ability, and with an independent character, may simultaneously assimilate the observations and the experiments made by the scientific workers in the various connected fields of knowledge, and then he may begin to speculate on the basis of these assimilated, and very seldom personally worked-out, knowledges. Just as workingmen rest contented with simple, little varied, not specially nor artfully prepared food; just so, in the intellectual world, the scientific workingman, i. e., the pure observer or experimenter, the non-speculative scientist, rests content with brute,

primitive, unvaried intellectual food, i. e., with mere meaningless, uninterpreted, brute observations of a single kind. Whereas the intellectual aristocrat, the thinker, needs a larger range of varied, specially prepared intellectual food, i. e., he needs all sorts of observations gleaned in all scientific fields and variously interpreted, analyzed, and synthetized.

The speculative thinker is endowed by Nature with an intellectual capital, i. e., with inborn abilities of drawing the most intellectual profit out of single experiences, or with the inborn ability of forming general views, conceptions, hypotheses. He very seldom descends into the low regions of brute facts and of *per se* insignificant details, in order to verify, modify, his old hypotheses and acquire suggestions for new ones. Usually he leaves detailed verifications and modifications of his general views to the scientists, observers, experimenters who, inheriting less or no intellectual capital, confine their field of activity to working out the suggestions of the former and preparing the raw material needed by the former for further intellectual constructions. This is the rôle of scientists, and especially of pure observers or pure experimenters, although they like to disown their anonymous intellectual employer, or benefactor, and although they try now and then to become independent of him.

Reputation, success, presupposes ability, among other qualities; but the converse is not necessarily true: Ability alone does not lead to reputation. Opportunity being given, a lesser degree and even a mere semblance of superiority is sufficient for attaining reputation. Hence, living superior men cannot be appreciated according to their reputation. Nor is it fair to consider with Galton a man superior to his fellow-men just because he happens to have a good reputation, an influential position, the opportunity of exerting power,

making noise, appropriating and putting into practise others' ideas, and—in short—of doing what any normal average man could do in his place.



The analytical writer who moves in straight lines only, i. e., who deals with a single line of thought at a time, has more chance of being read and understood by many, and of gaining quickly reptuation, wealth, etc., than the synthetical writer who while describing the part cannot refrain from giving an idea of the whole, and while following up a definite line of thought ABCD cannot refrain from little digressions, from at least indicating on his way the collateral lines of thought, analogous or parallel lines A′ B′ C′ D′, the super- and subordinated thoughts connected therewith, the principles and the possible applications, etc. The synthetic thinker naturally writes less books than the analytical thinker, let alone than the purely erudite writer; for he offers in one work so many new and fruitful ideas, each of which would be used by an analytical writer to fill a volume by diluting it in a mass of unnecessary details, illustrations, repetitions of commonplace knowledge.

To have abilities is one thing; to know how to transform them into wealth, fame, success, is a quite different thing, is an ability apart; to get wealth, fame, success, by exploiting others' abilities, is a third kind of ability, although an immoral and parasitical one. If genius and fame were necessarily bound up together, we should know the names of those innumerable geniuses of the people who have condensed their wisdom in proverbs,

their noble sentiments in the folk-literature, instead of spreading them out in voluminous printed books. Not the genuine original man who is never in a hurry to publish his original ideas as soon as they arise in his mind but waits until he sees them grouping themselves into an harmonious whole, not this Spinoza-type of thinkers become famous during their lifetime; but those pseudo- and semi-superior men who spread their slightest original ideas into magazine articles, those who understand how to exploit actuality, how to fight and talk about one-sided, immature theories and movements on account of their being sensational, actual, in fashion, i. e., fit for ostentation of superiority, and on account of their authors being men of established reputation, and not on account of the intrinsic and permanent value of the theories themselves. In our present individualistic society based upon an inexorable, unscrupulous competition among its members, the main requirement to get and to keep a position is not so much the specific ability to perform one's duties as the unearned privilege of having been born into an influential family, the ability to please or, rather, to flatter one's superiors, the ability to conceal one's poverty, ignorance or incapacity, the ability to exploit one's social inferiors and willingness to share the spoils with superiors.

Only those who hopefully and naïvely rush straight and whole-souled into the uncertain battle of life, without any *arrière-pensée* or mental reservation to desert the field of battle, to take the roundabout way of parasitism and hypocrisy in case of imminent danger or failure, to break with the moral code as soon as it becomes a hinderance to their success; only those, I say, begin soon to feel the burden of life's tasks and responsibilities, become paralyzed by the fear of failure, are exposed to premature breakdown, are exposed to being inexorably thrust back by life's stumbling-blocks into

the abyss of misery, apathy, vegetation, and insanity.

In the so-called sociable man, the critical sense is over-active, over-zealous when he has to deal with the disinherited and exploited class, with *homines novi*, with superior men unknown to public opinion; and the same critical sense falls asleep, nay, it becomes under-active when he has to deal with wealthy, prominent or illustrious men. In the over-active, hypercritical stage, he sees common-place, banality, defects where there is true originality, genuine merit; in the under-active, hypocritical stage, he tries to see the reverse, his parvifying eyes become magni-fying. The so-called sociable man is superficial in all respects: in his thinking, feeling, and acting. He is friendly with everybody, but a friend of nobody. He talks about everything, but at bottom he understands nothing.

Superiority in intelligence can never be tested, except by means of original work. For knowledge may be merely verbal or memorized, reasoning about old subjects may be merely an analogical reasoning, made by analogy with memorized reasoned-out problems. The difference between real and verbal knowledge is the fact that the possessor of real knowledge can draw further conclusions from it and make practical application of it.

Just as there are so-called sons of good families who find access everywhere without being asked for legitimation, without being controlled as to whether they belong there, so there are words, phrases, sentences of good repute, which being handled by any humbugger in discussing any scientific, philosophic, or literary matter, give him the appearance of a thinking man, because our respect for those stereotyped expressions prevents us from testing their legitimation in a certain context. In other words, the thoughtless, superficial humbugger hides himself behind expressions that mean something to

others, but are empty words to him; he exploits symbols of thought, just as dishonest politicians and dealers exploit symbols of patriotic, domestic, etc., sentiments. What is true of stereotyped, sanctioned expressions holds good, although in a lesser degree, of language in general: A thoughtless or superficial man can speak without his thoughtlessness being detected; because we, naïve people, are used to see thoughts behind language.

Just as philistines, and even psychologists, especially the so-called ethnical psychologists, are usually unable to understand the psyche of individuals belonging to other classes, countries, nationalities or epochs, owing to external, superficial, or acquired, imitated differences in language, manners, customs, clothing, etc., which the former mistake for fundamental or inborn differences; just so do the masses of philistines, living in very low intellectual regions, misunderstand and even ignore or doubt the existence of the intellectual heights with their broad horizons and pure moral atmosphere where the genuine superior men live: the only superior men whom the masses admire and hail as such, are the semi- and pseudo-superior men who live at an intellectual level sufficiently high to enable them to see and to ape the loftiness of genuine superior men, but very near the low region of common mortals to be within the visible range of these and to dazzle them with the light of their economic success and prominence.

Since lucrative occupations or serious activities are nowadays very seldom a matter of choice and of specific ability, it follows that a man's character, dominant interest and ability, betrays itself much better in, or can much better be appreciated or inferred from, the kind of amusement, play activity or unremunerative occupation in which he freely, preferably and sincerely takes delight, i. e., in which he does not indulge for the mere

sake of interested or disinterested sociability; for in play or in revery man expresses or vents his impulses which have been partly or entirely suppressed during his bread-winning activity. Thus the pseudo-scientist, whose scientific investigations are mostly plagiarisms and a mere instrument for enrichment or gratification of vanity, will never seek relaxation in disinterested investigations, discussions, conversations not pertaining to or not in connection with his specialty, but will rather do anything else or idle away his leisure time. The genuine thinker finds relaxation only in self-imposed intellectual pursuits, revery, lectures, reading, instructive and thought-stimulating conversations, walks or travels that furnish unlooked-for material for reflection, but never in the philistine's games or aimless muscular exercises. The business man who does not get sufficient satisfaction or profit out of his business, and who is in business, not for a mere livelihood, but out of greed or rapacity, finds relaxation in gambling, card-playing, ball games, races and prize-fights, which mimic the exciting competition or warfare of the business world. The wage slave who drudges day after day, year after year, without any hope for better circumstances will find pleasure—if he is not yet entirely stultified—in listening to agitators or pioneers of a better social order; if stupid, he will find pleasure in forgetfulness, sleep, thoughtlessness, or illusory hopes and happiness induced by intoxicants, narcotics, joking, mutual teasing, lotteries, betting, etc. The pseudo-ruler who in modern times has no more chances of fighting and killing men, and who does not really care to leave the world a little better than he found it, will indulge during his leisure time in boxing, hunting, killing animals, or in intrigues, secret vindictiveness, schemes of boosting and immortalizing himself. Of the great mass of modern women, for whom love is the main or

only business in life, those who are serious-minded, sexually honest and not actually in love will find relaxation in the reading of novels that deal with love affairs; the sexually dishonest spend their leisure time on flirtations, in frequent visits to resorts for pleasure-seekers; the married and sexually honest women of the well-to-do class find pleasure in gossip, aimless and endless talk, slander, private philanthropy, dilettantism, etc.; only the poor workingmen's wives who are faithful to their domestic duties can hardly find time for amusement. The idler whose entire time is filled out merely by play, wasteful consumption, pleasure-seeking, love-making, etc., is at an even lower level than animals which have at least one serious pursuit in life, viz., securing of food for themselves and their progeny. The honest man who takes seriously his duties as a bread-winner and who hardly ekes out a living for his family does not seek any relaxation or amusement; the individual who is so fortunate as to follow a profession which is at the same time his vocation, i. e., the realization of his natural abilities or interests, is not much in need of relaxation. He who really likes his work and considers it as his life calling never seeks or finds pleasure in an activity of an opposite kind. Thus the genuine philanthropist does not find pleasure in joining in the plutocrat's favorite faultfinding with the poor; the genuine scholar could not waste his time on gossip, platitudes, petty ambitions, athletics; the genuine, vocational athlete sincerely abhors intellectual pursuits; the genuine, disinterested leader of men cannot find time for idle amusements; the genuine labor leader does not feel at ease at the table or in the parlors of the exploiters; and so on.

Admiration without Adherence.—We may admire a great thinker without admitting his theories, if we keep in mind that the fundamental ideas upon which he con-

sciously or unconsciously is building, are often imposed, impressed upon him through physiological or social heredity. He may have built a masterly, logical, intellectual edifice upon a shaky, illogical foundation. Hence, we cannot always take the amount of solid objective truth attained by a genius as a criterion of his greatness. Objectivity is the true criterion for those geniuses who are at liberty to choose their basis of foundation. Logic, consistency, is a general criterion for the greatness of all geniuses. The writings of the genius are harmonious organic wholes, intellectual organisms rather than complete, systematical arrangements of related knowledge. The reverse holds of the non-original writers.

Treatment of Superior Men and Their Social Usefulness.—We treat men, not according to their merits, or according to what they are, but according to what they pretend to be, according to their claims or pretensions. The pseudo-superior man takes advantage of this natural mixture of cowardice and politeness of the average civilized man; whereas the true superior man is too modest, too reticent, too absorbed in higher pursuits to ask for the treatment he deserves. Instinctively, or out of fear, cowardice and self-interest, we bow before, and give importance to, those who assume an air of importance, usurp authority, and do not shirk any foul means that may be necessary in order to keep it up.

The ideal man, the straight-minded, the poor, are exposed to having their merits turned into defects, or ignored, or at best under-rated, and to having their defects over-rated, if not entirely invented. For they have no time, patience, opportunity, or ability to proclaim their own rights and merits. Nor can they compete with the pseudo-superior men who boldly, persistently, and loudly impress their superiority, their

claims on honor and respectful treatment, upon the intellectually blind masses, which have neither the courage, nor the need, nor the means of verifying the justification, the foundation of such claims. By pseudo-superior I do not mean a man wholly destitute of merit and of usefulness for mankind. Superiority cannot be simulated, imitated, by him who has none. Simulation means to exaggerate what we have in a small quantity; to give the appearance of actuality, permanence, voluntariness to what occurred in the past, occasionally, spontaneously; to give the appearance of altruism, sympathy with others, to what is in reality egotism, sympathy with ourselves or self-pity.

The usefulness and harmfulness of the pseudo-superior man is in the intellectual world the same as that of the middlemen in the commercial and economic world. They are a necessary evil as long as producers and consumers, I mean geniuses and people thirsty for knowledge, are widely apart, are not in immediate contact, are not united into one and the same class. The semi-superior men (poets, novelists, literary writers, emotional geniuses, most social reformers) are more honest, socially more useful, because less selfish, intellectual intermediators between the great original, independent, solitary thinkers and the masses than the pseudo-superior men (most professors, professional preachers and moralists, journalists, leaders, professional or imitative writers, i. e., writers without inspiration, academical philosophers, sectarian and official scientists . . .). The prominent and influential pseudo-superior men are too well trained and born actors to betray their real characters, their real thoughts, feelings, and doings. But no matter how skilfully they may deceive themselves, the masses, and even sincere historians, they cannot conceal their meanness and hypocrisy from the scrutinizing eye of the inde-

pendent truth-lovers who, unfortunately, are as yet such *rarœ aves*, who, in their appreciation of such hermetically sealed individualities, guide themselves by the maxim, "Tell me whom you favor, and I'll tell you who you are"; "Do you favor hypocrites, mercenary or venal panegyrists, and self-seekers, then you belong to the same class."

The morally pseudo-superior men (professional moralists, preachers, most leaders and organizers of philanthropic, labor, political, ethical, . . . institutions) pose as intermediators between the moral geniuses and the masses. The moral geniuses supply, without expecting and without getting any other remuneration but inner moral satisfaction, ethically original ideas, schemes for bettering the condition of the people, for raising the moral level, for increasing human solidarity. And the financial or exploiting class supply the material means for the support of such institutions, on condition that the pseudo-superior men, in their apparent altruistic work, do not interfere with, or betray, the criminal and parasitical methods of the exploiters. The moral genius is too distinterested, too honest, to accept support from the ruling and exploiting class on such conditions. On the other hand, he is too poor and too lonely to be able to carry on the holy fight on his own account. Moral progress is, therefore, left mostly in the hands of pseudo-superior men who are willing to make a compromise between their own convictions and their personal interests; who—in other words—are quite willing, although not very eager, to serve the people if their own interests are also furthered by so doing. A radical, quick, complete, real cure of social evils cannot, of course, be expected from such semi-mercenary defenders of morality.

The pseudo-superior man is rather a hindrance to than a factor or promoter of truth, morality, art,

progress, social happiness. He turns everything into a profession, into a business, into a source of personal profit. He embraces the cause of a new truth, idea, sentiment, religious, social or ethical movement, if, so long as and in so far only as, it can be made profitable to himself. But he lives just as well and at the same time on the prejudices, fears, superstitions, ignorance, quarrels, . . . of the masses, as he lives on the higher pursuits, inventions, lofty ideals, peace aspirations of superior men. Like the middlemen of the economic world, he has no real interest either in producers or in consumers, either in employers or in employees, either in the ruler or in the ruled, either in defendants or in plaintiffs, etc. He cheats both out of their possessions; he keeps both asunder, while making believe that he tries to bring them together; he keeps up and instigates class struggles or antagonisms, under the mask of working for reconciliation. He is neither interested in the cessation of social evils nor in the victory of the good; for this would mean the end of his lucrative and glorious parasitical career. His craving for power or authority is but a mitigated and disguised form of rapacity. The pseudo-superior men are the merchants of the intellectual world: they commercialize, capitalize, sell, nay, they often also take the credit for, the ethical, religious, scientific ideas which they steal from the intellectual producers or geniuses; whereas the dealers in material commodities cannot so easily avoid giving some credit and paying something to their victims, that is, to the economic producers.

The pseudo-superior man, while giving himself the appearance of furthering human progress, is in reality a hindrance in its path. He who has no ability whatsoever of doing, inventing, composing, writing, ruling, guiding, constitutes himself a critic, counselor, and has the audacity of setting down, prescribing, or teaching

the methods of acting, the rules of invention and composition, the forms of writing, the standards of language, the laws to be obeyed by the masses and by the geniuses. He who thrives by circumventing, transgressing, violating the laws constitutes himself a legislator and enforcer of laws. The pseudo-superior men invent all kinds of handicapping devices to keep the superior men and the masses in bondage; they invent all kinds of legal, financial and other networks for capturing the fruits of the people's labor. They turn the originally or supposedly useful institutions into sources of gain for themselves, into means of enslaving the masses and of holding back the aspiring, high-soaring geniuses. Fortunately, however, they get sometimes caught in their own nets of legal fiction and of empty idealistic, patriotic talk, and have to stick therein until they find a way out of it; but meanwhile the genuinely ideal men and the masses regain an ever-increasing part of their lost freedom. And lately the economic, financial, commercial, political, educational, and other apparatus have become so complicated, so labyrinthine, so interdependent, so international in character that they promise to grow beyond the concerted and immediate control of pseudo-superior men, and hence to become ready to be taken over by the entire nation, nay, by the whole intelligent and honest portion of mankind.

Under the actual reign of hypocrites, of pseudo-superior men, fostered by the competitive struggle for existence, there is no danger in talking idealism; for every one does so, even the crassest, most incarnate materialist. The superior man, the idealist, becomes an object of hatred, a *bête noire*, when he is so naïve as to act as he thinks and speaks, when he is so naïve as to think that all those who talk idealism are with him, while in reality they are against him, for the ideal principles which they proclaim are not meant for every-

day use. Unsuccessful, he stands alone; successful, he has the whole world on his side; all the hypocritical pseudo-idealists vie with each other in greeting, hailing, proclaiming him as their leader, master, and what not.

The ideal man is the *enfant terrible* of his friends and acquaintances. They like him privately, but keep away from him in their public and social life where they are wearing the same mask like all the rest. The ideal man is badly disillusioned if from the friendship shown him privately by everybody he infers that he may count upon it in public life.

The lot of the ideal superior man was, is, and will always be: abnegation, solitude. Socrates, despised by the sophists, his contemporaries, and condemned by the then ruling pseudo- and semi-superior men, would not be better off to-day if through some miraculous chance he should reappear upon earth: the professors of philosophy, or the modern sophists, and the political leaders who constantly quote and glorify him, would be ashamed of counting him among their friends or guests. And those who to-day preach in the name of Jesus, would keep away from him as from an unsociable, inadaptable, eccentric revolutionist, should he be so unfortunate as to reappear among them. Nay, I am afraid, they would soon excommunicate him from the Christian Church, for he could hardly refrain from denouncing it as being everything else but Christian in spirit.

Mutual Appreciation Between Superior and Average Man.—The genuine superior men are ridiculed—not always openly—by average and pseudo-superior men for their modesty, simplicity, unpretentiousness, for their belief in the phantom of immortality, eternity. And the superior man, in his turn, pities the average and pseudo-superior men for their ephemeral pursuits, illusory and perishable pleasures. In reality, both classes

misunderstand one another. Both act logically, for they can not do any better. What is illusion, unattainable, of little use, an uneventful life for one class, may be real, attainable, the only good, an eventful life for the other class. He who has to expect everything from the actual local society, in the midst of which he lives, can not act like the idealist who acts for eternity, for the whole of mankind.

The clear-headed, truth-loving, altruistic, genuine superior man merely feels bored, but not personally insulted, by the writings of mystical, obscure, word- and self-worshiping, rigoristic, pseudo-superior men; whereas the latter get irritated, feel personally insulted when compelled to peruse the impersonal writings of the former.

Every individual, in his appreciation of others, can not help taking himself, at best his own aspirations, as a unit of measure, as a standard. The matter-of-fact, truth-loving, clearheaded, . . . individual can not help being a little prejudiced against, hence unjust to, the formal, insincere, vainglorious, self-glorifying, mystical men. His contempt for untruthfulness and obscurity makes him underestimate the little amount of good qualities and the talent of the latter. But still more unjust is the self-seeker, insincere, mystical, . . . towards the truth-loving individual; he appreciates, however, the greater skill, the greater talent in individuals of his own class, if such an appreciation does not harm his own glory or interests. Every one admires and betrays himself in others, i.e., he admires in others his own attainments and aspirations. The insincere and the masses of blind imitators, however, express verbal, external, interested admiration for any type of men whom fortune has favored with success and popularity. Hence, if we have no way of judging others by means of our own eyes, it is not enough to collect indiscriminately the opinions of critics. We must give most

weight to the opinions of truth-loving colleagues whose interests are neither in conflict nor bound up with those of the individual whose merits are to be appreciated; we must give more weight to inner, autonomous, active, unconsciously betrayed admiration than to outward, heteronomous, passive, deliberately expressed admiration. We must consider not so much *what* verdict one passes on the individual to be appreciated as we have to see *who* passes it; not so much *who* criticizes as *why* he does so. A genius is very seldom a good critic. He finds too easily expression for indescribable thoughts and feelings; he finds too easily answers to questions that others ask in vain, to be able to appreciate the value, adequateness, and inaccessibility of his findings to others. He has too peculiar and irrepressible ways of his own to be able to appreciate the ways, means, methods employed by other geniuses. Taking himself as a standard, the genius usually fails to see the importance and value of lesser talent to the great mass. He stands too high above mere talent to be able to appreciate, to estimate correctly distances traversed in those low regions, to be able to appreciate differences between philistines and talented men, or differences between various degrees of talent. He is in a better position, however, to appreciate greater geniuses than himself and also geniuses who stand immediately below him, if they belong to his own class or, at least, to a related class, i. e., he can appreciate geniuses who stand nearer to him horizontally or vertically, but he has no real understanding for geniuses of a quite different type or class. The born critic, who stands midway between the average mind and talent, but much below genius, is in a better position to appreciate, to estimate correctly, talent and differences in talent; but is less able to appreciate differences between geniuses. The man of genius may, however, be a good critic in

fields of activity where he has mere taste, or mere talent but no originality.

We can estimate correctly the value and significance of men, institutions, ideas that are not too much above nor too much below us. Thus the semi-scientific observer or experimenter who scoffs at speculative thinkers in general, at speculation and generalizations in fields of knowledge untrodden by, and unknown to, him, feels proud, however, if he himself succeeds in attaining some general view, some speculative conclusion or hypothesis in his own field of activity; because he is able to appreciate the loftiness and guiding influence of speculation in his own specialty. To take another example from the industrial world: the plain workingman who sees the necessity, the *raison d'être* of a foreman, may fail, however, to see the importance of an engineer, of a superintendent. If the self-conceited finds fault with everything and with everybody who does not bow humbly before his imaginary highness; it is because he wants to throw into relief his own self-important personality; it is because he wants to prove his own greatness and perfection by finding everything small and imperfect, and because he finds pleasure in robbing others of their hard-earned repute. He spares those only who are willing to pay tribute to him and to become his intellectual vassals.

But if the genuinely superior man finds faults, imperfections, pettiness, . . .; it is not because he is blind to merits, perfection, greatness; it is not in order to extol his own merits, or because he enjoys belittling everything. If it were so, he would spare his admirers, he would take delight in his being unique and different from others. As a matter-of-fact, he can not help finding the littleness of others when he measures them with the standards of his own greatness, achievements and aspirations.

The pseudo-superior men display great ingenuity in belittling all the genuinely superior qualities of the genius. Thus the philosophical sagacity which does not allow itself to be blinded by outer appearances, superficial differences between various epochs, historical changes and apparent progress, as to the hidden realities, deep-seated similarities, real stagnation, is described as lack of historical sense; the refusal of the genius to join in frivolous, stultifying amusements brings upon him the charge of lacking the sense for humor; the moral genius is charged with unfitness, impracticality, inadaptability, anarchistic propensities, etc., when he condemns the competitive, *laisser-faire* system of earning a livelihood because it brings social prominence and material success to greedy, vain, megalomaniacal, one-sided degenerates who devote their entire time to the accumulation of money and of power, and who are entirely deficient in morals, altruistic concerns, intellectual needs; many-sidedness and mental fertility is decried as inability to stick to the point, inability to concentrate his attention, as evasion of the issue; his frankness, open-heartedness, lack of distrust, his kind-heartedness, unsophisticatedness, disinterested love of knowledge and of men, his idealism preserved in the midst of our cruel, prosaic, corrupt, predatory régime, are labeled as childishness, naïveté, foolishness. Strange that the genius' cosmopolitism, his indifference to and disrespect for the accidental, artificial, compulsory, transitory, unimportant national and racial distinctions have not yet been baptized as lack of the geographical sense. His subordination of material, personal, immediate interests to truth, and to spiritual, general, remote interests has been attributed to unfitness, tactlessness, lack of business ability or some other deficiency, as if all kinds of unfitness were blameworthy —even if it is unfitness for evil—, as if a deficiency in

one kind of ability could account for the presence of an ability in some other direction, as if movement or activity could be accounted for by lack of ability or of opportunity to rest and stay inactive, as if the ability to rise higher could be explained by the inability to stop at a lower level, as if unfitness for the actual, prosaic, egoistic, predatory social organization were sufficient to explain the fitness for, and ability to strive after, a more ideal, cooperative, altruistic human society. As a matter-of-fact, it requires nowadays much more ability, intelligence, self-reliance, love of men, courage, foresight, farsightedness, and a higher kind of fitness or adaptability (active or progressive adaptability) to get along by straight, honest, socially useful work than by roundabout, deceptive, parasitical, flattering, or so-called business methods; to pursue big, generally and lastingly useful things than to rest satisfied with accomplishing little, momentarily or only personally useful things; to abandon, or abstain from, petty ambitions, the pursuit of wealth and popularity than to persist therein; to fight the usurpers of power, the exploiters, the pseudo-rulers, the self-styled or sham aristocrats, to fight the prejudices and ignorance of the masses, to cure the masses of their intellectual blindness in order to render them capable of self-help and cooperation with their real leaders and friends than to flatter or serve those in authority, to take advantage of the people's prejudices, ignorance, blindness and other weaknesses; to express new, original, bold, broad ideas in plain ordinary language than to clothe old, commonplace, cowardly, narrow views in unusual, obscure, abstract, original, bold-sounding language. It is not his hatred of the parasitical or power-seeking minority, but his love of the honest masses, that drives the moral genius—be he socialist, anarchist or communist—to preach contempt for, and

rebellion against the rule of the so-called upper class. Of course, the pseudo-superior men are prone to accuse him of arousing class hatred, which sounds better to them than the more correct expression "hatred of a parasitic minority"; they are not so prone, however, to give him the credit for eradicating by this means the really dangerous and ruinous ungrounded hatreds, prejudices, dissensions, obtaining between races, nations, professions, religious sects, political parties and other such artificial divisions created or kept up by the parasitical minorities for exploitation purposes.

Self-appreciation.—In addition to a lack of differentiation between sentiment and reason, between wish for superiority and the belief in one's superiority, there is another minor reason why women are more self-conceited than men, the rich more than the poor, children more than grown-ups, the socially prominent pseudo-superior men more than the socially obscure genuine superior men, viz., the fact that the former are not only very seldom contradicted in whatever they maintain, especially in the opinions entertained about themselves, but they are continually courted by favor-seekers and all sorts of flatterers.

The pseudo-superior man is self-complacently engrossed in what he knows or thinks he knows, and in his superiority over the masses. The genuine superior man is rather preoccupied by what he does not know yet, by what he yearns to know, and by his inferiority to the ideals pursued. The aristocratic philistine's and the pseudo-superior man's self-idealization and idealization of the *status quo* is a sign of their unprogressiveness, of their purely deceptive originality. It also shows that they are dimly conscious of their deficiencies as well as of their inability for self-improvement, for fearless self-scrutiny, for improving their environment, for really satisfying their inborn

human aspiring impulse.

Usually great minds launch into the intellectual world ideas the range of which they themselves do not know or can not foresee. In other words, they form concepts, laws; they advance general views without knowing the numberless particular cases falling under them, without suspecting their immense sphere of applicability. The disciples of such great men are usually so naïve as to think that these are able to grasp and draw all the consequences from their own original ideas, and hence feel sorely disappointed if they discover in their masters the same intellectual blindness as in philistines with respect to some conclusions and applications drawn from their own theories in a way which seems so obvious, so quasi self-evident to the former, to the disciples.

The superior man can better appreciate his own creations after a certain lapse of time, and especially after having brought to light better creations. He judges the earlier productions in the light of the latter; he also forgets the amount of work expended on the former, and thus becomes able to appreciate them more objectively; for personally the genius takes his creations to heart in proportion to the amount of labor and suffering they have cost him.

The sub- and un-conscious which appear so problematic and mysterious to the psychologist, to the thinker, to the man whose mental activity has reached the climax of clearness or consciousness, are not in reality more mysterious than consciousness itself. Nay, the sub- and un-conscious may be considered less problematical than the conscious, for they represent in our mental or subjective world the data, the cradle and the grave of all thoughts, just as chaos, disorder, an- and dis-harmony, disconnection, . . . in the external or objective world give birth to and then threaten to

swallow the cosmos. Order, harmony, connection, clearness, consciousness, thinking, serious activity, are subsequent to, derived from, and exposed to easily relapse back into, disorder, disharmony, disconnection, vagueness, sub- and un-consciousness, thoughtlessness, play-activity. All new, original, thinking is spontaneous, involuntary: It springs from sub-consciousness, and rises to the day-light of consciousness, conquering all the obstacles and overcoming all the voluntary efforts made to repress it on account of the pains resulting from its dislocating and severing old organized systems of feelings and beliefs. Like many child-bearing women, most original thinkers do not love their new conceptions while being pregnant with them, nor immediately after having given birth to them. The love of the thinker for his original conceptions or spiritual children grows, like the love of ordinary men for their progeny, with the exertions made in their behalf, with the exertions made in order to defend, protect, develop and perfection them.

Only the superior man endowed with objective self-introspection can appreciate himself. The criterion of self-appreciation of the average man is the esteem shown him by his fellow citizens. His resentment of criticism and hatred for critically-minded individuals proves, however, that he is dimly conscious of his lack of praiseworthy qualities. If the pseudo-superior man is so thirsty for popularity, honors, titles, high positions, and so eager to make others believe in qualities that he has not or that he possesses to but a slight extent; it is not only because he wants to deceive others, but also because he wants to deceive himself; it is because his power or capacities can not keep pace with his indomitable ambition. He believes in his own significance in proportion as he succeeds in making others believe therein, in proportion with the praises

bestowed on him by others. He believes so little in his own merits, and has so few of them, that he needs to be persuaded and hypnotized by others into believing in his own greatness. Dissatisfied with his real self, he looks for consolation in an auto- and hetero-suggested self.

Criteria of Genius.—The different kinds of genius are practically incommensurable, i. e., each must be appreciated by means of a qualitatively and quantitatively different standard, or criterion. The criteria of emotional, observational, theoretical, technical, moral genius are respectively the amount of beauty, objectivity (reality), truth and logical consistency, utility, social happiness they can produce. This does not mean that in a work of art, for instance, we have to disregard totally the amount of truth, reality, utility, morality that it may contain. It merely means that a work of art has first of all to be appreciated according to the amount of beauty it contains, for this is its specific or primary quality or aim; but it must also contain implicitly, as secondary qualities, a certain amount of truth, reality, utility, morality, varying between a minimum and a maximum below or above which it ceases to be a work of art; a perfect work of art contains a maximum of beauty, and an optimum of secondary ends. If two works of art are equally beautiful, then the other criteria must be called upon, in order to appreciate their comparative excellence, i. e., the one which is nearer the optimum of truth, reality, etc., will be considered a product of greater genius. In the light of this theory it seems to me that both theories, that of art for art's sake, and that of art as being necessarily moral, socially useful, appear as equally childish, one-sided and short-sighted. A work of art, a novel, must not necessarily have a moral or other purpose. If, in addition to a beautiful

form or description, it contains implicitly, suggestively, a certain amount of truth and of moral teaching, we praise it the more highly. If, however, the teachings are too explicit, the work ceases to be a work of art.

If so many so-called novels with a purpose prove distasteful, it is not because art is incompatible with ethics or because art does not serve ethical purposes. It is either because the novel is too artificial, unreal, improbable, a mere makeshift, intellectually dishonest, i. e., it pretends to draw or extract a moral lesson from supposedly historical, real, or probable events when in reality the moral lesson was ready made and secretly slipped into the excogitated or manufactured narrative to be afterwards seemingly found therein, just as the magician pretends to get out of an empty hat a bird kept hidden in his sleeve. Or the novel with a moral purpose, the drama with a moral dénouement, may be a real work of art, but its readers and critics happen to belong to the dishonest, selfish, parasitical, predatory, capitalistic class, to whom ethics is distasteful under any form, no matter whether implicit or explicit, clothed or naked, illustrated or *in abstracto*. We judge of men and their achievements according to their promises, claims, pretensions, according to what we expect of them. If we are struck by, and hence tend to over-rate, animal flashes of intelligence, it is because animals do not lay any claim to intelligence and because we do not expect to find any reasoning power in them; whereas the intelligence of human imbeciles, which is certainly superior to the intelligence of many an animal, does not strike us at all, because men in general and the imbeciles in particular pride themselves on their "smartness" without displaying any in their behavior. Likewise with men's works: a work which is moral in purpose and origin, but adopts the form of an artistic or literary work, exposes itself to

being under-rated and not valued even for what it is, if it does not do what it pretends to, if it fails to justify its artistic pretensions. Thus many a theme expounded in the form of a poem would be more valuable and more appreciated if it were expressed in plain prose.

Although the criteria of genius are still in their qualitative, subjective, arbitrary stage, a certain use can and is tacitly, implicitly, unconsciously being made of them. It is hard to decide, for instance, between two purely lyrical poets both of whom lend adequate expression to the same human passions. But if one of them is capable of interspersing philosophical reflection, i. e., if in addition to beauty he gives us implicitly a certain amount of knowledge or truth, we declare him as the greater poet even if he does not give a more adequate expression to our sentiments than the other one. Of two purely scientific or philosophic thinkers he is the greater whose generalizations are wider, i. e., allow a survey of a larger field of phenomena. Of two thinkers whose conceptions are equally broad, he is the greater who is more many-sided, i. e., who, in addition to truth, offers poetry, utility, moral ideas also.

Appreciation and Reward of Genius Under the Capitalist Régime.—Just as in our anarchical, predatory economic world the workers or producers are not sufficiently organized to elect their supervisors, chiefs, leaders, rulers among the most many-sided, most broad-minded and most broad-hearted in their own ranks (i. e., among those whose love is not confined to a few particular individuals, and whose skill or interest does not spend itself entirely on a single line of pursuit, but is distributed among the essential operations of all the correlated works of one and the same industry), and have therefore to bow to slave-hunting self-imposed superiors, who are themselves incapable of production,

or to superiors imposed by parasitical rulers and by exploiters; just so in the intellectual world the genuine or vocational poets, artists, dramatists, scientists, philosophers, inventors or other creative thinkers, are too poor and too scattered to elect their own critics among the most many-sided in their own ranks (i. e., among those whose creative and appreciative ability is not entirely concentrated upon a single *genre*, but is rather distributed among the most essential features of all correlated *genres*), and must therefore bow to self-anointed power- or fame-seeking pseudo-critics or to professionals, capital-employed censors (publishers, editors, book-reviewers, readers, official preachers and educators) who, being themselves aborted thinkers, mentally sterile, incapable of intellectual production, incapable of unbiased judgment and often devoid even of taste, monopolize the channels of publicity and thus arrogate to themselves the privilege of dictating what and how shall be written or said, the privilege of sitting in judgment on others' creations, the privilege of distributing praises and honors among their vassals, the privilege of arbitrarily giving or withdrawing the daylight of publicity, the privilege of undeservedly taking the credit for having discovered or encouraged some geniuses who would have risen anyhow as their *genre* happens to be in general demand, the privilege of escaping the blame for having discouraged, corrupted, annihilated or driven into prostitution so many other geniuses who are in advance of their times or, more correctly, not in favor with our exploiters.

So long as the intellectual producers depend for notoriety on such pseudo-critics or disguised censors, and depend for a living solely on their works, which the idle rich alone can afford to purchase, if their superficial, vacillating, capricious, sportful literary or artistic tastes and their self-conceit happen to be grati-

fied thereby; so long as the means of production and transportation in the economic world, and the sources of information and the channels of publicity—the socialistic channels not excepted—in the intellectual world are not collectively owned and democratically managed or controlled, but remain monopolized by a few cliques, coteries, parasitical minorities, which more often cooperate than compete; so long, I say, as this anarchic state of affairs is tolerated, it stands to reason that only those pervertible, muddle-headed writers will be given access to the channels of publicity (the press, the pulpit, the platform, professorships, etc.) who are willing to serve the interests of the capitalist robbers, to take orders from and to set great store by the praises of the incompetent usurpers of power, to prostitute themselves, to suppress and distort truth on command, to intoxicate the people with empty humor and exciting sensations, to hypnotize the masses into the worship of fake heroes and into the pursuit of spurious aims of life; whereas those honest and clear-headed intellectual producers who stand up for truth, for the enlightenment, emancipation and uplift of the human species, and who do not care for the honors or titles bestowed by incompetent pseudo-critics, are mercilessly driven out of the field into obscurity, ridicule, poverty, despair and robbed of everything except the ethereal hope for posthumous fame. Under such a régime of capital-owned channels of publicity and capital-employed pseudo-critics there is no success for the great original thinkers who first spend their best years in conscientiously producing some work worthy of public attention and gratitude, and then begin to think of how to approach the public; all the honor, credit and material success is reaped by the unscrupulous phrase-mongers who first monopolize the channels of publicity or hunt for popularity in order to win an

audience, and then sell to the people, at the highest prices, the intellectual products stolen or cheaply bought from such poor, unpopular, unobtrusive original thinkers; just as in the economic world it is not the indispensable services of the tillers of the soil or of the industrial workers that are well remunerated or at least appreciated, but the sham services of unscrupulous financial speculators who first push themselves as harmless or even beneficial intermediators between consumers and producers (and also between the latter and the tools of production), and then begin to drive the two parties further and further apart in order to levy a heavy toll on both. The college professors and the other official scientists, who own or edit scientific, philosophic, psychologic journals and bulletins, do not aim at creating channels for the dissemination of knowledge, as they profess to do. Their real but hidden aim, apart from financial gain, is to levy toll on the poor original students and non-official thinkers whom they have it in their power to debar from the consumers of knowledge, just as the robber barons and the pirates of the medieval ages used to intercept the wagons and ships of the merchants on their way to the market; another parasitic aim of these intellectual robbers is to constitute themselves and their satellites into a company for mutual advertising and immortalizing; they also aim at exacting undeserved recognition from the popular writers of other cities and countries in exchange for the recognition which they give the latter in their magazines or bulletins.

CHAPTER IX

NORMALITY AND ABNORMALITY

Normal and Abnormal Ideals.—A sane mind looks into the future for the realization of ideals; a diseased, senile or exhausted mind idealizes the past. What is true of an individual, holds also of an entire epoch, a literary school. There are epochs, schools of hope, of a surplus of energy, and epochs of depression, despair, of a minus in vital energy.

The ideals of morbid, exhausted, decadent, weak, despairing, insane, impotent, unproductive individuals lie in the past, in the realm of vain dreams, and spring from a desire for outside help. Such ideals find their expression in romanticism, idealistic or nebulous philosophy, mysticism, aspiration after Nirvana, ancestor-worship, animal worship (totemism), slavish hero-worship, magic, belief in miracles and in a Messiah, fatalism, dogmatism, worship of gods, paternal and hierarchical government, blind reverence for official or institutional wisdom, for conventions, traditions, precedents, stereotyped ways of acting, fashions, pleasure-seeking, slave-hunting, warfare, militarism, parasitism, deception. . . . Whereas the ideals of vigorous, healthy, hopeful, progressive, sane, productive, self-reliant, resourceful individuals lie in the future, in the realm of possibilities, and spring from a desire for purposeful activity, for self-realization. Such ideals find their expression in realism, the fearless facing of facts, scientific research, clear thinking, free thought or intellectual boldness, belief in causation and economic

determinism, worship of humanity, democracy, popularization of knowledge, socialism, communism, anarchism, cooperation, fairness, sincerity, reverence for logic or reason. Ancestor-worship, idealization of the "fathers," worship of the dead, goes together with and is but the reverse side of the blind genuflection before the powers that be or before the self-constituted rulers. The latter impress upon the masses the unquestioned reverence for the "fathers," just as they lend their support to all the other above-mentioned correlated stultifying cults, in order to secure posthumous glory for themselves and in order to prevent even posterity from attempting to scrutinize their motives and doings.

Sane and Insane Genius.—The creation of the genius is the intellectual analogon of childbirth, and is preceded by intellectual pregnancy. Bodily pregnancy and childbirth cause bodily disturbances, and sometimes also brain and mind disturbances. Likewise, incubation and creation or elaboration of original ideas produce brain and mind disorders, and sometimes even bodily derangements. If the body and the mind are hereditarily less resistant or degenerate, the disturbances do not remain confined to transient, slight, minor ill-being, perversions, errors, illusions, confusions, mysticism, but assume a persistent character of chronic diseases, mental aberrations, delusions, incontrollable hallucinations, insanity, and may even end with death. But to say with the famous, immortal Lombroso that degeneration, insanity are causes, conditions, or mere stimuli of genius, of creation, is just as erroneous as to say that puerperal fever, puerperal ailments ending sometimes in insanity and death are productive, or merely adjuvant causes of childbirth. If Lombroso, in his answer to the objections of Max Nordau, that typically sane genius and living contradiction of Lombroso's theory, brings forward cases of geniuses having

been insane, or rather mentally unstable before having created anything, I answer that this is due to early intellectual pregnancy or incubation of original ideas, and to psychical degeneration, i. e., inherited feeble resistivity to mental strains caused by intellectual pregnancy. If in some distant future science will be able to prevent conception of original ideas and especially multiple, simultaneous conceptions in degenerated geniuses, by preventing them from entering into close communion with Nature, or with the fertilizing ideas of others, or rather with too complex an environment, just as conception and pregnancy can be prevented in women; then, these geniuses will be imparted negative immunity from, and will be guarded against, insanity and death. Just as presumably our first female ancestors were unable to stand the strain caused by childbirth and for many generations died after the birth of the first child or became sterile through abortion, before our species became more fecund, more resistant to these strains; just so with intellectual childbirth or creation: Many become insane during the incubation, or after the creation of original ideas, or become sterile after the first original creation, and afterward rest contented with adopting or stealing others' intellectual children. Few are as yet the sane geniuses who to the end of their life remain fertile, capable of resisting the mental strain involved in creation, capable of conquering the slight ill-being caused thereby. Few are those sane geniuses who can resist the temptation of conceiving and of elaborating too big ideas which stretch the mental faculties to their breaking point, beyond the point of recuperation, beyond the point of recoverable stable equilibrium. It will take many, many generations before the majority of men will become intellectually fertile, will become sane geniuses of one kind or another.

The philistine is mentally sterile or unproductive.

Most pseudo-superior men, the graphomaniacs, the pseudo-active men, the nebulous, mystic, verbose writers, the loquacious individuals, are abnormally creative or aborted thinkers. They give birth to shapeless, amorphous, non-viable, fragmentary, unripe or monstrous, impracticable mock ideas. Conscious of their inability to offer quality, completeness, originality, results, they draw attention to their mock prolificness, quantity, efforts, voluminousness. Instead of patiently producing and rearing a certain number of clear, practicable, harmoniously developing ideas, they give birth to innumerable aborted, dismembered mock ideas and pseudo-generalizations which, although looking different from one another, are in reality abortive attempts at grasping and expressing the same few, but to them unattainable, thoughts. What drives these unripe thinkers to seek relief in morbid, incessant, aimless activity, in abortion, in the premature expulsion of their intellectual fetus, and to thrust their sham ideas upon an unwilling audience, is their horror of the lonely, secluded life of inner meditation entailed by the growing spiritual embryos, their inability to get over the inner disturbances, dislocations and readjustments caused by the expansion of the new ideas, their fear of an impending mental breakdown in consequence of the disturbances caused by this state of intellectual pregnancy, as well as their vanity or morbid craving for fame and impatience to boast of their original ideas. And the poor devils whose minds are thrown in contact with these still-born, miscarried, pestiferous decadent pseudo-ideas, become intellectually poisoned for life.

Leisure is not such an important condition for the manifestation of genius, of intellectual originality, as is psychical isolation, psychical independence. In

fact, there arise just as few geniuses among the idle social classes as among the paupers. In villages, in small compact communities, where every individual is known and watched in all his doings by the others, a sane-minded individual cannot afford or dare to manifest his peculiarities without attracting antipathy, social ostracism, and hence endangering his very existence; he cannot afford to differ openly from his fellow-men; he cannot refuse to partake in common beliefs, practises, customs, no matter how absurd he may consider them. In a small, undifferentiated community economic dependence goes together with intellectual dependence or rather stagnation, for public opinion rules there despotically. In such primitive communities, the only original individuals are the insane and the semi-insane whose impulsiveness prevents them from taking into consideration the risk which they run by showing themselves different from their fellow-men. With the increase of cities, of the division of labor, of the anonymous ways of earning a livelihood, the community splits up horizontally and vertically into many classes and sub-classes; one and the same individual may belong economically to one sub-class, intellectually to another one, or to many simultaneously, or to none, emotionally to others; the psychical isolation or freedom of thought increases; sane geniuses get many opportunities of expressing their thoughts and carrying out their ideals, although not in the sub-class where they belong and on which they depend economically. We see, therefore, that genius and insanity will part company in a more civilized, more differentiated, more tolerant human society. The few cases, however, which Lombroso cites of non-gregarious animals (domestic dogs, monkeys, . . .) which showed genius and nervosity at the same time, prove that the physiological causes of insane genius are more important than

the social.

The mental horizon of a sane genius is like a serene sky, illuminated by the sun in all its splendor; whereas that of the insane genius resembles that of a heavily clouded sky, traversed from time to time by the dazzling but quickly disappearing flashes of lightning, preceded and followed by melancholy, lugubrious darkness. There is continuity, connection, between all the successive acquisitions of the sane genius; he never falls from the height he has reached. The insane genius is inferior to his own creations, he becomes a stranger to his own spiritual children. .

The sane genius, as well as the misanthropic genius, behave timidly, awkwardly, and do not feel at ease in philistine society. The difference is that the sane genius does not like it if too much self-denial is asked of him; whereas the misanthropic genius hates it, even if he is economically independent, and no self-denial is expected of him.

The average man is suggestible, subjective-minded, credulous; the superior man is objective-minded. In the insane genius, auto-suggestibility is despotical, anarchical, of the fixed-idea type; the sane genius is democratically minded, consistent, mentally harmonious.

A sane speculative thinker traverses a complete circuit; his thoughts start from facts, from reality, and, sooner or later, come back to the world of facts. An abnormal philosophical speculation starts from a minimum of facts, from a bit of reality, and, after awhile, it is short-circuited, it loses itself and gets drowned in the vast ocean of pure ideas, without ever coming back to the light of dry land, to the real world in which the streams of thought took their origin. The so-called idealistic philosophers are either humbugs or, if sincere, theoretically insane, but not practically, i.

e., they entertain insane ideas, but do not act accordingly as really insane people do. A sane man may advocate an insane theory; and vice versa: an insane man may advocate a sane theory. But they do not put it into practise. The test of sanity and of insanity is not only the quality, but also the quantity and the motor energy of one's theories, opinions.

The insane genius pays for his superiority with mental deficiencies, disproportion, disharmony; he gains very much in one direction to lose in others; he progresses by compensation. The sane genius or the great talent, however, progresses by additions. He may, however, pay for this mental progress with a bodily regress or early stagnation; for the harmonious development of his head with under-development in the rest of the body. The normal superior man is intellectually richer than the average man, he differs from the latter in quantity alone; the abnormal differs in kind.

Normality, Abnormality, Adaptation.—If I have enumerated in various parts of this mosaic-built, semi-aphoristical and therefore incoherent-looking essay so many characteristics and abilities of geniuses, it does not mean that every genius possesses them all, at any moment, and in every subject-matter or problem. It only means that a genius may possess all these abilities at certain moments, called moments of inspiration, and some of them at any moment. It only means that a genius may display all these abilities sometimes or exceptionally in a general survey of the whole field of human knowledge, and often or usually in but a limited field. It only means that the genius possesses more of these characteristics than the mere talented man; and that the balanced genius possesses more of these characteristics, possesses them more steadily, mixed with less deficiencies than the unbalanced genius. He who rises to the highest summits of comprehension and of

human sympathy is more exposed to falling into the abyss of delusion and insanity than the average mind which never swings much above the point of mental inertia and indifference, which never ventures above the solid ground of common sense. Abnormalities, inconsistencies, which are *bedenklich* in an average man, have nothing surprising about them in nascent, immature, inexperienced, easily exhaustible or in decaying geniuses. What is surprising is that sane-minded men of talent mistake the vagaries of tired, or of broken-down geniuses for precious revelations, for profound intuitions; and bestow the same uncritical veneration and praise on the most patent non-sense, short-comings and immoral advices coming from the mouth of a genius as on his veritable superhuman conceptions, merits, and broad-hearted teachings. The fact that many men of genius have had fits of nervousness, of mental disequilibrium, during their childhood, before the so-called creative stage, does not speak in favor of Lombroso's theory that genius is an effect of degeneration, of masked epileptoid convulsions. For a genius is creative all the time, hence is always exposed to mental exhaustion. Only his creative spirit is not so persistent, not so apparent, during childhood when it confines itself to reconstructing, rediscovering, understanding the intellectual acquisitions of the race, upon which as a foundation it will continue in later years to build new intellectual edifices. In childhood the actual difference, the actual divergence between the proclivities of the genius and those of other mortals is too slight or too much repressed to be visible to the untrained eyes. Potentially, however, the difference is as great in the beginning as it ever will be in later years.

There is more permanence, stability, continuity in our tendencies, abilities, than in our activity, achievements; more in the direction of our tendencies than

in their point of application and actual magnitude; there is more permanence of selfhood in our activity taken as a whole than in our single activities; in the resultant of co-working abilities than in non-collaborating abilities; more in our physiological, emotional, inherited, sub-conscious personality, than in our psychical, intellectual, acquired, conscious personality; more in our imitative, practical than in our creative, theoretical life; there is more permanence, harmony, non-contradiction of selfhood in vital and essential questions, in a normal than in an abnormal individual; more in the ideal, aims, methods, than in the real, means, subject-matter; more in the grown-up, mature, than in the child, immature; there is more normality, equilibrium, harmony in many-sided, scientifical, philosophical, than in one-sided, artistical, technological geniuses and talents; more in truth-, essence-, thought-seeking than in beauty-, form-, phraseology-seeking authors.

To declare with Lombroso that genius—no matter whether many-sided or one-sided—is an abnormality, a morbid deviation, an intellectual monstrosity means to assume that the human species is a static, finished product of nature; it means to assume, as Lombroso in one of his shorter essays actually did, that intellectual stagnation and inertia is the usual condition of mankind, and progress is a mere anomaly, an exceptional effect of disturbances, persecution, agitation. Those, however, who believe that the human species is still growing intellectually and morally, if no longer bodily; and that its apparent stagnation is due to its being infected with parasites, oppressors, intra-social criminals: those, I say, do not look to the average man for intellectual or moral normality, but to the fortunate few—to the many-sided and to the moral geniuses —who renounce the pursuit of material success and of the favor of parasites, in order to escape the en-

slavement which goes therewith and which would hinder the free, harmonious, socially useful development of their souls. To set down the intellectual and moral norm for all times for the human species, whose growth is not yet finished, by merely including ourselves in the calculation, i. e., by taking the average intellectual and moral status of the oppressed masses of living men, who under present conditions can never grow to intellectual and moral maturity, is just as wrong as to calculate the average stature of a race, nation, or social class, without excluding from the calculation the statures of children, i. e., of the still growing generations, as well as the statures of cripples, dwarfs or individuals with arrested development. To obtain the intellectual and moral norm of the human species, we, the adherents of evolutionism, ought to take into consideration, not only the actualities, not only the contemporary generations, not only the distribution in space of mankind, but also its potentialities, tendencies, future generations, distribution in time; but since this cannot be done, i. e., since the norm of a growing thing cannot be set down by striking the average of its abnormal, i. e., undeveloped, stunted, aborted specimens, the only way of finding such a norm is to look to the few finished specimens, I mean to the many-sided and moral geniuses, who have escaped the thwarting influences of our anarchical, competitive, or predatory organization. The consistent evolutionist inverts Lombroso's way of measuring normality, and re-enthrones the genius, thus coming back to a purified, discriminating, enlightened form of the plain man's hero-worship: he does not take the modern average man as a norm, but considers, on the contrary, every man who is short of genius or at least of many-sided, higher life interests as an abnormal, thwarted, aborted, crippled, undeveloped human specimen; be-

cause he knows that under a future orderly, wisely regulated, socialistic, solidary, universally cooperative régime the types of men who are to-day the rule will form an exception, a mere deviation from the then widely-spread mental superiority; he also knows that under modern oppressive conditions mental superiority must be rare, because in its tendency to grow and rise upwards towards the light of truth and warmth of love it is often crushed by the rigid barriers of caste, custom, conventionality, petty-mindedness, despotic or parasitic institutions, whereas philistinism that never grows upwards as far as the oppressive, artificial, parasite-made barriers, as well as perverted or downward growth through the dark subsoil of materialism, ignorance, secrecy, intrigue, servilism, escape oppression. Our capitalistic or predatory social organization, wherein only those men are tolerated who are one-sidedly developed or specialized into tools, is mainly responsible for the present divorcement between bodily and mental growth, between affective or moral development and intellectual development, and even between the various intellectual faculties: it is responsible for the existence of a majority of mentally abnormal or undeveloped philistines and of quite a number of bodily abnormal or undeveloped but mentally developed—although one-sidedly—geniuses.

Normal and Abnormal Originality.—To disregard, to violate social prejudices, customs, manners, traditions, is a sign either of normal and progressive or of abnormal and regressive originality. It is progressive if we violate them on account of their being or having become meaningless, burdensome, dangerous. It is regressive from the individual's standpoint, although it may be progressive for society as a whole, if we violate them out of inadaptability, impulsiveness, hysterical lack of modesty and desire to attract attention. The

former originality is calm, patient, persuading, unobtrusive; the latter is noisy, hasty, harsh, obtrusive, provoking.

Normal and progressive discontentedness or emotional originality does not vent itself on trivial, unimprovable, insignificant, harmless, blameless, . . . men, things or institutions; it does not vent itself in petty, personal, envious, malicious, evil-minded criticisms. Normal and progressive intellectual originality or inventiveness does not grapple with verbal, dialectical, unsolvable, unworthy, fruitless, time-wasting problems. Normal and progressive restlessness or volitional originality does not undertake to carry out impracticable, utopian, irrational, petty schemes; unlike the restlessness of the morbidly vain, of the unscrupulously materialistic pseudo-leader, it does not spend itself in unnecessary changes, or in purely formal, perishable, abortive, deceptive innovations.

Abnormal, morbid artistic originality (impressionism, luminism, pointilism, futurism, orphism, sensationalism, compositionalism, synchronism, cubism, . . .) divorces form from content, lays stress upon trivial details to the neglect of the whole, is impatient to learn its own technique while attempting to do what is not within its domain or power, sacrifices either matter to substance or substance to matter, seeks notoriety by eccentric means, is too egotistic to become disinterestedly absorbed in the pursuit of beauty, shows incapacity for both observation and creative imagination; in short, it is parasitical, deceptive, rapacious, greedy for success, appearance-hunting like its counterpart in the economic world, viz., capitalism or commercialism.

Man is the animal which possesses *per excellentiam* the ability of adapting his physical and his social environment to himself, of creating an adequate en-

vironment instead of adapting himself to the actual environment. This ability is expressed in industry and in social reform. Therefore, we do not measure, we do not test the bodily health of man by the conformation of the body to the physical environment. Or, more correctly, the conformation of the human body to the physical environment is not an adequate test of bodily health. Just so the complete conformation of man's mind with his social environment (manners, customs, beliefs, etc.) is not an adequate test of sanity; for there is a progressive non-conformation just as there is a regressive one. Hence, the social test of insanity is not conclusive, is not *maassgebend* if applied alone.

In times of social disorder, anarchy and upheavals, in times when the government slumbers impotently, we see rise to social prominence or popularity personalities of obscure origin which have been entirely unnoticed, disregarded in times of order and of an awake, active government. Just so in an individual's mental life, during a condition of disturbed sleep, of insanity, while the highest, teleological, regulative, self-preservative brain centers slumber impotently, we see emerge into consciousness percepts, memories, wild, intuitive, revealing imaginations, original thoughts and abilities which the individual has never before been conscious of, which he unconsciously used to repress, to disregard, to relegate to the darkest nooks and corners of his mind. Just as in a really and completely, and not only apparently and partially, well-ordered community, all the capable individuals—regardless of their descent and of their personal relations with the rulers—will have a voice in matters of general interest; just so in a sane genius, in a normally original individual, every valuable thought is seized upon by consciousness, even if it is not related to the dominant self-preservative ideas, even if and while these dominant ideas are awake,

active, and in power.

It is difficult to attain, but easy to lose, the equilibrium of the intellectual functions.

Common Sense, Science, Speculation.—Common sense regards all knowledge as simple, self-evident. It is easily satisfied by apparent, superficial, tautological proofs. It regards theoretical considerations as fictitious, unreal. It regards empirical, sense data as ultimate, indisputable, universal, independent of time and place.

Speculation tends to look upon all knowledge—even axioms and data of our senses—as complicated and in need of proof. It sees difficulties and mysteries everywhere, even where there are none. No amount of proof satisfies it. It gives to theoretical considerations, to negligible factors, more importance than, or at best just as much importance as, to practical factors. It relegates to infinity the threshold separating data and facts from inferences and hypotheses.

Between these two extreme attitudes of mind—between the common sense of the plain man or of the materialist simplist, and the wild speculation of academical or sensational philosophy—stands Science and Common sense Philosophy which gives proportional weight to theory and to practise, and tries to discriminate clearly between fact and inference, between certainty and probability.

Mental normality, in its ideal sense, is possessed by a privileged minority of talented men. Even with them it extends over a short part of their life, over the age of maturity from which there is yet to be subtracted the time given to sleep, reverie, etc.

He is not abnormal who fails to adapt himself to continually changing circumstances, varying now in one direction and now in an opposite direction. For to be adapted to doubt, or uncertainty, means to re-

gress in sensibility, to become a brute. A normal man rather commits suicide than accept such a regressive adaptation.

Since human society is not yet organized on the basis of rewarding genuine merit, it follows that an ambitious, fame-seeking genius has to be regarded as less adapted than a wise, unambitious genius.

Since reason is of late appearance in human society, in other words, since the human soul is younger than the human body, it follows that bodily adaptation is possessed by the majority, whereas psychical adaptation is still the prerogative of the minority. Hence, agreement with the majority is no test of psychical normality. The majority is objective and sane in the domain of perceptions; whereas in the domain of conceptions or reasoning this privilege is as yet the property of the few.

Animals are bodily better adapted than men, but psychically men are better off. Bodily adaptation is possible in certain actual circumstances only, whereas psychical adaptation provides for potential, possible circumstances.

The lower or more primitive races—owing to their abundant pigmentation which absorbs all excessive and hence detrimental heat, and particularly the tissue-destroying actinic rays of sunlight—are bodily better adapted than the higher races; the philistines—owing to their better developed muscular system—are bodily better adapted than the men of genius. But psychical adaptation does much more than compensate for deficiencies in bodily adaptation.

The philistine's entire vital energy being pressed into the service of mere bodily self-preservation and procreation, whereas the superior man's vital energy is largely directed into the channels of intellectual and moral expansion or creation, we understand why the

former is bodily better adapted, i. e., he is capable of greater physical exertion, he is better fitted to cope with—but unable to free himself from—the vicissitudes of our chaotic predatory social organization, he is also less sensitive to physical pain, let alone to the psychical painfulness of humiliation, of oppression, of economic insecurity or dependence and of monotonous routine work, and therefore less eager to change the *status quo* or the existing social disorder.

Parallel with this regressive or degenerative method of the philistine of preserving himself in the midst of our predatory régime by dropping off his sensitiveness and his higher aspirations, we see his equally inefficient method of unconsciously trying to preserve the race by procreating more human beings than our parasitical classes and the adverse circumstances can destroy. And, of course, the pseudo-superior man, the pseudo-leader, who is the spokesman of the parasitical minority, encourages the philistine to persist along this path which leads straight into the traps laid by our industrial slave-hunters; he fulminates against what he calls "race suicide," that is, against the superior man's method of simultaneously preserving and uplifting the race by procreating fewer human beings of a higher quality and better provided-for so that they shall be in a position to escape the clutches or snares of predatory individuals, to fight against instead of submitting to the destructive social and physical conditions.

An idea, a sentiment, a conscious reaction, are in comparison with an instinct, an emotion, an habitual reaction, what an adventitious organ or function is in comparison with a permanent organ or function. The idea arises in consequence of a momentary surplus of mental energy; whereas the instinct entering into activity under the impulse of a perception draws its

energy from a specific reserve fund. In other words: The instincts are psychical permanent organs entering into action under certain constantly or frequently recurring conditions; whereas ideas, thoughts, are adventitious psychical organs or functions arising under the pressure of novel circumstances. Adaptation to social environment can be effected in two ways: either by doing what others in a similar situation do, or by trying to win the sympathy and understanding of others for novel ways of acting. The first method of adaptation being easier, I mean the method of imitation and of suppressing one's original individuality, has become instinctive, has become a permanent psychical function; whereas the second method, I mean the method of invention or originality, requiring too much mental energy or the withdrawal of our mental energy from other social functions, has remained an adventitious psychical function found only in geniuses and in insane people.

Mysticism.—In the brain of the mystic, the isolation and the insulation of the nervous cells seems to be weakened, or destroyed. Hence, so many short-circuits in his nervous currents: where the normal man has distinct or connected ideas, the mystic seems to have fusion, identification of ideas. Mystical minds stretch their concepts so as to include and cover everything; but the result of this stretching is that the concepts burst at last and end by containing nothing at all, by being reduced to empty words, to concepts consisting of mere extension and devoid of intension.

Upon the summit of thought, the mystics, the idealistic philosophers, seem to get a sort of intellectual dizziness, their vision becomes confused, their judgment bewildered, they do not find their way back to the concrete world. Even when they succeed in coming down to the world of facts, the mental dizziness seems not to

give up the firm hold it got on them.

A combination of words does not necessarily express a thought; a grammatical or verbal question does not always imply a logical question; one and the same form does not necessarily enclose one and the same substance. A true, logical question suggests more or less the answer; it arises from our becoming conscious of an idea having been disconnected from its usual ideational *milieu*, or of an idea not yet brought in connection with old ones, not yet supra-, co-, or subordinated. A merely verbal question is taken seriously by naïve, intellectually timid men only. The arising of empty, formal, purely verbal questions in a human mind seems to be a symptom of a nascent mental disequilibration, anarchy, dissociation: The servant gets mastery over his master who has grown old or debile; form, language, overpowers thought; words enter into new combinations without there being any reasonable need, any higher conscious order; reason is dethroned, and semi-insane mysticism begins to reign.

Mathematical Mysticism.—The contradictions or antinomies arising from mathematical speculations are due to the following facts: To facilitate the comprehension of real events we simplify them, we abstract for instance from the extension of moving bodies and speak of moving points. We make abstraction of time or duration, and speak of velocity, acceleration, etc., at a certain *moment*. If it were convenient to make abstraction of the movement also, we would speak with Zeno of movement as consisting of *rest-elements*, just as we consider the *point* as the ultimate element of space, and the *moment* as the ultimate element of time. Forgetting that this is a mere convenient or useful abstraction, simplification, fictitious substitute for a complex reality, we imagine that a point can really move in space, we imagine that statistical averages have

real existence. Now, since a line may for convenience be considered as consisting of an infinite number of points, we conclude that a point moving over a line ought to traverse it in an infinite time. But as a matter of fact, a point having no extension, no real existence, cannot be a constituent part of any real thing, nor can it really move in space. In addition to this source of mathematical puzzles consisting in mistaking abstractions, symbols and words for the real thing and thought which they stand for or symbolize, there is another source due to the fact that in mathematics we operate upon the quantity of the figure or of a thing, forgetting that the quality also changes with the changing quantity. It is true that in mathematics the quality or essence of a figure does not depend so much on its quantity or size, that the magnitude of an angle, for instance, is independent of the length of its sides; but if we diminish the sides until they become zero, we do not need to feel surprised that the angle vanishes also, for an angle does not consist of a mere vertex or point. If mathematical quality does not vary with variations in quantity, this does not mean that the former persists after the vanishing of the latter. Continuity, straightness, simplicity to the naked eye, become discontinuity, crookedness, complexity to the eye armed with a microscope. Hence mathematical continuity, straightness, simplicity, perfection, are primarily the product of imperfect knowledge, of real percepts, and only secondarily they may be conceived as ideal constructs of our mind, as intentional simplifications.

Mysticism is either the dawn or the decay, the decline of scientific, clear knowledge. It is the crepuscular light, and not the day-light of knowledge, and still less a higher kind of light or celestial light as the semi-insane mystics would have us believe. It is either the

beginning of original thought, or the end of all thinking, the end of logic, a relapse into primitive confusion or childish thinking which does not see any relations at all or suspects relations everywhere between any disparate things.

The conception by primitive thinkers of animism, of the soul hypothesis, of metempsychosis (reincarnation, migration of souls), of Karma (Mœra, Fate), of mind cure, etc., was certainly a manifestation of progressive mystical thinking; it was a first, crude, groping attempt at extending old, materialistic, anthropomorphic theories and at grafting new hypotheses upon them so as to account respectively for the dimly and newly perceived one-ness of man with Nature, for the peculiarity of the dream realm, for atavistic heredity, for the chain of causal sequences, for the influence of suggestion and of the mind upon the body, etc. But the revival of the same crude beliefs and practises under modern names and under the scientific garb of the corresponding more advanced hypotheses (spiritism, theosophy, Christian Science, etc.) is certainly a manifestation of regressive mysticism, of a decaying intelligence in the adherents, and of sordid humbug in the leaders.

Mental laziness, incapacity, impotence, aspires to the acquisition of knowledge, without any intellectual effort, through so-called revelation, inspiration, intuition, speculation, dialectics, mystical, occult or supernatural channels, communion with spirits, etc. It has no patience for the acquisition of knowledge through observation, experimentation, comparing, analyzing, synthesizing of sense data, or through continual reflection. Likewise, the intellectually dishonest prefer to dwell in the misty, dark regions of wild, verbal speculation, where their tricks and ignorance cannot so easily be detected as in the lighted regions of honest,

scientific, matter-of-fact investigation.

This intellectual parasitism, dishonesty, laziness, impulsiveness, incapacity of observing patiently and of thinking logically, clearly, coherently or consistently; this desire to quickly obtain supernatural knowledge or ready-made spiritual wealth and possessions, to wrest from Nature her secrets and to easily exert power over her, by mere intellectual gambling, i. e., by merely relying upon magic, miracles, chance, revelation, trickery, and not by laborious, gradual, slow but firm acquisition, has its analogue in the economic world in financial gambling, speculation, reliance upon chance and trickery, by means of which both the degenerate, predatory classes and the hopelessly struggling pariahs try to get rich quick, to wrest from others their ready-made wealth and possessions, to acquire power over the toiling or producing masses, because they themselves lack either the ability or the opportunity to produce, create and accumulate patiently, slowly but securely.

The knowledge of and about the abstract, unknown, psychical, intangible, general, functional, dynamical, begins by being almost identical with, then is merely grasped and retained by analogy with or in terms of, and finally becomes independent of, the knowledge about the concrete, known, physical, tangible, particular, structural, statical. The nebulous, unstable thinker, after having reached for a while the third stage of abstract knowledge, usually relapses into the second, i. e., into that of analogy; and finally into the first. i. e., into that of concretizing, personifying, the abstract and retaining merely its verbal form or expression. He ends by talking trivialities, commonplace truth, or even puerilities and tautologies in abstract, philosophical language; he ends by talking about ideas and feelings as if they were things, about imaginary things as if they were real things, about scientific laws as if they

were external forces, about relations as if they were facts, about concepts as if they were percepts, about related concepts as if they were identical, and vice versa.

Regressive Genius.—Abilities which are declining with the advance of the human species, like muscular ability, non-voluntary imitation, pictorial thinking, etc., if found in an extraordinary degree in an individual, may be considered as retrogressive genius. (Athletes, acrobats, certain actors, spiritistic mediums, calculating genius or calculation by means of mental imagery, etc.)

Just as the concrete, personification- and archaism-abounding, pictorial language of the poet, when used for thought expression, indicates a more primitive, regressive, emotional, unilateral way of thinking, while indicating at the same time a more advanced, intellectualized, complex way of feeling; just so the grimaces, gesticulations, sympathetic bodily movements, voluntary control over more facial muscles than average men have, indicate in the actor a more primitive, regressive, impetuous, elemental, simple, undifferentiated way of feeling and of artistic expression, while indicating at the same time a more advanced, socialized way of acting upon and reacting to one's fellow-men than fighting, killing, quarreling.

Psychic Poison.—The psychic organism has its pathogenic, and also its inoffensive and collaborating microbes, like the physiological organism. There is a psychical, as well as a physiological, self-poisoning resulting from an incomplete elimination of useless, undigestible, absurd, self-contradictory, superfluous ideas. Our intellectual, like our physical, atmosphere is infested by all sorts of mental excrements, microbes, parasites, still-born pseudo-concepts produced by degenerate geniuses or pseudo-geniuses. Ideas that cannot be digested, assimilated by our mind, or eliminated

as waste material, cause a mental constipation which is not less harmful than a stomachal or intestinal constipation.

A normal body has always, in health and in disease, healthy appetites, i. e., it craves for such food and drink as make for harmonious growth, for the maintenance or for the restoration of bodily equilibrium. A degenerated body has unhealthy appetites, i. e., it craves for intoxicating, exciting, or stupefying food and drink which yields greater momentary pleasure than healthy food, but makes for decay, for increasing distintegration, disequilibration. Just so a normal mind craves for healthy intellectual food, for clear knowledge, for attainable truth, for moderate emotions, for reality; whereas a degenerated mind craves for intoxicating, ecstasy-producing, stupefying intellectual food, for mystical ideas, for insoluble problems, for stirring emotions, for puzzling and horrifying beliefs, for illusions.

The producer of and the dealer in alcoholic liquor recruit their consumers mostly from those to whom a plain, regular, domestic life is inaccessible, or distasteful. Just so the superior degenerates, the pseudo-philosophers, the pseudo-prophets, the mystical writers, the producers of psychical intoxicants, recruit their admirers, adherents, and readers mostly from those to whom plain truth is unattainable, distasteful, or not sufficiently stimulating. If the spread of alcoholism seems quicker and more extensive than it is, it is mainly because intoxicated people are more noise-making, more unruly, more obtrusive than the sober, home-loving citizens with healthy appetites. Just so with the producers and consumers of psychical intoxicants: they seem more numerous, more important than they really are on account of their noisiness, obtrusiveness, self-styled fame. This is true of the artistic fads and

literary aberrations of poor degenerates who are far from being as pernicious as one could infer from Nordau's masterly work "Degeneration," but harm only less gifted degenerates of their own kind without intending to do so; on the contrary, they administer to others the dope of their own making, in which they themselves look for salvation and happiness. It is also true to a lesser extent of the mystic, occult doctrines and practises (spiritism, theosophy, etc.), which are revived by semiconscious charlatans, and from which the masses are immune. Unfortunately, however, there is a much more dangerous class of morally perverted individuals who —in exchange for fat salaries or privileges given them by exploiters—manufacture mental narcotics and intoxicants, from which they themselves abstain, but which they force upon the toiling masses in the guise of supposedly wholesome intellectual food or medicines, under the cloak of official religion, public education, patriotic oratory, political guidance, important news, suggested enthusiasm for sport, athletics, ball games, etc. These mental intoxicants and narcotics dealt out from the pulpit, from the platform, in the classroom, in newspapers, under false pretenses and with the label of respectability or official approval, are much more dangerous and hence much more in need of being dealt with by a prohibitionist party than the generally condemned alcoholic beverages, which are not forced upon anybody and which at least bring some real relief to the hopeless, helpless, overworked, overstrained victims of our predatory régime, and which drown more criminality than they unchain. What narcotics can be more permanently mind-deadening and more injurious to the progress of mankind; what narcotics could more inescapably paralyze the critical judgment of the masses and maintain them in stupidity, automatic submissiveness than the worship at the shrine of patriotic fetishes

(the flags, national self-conceit, the words constitution, liberty, etc.) kept up by politicians; the vain, soporific hopes aroused by pseudo-rulers; the hocus-pocus dealt out by priests and their invocation of divine wrath or of miraculous help; the ancestor-worship, stupid contentedness, thanksgiving for imaginary gifts, and the adulterated historical knowledge inculcated at school; the theological non-sense stuffed into the still weak infantile minds before they have acquired the power to resist stultification and hypnotization; the intentional misrepresentation and denigration of the doctrines of free thinkers, agitators, genuine friends of the people; the exciting, fraudulent, concocted news dealt out by the press?

Sex and Mental Superiority.—Women are, as a rule, born philistines, i. e., they lack genuine intellectual needs and ideal or moral aspirations. And gallantry, that devilish invention of idle, parasitical, sensual men, encourages them to persist in their natural state of mental torpor. Intellectual functions being relatively permanent, organic, primary functions in men—on account of unknown physiological reasons, and on account of the constant pressure of the struggle for life, of competition, of the unshiftable burden of responsibility—and only occasional, adventitious, intermittent, secondary in women; we understand why they cause or go together with more disharmony, abnormalities, contradictions, exhaustion, compensatory deficiencies, in women than in men; we understand why superior men are more many-sided, more balanced, truer to their sex than superior women; we understand why after the cessation of college life, and after the cessation of the stimuli of sexual selection, more women than men relapse into their natural state of philistinism, conservatism, emotionalism, superstition, narrow, petty-minded and prosaic pursuits; we understand why

for women, knowledge, or truth, is still a means to success, and has not yet become an end-in-itself.

With women, reason and love of Truth are as yet intermittent, occasional, unstable, purely theoretical functions. Neither Reason, abstract logical principles, nor purely disinterested sentiments have any guiding influence on their activity which flows wholly from self-interest, instincts, alternating emotions, habits, suggestions coming from acknowledged and self-styled local authorities, imitation of mere outer appearances. A woman may appeal to Reason and even to Philosophy in order to inspire love to intellectual men, or when she has to belittle unattainable material and vain possessions, or when she has to criticize another woman's conduct, or when she has to justify her own past conduct; but in her own actual affairs she fails to make such an appeal. An intelligent man, after having won the love of a woman who agrees to become his life companion, will no longer make any effort to win the love of other women; whereas even very intelligent married women cannot resist their mania of uselessly, aimlessly, thoughtlessly making conquests among men. Of the moral and disinterested sentiments, woman possesses but condescending pity for the bodily and the social inferiors—for their palpable and physical ailments only—and maternal altruism; but she has no sense for justice, for impersonal duty, for disinterested and constant friendship, for a higher altruism that embraces all social classes, all nations, and races, which transcends personal interests. Maternal altruism is her only redeeming and ennobling mental feature. In Religion woman seeks self-preservation; but she ignores the metaphysical aspect, the cosmical sentiments and consciousness. In women, the intellectual functions are still subservient to, and undifferentiated derivatives or mere appendices of, the

self-preservative and reproductive instincts. Love-affairs are for woman, particularly for the sex-parasite, not only and not so much a matter of pure sexual attraction, a source of sexual pleasure, as they are for men; but they are also or rather a source of intellectual pleasure, a source for gratifying vanity, a source for dispelling *ennui* or empty-mindedness, a source for gratifying the need of exerting power over others, a means of ascertaining her own value or importance and of rising in social rank, a means of approaching and gaining the friendship of prominent and of superior men on whom she has no hold except through her sexual charms. A love-affair to woman means everything, her entire life; whereas to man it means one episode, one aspect, one constituent part of his life. Even intellectual women cannot help engaging in some higher pursuit out of love for a certain man, or with a view of gaining the admiration of men, with the more or less conscious aim of making their intellectual attainments subservient to their sexual and material pursuits. If the low-class women join in the frivolous, lascivious talk of low-class men, it is not out of sensuality. The average or normal woman is not sensual; for the so-called "free-loving" women, i. e., women of masculine sensuality, as a rule, do not give birth to children, hence cannot propagate their kind. It is because this is the only matter next to the matter of dress or personal adornment in which they feel competent to mix in, and which —they think—lends them some importance. Because women expect from love so many gratifications which a single man is very seldom able to satisfy, we understand why women, as a rule, are more discontented with married life than men, we understand why women lack soul chastity, i. e., they are platonically or mentally polygamous while they remain bodily or sensually monogamous.

If Spencer's theory of sex-inheritance is wrong, i. e., if it is true that daughters may inherit from fathers and sons from mothers, it follows that woman's mental inferiority is rather constitutionally, physiologically than socially determined; it follows that the difference in treatment, in early training (which, by the way, is mostly in the hands of the mothers), in social condition, between the sexes, is not so much due to man's despotism and physical strength (primitive man was not much stronger than woman), is not so much a cause as an effect of woman's intellectual inferiority. The truth is that men are more often tyrannized by women than vice versa; that physical strength is a negligible factor in the shaping of human relations; moreover, no amount of oppression could repress intelligence altogether, it can only hinder intelligence from manifesting itself in certain directions. Whereas, as we know, the manifestations of woman's intellect have remained inferior in every direction, even in specifically feminine occupations. If it is true that in times of war, of famine, of storm and stress, of poverty, of ill nutrition, of inner commotion, hence of unusual brain activity, women give birth to more boys than girls, this fact would be another corroboration of the theory that woman's intellectual inferiority, like that of the females among the other mammals, has a physiological foundation, and that, hence, most of the so-called superior women are as yet to be considered abnormal. Thus, although female geniuses do not advance theoretically as far as male geniuses, still the discrepancy, disharmony or difference in pace between their intellect or reason and their instincts or practise is much more pronounced than in male geniuses.

Women unite the empty-mindedness, thoughtlessness, of the philistine men, and the deceitful mania for posing or for making impression of the pseudo-superior men,

without having the latter's embryonal superiority. If we select at random two equal groups of men and of women, 90 per cent. of the female group will cluster very close around the level of philistinism: it will show uniformity, lack of mental variability. Whereas the male group will be scattered over a wide area, above and below the philistine level: it will cluster around several types (genius, talent, taste or critical ability, philistinism, weak-mindedness, imbecility, idiocy, insanity).



Or, more correctly, representing the various mental status by various arcs of a circle, and measuring the frequency along the radius, we get the following diagram:



Women, as a rule, are *born* philistines: Their intellectual needs remain rudimentary, they persist in con-

sulting fortune-tellers, clairvoyants . . . ; they persist in identifying the church with the seat of Religion, titles with merits . . . , even if they are brought up in colleges and in the midst of intellectual men. Whereas men, as a rule, are *made* philistines by circumstances, social pressure, exploitation, oppression. In spite of the most stupefying drudgery to which they are subjected, we see working men flocking to listen to words of enlightenment. In spite of abject misery we see hungry, homeless tramps devouring a bit of newspaper or a book that happened to fall into their hands.

The female individual is probably the older, more primitive form of living being than the male. Or, more correctly, the most primitive form of living being, the parthenogenetic, hermaphroditic, or self-reproductive individual, branched off at a certain early period, when bodily progress was predominating over psychical progress, into female individuals which were still parthenogenetic and differed but little from the original type, and into male individuals endowed with less racial or instinctive traits, but more capable of inheriting the acquired characters, more energetic, more capable of variation and adaptation, and whose primary rôle was to fertilize the females, to stimulate their reproduction. In course of time the functions of the male became more numerous, even their sexual rôle advanced from a mere stimulating to a contributory rôle. I surmise that in the case when the female lends herself to sexual intercourse without any attraction towards or love for the male, the rôle of the latter is merely stimulating, but not cooperative. Now, if the female inherits and, like the child, recapitulates, the organized, racial, primitive characteristics, but not the recent, functional variations, we understand why the female is superstitious, conservative, confused-minded, irritable, impulsive, intolerant, despotical, vindictive, unsociable

and in spite of her being protected against the uncertain struggles of life, is still greedy, deceitful, envious, untruthful, selfish, unintellectual, craving for power and caste distinction, incapable of disinterested friendship; we understand why the progress of woman will always be behind that of man; we understand why women will never truly inherit any higher aspirations, for these do not become so easily a general or common property of the species. Man is destined to supply woman with all the necessaries of life; to make woman progressive, he must see to it that progressiveness passes from the possession of a few, of a privileged class, into the possession of all. Woman's progress comes normally through education and inheritance, and not spontaneously nor through direct stimulation from the cosmico-social environment. The normal, typical woman has neither the strength nor the opportunity of being exposed, and hence of reacting spontaneously, to the direct blows and impacts coming from the surrounding world. The spontaneous, original actions are left over for men, and especially for the men of genius who stand nearest to the periphery of the marching human phalanx; and only those reactions which have proved useful, adequate, are being transmitted by way of social and physiological inheritance to the bulk of the army whose core is occupied by women and children. But since human psychical progress is not yet finished, has not yet reached its limit like bodily progress, and necessitates therefore ever new adjustments which can be quickly but not efficiently transmitted through education, and efficiently but slowly and too late through heredity; it follows unavoidably that most of woman's reactions or ways of thinking, feeling, and acting must needs remain antiquated, behind the times.

Genius and Paramnesia, Amnesia, Perceptional Obtuseness and Other Apparent Deficiencies.—In param-

nesia, it is said, one mistakes an actual perception, thought, recollection, and—I may add—emotion, . . . for a past one; the patient has, with every new experience, the feeling of having experienced it *before*. Now, it seems to me that this *before* of the paramnesiac is not wholly a creation of his: he only mistakes a near, recent past, an instant, for a remote, indefinite, distant past, for the simple reason that his distracted or absorbed mind gives so little attention to actual experiences that these do not persist, remain vague in memory, do not get linked to other experiences; the men and objects before his eyes, the events going on in his presence, get such little hold of his attention which is almost entirely absorbed by organic sensations, inner experiences, revery, conceptual thinking, that they easily drop out of his consciousness (or rather out of his marginal consciousness) to be soon brought back into it because of their persistence or continuance. Usually the recollection of very remote experiences is very vague. Now, the paramnesiac infers unconsciously backwards from the vagueness of his recollections, due to vague, incomplete perceptions, to the remoteness of the experiences which are in reality actual or rather intermittently dropped and renewed instead of being quasi-continuous as in a normally non-preoccupied mind.

I surmise that a slight degree of paramnesia must be a familiar experience even to balanced thinkers, to men who are often deeply, but not hypnotically, absorbed in following out long trains of thoughts and of reasonings. For, while they are mentally absorbed, they have to repress constantly recurring perceptions tending to get a hold of their attention; they have to fight against the emotions aroused by these perceptions, and against the trains of thoughts associated therewith. Only people who get *totally* absorbed in their

thoughts, i. e., whose perceptive centers are totally shut up while the inner processes are going on; and also those who never follow any thought very far and seriously, who very seldom have thoughts called up by remote or past impressions; and especially people who confine their mental activity to mere perceptions, to mere looking-on without any commentation on or interpretation of what they perceive: such people, of course, can never have paramnesic illusions.

The superior man's continual inner mental activity, mental absorption or conceptual thinking—owing to its frequent drafts upon the energy of the next lower brain organs (active memory, active perception or observation) and also owing to its incipient centrifugal, outgoing or motor currents, which often overflow into the centripetal, ingoing or sensory channels—is responsible for his perception being functionally or temporarily obtuse and sluggish. It is not so much his passive or receptive perception as his active or interpretative perception that is affected: While absorbed, he may hear and see, but he does not understand what he hears and sees, because he is too busy digesting, assimilating, correlating the experiences, impressions, teachings of the past. And, of course, what we call the genius' paramnesia, amnesia, forgetfulness, absent-mindedness simply means that the imperfectly, slowly, inattentively perceived impressions cannot be remembered as clearly as impressions received when the mind is unpreoccupied, empty, hungry, ready to absorb anything that comes along. To see with Lombroso a symptom of degeneration, an abnormality, in the genius' absent-mindedness or inability to receive new impressions while digesting old ones, or to see what is going on in his vicinity while looking far ahead into the future; in his apparent amnesia or inability to remember what he has not clearly perceived; in his unprac-

ticality or inability to attend at the same time to details, particular cases, immediate ends and to wholes, general interests, remote ends; in his tactlessness or inability to both pursue truth and justice and ingratiate himself with the truth-hating rich parasites; in his unsociability or inability to both indulge in reflection, meditation and enjoy the company of the thoughtless, frivolous philistines; in his unadaptedness or inability to both conform with the old order, travel along the beaten path, respect empty conventionalities, bow before monarchs and other such drones, and pave the way for a new, better, equitable, democratic social order, etc.; in short: to see with Lombroso an abnormality in the genius' inability to perform two successive or even mutually exclusive tasks at the same time is certainly just as absurd as to blame a man for not being able to stuff himself with new food while his stomach is full, or to blame him for not being able to be in two different places at the same time, or to blame him for not being able to focus his eyes upon both near and distant objects at the same time. It is much more logical to see degeneracy, abnormality or, at best, arrested development in the pseudo-superior man's one-sidedness and in the philistine's inability to rise above or go beyond mere suggestibility, passive or receptive perception; in his inability to compare, harmonize or throw off the contradictory empty beliefs imposed upon him by his various exploiters; in his inability to see the incompatibility between his professed opinions and his practise. To see in the superior man's contempt for and unproficiency in philistine methods and pursuits —such as submissiveness, blind imitation, mental passivity, worship of brutal, muscular energy, of material success, of size, quantity, forms, pursuit of material success and of bodily comfort as ends-in-themselves, compliance with conventions and fashions, self-

degrading hero-worship, reliance upon the outside help and guidance of gods, good luck, leaders, quacks—a sign of inferiority or of maladjustment, and to see in his smaller stature or weaker muscles a sign of degeneration, is just as absurd as to see in man a degenerate animal because he is inferior to his animal cousins in muscular strength, swiftness, visual and olfactive acuity, etc. What need has man of developing his senses, of relying on and of training his muscles when he can manufacture tools, machines, weapons and when his intellect is capable of conjuring up the inexhaustible hidden forces of Nature and of compelling them to do his work? But, just as it is not advisable to entirely discard the petroleum lamp when we have at our disposal the much better gas and electric light, just so is it not advisable to entirely neglect our muscular ability. Only it would be a waste of time to try in vain to attain the agility of apes when we have much better weapons and more inexhaustible resources at our disposal. The genius despises the philistine's methods or paths, because if followed blindly to the end beyond the cross-road they turn out to be blind alleys. The genius, too, starts by traveling along the philistine paths, but he leaves them as soon as he meets with better, broader, onward and upward leading paths. Still more absurd is it to consider as abnormal not only the superior man's differences from the average man, but also his sharing in the latter's weaknesses, such as vanity (although he is more entitled than anybody else to feeling proud), inconsistency (as if there were a man absolutely free from inconsistencies, especially when his intellect is always in advance of his instincts, practise and surroundings), etc. Since the genius or the precursor of the super-man—who, by the way, will be the exact antipode of Nietzsche's fictitious, confused, capitalistic conception of a brutal, anti-Christian,

egotistic, unsociable, anti-social, slave-hunting, predatory, destructive super-man—cannot help coming of a philistine ancestry, and is nothing but a more normally, harmoniously, many-sidedly, freely developed human being, it follows that he cannot be expected to either differ entirely from the common mortal or use all the lower abilities of the latter in addition to his better weapons.

What has been said about the genius' apparent mental deficiencies accompanying his inner absorption applies also to his nervous derangements following upon intense or prolonged intellectual labor. If geniuses suffer from nervous exhaustion, mental depression, lowered potential, melancholia, epileptic seizures; and if many of them eventually break down or become insane under the combined load of mental exertion and social prejudices, ostracism, ridicule, adverse circumstances, persecution; what does it prove? It merely proves that one cannot both spend and keep his money or energy; it proves that if one works hard, one must expect to get tired; it proves that even an intellectual giant must pay a penalty if he overtaxes his strength; it proves that even geniuses are not entirely immune against social disapproval; it proves that pioneer work is beset with many dangers; but it does not prove in the least that genius and degeneration, intellectual creations and epileptic convulsions, are equivalent, for this would be tantamount to saying that energy is equivalent with the fatigue or weakness resulting from its expenditure. The genius takes delight in testing and applying his intellectual ability or strength, his capacity for original thinking or mental exertion, and is liable therefore to often overestimate and hence overtax his own powers; just as the athlete, who is nothing but a more brutal, more primitive and hence more robust type of philistine, takes such delight in feeling his muscular

strength and dexterity that he often attempts the impossible and meets therefore with accidents. Whereas the ordinary philistine is exempt from both bodily and mental self-inflicted or self-caused accidents, for his self-protecting instinct prevents him from attempting what he feels unable to accomplish. His misoneism is not an aversion to any change, to anything that is new, as the great Lombroso, the inventor of this term, was inclined to think; it is merely an aversion to mental exertion or to original, unconventional thinking, originating from his inability to do so and dictated by a healthy and self-protecting instinct.

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